



**PROGRESSIVE VALUES  
FOR THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

With foreword by:  
Alfred Gusenbauer

Edited by:  
Ernst Stetter  
Karl Duffek  
Ania Skrzypek



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### **“Progressive Values for the 21<sup>st</sup> century”**

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**PROGRESSIVE  
VALUES FOR THE**



# Foreword

1<sup>ST</sup>  
CENTURY



## Progressive values for the 21<sup>st</sup> century

Throughout the years of the renewal practices, the debate on values have become a sort of a safe haven in which political parties anchor after their respective electoral defeats. Using this marine metaphor further, it gives the time for the *crew* (party members, elites) to regroup and refurbish the *ship* (the party), in anticipation of the next cruise – hopefully to the other, sunnier, greener, governmental shore. Though often after such a process, the deck and ship's sides are shiny, there is often also a new captain – it is hardly ever the case that the actual ship becomes a profoundly different vessel under the same ensign. The problem is that the ideological debate is not supposed to remain the question of the opposition harbor time-spending. On contrary, it is supposed to be an anchor, a compass and a lighthouse during their journeys.

Though the metaphor used above is an obvious simplification, it echoes the principle questions which are: *do we, as progressives, need core values in modern times and what role should ideological debate play nowadays*. These seem appropriate queries in the times when anything that seem to have been fundamental, settled and obvious is not longer to be taken for granted. On the macro level this is connected with decomposition of the post-War global order. The recent financial and subsequent economic crises may have been catalyses of speeding this decay, but the fact remains that 66 years after the peace treaties were signed and the United Nations institutions were launched, there is hardly anything of that spirit left. Furthermore, the future of the European Union remains uncertain. The euro-zone crisis is an eminent sign of it, going beyond the economic dimension. Nowadays the reasoning that laid fundamentals for the first Community and subsequently for the European Union seems either taken for granted or completely missing. One could continue elaborating changes within the societies and corrosion of the communities; could then embark on disillusion about democracy and party political systems – these are all frequently repeated observations. The fact remains that if there was once upon a time *a specter that was hunting Europe*, then a will that drove it – nowadays there seems to be *no spirit* anymore in the global, European or



national proposals. And here is where the importance of redefining the values in a progressive manner and making them the prevailing ones lies – only concepts, which people share and hold dear, can mobilize them to gather together, to rejoin one another in a historical struggle to bring the change in place.

These were the preliminary thoughts that initially inspired FEPS Next Left Research Programme in 2011. The first discussion of the Focus Group at the beginning of the year made it clear that the task to deliberate what contemporary progressive values are and what their content should be in order to make them tangible concepts in the modern times is a challenging assignment. First of all, *values* are being described as notions in various branches of science, but there is no one, broadly acknowledged and accepted interdisciplinary definition available. Hence, the fact that the Focus Group through their members' respective profiles had at their disposal expertise from different academic fields (political science, economics, journalism) was of a great relevance in outlining the scope of the undertaken research, adequate methodology and desired objectives.

Secondly, additional complication arrived from the Focus Group's ambition to include an additional, innovative question to the research – namely to seek defining values within the multifaceted context (national political parties, European framework, global dimension). The difficulty was that anthropological understanding of values situates them very much within certain societal perspectives (predetermined by common history, politics, social circumstances etc.). It is complicated to reconstruct a similar framework within the European context – where of course notions such as European identity of the EU's citizens remains questioned. The two preceding years expertise of the Next Left programme, in the framework of which a number of various comparative studies have been completed and in which the European focus has always been a significant one, helped overcoming many dilemmas on that field.

Thirdly, the process to reach the results that this volume encompasses took almost a year. During it the Focus Group's members met several times, using each of those opportunities to present progress in their studies and to support one another through engaging debates, in which they offered each other constructive feedback and supplementary ideas. Therefore the outcome is not only a collection of extraordinary articles, but should be seen as a reflection of an inspiring process, during which many questions were answered and even more have emerged additionally. The relevance of the procedure should not be underestimated, as it enabled establishment of an intellectual exchange that is of a different character. It was not a typical production of a one-time presentation, but a consciously steered process that showed many promising signals that carry a potential to lay fundamentals of the new school of European progressive school of thought. This translates into determination of the Focus Group Members to continue herewith begun work in the upcoming months.

Finally, as in the maritime metaphor used above, also the ambition of the Focus Group was not only to oblige with a debate (hence respond to the typical requirements of the safe-harbour times). Following the requirements of the *utilitarian theory of values*, as also responding to the expectations of the ongoing pan-European debate, the Focus Group aspired to contribute foremost with ideas that could help ideological transformation of the progressive debate into the 21<sup>st</sup> century one. This imposed a certain discipline on authors to go beyond the regular descriptive exercise and instead try to apply different adequate theories and models in a search for new proposals, while not losing strategic objective of creating new identities and new alliances around them.

*"Next Left: Progressive Values for the 21<sup>st</sup> century"* is composed of three integral parts. The tone of the volume is given by the introductory article of Dr. Alfred GUSENBAUER, former Chancellor of Austria and the Chair of the Next Left Focus Group. In his essay, he puts forward a challenge on how to liberate the movement from the limitations of the renewal rituals of the social democratic parties. In that sense Dr. GUSENBAUER explained the profound role of ideological debate, as the one that should be the key to claim space in a societal discourse and construct a brand new, tangible vision. The values he chose as leading in order to provide the bold answers in place of the contemporary reform discourse and to break free from nostalgic organizational formulas are: labour and internationalism.

Part I, *"The Next Ideological Debate"*, features 8 articles. The first one entitled *"The tasks of state and its responsibility for the future"* was written by Julian NIDA-RÜMELIN, Gustav-Adolf HORN, Christine FÄRBER and Gesine SCHWAN – all four members of the Fundamental Values Commission of SPD. Their argumentation evolves from an observation, that *neoliberalism will not just vanish of its own accord*. To combat it and its heritage (such as *growing inequality of income and wealth, (...) which are not only socially unjust but also economically problematic*), new answers are required from social democrats. They must provide a new vision of state, its respective tasks and responsibilities. It is clear that this new concept has to reach beyond traditional national state, as it needs to include the context of European integration and necessity for global cooperation. In order to succeed in installing such a vision, challenges of the lack of popular legitimacy for *politics and public authorities must be overcome, to which a concept of state as of Political Self-Organisation of a Democratic Society* provides a solid answer.

The question how progressives could frame the future, is also a leading thread of the article *"The core values for the Next Social Deal"* by Ania SKRZYPEK. She brings attention to a need of defining what the progressive values are in 21<sup>st</sup> century, so that their content could guide a vision that would adequately respond to world challenges and popular hopes in the new era. Proposing the new interpretations, A. SKRZYPEK, indicates their utilitarian aspect as far as building new identities and creating new majorities is concerned. What remains in the





scope, is pluralism of the progressive movement on one hand, and the need to continue thinking about the transposition of the ideas onto all levels (from local to global). Consequently, *humanism* and *cosmopolitanism* are named as two philosophies to be embraced. The overall, mainstreaming argument of the article is however that a key to success of a value-based renewal is a mutually supportive triad of elements: ideology-anchored vision, proposal of next social deal and new, empirically provable socio-economic paradigm.

The search for a paradigm, links A. SKRZYPEK's article with text by Rémi BAZILLIER, which is published under the title "*The economic meaning of progressive values*". This work is of a great significance, as it uses the elements of economic theories to propose credible alternatives to the answers that social democracy has been giving till now, and which have been put under pressure. Exemplification of that is the debate on equality of opportunities and equality of outcomes – which R. BAZILLIER outlines on the bases of available literature, searching there for reply to the popular anxieties around the "free riders of welfare state". In fact, it is "equality of autonomy", that the author finally proposes as the new ideological framework. Additionally, the paper reconsiders the traditionally adopted concepts, such as growth, welfare and well-being, proposing a fresh take and reclaiming them for progressive economic thought notions such as *homo economicus*.

The question of attitudes, which opens the text by R. BAZILLIER, and the balance between equality and justice was also an inspiration for Patrick DIAMOND. In his article "*Social Democracy and Social Justice in Europe*", he discusses and completes David Miller's model (by supplementing the notions of *equal citizenship, the social minimum, equality of opportunity, fair distribution by responsibility and empowerment*). The public opinion attitudes and also the socio-economic reality in Europe provide the context to P. DIAMOND's elaborations. Among the leading points, there is a strong appeal towards the political parties that though opinions and attitudes matter, it is up to the parties to challenge and shape them accordingly to the values-based vision they wish to realize. On the bases of his conclusions, P. DIAMOND formulates an 8 point strategy on how to pursue the agenda of social justice in contemporary reality, linking what could appear as more abstract and normative debate with the realistic policy recommendations.

Challenge of translating values into everyday politics became also a leading research question for Pim PAULUSMA. His essay "*Promoting principles of diversity in a changing society*" derives from contextual theory of values, emphasizing how understanding of different notions changes due to the societal developments. The core interest of P. PAULUSMA remains social democratic answers to diversity. Discussing principles of *openness, tolerance* and *multiculturalism*, the author makes an assessment that there is not one, unified answer from the progressives. The common characteristics however, seem to be the traditional optimism around the issues such as migration, which step by step is being replaced by a sort of a

political limbo. P. PAULUSMA argues that this is a critical test for social democracy if it wins the battle to preserve the value of solidarity among the people in multi-ethnic societies, who are put under diverse pressures connected with the financial and economic crisis.

All these four texts are written in a spirit of constructivism – which comes from awareness of difficulties and deficiencies coupled with readiness to make an effort and to propose a new alternative. This matches very much with the appeal made by Eric SUNDSTRÖM in his article *“The future is unwritten. The optimistic nature of social democracy”*. Re-discovering inspiration in Olof Palme’s speeches, E. SUNDSTRÖM, following Kjell Larsson, puts forward a thesis that the strength of this Prime Minister’s discourse was profound due to his ability to embrace notions of optimism and progress. This made the traditional formula of *“Modernity + Equality = Freedom”* credible, believable and hence, work out. Similarly to P. DIAMOND, also E. SUNDSTRÖM proposes a strategy – including among 5 points a plea not to forget the past, to remain open and to find new communication framework for the progressive ideological debate.

Different inspirations from the past are same time present in the text by Dimitris TSAROUHAS, who picked a challenge to look at the traditional alliance between the social democrats and the trade unions. He argues that in the past the link between both was strong and had a certain purpose of *solidifying the mass base of the progressive movement*, which in his article is shown in the historical perspective of post-war evolution of the labour market. Progress, however, brought along changes in organization of both – deriving them relatively apart from one another. D. TSAROUHAS assesses that the way out is a frank, ideologically rooted dialogue to which both sides should have access fully liberated from either nostalgia or skepticism. *Social democrats should dare go beyond the social democratic type of trade unionism*, states the author, relating to relevance of creating a new progressive alliance.

In several of the articles the pledge was made that the modern interpretation of values must make them transferable onto local, national, European and global level. This is why, it is so significant that the European reflections are complemented by the article *“The Limits and possibilities of American Progressivism: Lessons for Europe”* by John HALPIN. The author provides an interesting insight on both the campaign and the presidency of Barack Obama, dealing with myths, threats and possibilities they have been facing. Confronting those observations with the European proposals, J. HALPIN consequently enumerates the differences between the two, exposing the difficulties in promoting liberal ideas in the US on one hand side, and showing the strength of the governmental traditions on the other. While discouraging any *“enthusiastic translation by default”*, J. HALPIN also refers to the shared concepts – such as i.e. notion of common good – which can serve as base for a transatlantic progressive alliance.



Finally, Part II “*Core values of modern social democracy*” closes the volume with the FEPS research paper, which was completed by Ania SKRZYPEK. It presents the findings of the comparative analyses of core values of the PES member parties, as also of the study of the ideological evolution within the PES within the last 20 years.

Altogether “*Next Left: Progressive values for the 21<sup>st</sup> century*” constitutes therefore a solid contribution to the ideological pan-European debate on renewal of social democracy. Resulting from a year-long thorough intellectual process within the FEPS Next Left Focus Group, the volume emerges rich with proposals on how to define the progressive core values and how to build upon them a vision, which would unite and mobilize.

**Dr. Ernst STETTER**

FEPS Secretary General

**Mag. Karl DUFFEK**

Director of Renner Institut and FEPS Vice-President

**Dr. Ania SKRZYPEK**

FEPS Policy Advisor

## Defining the path forward

Crises of social democracy have been proclaimed many times throughout modern, post-war history. Each of them has been characterised as “the most profound one” in its time and most of them have been met with adequate renewal attempts. Traditionally the rehabilitation processes begins with a conclusion that the decline was caused by “driving away” from the core ideology, which shift was assessed as having been accompanied by a miscalculated strategy leading to an electoral disaster of a certain degree. Such formulated conclusions then become an inevitable invitation to a debate that allows multiplying comparative analyses and helps enlisting the most essential questions for the renewal. These processes should not be disregarded or disrespected. They allow a sort of an internal political catharsis, sustains readiness to reorganise, and also encourages looking for new inspirations and for “new” people who may embody the hopes that are to be entrusted in a party again. The list of questions arising from the debates gets eventually completed and that happens usually at the time when the party needs to proceed towards subsequent elections.

A danger of copying this pattern exists for everyone. It is extremely tempting to think that one can get away with a handful of smart queries posed in the light of comparative studies about the past and present. Such a process is however not a renewal, but a remake – and more of the sense of those television programmes that make one believe that a house’s interiors can be rearranged entirely under one hour including new wall-papering . This is no longer enough. To use the metaphor further, we cannot be thinking in categories of refurbishing, while the entire urban civilisation has been transformed. What is at hand is a rapidly changing world, a speedily evolving society and a systematically deteriorating global order. The new century brought along new challenges, which require a new sort of political actors to provide different, “bold” answers; responses that have yet not been given and reformulated many times. Comparative analyses are indispensable to deliver those, but they should be seen as a first step. It is a path forward that people, parties and media look for. And this is what the progressive debate on values should actually serve to; determining this path in an ideological sense and should equip progressives with a moral compass.



## Sense of ideology in the story-tellers' times

Cynicism of modern times could suggest that these are not the times for grand ideologies. Many reasons could be given to explain that. Among them is the decline of the idea that the parties are the membership based political organisations that serve, among others, politization and political socialisation of a society. Today, nobody signs in for a party and through that discovers the world accordingly to the specific ideological interpretations available. To see "what is up" people use their remote controls and embark on the infamous 24 hours media cycle. It is television and internet that captures their views through catchy sound-bites. If the ideological power house lays no longer with respective political parties, who should be the ones to develop and advocate for them, then it should not come as a great surprise that they are just absent in the societal discourse.

Next to that, different statistics and polls seem to suggest that people expect from those talking in the name of politics to give them a story to hold on to. Within the atmosphere of general distrust in politicians and politics such a tale requires simply to fulfil the criteria of being more likeable than "the other". And for that a solid political marketing is much more useful as a tool, than an elaborated political thought. The mainstream discourse about globalisation and about how there are so many limitations to what the state, governments, institutions etc. can do versus the overwhelming power of the market, after two decades of trouncing, has made it to the minds and hearts of citizens. The result is however different than the desired one; people did not side with one or another political party talking about them, but gave up on politics in general. This is also why the turnout declines so much and this is why it is possible for Christian democrats or for social democrats, to win elections by default ("the other" loses more). If one sits quietly and does not make too many mistakes, there is a fair chance that the other one will come across as a more repulsive one. As tactics this sounds pragmatically smart, but should a political mission nowadays come down to an ambition "to be hated the least"?

In that sense, perhaps the assumed downfall of neoliberalism that the recent global crisis was to expose is the ultimate test for all the ideologies. The emphasis is on all not on 'the other; and hence it is a trap to think that the presumed discrediting of one system of thoughts should pave the way for people to automatically shift to support another creed. For social democracy that has been the cardinal mistake in their estimations, which derives always rather from wishful thinking than from any i.e. historical experiences. In seeking hope for their own renewal at the moment of a crash, they overlooked additionally two important factors.

First of all, social democracy has been a force that helped building the post-war order embedding in the last decades notions such as capitalism. Of course, it tried to make a

distinction between “good” and “bad” capitalism, but not that this diversification would be really clear. Not even now, when it is being recalled during the renewal debates. The compromise between capital and labour, which has been the historical mission of social democracy, has been in that sense achieved in most of the “Western Europe”. With the assignment primarily fulfilled, social democracy found itself in a defensive position trying to act in the name of preservation of the arrangements on the one hand and on the other accusing opponents of having stolen its dialectics.

Secondly, the success of the European welfare state has been co-dependent on the prosperity of the respective countries. With the crisis on the horizon, social democrats pre-occupied with their self-evaluation on what went wrong in the last elections responded in a reactionary way. Their approach has been based rather on showing an alternative to the measures being taken in order to return to the pre-crisis conditions, than on assuming that the world has been changed forever and so must be the very ideological core of the movement. Of course, rhetorically, social democrats have also been repeating “we cannot get back to the business as usual”, but it is hard to resist the temptation to think that they meant that “others” (bankers especially) are the ones who cannot.

These two factors top up the above list of circumstances that make the situation by all means unfavourable to a new grand ideology. It could therefore appear irrational to advocate for one, which this essay makes a point of. Behind the thick layer of poisonous cynicism and ridiculing criticism that can be experienced in contemporary politics there is a desperate call that things can go in another way; not an “alternative” way to the one that is known, but just a new, different one. It has to go beyond the regular social democratic tendency to compare their implicit idea “about a society” with the “contemporary society”, via enumerating the deficits of the latter one. It can neither be a set of complex proposals that look believable, thorough achievable, – just responsive and hence unexciting. Nor can it be a pledge that smartly generates enthusiasm and herewith takes a mortgage of trust, which can never be re-paid since the conditions of the repayment are so unpredictable. It must be an overall vision, a sense of directions and rules that apply while seeking to reach it altogether; and this is what the ideological debate has to be about.

In this understanding values derive from a vision. Though it is commonly repeated that “social democrats share the same values” – it seems to be more of a nostalgic memory than the case nowadays. Surely, if asked, social democratic parties will present a shorter or longer list of values and principles, more or less built on the French Revolution trio of “freedom, equality, solidarity”, but because of many reasons, what they mean by enumerating them will remain very different. Majority of the interpretations will be predefined by the traditions, which are so highly regarded in the movement. And here is



where the main challenge lays nowadays; the ideological renewal cannot be a revision leading to readjustment. The core sense of the ideological debate is not to rescue the image of social democracy as one of the forces within the democratic arrangement. This one is gone and its obituary is written on the placards of the popular protests and “occupy” movements across the Western world. What is needed is a completely new visionary proposal that may create a new collective and that may appear as a challenge to make every effort for. There is a must to name what the 21<sup>st</sup> century social deal should be about. Internationalism and labour, both understood as values and not as principles or means, could be the core pillars of it.

### **Replacing reform discourse with bold alternatives**

The defensive strategy is one of the reasons social democrats are so quick in proposing reforms. This is a sort of reaction, which allows them to admit that things have not been great perhaps – but surely can be significantly improved if only transformed, reorganised and re-adjusted. This is not only weak, not only untrue, but also self-limiting. In life, even if arrangements serve well for several years, it does not mean that they will do so forever. Even if you repair them, they will still get to the point of being exhausted, old-fashioned and deserving replacement. Same is with political ideas. Even if they succeed, it does not mean that they can always be reiterated. Every time in the history needs its very own answers and they must be bold if they are to make a historical difference.

It is therefore enough of analysing the “Golden Age”, split between the “Third Way” and the traditionalists, the reasons of decline of social democracy. There is perhaps nobody left anymore within the progressive movement and its surroundings, who would not have taken part in these debates and have not yet expressed his or her respective opinions. There is really nothing left anymore to defend or to attack. The principle challenge lays therefore not in analysing if the strategic answers to the political questions were the correct ones, but rather to pose new questions that have never been dared before. There are three that, deriving from the values “Internationalism and labour”, could become the core important ones. The first one is about the notion of the welfare state in the 21<sup>st</sup> century; the second on the role of work; and the third one on education.

#### **The notion of the modern welfare state**

The welfare state has been an incredibly successful project that social democrats have consequently been implementing in the post-War Europe. As stated before, it has become so

strongly embedded in any national, but also European deal, that even conservatives and liberals (especially the new, compassionate conservatives) would not make a priority of too aggressive dismantling it. Perhaps they would rather be looking into restricting it. One could risk assuming that more likely independently from the conservative rule in the majority of the EU member states at the moment, welfare state did arrive to the point in which its future is being so heavily questioned. There are two explanations.

First of all, the welfare state has in general terms catalysed the emergence of the contemporary middle class; emancipating their members from misery, poverty and lack of opportunities. They arrived however to the point that they became actual carriers of it, without significant benefits in return (both as individuals, as group and in the societal context). That resulted in the appearance of a phenomena called now already popularly as “squeezed middle”, who feel above all overburdened with the responsibilities for the once successful project. No answer to that issue has yet been found, which does not mean that any other group has been identified as new enthusiasts.

Secondly, the battle around the welfare state evolves around the two criteria that in fact social democrats allowed their opponents to impose on them: sustainability and affordability. It carries a new danger especially that now (due to political circumstances) social democrats become more and more associated with austerity measures. It is unlikely that the debate on “good and bad” austerity that one can hear now in social democratic circles, will have a better impact than the one on “good and bad capitalism” that was quoted before.

The issue therefore is not to embark on defending the welfare state as it is imagined now. The question is rather what the welfare state of the future should be that would go beyond the disputes on the enabling state; social investment versus social guarantees etc. The new welfare state needs to give an answer on how the society must be organised to build bridges between the worlds of labour, education and care. It must become a prospect for constructing on what at the moment is most valuable; human talents and work. In contradiction to what it has become now in popular understanding as a charity project, guaranteeing diminishing minimum protection for those in need. It must embody a new way of thinking about different societal groups as women, men, youth, elderly, and migrants, with acknowledgement that the society has changed, which should neither be glorified or demonised but simply accepted. This is the way to seek for creating a new collective and hence new electoral base. Only this way the left can become a force that is associated with progress instead of preservation. The more comfortable alternative, that social democracy is pursuing at this point, is to continue defending the arrangements that serves mostly elderly people and see the electorate ageing and shrinking.





## The new notion of the role of work

In the last decades it was assumed that sustainable economic growth is to be translated into the improvement of people's living and working conditions. In the aftermath of the recent financial and economic crisis, and in anticipation of the next one hitting soon, it is hard to uphold this particular paradigm. European economic growth potential is being heavily questioned. No other base has been identified to build upon instead. The proposals so far, to add new measures such as "calculating people's happiness" additionally sound attractive, but remain hard to imagine in a generation that is the first one in the history of Europe to believe that their children will have it worse off than what they poses. The key to find a different answer may be the question: what does work mean nowadays?

There are a couple of observations on that query. First of all, getting into the labour market is becoming an extreme challenge. There are few hypotheses why that is. Primarily, it is being spoken about the mismatch between the educational systems and the jobs available, which comes down as an arousing assumption for all who do not want education to be subordinated to the market. Furthermore, there are a number of new inventions that were to enable entering of young people into their first jobs or requalification of unemployed, which – however – became more "keeping in stand-by" options than true ticket to the world of jobs.

Secondly, a job no longer appears as a sort of a dream of which its realisation gives a sense to a person's existence – an identity. A job has evolved to a sort of an occupation; a way to earn one's living. Holding a post does not translate to any sort of security, it is being repeated that there are no jobs for life and job mobility is the future. Such an approach must naturally generate an attitude among the employees, which leads them to the conclusion that all the efforts they make should remain within the limitations of the working hours and job descriptions, as also that their private life should be equally entitled to claim space within a day as the professional obligations are. This is new and formally recognised by the sociologists as occurrence of a new generation. This is topped by European statistics that show that there is a new group emerging who simply does not aim at entering the labour market in a traditional sense of holding a post.

Thirdly, having a job became more of an individual issue. Working in a certain environment does not imply socialisation. On contrary, with the development of technology, and especially IT in certain professions, one can complete a project with a co-worker, which one has never seen or spoken with – except through emails. This makes individuals much lonelier in their struggles and much more exposed to certain psychological difficulties (so called "burn-out effects" to name an example). It does not seem that the fashionable self-evaluation and group performance assessment technics that modern companies apply as an antidote brought an

adequate solution. This “de-socialisation” of the workplace is phenomena that progressive must address urgently especially if they ever wish to appear as a movement of the hard working people. It is impossible to reach that stage, one every worker / employee sees herself or himself as a lovely grid in a gear wheel on which no new collective could ever be built.

### **A new notion for learning**

Last, but not least, progressives will not succeed in giving bold answers if education is not one of them. The problem that there is with whatever has been developed until now is that the social democratic vision on education always embraces one specific group. Either that is the early education ones, through which proposal the issue of ensuring equal chances for all is to be tackled. Either that is the matter of higher education and the tuition fees, which usually is being placed among the demands for social justice. Or finally this is a question on life-long learning, which throughout the years has been melted down into the answer on unemployment. All these answers are absolutely appropriate, but too little to give progressives a firm lead in the matters of education.

There is a must to derive from all the core values together, equality, freedom and solidarity, and lay out a totally new vision of what the subsequent stages of human lives are and where the place is for education and simply learning and of what kind is necessary to emancipate and fulfil their potential. The programme must mirror civilizational progress; allowing pupils, students and participants to enjoy all its benefits in order to truly equip them for the challenges of the new century and make generations learning and being together. As much as about knowledge and skills, it must also be about socialisation, developing their abilities to think critically and hence being able to self-determine their place as citizens in a modern democracy. This sense of education is applicable at all the levels and seems to have been most forgotten.

### **Breaking free from nostalgic organisational formulas**

Several dangers have been described already, as the traps of the renewal of social democracy – among them redundancy in methodology, rush in remaking and reactionary character of alternative proposals. Another one, which seems to be more and more of a burden is the nostalgic attachment to traditional organisational formulas.

The outcomes of the different elections in various EU member states prove three tendencies. First of all, there is a decline in turnout, which naturally weakens the legitimacy of the elected representatives and causes an enlargement of the gap between the world of politics and citizens. Secondly, there are no landslide victories. This means that the parties,



which gained the largest amount of votes, may not be the ones capable to form a government. Also that implies that unnatural, multiparty coalitions will need to be formed, and can be observed more frequently on the political stage. Thirdly, a decline of the support for traditional parties is accompanied by emergence of the new, more radical groupings both “left and right”. Some of them are populists in a traditional sense, while some others are rather protest gatherings. These tendencies are of course realised across the aisle and the political parties of the “left” consider their renewal as a relevant one in contributing to restoration of democracy as such.

This was also the assessment in the first phase of the pan-European debate on the renewal of social democracy. It was correct back then, but needs revisiting in the light of the last year’s developments. Post-war political party systems the embodiment of principles of representative democracies are in decline. With people on the streets in all European capitals and additionally groups aiming at translating the American OWS into the European movements, this seem to be unrealistic to place hope in a return to a sort of establishment parties that can eventually gain majority and rule solely accordingly to their agenda. It is time to face it: the core electorates are gone, the parties are no longer membership based and traditional alliances have become a myth.

There is a need to think therefore that the ideological process that this essay began with is aimed at creating new collectives that can explore new sources of political identity. New visions with new bold proposals shall be the prevailing argument to attract partners in one struggle, to work tirelessly on them together. In such an identity based coalition it is the shared belief and not the structural agreements, to base one self upon. And this is a great challenge for social democracy, which takes its comfort in well-established party structures. This dare goes beyond the proposals of open primaries – it touches upon if social democracy is ready to give up its safe heaven and become a force in establishing new progressive force on all levels, from local through European to international ones.

## Conclusion

The on-going renewal of social democracy as a process is reaching its limits. Those are either predefined by the traditions of the previous, similar processes or related to nostalgic hopes that social democracy can recover to return to its best days. Either way, they impose a certain expiration date.

The leading idea of this essay is that the first conclusion in the renewal debate is that social democracy must break through from it. There is no realistic chance that it will re-emerge strong with its “traditional” programme and re-energised as far as the party structures are concerned. Though knowledge about the reasons of the defeats is a relevant one, both to

understand it and also to offer a sort of a catharsis to the members, it is time to quit the phase of comparative analyses.

This is a time to move ahead. The frame to think in is that a new progressive vision with a new set of values and policy principles is needed to gather behind it a new political force that can be the point of reference for new collectives. Parties, think tanks, civil society, and trade unions, all actors are equally desired in this debate and equally responsible to place in the heart of societal debates what people can expect in the new century. Unless it becomes a part of the public exchange, it will remain as a sort of socialist *"Night in the Museum"*; dramatic and entertaining for the ones inside, unnoticeable for the rest of the world.

**Dr. Alfred GUSENBAUER**

Chair of the FEPS "Next Left" Research Programme

Former Chancellor of Austria

PROGRES  
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CENTURY

**PROGRESSIVE  
VALUES FOR THE**



# The Next Ideological Debate

21<sup>ST</sup>  
CENTURY





Julian NIDA-RÜMELIN, Gustav-Adolf HORN, Christine FÄRBER, Gesine SCHWAN <sup>1</sup>

## The tasks of state and its responsibility for the future



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<sup>1</sup> The authors are Members of the Basic Values Commission of the SPD. The paper was discussed in the Commission and passed in August 2011.



## **Key words**

**Global Crisis – Neoliberal Capitalism – Democracy – State –  
Market – Public Goods – Social Justice – Taxation –  
Regulation of Financial Markets – Social Inclusion –  
Ecological Sustainability**

## **Summary**

The social democratic conception of the state must be renewed in view of the excessive criticisms of the state characteristic of neoliberal economic policy in recent decades and the global financial market crisis. Politics must have primacy over market economic processes and the state as guarantor of economic and social stability must be reinforced by extending its relevant competences and by providing for an adequate revenue base - appropriate to priority tasks such as inclusion, education and sustainability. Thereby social democratic policy should be based on a participatory conception of the state which represents the political self-organisation of a democratic society and includes all social groups. Social democrats must be advocates of democratic and cooperative structures also at the transnational level, for more integration in the European Union and the need for global cooperation.

## 1. The Global Crisis and Its Consequences

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### Comeback of the State?

In the past three decades it has been fashionable to preach the rolling back of the state. Some promised in this way to solve problems allegedly caused by the welfare state, such as inflation, state indebtedness and unemployment, while others predicted that competition between countries for business locations and the race to the bottom in terms of labour costs driven by international financial capital would do the trick. In the wake of the global financial crisis everyone is talking about the state again. Is it true that the state is back?

Certainly, in response to the crisis massive state intervention in the economy was needed, which previously would have been considered a sin against proper economic governance. Evidently, the basic lesson of the world economic crisis of the 1930s that followed the financial crash in 1929, with all its political consequences, had been learned: capitalism is not self-correcting in a crisis. This time, a coordinated global stimulus programme prevented a protracted depression and revived the global economy. At present, the German economy is benefiting from this, in particular the export sector, so that not only did Germany get through the bottom of the recession rapidly, but in spring 2011 there was even a dynamic upturn.

What the further after-effects of the crisis will turn out to be, however, cannot be predicted with certainty. **One would have expected that the global crisis would have spelt the end of the line for the hegemony of market fundamentalist neoliberalism as an influential ideology. However, neoliberalism will not just vanish of its own accord.** The understanding that the market cannot heal itself – in other words, that it needs the state for the sake of economic and social stability – has already been masked by a different interpretation of the crisis and thus repressed: now it is alleged that the state, not least because of the debts it incurred by intervening in the crisis, is the problem. Instead of those who caused the debt crisis being asked to pay up, the state is being repudiated once more. This puts us right back where we started. It is clear, however, that if no fundamental lessons are learned from the crisis the global economy will be continually prone to crisis, with all the political consequences that this brings with it.



## The State in the Ideology of Neoliberal Capitalism

The ideology of neoliberalism has exerted enormous influence over the past three decades. In essence, so-called neoliberalism claims that:

- Freedom is the freedom of the individual. This means that “there is no such thing as society”, only individuals who pursue their own interests, without consideration for their social and cultural environment.
- The ideal forum for exercising individual freedom is provided by the market, because it is realised in competition, not in cooperation and responsibility for one another.
- The state must therefore be limited to the absolute minimum: individuals know better than the state what serves their interests.

Contemporary neoliberalism or market fundamentalism thus proceeds from a view of man as seeking to maximise his interests (so-called “*homo oeconomicus*”). Ultimately, therefore, all relevant decisions can be interpreted in microeconomic terms. Because neoliberalism recognises only individual property rights and acknowledges the market as the sole legitimate form of interaction, and because it puts the market in place of the state and consumers in place of citizens, there remains nothing more for the state to do, in its eyes, than to guarantee property rights (besides such obvious things as life and freedom from injury).

This was already the view of the liberal “*nightwatchman state*” of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which was supposed to be limited to police and military matters. This approach has failed before, not least because of its inability to solve social issues. The political pressure organised by the workers’ movement gradually changed people’s views on the responsibility of the state, the most striking manifestation of which was the development of the welfare state in the twentieth century. Finally, the “need for the state” (*Staatsbedürftigkeit*) became a characteristic of modern society at the height of this development at the beginning of the 1970s. For a long time, this concerned not only the traditional welfare state safeguards: the state was supposed to create the conditions in which the challenges of a modern economy and society could be overcome.

The new neoliberal model of capitalism characteristic of the past three decades was therefore understood as a reaction to the previously dominant demand-oriented economic policy and the development of the welfare state. Basically, it amounted to an assault on the predominantly positive view of state action in the economy and society in general. And it worked. Since then, neoliberal ideology has been able to oust the positive view of the role of the state and to bring about the hegemony of a view critical of the state. Step by step, its representatives were able to assert their demands for a withdrawal of the state from economic

life, primarily by restricting the state's scope of action by systematically squeezing state bodies financially, including the social security system.

In this way, the state was forced to privatise a large proportion of public assets, which further reduced national state control of economic developments. Of course, this did not occur everywhere to the same degree. How differently this adjustment could be carried out is shown by comparing, for example, Sweden, with an expenditure-to-GDP ratio of 56%, and the USA, with 34%. But contrary to neoliberal expectations, Sweden did not suffer economically from this approach. In Germany, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio had already fallen significantly in the run up to the crisis. Nevertheless, the demands for a further reduction in government expenditure have not died away.

However, the heart of the problem with regard to government finances is not on the spending side, but on the revenues side: in other words, taxation. When during an economic upswing a debate commences on whether taxes are too high budget consolidation does not ensue, but rather a downward spiral in government finances is set in motion: lower taxes generate higher deficits, leading to calls for spending cuts. As a result of this long-term neoliberal finance policy the economic significance of the state is constantly pushed back. In other words, it is a matter neither of too high taxes nor of too high deficits, but of the far-reaching retreat of the state from economic life. However, this jeopardises the humane, stable, just and inclusive development of the economy.

## **Results and Lessons of Three Decades of Neoliberal Dominance**

The most conspicuous outcome of these decades is that the gap between rich and poor has widened significantly in Germany, too. Regardless of the recent crisis unmistakable income disparities can be observed which threaten social cohesion and the principle of justice based on individual performance. Social justice must urgently be given priority in political decision-making and state action.

**The growing inequality of income and wealth, however, is not only socially unjust but also economically problematic.** One reason for this is that since the beginning of the 1980s profits and investment have not been in harmony. That means that profits are no longer reinvested but increasingly funnelled into the financial markets. In this way the hierarchy of the markets has also changed. The financial markets dictate conditions to the markets for products and services and these in turn dictate to the labour market. Profits are no longer company results less costs, but expectations have arisen of a minimum yield on invested capital. The pressure for yield has been passed on to suppliers and workers. In this way



performance and reward – or share in the prosperity of the economy as a whole – have been decoupled.

The bloated financial sector, which is also a result of increasingly unequal income distribution, boosts speculation and corresponding promises of high returns far in excess of what is possible in the so-called “real economy”. The increasing demand for financial products on account of these promises of returns on the one hand reduces demand for consumer goods and on the other hand increases demand for goods whose prices are formed speculatively and promise profits in the future. In such circumstances, speculation ranges through commodities, real estate, stocks and, lately, government bonds, until the bubble bursts, as we can see in the crises which have succeeded one another at short intervals since the 1980s.

In contrast to the recent global financial crisis previous crises were more or less limited regionally or by branch. The global financial crisis arising from the US real estate market in 2007, however, affected the largest economy in the world and its growth model, which up until then had been decisive for the world economy. As a result of the crisis there were sometimes dramatic slumps in growth in all the larger economies. For example, in 2009 Germany experienced a fall in GDP of 4.7%, by far the deepest recession of the post-War period. During this time the state had to taken on a heavy burden in order to revive the economy, a policy which succeeded marvellously. However, the government debt ratio is now around 20 percentage points, in absolute terms about 500 billion euros above its pre-crisis level.

In order to reduce the resulting burden on the public budget and to give the state more scope for investment projects a long-term consolidation policy is needed. However, this will be successful only if the economy develops positively and tax revenues flow abundantly. Even that will probably not be sufficient so a political decision must be taken concerning whether the state will cease to perform certain tasks or whether taxes must be increased.

### What general conclusions can be drawn from the crisis?

- Clearly, **it is not possible without the state**. The recent global financial market crisis showed that only by means of massive state intervention and coordinated government action, including the nationalisation of banks, was it possible to prevent an even bigger crash.
- **Belief in the rationality and effectiveness of free markets was permanently shattered**. This is reflected in a seachange in social attitudes: a majority of people in Germany take the view that a more capable state is more important than further tax cuts.

If the state must take on a stabilising role in times of crisis it must have a broad range of

stability-policy instruments at its disposal, not confined to extremely costly crisis responses. The role of the state cannot be solely reactive if trust in democracy is not to suffer permanent harm. If dramatic inequalities of income and wealth tempt the higher income and wealth-owning strata to undertake ever riskier financial investments the danger is that whole economies could be seriously damaged. **Democracies themselves are in danger from too much social uncertainty and economic inequality.** Democracies must therefore respond to the economic and social uncertainties that have accompanied the crisis by providing an answer to the question of how the economy can be developed in the interests of people and public welfare.

### **What does this mean for social democracy and for social democratic policies?**

- 1. The social democratic conception of the state must be renewed** against the background of the excessive criticisms of the state characteristic of economic policy in recent decades and of the global financial crisis.
- 2. Social democratic policy should be based on a participatory conception of the state** which all social groups can benefit from in an equitable manner so that the state does not become prey to individual, particularly powerful interest groups.
- 3. The social democratic conception of the state must, beyond the nation-state, take into account integration in the European Union and the need for global cooperation.** Social democrats must become advocates of democratic and cooperative structures at the transnational level.
- 4. Politics must have primacy over market economic processes.** The role of the state as guarantor of economic and social stability must be reinforced by extending its relevant competences and endeavours and by providing for an adequate revenue base.

## **2. Democracy, State and Market: The Primacy of Politics**

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### **The State as Political Self-Organisation of a Democratic Society**

The goal of the SPD is the *realisation of a society based on freedom, justice and solidarity*. So says the Hamburg Programme of 2007, from which it follows directly that: *because we adhere to this goal we insist on the primacy of democratic politics and repudiate the subordination of the political to the economic. We have a broad conception of the political which may not be reduced to the state, but includes civil society alliances and networks, as well as freedom and self-determination*



*for people. Politics must ensure that certain things are not reduced to commodities: law, security, education, health, culture and the natural environment.*

The rule of law and the welfare state are the “fundamentals” of democracy for the SPD. To our way of thinking, therefore, democracy requires a basic provision for all citizens of equal political and social rights, as well as access to public and collective goods that afford them the necessary individual and social opportunities with regard to freedom and the ability to shape their own lives. Accordingly, the state, as Social Democrats understand it, has more than a servicing function in the (economic) liberal sense. Nor is it, as in the conservative view, a kind of “board of directors”. For us, it is an instrument citizens can use to shape their own society in the general interest. It bears responsibility for guaranteeing public goods in sufficient quantities and in the necessary quality.

In a democracy, the Constitution and democratic legislating shape relations between the state and the (market) economy, civil society and the associated public sphere. The state must be defined with regard to its relations with the citizens and – more generally – those people for whom it implements the law it makes, performs the tasks expected of it and provides the corresponding services.

Socialdemocratic policies have always been based on the assumption that the state is an indispensable instrument of modern societies which is not to be used to constrict the freedom of its citizens but, on the contrary, to increase it. However, this requires that the users of public goods do not have less influence over whether or not they are provided and also their quality than the customers of private economic goods to whom a certain range of options are available. On the contrary, they should have more influence, not least because the quality of public goods tends to be superior to that of private goods precisely because of such influence.

Modern society defines itself, therefore, not by the level of its need for the state but by the fact that it assigns the state the role of guaranteeing an optimum level of participation for and by citizens: the modern state, in order to function properly, has an equally strong need of social codetermination. With good reason the SPD’s Hamburg Programme of 2007 espouses *a broad conception of the political which may not be reduced to the state, but includes civil society alliances and networks, as well as freedom and self-determination for people.*

At the latest from the end of the 1980s it became increasingly clear that state governance processes were undergoing considerable change. Statehood, the ability to make and implement binding rules for the economy and society up until then had been almost entirely concentrated in national government. Successful political governance is no longer possible on this basis. Under the influence of globalisation and regionalisation competences as regards political governance are distributed not only between civil society and national governments,

but equally between the global, regional and national levels. Increasingly, their functioning is in the hands of political and government-like organisations beyond national borders, such as the UN or the transnational regulatory systems of the WTO. In Europe, the European Union is developing into a new kind of regional state. An increasing number of state tasks can be carried out effectively only at transnational level. If these state tasks are to be performed successfully everything now depends on whether the political division of labour between global, regional and national levels is undertaken effectively and in good time, in keeping with the problems in question.

Societal or private actors have long been involved at all levels of the state, including in the definition of objectives. We are therefore observing a development in the way the state acts from regulatory hierarchy to societal cooperation. This is happening for a variety of reasons and has various consequences that must be carefully noted and critically evaluated from a social democratic standpoint. The task of social democratic policy is to shape the opening up of the state to societal actors as a process accessible to all social groups in a fair manner and not to allow individual, particularly powerful interest groups to “capture” the state. The considerable influence of the financial sector on regulatory policy in the run up to the crisis may serve as a warning in this respect. Social democratic policy must ultimately operate in the public interest.

### **Need for an Up-to-Date Conception of the State**

In principle, citizens’ need for participation has increased considerably. This is entirely in keeping with the social democratic conception of the state. Furthermore, the complexity of modern states has grown so much that state policy – both in the executive and in the legislature – depends on the cooperation of societal actors if its decisions are to correspond to reality and citizens’ political preferences. For the sake of successful state action and its long-term feasibility a need has emerged for cooperation and consensus that could lead to tensions in relation to party competition in a parliamentary democracy. **Party competition leads to modes of behaviour – rejection out of hand of the proposals of rival parties, personalisation and political short-termism – which put citizens off, especially those with no party affiliation, and bring party democracy into disrepute. On the other hand, such competition is indispensable for parliamentary democracy in a free society.**

The increasing cooperation between state and societal/private actors, moreover, emerged during a period in which state policy towards the governance of the market economy for obvious reasons generally came under suspicion of incompetence and bureaucratic opacity. The reasons given for this were unfounded but came to be formulated in terms of a general





political position, according to which the market appeared to be more transparent and more effective than any form of politics, so that in broad terms politics should be replaced by market processes.

However, “the baby was thrown out with the bathwater” and, as a consequence, the state was weakened considerably. One example of this is the wave of privatisations – also propagated by many social democrats – for example, of municipal undertakings, which, while filling municipal coffers in the short term, in many instances took away the instruments required for effective state policy.

In this connection there has quite rightly been a rethink in favour of the significance of the state and of public goods. However, the general insight that effective state action requires the cooperation of organised civil society and also the private sector cannot be gainsaid.

**As social democrats we are therefore calling, in order to reassert the primacy of democratic politics, not for a return to an obsolete, illusorily autonomous and latently authoritarian conception of the state, focused narrowly on the national level, but for a new, participatory and global quality with regard to state policy.**

In the face of the mistakes of the past two decades this policy puts the focus once more on the public tasks and goods that we need for human welfare and at the same time retains the gains with regard to citizen participation and cooperation with the private sector. Admittedly, with regard to the latter the question of the legitimacy of decisions taken in this way arises constantly since neither organised civil society (citizens’ initiatives) nor the private sector, in contrast to state institutions, have democratic legitimacy.

There can therefore be no question of replacing the state with societal actors or of considering them to be of equivalent legitimacy. Rather the involvement of societal interests in state – parliamentary and ministerial – decision-making is being enlarged. In the form of lobbying, this has always been part of parliamentary democracy, but now it is assuming the form of procedurally active cooperation with a wider range of societal groups. Partly they are the legitimate representatives of particular interests – in keeping with the traditional lobbying of associations – and partly they are “advocacy” NGOs, oriented towards the common good in the interest of overarching social objectives (environment, fight against poverty and so on).

This cooperation is by no means without conflict. Rather it could be described as “antagonistic” cooperation, reminiscent of West Germany’s “social market economy” in the 1970s (at that time between capital and labour). This is because in a pluralistic society conflicts of interest are not eliminated by such cooperation, but only ameliorated in particular instances.

When state policy cooperates in this way with social partners “antagonistically” it in no way loses its special character, oriented towards the common good, and its pre-eminent status legitimised by democratic elections. However, its decision-making can become more informed, find wider acceptance and be more long-lasting and thus the input legitimisation of elections can be strengthened by the better output legitimisation of decisions that enjoy societal support. This could help democracy to halt the erosion of its credibility which it is currently experiencing.

Another reason why social democracy cannot return to an obsolete conception of the state based on complete national autonomy and hierarchical, top-down government that excludes society is the transnationalisation of political challenges and regulatory needs. If the nation-state wishes to carry out its public functions, for example, by means of higher revenues today that can be done successfully only in association with other states in order to prevent individuals or economic actors from “jumping ship” to other states where tax conditions are more favourable for them. One of the most prominent causes of the depletion of state revenues in recent times, especially in the European Union, is the “location competition” for capital investment into which countries have been plunged.

In order for cooperation between states to work, socially responsible democratic politics needs transnational social actors that, in contrast to particular national interests, are committed to public goods, climate issues and a resource-conserving energy policy and are able to overcome nation-states’ temptation to relapse into sole dependence on national lobbies and electorates. That applies especially to the European Union.

Today, governments are not politically sovereign either domestically or globally when they wish to favour democratic and welfare state policies. However, although they are no longer capable of mobilising alone nor of exerting control they remain indispensable for the legitimisation of political decisions. **Democratic politics must be broadened to encompass good governance, both domestic and global, which defines the processes described above, if social democrats in future wish to assert the primacy of democratic politics in favour of public interest obligations as against uninhibited particularist interests and the danger of unregulated markets.**

For these reasons it makes more sense than hitherto for social democrats to reach out, actively and “pre-emptively”, to NGOs and the private sector when in government, prioritising public interest obligations, without arrogance but rather in the spirit of civil engagement and cooperation. This form of increasing citizen participation is both effective and in keeping with representative democracy. It offers – in contrast to referendums – the best chance to win back citizens for democracy (not to mention for social democracy) within the framework of practical politics, not merely as a “front” but as serious partners for sustainable politics in our pluralist societies.



## Is the Social Market Economy on Its Way Out?

The state cannot replace the market. However, to the extent that pursuing a preventive social and environmental policy for the sake of the life chances of certain social strata, but also of future generations the state's role is increasing. The state must coordinate and complement – this is because the market fails, even under ideal conditions of perfect competition and transparency because it is social and environmentally blind. The market can offer neither security nor public infrastructure without excluding those parts of society or the economy which cannot afford scarce goods. Nor can the market take into consideration the interests of future generations, which of course do not generate demand today.

The anchoring of the principle of the welfare state in the Constitution has over the past five decades ensured that the state has counteracted market failures; it has also provided for more equality of opportunity, made available collective protection against life's contingencies and combated tendencies towards social division. The long successful balance between market, state and society pursued during this period – a balance which characterised the Federal Republic – is known as the social market economy. The SPD played a decisive role in its development (among other things with the Stability and Growth Act of 1967, the Employment Promotion Act of 1969, the further development of codetermination in 1972 and 1976, as well as Social Democratic education reforms).

There is broad agreement on the economic order labelled the social market economy even today. Support is becoming increasingly vocal for the supplementing of private provision of goods and services with high quality provision of public goods and services oriented towards social needs. However, the model has also lost public trust. Only 1/3 of the population is happy with the social market economy as it currently stands, especially because they deem that the promise of social mobility, fair shares and social security is no longer being kept. As many as 59% are in favour of the government intervening in economic life more strongly. The question is only, how?

Germany's model of the social market economy, which is conceived essentially in terms of the nation-state, is enormously affected by Europeanisation and globalisation. To date, it has not come up with a satisfactory response to the new global capitalism. The nation-state's options with regard to managing economic processes have diminished. Large national companies have been superseded by global production networks and the state itself has been weakened as an economic actor by the privatisation of public property.

Although a great deal can be effectively accomplished only at the transnational level the nation-state has by no means lost its decisive significance. It continues to play a key role both

in decision-making on regulation beyond the nation-state and in its implementation and also internally retains broad autonomous decision-making and regulatory competence, even under conditions of globalisation and regionalisation.

The European single market and the continuing globalisation of markets require regulations and policy instruments in keeping with the intensive integration of national economies via the capital and commodities markets in order to implement an economic order oriented towards social rights. If and as long as this is not possible the alternative is negative location competition, a strategy based on pursuit of the lowest social costs.

**Politics therefore faces the task of establishing a new balance between capital and labour, but also between financial capital and the real economy, at every level of the state and with a variety of instruments.** On top of this a number of new and acute problems have come to the fore, primarily the environmental restructuring of the economy under the aegis of climate protection and resource scarcity, and the long-term reduction of the national debt. All this means that we need a new comprehensive and coordinated government strategy for stability and sustainable growth. **If we are to be able to cope with future challenges, such as social and environmental issues, we need a new economic order. Politics is indispensable in both developing and managing all this.**

The social market economy, understood as a model that combines economic performance with a social orientation for economic policy, has very much proven its worth in the global financial market crisis. Social justice and economic performance are not opposites, but complement one another. An economic policy oriented towards social justice and competition will increase both competitiveness and motivation. This is demonstrated by the fact that people who are insured against social risk are prepared to incur higher economic risk. Similarly, an economic policy oriented towards social inclusion tends to result in more people with better qualifications, which in turn benefits the labour market. **The social market economy is thus a model for the future which combines economic success with social security.**

## **The State as Guarantor of Economic and Social Stability**

The crisis has once more brought home to us in no uncertain terms that economic activity is fraught with uncertainty. Rational economic behaviour in the conventional sense, given inherent ignorance of what the future holds, is simply not possible. This applies particularly to how market participants cope with uncertainties during crisis periods. Panic selling on capital markets and precautionary saving in the face of unemployment on product markets are typical signs of an uncertainty that a crisis only intensifies. "Irrational exuberance" with regard to



investments in risky investment vehicles is the optimistic side of the same coin. Both destabilise the market and generate social risks which cannot be managed on the individual level.

The state does not embody superior knowledge. Nor is it a question of glorifying state action of the kind once so eagerly cultivated by the political left. It is simply a matter of macroeconomic rationality. This cannot be expected from individuals because of the herd instinct, the pressure for higher yields and oppressive uncertainty. The herd instinct and the pressure for higher yields are not characteristic of the state. There will be uncertainty about the economic situation, sure, but the state has instruments at its disposal with which it is able to counteract the excesses of the private sector. It can therefore at least steer things in the right direction, even if it does not know precisely how far it will have to go.

In other words, state intervention is not necessary because the private sector is less well-informed than the state. This can be the case, but that is not relevant here. The point is that the private sector, even when its information is perfect, will pursue its private-sector economic logic and it is precisely this that exacerbates the crisis. State intervention is needed, in other words, not because the state knows more, but because in both crisis and boom periods it is not constrained by microeconomic logic.

- Stability, therefore, cannot come from the private sector. **There is only one authority capable of taking action against the collective economic irrationality of rationally acting individuals, and that is the state.**
- The task of a stabilisation policy is therefore primarily to combat uncertainty and euphoria. The anti-cyclical economic policy proposed by Keynes must be seen in this context, not, so to speak, as a hydraulic instrument to stimulate the economy. It is primarily an instrument for diminishing – understandably – profound uncertainty during periods of crisis. By doing this, anti-cyclical policy supports private expectations and breaks up waves of panic – but also of euphoria.
- When and to what extent state instruments are to be deployed can and must be the object of political and economic argument. There is no “one-size-fits-all” answer here. What is critical is that all sides recognise that responsibility for economic stability belongs to the state.

## Public Goods and Social Justice

Instruments available to the state for shaping a stable economy and a just society are not limited to crisis intervention or sanctions, taxes or subsidies as means of prevention. Sharing and participating fairly in society, social security, equality of opportunity and fair reward can be ensured pretty much exclusively by the whole infrastructure of concrete public goods,

ranging from state education to nursing care. The importance of such concrete public services is increasing as a measure of distributive justice within society in place of monetary transfers.

Notwithstanding the increasingly critical debate on the use of monetary benefits to make up for social disadvantages, the provision of public goods – in other words, services accessible and affordable to all – has not grown in recent decades. The great – by both historical and international comparison – wealth of Germany today, accompanied by tremendous opportunities for most of the people living there, is based primarily on goods and services most of which are provided in the private sector. This is to be set against a public consumption that has remained comparatively underdeveloped and indeed has declined over the years. Lacking, unsatisfactory or downright poor public goods cannot be compensated by private consumption, however. This restricts the opportunities and impedes the futures of many people and access to social participation remains unequal. The chances of future generations are also impaired if the necessary investment is not made in child raising and education, preserving society's natural resources and infrastructure.

In order to improve the prosperity of people living in Germany and to distribute opportunities for social participation more fairly, while at the same time boosting economic competitiveness, the domain of public goods must be strategically developed and expanded. This is possible because in economic terms most public goods are infrastructural goods, which benefit the economy by increasing productivity and competitiveness, human capital and mobility, as well as the sustainable use of natural resources, the economic relevance of which is growing. These factors contain the key to a modern growth strategy. This is based not only on the supply side of the labour market and production location, but also refers to location and performance factors that can be strengthened only by means of public goods, such as people's willingness to cooperate and creativity that is not subject to commercial constraints.

**A just society is possible only if public goods are made available in sufficient quantity and variety. A democratic society needs the cultural and social cohesion that these collective goods provide and the structure of cooperation that goes with a flourishing civil society. Finally, all of this is needed to preserve cultural pluralism and thus the fruitful soil required for successful social integration.**

**For this reason, education is a crucial public good. It is the key to the successful integration of the individual, whether in society or working life. It is a task of the state because not only does it make possible a self-determined life, but it is also a condition of the proper cultural, social and economic development of society as a whole.**

Because the broad and properly developed provision of public goods and services makes sense for both the economy and society the neoliberal vision of the lean state must be



rejected. On the other hand, public goods are by no means only state goods. In Germany, over the decades a mixed system of state, societal and private-sector producers of public goods has developed and proved itself. This system must be further developed. In it, the state and its institutions

- mobilise the resources needed to provide these goods or stimulate their production to the requisite degree if they do not produce them themselves; and
- ensure equal access to public goods, as well as their adequate quality.

This is in keeping with our image of a state which – under democratic control – performs its tasks in cooperation with societal institutions and organisations, as well as private sector actors, provides them with the necessary support and makes available opportunities for development.

Besides and complementary to the state, therefore, the involvement of civil society in the economy should also be promoted. Civil society can make collective goods available in competition with the private sector, not only taking into account considerations of economic return, but possibly also more in line with people's ideas about forms of production and participation. One example of this is local energy generation. The joining together of cooperatives serves this purpose. With regard to collective goods, therefore, it is not a matter of substituting for state activities but of complementing purely private provision.

### 3. Current Challenges

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We live in a time characterised by the reciprocal interpenetration of the global economy, global society and global culture. As a result, we are experiencing rapid societal change which is giving rise to major challenges to which we must find a response if a just and democratic society based on solidarity will also be possible in the future.

Although Germans live in the richest region in the world and in a country that possesses outstanding economic, scientific and cultural potential, our society must find ways of overcoming growing social inequality and exclusion, and indeed within the framework of competition for ever diminishing natural resources. We deliberately frame the global question of the age together with the social question because solving them is crucial if peace and freedom are to have a future. We are convinced that we will be able to deal with global challenges if we can overcome the problems of our society and unleash new potential.

The following current challenges and problems have to be prioritised by politics, state action and societal actors:

## **Inclusion**

Inclusion is the major challenge of social democratic policy. We must prevent society from splitting increasingly into winners and losers and the growing threat to ever larger sections of the population of educational deprivation, unemployment and exclusion.

In keeping with its obligation to ensure societal affiliation and equal participation the welfare state must take into account a range of dimensions, focusing, in other words, on an “inclusion mix”. Inclusion cannot be brought about by means of monetary benefits alone. Depending on the specific problems, it requires answers that can be provided only through an appropriate labour market and employment policy, education and promotion of education or through social care. Inclusion includes both preventive and remedial, activating and protective provisions – depending on the variety of causes of exclusion and the typical upheavals and sets of problems that arise from that.

In Germany, social affiliation and equal participation have traditionally – and also in the future – been determined by the values and institutions characteristic of a work-oriented society. Gainful employment, therefore, is and remains the key to social affiliation and equal participation. Persons affected by unemployment must be given access to the labour market. Adequate support must be provided for this, including appropriate measures on the second and third labour markets.

Integration-policy problems are also predominantly economic and social, not cultural. The fact that a high proportion of young people from an immigrant background leave school without qualifications and experience higher unemployment and dependence on transfer benefits represents a challenge for education policy, economic policy and social policy.

## **Education**

Education is key to a preventive social policy. An inclusive society calls for educational institutions which bring people in rather than shut them out. The German education system is selective to a considerable degree: in other words, social origin plays a major role in the distribution of educational opportunities. The consequences of disadvantage and exclusion for a person’s education are grave. There is a close connection between educational attainment and occupation, failure and unemployment.

Education policy as preventive social policy means that individual needs and cultural





differences must be taken into account and that schools, besides being places where knowledge is acquired, must also be places of social cooperation, solidarity and empathy. Schools should be a habitat in which individual personalities can be developed, but where consideration and cooperation can also be learned. All-day schools have more scope for including the ethical, aesthetic and physical dimensions of education. Teachers should also be supported by social education workers and psychologists. Switching schools to all-day operation would also be a very effective integration policy measure. Differences with regard to language skills would be reduced and cultural segregation counteracted. Furthermore, it is to be expected, from a socio-economic perspective, that in Germany inclusive education and training can counteract existing divisive tendencies, such as the high proportion of early school leavers from immigrant families.

### **Equality**

Gender equality has (largely) been achieved in legal terms, but still not in the sphere of employment and family life. The low employment participation of women in Germany is in striking contrast to women's high qualifications. The majority of students today are female and their school-leaving qualifications are generally better than those of boys, a state of affairs which continues up until their final studies. There are many reasons why, after the completion of education and training, many men draw ahead of women with the same or better qualifications. It is not merely a matter of discrimination. Given the wish expressed by many younger women for reconciliation of work and family life – which is also becoming a matter of course for many younger males – women's low employment participation cannot be justified on the basis of different priorities.

Facilitating the full-time employment of men and women from completion of education or training until retirement as late as possible (with flexible transitions and a high degree of control for employees) can be enabled by the democratic fundamental values of equal freedom and ensuring autonomy for all, regardless of gender, ethnicity or religion. Alternative conceptions, such as an unconditional basic income, would merely prolong or even widen divisions by gender, social status and origin.

### **Demographic Change**

Life expectancy is rising worldwide, though already in the past, still in the advanced industrialised countries, such as Germany. This does not necessarily place a heavier burden on the health care system, since sickness and the need for care are correlated less with age than with time of death. However, demographic change does call for a major restructuring of

public infrastructure. As a result, priorities are shifting in favour of the needs of older people. Although for younger people, on the one hand, the demand for infrastructure is diminishing, the leeway arising from this should partly be used for the sake of qualitative improvements. Since the proportion of older people is increasing significantly additional provisions should be made available on a large scale in order to meet the expected needs.

But the goal of inclusion should also take centre-stage here too. Many older people have valuable knowledge to contribute and the willingness to get involved both inside and outside the workforce. More account must be taken of these capabilities and needs than hitherto. This applies not only to the funding of old age pensions but also to the possibility of a self-determined and active life in old age. Given the age structure, society and the economy cannot afford to do without the capabilities of older people.

## **Sustainability**

Climate change, energy crisis and resource scarcity, both already and in the future, epitomise the consequences of a form of economy and lifestyle which represent probably the greatest challenge of our time with regard to the natural environment and our social, political and economic systems. The fact that within a very short period of time, in historical terms, a profound transformation is needed in our way of life, together with the restructuring of our economy in accordance with sustainability criteria, politics must play the key role in mobilising the forces in the economy and society needed to enable sustainable management of limited resources without deepening existing social inequalities throughout the world.

Sustainability means measuring economic decision-making, social agenda setting and technological innovation in terms of their contribution to a good life for all people in the future. Naturally this encounters resistance when habits and short-term profit interests are affected. The environmentally necessary structural change in the economy may impair competitiveness of individual companies in the short term, but for the economy as a whole it brings long-term cost benefits. Most of the objectives of sustainable production can best be achieved in accordance with specific local possibilities which are decentralised and close to consumers. A start can be made everywhere and people should get involved: citizen participation is the key to success. Best suited to bring this about is a cooperative state, both in relation to potential social actors and together with the various levels, from local level to the European Union and the United Nations.



## 4. Priority Tasks of the State

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The tasks of the state must always be adapted to the needs of society and the challenges of the time. That is the decisive criterion, not the incessantly debated ratio of government expenditure to gross national product. On the one hand, this needs to be reduced in order to create more room for private economic activity; but on the other hand, it should be increased in order to improve the provision of public goods. This debate does not lead anywhere because the connection between the level of the spending ratio and economic dynamics is ambiguous. Economic policy should therefore not target a specific level of the spending ratio, but concentrate on determining what tasks the state should perform. Carrying out these tasks must be ensured by an appropriately high expenditure level with corresponding tax revenues.

Not all tasks of the state have to remain so. At present, for example, it is advisable for the state largely to withdraw from the production of private goods which earlier were regarded almost as a sovereign task – for example, post and telecommunications – but to become increasingly involved in transport infrastructure (railways), energy supply (energy networks), education and health care.

**The activities of the state should be reviewed at regular intervals with regard to whether they could be provided more efficiently in the private sector.** Whether this leads to a lower spending ratio is doubtful given the already extensive privatisation of large sectors such as telecommunications and post.

When it comes to the provision of public goods, such as access to effective labour and education markets, health and old age care, account must be taken of taxation and social contributions as a whole. Without upfront investments by the state and strenuous public efforts with regard to public infrastructure, education, equality and social inclusion no sustainable progress could be made in Germany.

### Education - a Priority

The massive expansion of state educational institutions will not only make it necessary to set new priorities in budgetary policy, it will also require additional state revenue sources. Over the medium and long term state financing up front will pay for itself by means of additional jobs, in particular for women. The expansion of educational and social occupations, the expansion of educational and social institutions and switching from transfer payments to institutional provisions is not an end in itself, but serves social justice, educational institutions

and gender equality. This “Scandinavian” project corresponds to the concrete wishes of men and women, adults and children and reflects ideas about a good life in our society.

### **Priority of Reconciliation of Work and Family Life**

The key to real employment equality between men and women in Germany is the expansion of child care facilities and the reorganisation of state care and education provision from kindergarten onwards on an all-day basis. Other strategies, such as the extension of part-time work and flexibilisation of working time, with more parental control over working hours, can play a complementary role, but not a central one.

The state must create the conditions for the equal employment participation of women. Millions of additional jobs are required for this purpose but they will also be created because this will stimulate growth and boost government tax revenues.

### **Priority of Public Networks**

The provision of public infrastructure is among the most important state services. It is the core of local responsibility, but also of the states and of the federal government. In the past two decades, however, private operators have taken the place of public ones, which has made the question of the cost and quality of the relevant services, as well as their public control, into an explosive social issue. In particular, the question arises of whether there is insufficient competition between private operators. For that reason alone the state has a regulatory responsibility for these markets.

Another central social debate concerns energy supply, including networks for electricity transmission, energy generation and the disposal of its waste products. In the debate on the energy transition, society’s overall responsibility in contrast to that of the private sector is becoming clear: owners of power stations and networks are private, although federal states and local authorities sometimes have shares in them. The disposal of atomic waste, in contrast, is public because it was not possible to privatise such a responsibility nor would it ever be permissible. In other words, the risk must be borne by society – at unpredictable cost. Given the centrality of energy supply to society it is important that this sector must be subject to societal control and that the supply network belongs in public hands, not least on the grounds of fair competition.

Other supply or transport networks are also important elements of the infrastructure of a modern technologically advanced country and should be publicly run or licensed as a matter



of principle. This includes municipal water supply and sewage disposal, as well as waste management. Networks for information transfer are another, increasingly important infrastructure crucial to the economy. Access to information and information exchange is a key aspect of so-called services of general interest. Under private management, however, provision is patchy due to the differences in demand density between urban and rural areas. The planned privatisation of the railways, too, has led to a situation in which, for the sake of commercial profit, service provision is being constantly reduced and centralised, and there is insufficient investment in the network and rolling stock. However, this development could be dealt with by taking the network back into public hands and the deterioration in service arising from the monopolistic position of the railway company halted.

### **Priority of Environmental Modernisation**

For the sake of sustainability, long-term, less “productive” investments are indispensable. This is why the state will play a decisive role in financing. If the intention is to finance such investments without the state incurring debt there are two possibilities: higher taxes or nationalisation of productive assets. Since the financial crisis, the latter has ceased to be taboo: as “systemically important” institutions some banks had to be taken over by the state because they were no longer sustainable in the private sector. There is nothing wrong with a higher degree of public ownership, then, if the whole economy shares in the benefits, in this case from the potential added value of environmental services. State investment in environmental assets, such as forestry or municipal infrastructure and networks, can thus be a way of obtaining revenues for refinancing.

It is absolutely clear that without specific regulatory limitation of energy consumption or a considerable price rise restructuring objectives will not be met. In turn, this requires compensatory measures in favour of the socially vulnerable. Instruments for this purpose include environmental financial reform and a genuinely binding emissions trade with no exceptions and constantly falling ceilings. A whole bundle of measures for the reorganisation of transport are particularly important: speed limit, kerosene tax, air travel levy, motor vehicle taxation based on cubic capacity and consumption, elimination of concessions on company cars, road tolls for passenger cars and the reduction of commuter allowances are acceptable if the revenues are directed towards the expansion of an environmentally sustainable, but also efficient transport infrastructure. Also important is the restructuring of urban and settlement structures in order to join together functions that are currently separated and to increase proximity. On the other hand, more favourable conditions must be created for public transport systems and non-motorised mobility.

## 5. Enabling the State

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Enabling the state by ensuring an adequate and robust revenue base for public budgets is a crucial objective of social democratic finance and tax policy. In particular against the background of the so-called “debt brake” which de facto excludes the financing of state tasks by incurring debt for the federal government from 2016 and for the states from 2020 the alternatives of cuts in government services and higher taxes are brought home with full force. It is therefore a matter of urgency to provide for adequate and, even in crisis periods, reliable funding of essential activities at all levels of the state and in statutory social security.

### Welfare State Optimum

In Germany state funded goods and services amount to around 10% of all goods and services. Germany thus has a poorly developed public sector, with 12% of employees and 8% of total wages and salaries. In Scandinavian countries this domain is twice or three times the size. There is therefore significant room for improvement.

From an economic standpoint there is no objective criterion – apart from avoiding extreme solutions – with regard to how high the tax and contributions burden should be. Whether the tax burden is too high or too low depends crucially on people’s wishes. The relationship between taxes and contributions, on the one hand, and the quality of the citizen services funded in this way is the standard of judgement. Ultimately, however, the dispute concerning the tax and contribution burden is a political controversy about the extent and quality of public services. The two have to be viewed together. Looking at the tax burden in quantitative terms, therefore, is inadequate. The argument that the tax burden must be as low as possible in order not to endanger the German economy’s international competitiveness is only superficially true. Competitiveness always results from the interaction of numerous variables, such as wage levels and productivity. The tax burden is only one element which, furthermore, does not leave other explanatory variables unaffected. For example, if investments in infrastructure financed through higher taxes help raise productivity competitiveness can even improve.

On the assumption of a purely market-based society, if one measures the quality of a society and state in terms of the welfare of the individuals who belong to them then, the provision of public or collective goods – security, social goods, educational goods, environmental goods and so on – should lead to an increase in the aggregate of individual welfare and the level of welfare overall. Going to the other extreme of a purely state owned and managed economy which



finances all goods production from taxes and contributions it can be assumed that individual welfare will fall far below the optimum. Between these two negative extremes – the purely market-based society and the purely state-based society – there must be an optimum characterised by an appropriate combination of private and state activity.

How can one measure what it's like to live in Germany? There is no generally accepted measure of individual well-being, merely a variety of indicators, such as per capita GDP or the UN's Human Development Index. **A society's well-being can therefore be captured only on the basis of a bundle of indicators.**

It is an interesting fact that in recent months, presumably for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, opinion polls indicate that many people are against further tax cuts. This means that the majority of people take the view that their individual welfare gains do not offset the losses in collective goods, especially due to cuts in municipal services. There is a common interest in public infrastructure which exceeds individual welfare gains through higher disposable income as a consequence of tax cuts.

### **More Fairness with regard to Taxation and Distribution**

The essential basis of Social Democratic tax policy is personal income tax in keeping with economic efficiency, local taxes oriented towards sustainability and corporate taxation which sets effective limits on tax shifting and tax structuring. The criteria, therefore, are fair burden sharing and more distributive justice: otherwise, social acceptance of the system will decline.

Fair taxation, and together with that public acceptance of the tax system, can be ensured only if individual groups are prevented from systematically evading their tax and contribution obligations, for example, by means of so-called tax havens. Tougher sanctions are therefore needed for tax evasion, review of the approach to tax liability in order to avoid change of residence and stronger European and international coordination and harmonisation.

More distributive justice is needed because of increasing income and wealth inequalities in Germany. To counteract this, progressive taxation of personal income must be retained. This requires:

- direct taxation of high incomes and property (as an independent source of economic productivity, for example, through inheritance tax and wealth tax);
- recording of labour and capital income that is as uniform as possible; and
- the simplest possible tax system.

In order to relieve the burden – on both distributive and labour market grounds – on low income groups in particular, which is urgently required, taxes and contributions have to be approached in a much more integrated way. This would make much more money available for public tasks. In this way, too, the major economic and political disadvantages arising from the fixation on the tax element could be overcome.

Personal income tax and social contributions together make the difference between individual gross and net income. However, they are rarely perceived as distinct. In fact, the composition of the total burden of taxes and contributions differs considerably for different income groups. In lower income brackets contributions predominate: only income above the contribution assessment ceiling is subject to tax. The different treatment of single persons, married people and families with regard to taxation and contributions also gives rise to specific burden profiles. Furthermore, social security contributions, in contrast to taxes, are partly offset by individual benefit entitlements.

## **Promoting the Environmental Restructuring of the Economy and Society**

The tax and contribution system must play its own part in ensuring the environmental foundations of life in the economy and society. The taxation of environmental or energy consumption can thus combine the environmental aim with raising public revenues.

Cutting back environmentally harmful subsidies is a particularly good idea. Just as it is legitimate to use subsidies to reward socially desirable behaviour, organise structural transformation and provide for equal conditions of life, it also makes sense to reduce subsidies that contradict these aims. In this way we can acquire the financial freedom for necessary investments, targeted relief for those on low or normal wages and paying down public debt.

With regard to the federal level, calculations show that between 20 and 35 billion euros a year could be saved within five years by reducing environmentally harmful subsidies. Internationally, bilateral agreements are possible, for example, on flight levies: corresponding initiatives are already under discussion at EU level. Revenues from some subsidy reductions should be used directly in relevant support programmes, for example, for inland waterway transport and lorry tolls in order to make up for current deficits. Social hardships arising from subsidy cuts can be compensated by means of targeted support: subsidies tend to have too much of a scatter-gun effect.

The development of environmental technologies has a key role in both achieving economic prosperity and sustainability. This is because German industry's growth opportunities





are increasingly dependent on high innovation and investment dynamics in the lead markets of the future.

The tax and contribution system can support companies' innovation and investment efforts in two ways:

- by ensuring constant and targeted state investment activity – as a result, private investment also pays;
- direct incentives to boost private investment.

Within the framework of a sustainable growth strategy tax policy can make a contribution through an intelligent combination of such direct and indirect support.

### **Regulating Financial Markets – Financial Sector Must Bear Its Share of the Cost**

The burdens on public budgets arising from the efforts to deal with the international financial and economic crisis represent a major challenge to future capabilities at every level of the state, as well as to social security. The tax and contribution system can and should make a contribution to avoiding other crises on the financial markets; it must also help to get the financial sector to bear its fair share of financing the existing burden. Special levies would be an appropriate way of getting the financial sector to pay its share of existing costs arising from the crisis. Preventive measures include instruments such as the financial transactions tax or alternatively the securities turnover tax, complementing the requisite regulatory measures.

### **Ending Ruinous Tax Competition**

At the bottom has been going on with regard to tax rates and tax progressivity, both worldwide and in the EU. This is eroding the financial base of all states for the sake of what are likely to be short-term competitive gains for individual states.

Besides combating tax havens there must also be international protection of fair national tax and contribution systems: the ruinous tax competition must be halted from the top down by means of extensive harmonisation of the relevant bases of assessment and European and, prospectively, also international agreements on minimum tax rates.

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Ania SKRZYPEK

## The core values for the Next Social Deal



## Key words

**Modern Progressive Values – Next Social Deal –  
Next Socio-Economic Paradigm – Pluralist Left –  
Internationalism, cosmopolitanism and humanism**

## Summary

*We all know them, we all share them* – these statements are perhaps the most commonly heard in discussions that touch upon the subject of values. The aim of this essay is a double folded one. On one hand, it hopes to capture in a condensed manner the findings of the FEPS research on what the social democratic values at this point are. The ambition is to extract the most interesting questions emerging from it and see in where progressives may find potential means to re-emerge. On the other hand, this text's objective is to abide by the utilitarian principle of the ideological debate. Hence it is also an attempt to propose so called "step two". This is to answer two questions: if progressives were to propose Next Social Deal what ideological pillars could it be built upon?; and by what kind of socio-economic paradigm should it the 21st century vision be supported by? This triad formulation is being seen in the article as a process, which in itself must break free from the limitations of their traditional renewal processes and hence be a way to create a new progressive alliance for the future.

*We all know them, we all share them* – This statement is perhaps most commonly heard in discussions that touch upon the subject of values. It is expressed to provide a certain degree of comfort to both the speaker and to the listeners. Theoretically these two sentences symbolise the awareness that there is a certain number of ideologically predefined standards, which a person is willing to accept, struggle for and sees as guiding. Paradoxically however, they are also the most outspoken sign that the orator in question is himself or herself trapped in a mirage of the past and it is unlikely that he or she, together with the organization he or she originates from, have given real thought to what their system of philosophical beliefs might be. Furthermore it is also one of the reasons why **21<sup>st</sup> century politics is considered to be de-ideologised; the values are being taken for granted.**

It is tempting to assume that the *core values* have been and always will be there. It is self-dignifying to describe one's own movement as the one that strives for the realisation of a values-driven cause. It sounds far more honourable than admitting that one's real motivation comes from a strategy to win elections or specific tactics to uphold power. Also, it appears to be aiding credibility if one repeats; *we have upheld our historical values for over a century and we will remain faithful to the noble causes they predefine for our struggle*. Even though rhetorically strong, once again these are empty eristic statements. To illustrate why, it is helpful to recall the words *Heraclitus of Ephesus*<sup>1</sup>, an ancient philosopher who is often being considered as one of the great-grand-fathers of humanism: *"No man ever steps in the same river twice"*. Of course, Heraclitus's thought was more related to the rules of nature. His *"panta rhei"*<sup>2</sup> derived from an observation of a river and in that sense he is still most commonly understood by: *water flows continuously, so it is impossible to enter into the same river in different moments in time*. Such an interpretation in a political discourse could equal the statement that *"the world has changed"*. This is only a part of what Heraclitus meant 25 ages ago. It is not only that circumstances

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<sup>1</sup> Heraclitus of Ephesus, c. 535 – c. 475 BCE, was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, a native of the Greek city Ephesus, Ionia, on the coast of Asia Minor. Little is known about his early life and education, but he regarded himself as self-taught and a pioneer of wisdom. From the lonely life he led, and still more from the riddling nature of his philosophy and his contempt for humankind in general, he was called "The Obscure" and the "Weeping Philosopher". Heraclitus is famous for his insistence on ever-present change in the universe, as stated in his famous saying, "No man ever steps in the same river twice". He believed in the unity of opposites, stating that "the path up and down are one and the same"; all existing things being characterized by pairs of contrary properties. His cryptic utterance that "all things come to be in accordance with this Logos" (literally, "word", "reason", or "account") stands for reason, order, or law in an ever-shifting world. After: Wikipedia.

<sup>2</sup> Everything flows



change (the river), but also those who try to step in differ every moment of time. This is because they evolve themselves, and also the way they are being seen changes. This perhaps can serve as a true lesson for the contemporary ideological discourse. The world has changed, and so has the society. It is deception to claim that with such a profound evolution any movement could stay the same, upholding the *same values* and simply readjusting its policies for the new era. **The ideological cornerstones that built up the vision for the workers' movement belongs to the echoes of the past – as does the notion of the class it used to represent. It is not only linguistic fine-tuning; a challenge is to provide truly new virtues and verities even if the terms to name them are to remain the same.**

Accepting to leave a secured zone of applauded speeches on the *timeless character of "our" core values*, requires defining what one means while speaking about *values, principles, paradigms, system of values and visions*. These notions are complicated<sup>3</sup>. There are several disciplines that provide different definitions: sociology, political thought, economy anthropology and finally linguistics – all of which put emphasis on an element that is uniquely relevant for their respective branch of science. This descriptive pluralism results however in the absence of one systematic approach, which many scientists call a *theoretical limbo*<sup>4</sup>. The situation tends to present itself as even more blurred, once it is being considered not only in a national, but also in the pan-European context<sup>5</sup>. This vacuum poses a challenge. A proposal that was formulated in the FEPS Next Left research<sup>6</sup> is that *core values* are pillars of a *vision* that a group (in this case *progressives*) seek to achieve – they motivate and determine actions. The interpretation of values is, thus, predetermined by a socio-political context in which their set must appear as a unique system of values and in which they are identifiable<sup>7</sup>.

Therefore, values must be real, tangible concepts. They can't be nostalgic notions or distant ideas. They cannot come across as yet another set of nicely packed and intelligently sounding choruses. They must gain power by meaning something substantial to people. And this is the central question in any ideological debate: **how to make it meaningful. Contemporary history shows that this is possible when the ideological debate is mutually complementary with two other aspects: a broader vision of a social deal and a new socio-economic paradigm** that makes the visionary ideas somewhat scientifically reasonable and likely to be eventually empirically proven. Such a triangle (values, deal and paradigm) is a necessity if one was to consider creating a new majority to bring the desired change<sup>8</sup>.

3 Sh. Schwartz, *Basic Human Values*, paper for the conference on the Quality and Comparability Measures for Constructs in Comparative Research: Methods and Applications, Bolzano, Italy in June 10-13, 2009.

4 D. Graeber, *Towards an anthropological theory of value: the false coin of our own dreams*, Palgrave New York 2001, pp. 2-3

5 D. Wiggins & J. McDowell, *Needs, Values, Truth*, Blackwell 2000

6 A. Skrzypek, *Progressive Values in the 21st century*, FEPS 2011

7 P. R. Abramson & R. Inglehart, *Value Change in a Global Perspective*, University of Michigan Press 1996, p.3

8 Please see: *utilitarian values theory i.e. [in:] D. Knowles, Political Philosophy. Fundamentals of Philosophy*, Routledge 2001

Our modern understanding of *social contract* (or deal) naturally derives from the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau<sup>9</sup>. In his concept everyone is born free and to give up one's freedom is against human nature. In the *state of nature* everyone poses control over his or her own force as individual and is unable to create new forces. This is why, when people get into a situation in which their individual powers are not enough to respond to the challenges of their times, they agree to bind their individual forces together into one. This much more prevailing, joint power is a subject of equal control of all who participate in creating it – and this is ensured by a *social contract*. Its basic condition is to remember that all are equally free, that there must be a popular will and that each individual must in the end of the day be an inseparable part of a “whole”. Rousseau advocated that any change in this framework means a necessity for immediate return to the first and prior arrangement. The challenge is of course still to find an association that would be defending and protecting each and to which everyone will be equally contributing. For Rousseau a political body that would envisage that was a state, a republic<sup>10</sup>. Nowadays, the notion of a social or new “deal” derives in popular memory mostly from the American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt<sup>11</sup>. It is not entirely unbiased to narrow the scope in that sense, as in fact several US Presidents, whom history kept in kind memory, effectively got elected on the bases of their vision of respective (social or new) deals<sup>12</sup>. The Roosevelt's economic recovery plan “New Deal”, which was in fact the remedy after the Great Depression that began with the Wall Street Crash of 1929, brought about a major realignment of American politics. It is understandable though, as the FDR's one played perhaps the major role and its impact (in settlements such as Bretton Woods System) outlasted the administration by many years.

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9 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712 – 1778, was a Genevan philosopher, writer, and composer of 18th-century Romanticism. His political philosophy influenced the French Revolution as well as the overall development of modern political, sociological and educational thought. His novel *Émile: or, On Education* is a treatise on the education of the whole person for citizenship. His sentimental novel *Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse* was of importance to the development of pre-romanticism[1] and romanticism in fiction.[2] Rousseau's autobiographical writings — his *Confessions*, which initiated the modern autobiography, and his *Reveries of a Solitary Walker* — exemplified the late 18th-century movement known as the Age of Sensibility, featuring an increasing focus on subjectivity and introspection that has characterized the modern age. His *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* and his *On the Social Contract* are cornerstones in modern political and social thought and make a strong case for democratic government and social empowerment. During the period of the French Revolution, Rousseau was the most popular of the philosophes among members of the Jacobin Club. He was interred as a national hero in the Panthéon in Paris, in 1794, 16 years after his death. After: Wikipedia.

10 J.J.Rousseau, *Umowa społeczna*, Biblioteka europejska, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2009

11 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1882 – 1945, 32nd President of the United States of America. Roosevelt was elected for the President's Office for the first time in November 1932, at the depth of the Great Depression. In his first 100 days, he spearheaded major legislation and issues a profusion of executive orders that instituted New Deal – a variety of programs designed to produce relief (government jobs for the unemployed), recovery (economic growth), and reform (through regulation of Wall Street, banks and transportation). The economy improved rapidly from 1933 to 1937, but then relapsed into a deep recession. Roosevelt dominated the American political scene, not only during the twelve years of his presidency, but for decades afterward. He orchestrated the realignment of voters that created the Fifth Party System. FDR's New Deal Coalition united labor unions, big city machines, white ethnics, African Americans and rural white Southerners. Roosevelt's diplomatic impact also resonated on the world stage long after his death, with the United Nations and Bretton Woods as examples of his administration's wide-ranging impact. Roosevelt is consistently rated by scholars as one of the top three U.S. Presidents. After: Wikipedia.

12 See: H. Truman “Fair Deal”, J. F. Kennedy “New Frontier”.



Though the respective deals differentiated, as they were providing answers to different crises – in fact they shared certain building blocks. As Roosevelt’s three R-s (relief, recovery, reform) they all, in a certain way, referred to the issue of work and welfare; prosperity and productivity; and finally governance (financial etc.). They all mobilised different groups, creating prevailing force behind the ideas and enabling their at least partial implementation.

**The notion of “social deal” can be undoubtedly an inspiration for European progressives. The reasoning is very obvious: the amount of people, who fell out of the scope of the post-war social contract and of those, who feel clearly suppressed by its contemporary setting<sup>13</sup>, increases substantially.** There are already more than 23 million unemployed in Europe<sup>14</sup>.

What is happening on the streets of majority of European capitals is the end effect of this state, and perhaps the most evident sign that the 20<sup>th</sup> century democratic order is subjected to a lot of pressure. This is especially the case for its feature of *representative democracy*, which embodied till now by political party’s systems lacks public support (see the decreasing electoral turnouts). It also has become vulnerable to ad-hoc created groups, who storm their way onto a political stage with slogans of discontent. Herewith even the democratic parabola, which Crouch was vehemently criticising<sup>15</sup>, got broken – opening the doors not to revival, but to a sort of *after* post-democracy era in fact.

The aim of this text is two-fold. On one hand it hopes to capture in a condensed manner the findings of the research on contemporary social democratic values (research paper included in the third part of this book), with the goal to extract the most interesting questions in which progressives may find potential answers and means to re-emerge. On the other hand, its objective is to abide by the utilitarian principle of the ideological debate (as explained in the previous paragraphs) and hence attempt proposing a so called “step two”. Basing on all that was discovered, as far as similarities and discrepancies both among the national parties and in between national and European levels, it will seek an answer to the query: **if progressives were to propose a Next Social Deal, which ideological pillars could it be built upon?**

## 1. Core values – project for the future

Following the introductory thoughts, the fundamental questions of the contemporary ideological debate seems to be a two folded one: *what the core progressive values should be; and what the use of those core values could be.* The first relates to the tasks of defining what a value is, and subsequently which notions, with which particular understanding, one classifies in that group.

<sup>13</sup> See i.e. T. Judt, *Ill Fares the Land*, Penguin London 2010

<sup>14</sup> After: Eurostat.

<sup>15</sup> C. Crouch, *Post-Democracy*, Polity Cambridge 2010

The second reflects an attempt to explore why in reality core values would be needed, if one leaves behind the categories of political marketing, political correctness and political hedonism.

The results of the FEPS study showed that the members of the European institutionalised social democratic family are very diverse in terms of how they express what their values are, how many they enlist (if they enumerate them directly), as also what they understand under their notions. PES members generally use one of four categories of documents to talk about values: fundamental programme, mid-term programme, electoral programme and a statute (constitution of the party). Naturally, also within those categories sub-categories can be defined – showing variety of constructions and lengths of the respective documents. The number of notions recognised as values differ from 3 to 10. There can be five overall reasons recognised why parties uphold values (two first referring to the internal and three to external parties' policies):

- respect for past achievements and bridging them with a hopeful future;
- willingness to have guidelines in own functioning and decision making;
- creating a framework according to which a society should be organised;
- identifying core of welfare state; and
- the base for a democratic state to exist.

These findings may be seen as a reason to start questioning the ideological unity of the European movement. They should not be. On contrary, they should be perceived as a great potential of social democracy. They mirror diversity of the situations (societal, cultural and political) the respective parties emerged from and operate in nowadays<sup>16</sup>. Once it is really acknowledged and understood, it may enable the left to go beyond its own boundaries, defined by the institutional limitations and painful memory of the splits in the 1990s. This is a key to the new opening – hence broadening the horizons of the debate right from the start. **Today the debate of social democracy on social democracy is perhaps interesting for social democracy only. It is natural as it is a matter of its survival for its members and supporters. Instead the debate should evolve around the kind of vision for those who strive for a society built upon progressive values.** As such it may then lead not only to modernising interpretations of history, but to finding a new and broader formula. This is the way to answer at the same time questions such as: what is between social democracy and the trade unions nowadays? Is the more radical left a friend or a foe? Is there really a chance that social democrats and greens would fight together for the same agenda and not only next to one another, when convenient for both?

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<sup>16</sup> C. Kluckholm, *Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory and Action*, [in:] *Encyclopedia of Religion and Society*, (ed.) W.J.Swatos Jr, Hartford Institute for Religion Research, <http://hirr.hartsem.edu/ency/Values.html>





In the light of the FEPS study, it is the triple-pledge of *freedom, equality and solidarity* that still remains the most commonly recognised as the core of the social democratic ideology. Naturally, they originate from the times of the French Revolution during which freedom was the dream of all suppressed (relief), equality an ideal for all subordinated (recovery) and solidarity a guideline for how to advance in the common endeavour (reform). If those were to remain the core three of the progressive movement, it is necessary to seek empowering them with new contents.

### 1.1. Freedom, emancipation and community

Social democratic parties use freedom in three ways: as an abstract philosophical concept (from which certain rights derive); in relation to an individual (in which scope it is a question of self-determination and self-fulfilment); and in the context of society (here one could distinguish political and socio-economic freedoms). The last two together indicate the kind of relationship social democrats envisage as ideal between the individual and society. It is widely agreed among the parties that society is a liberator of individuals and it will never be free as long as there are women and men who aren't. The problem with that particular definition is that it is hardly commonly believed by European citizens. **Individualisation, the ability to remain anonymous in multiple life dimensions (work, neighbourhood, etc.) and increasing fear for one's own future and future of one's own children – these processes have been socially corrosive and make people perceive society rather as a burden**<sup>17</sup>. People started considering that if they want to freely express what they think, need and hence advance – they need to “take the matter in their own hands” and more and more it means “and onto the streets”. To paraphrase the words of JFK: it is neither a question *what America can do for you, not what you can do for America* – the popular question would most likely sound rather as: *what is that one can do for oneself*.

Acknowledging that, **progressives must come with a new idea on freedom. Or perhaps even shift towards emancipation. This last one assumes at its core the equal status for all, and should be broadened with the notion that in order for all to be economically, socially and politically equal, one has to be equal members of a community**. The relation between individuals and their community must be therefore mutual; based on rights and duties, founded on the idea that individuals must be free from exploitation and a (local) society must be free from the misuse of individuals and groups. This is the ideological reasoning behind why (global) governance is needed, why financial markets must be regulated, why bankers can't be exempted from rules of common decency. This way of interpreting *emancipation* should also

<sup>17</sup> See: R. Putnam, *Bowling alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York Simon and Schuster 2000

provide an answer for how the community can protect individuals, especially via eliminating reasons for anxieties about now and the times to come. This is the emancipation people of all groups expect nowadays. Without these answers there can be no talk about the next social deal, because, to return to Rousseau, why would people agree on bending into any rules, if their united powers would not mean an added value (such as opportunities and/or protection).

## 1.2. Equality of opportunities and equality of outcome

If *emancipation* was to enable all to become equal members of society, there is a need to pursue the question what would *equality* in fact mean. In the recent years, it is precisely *equality* that has been popularised as the leading value of social democracy – and in the light of different renewal debates it has been suggested that it should be a sort of *primus inter pares* among the core values in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The problem lies however in the ambiguity of the modern sense of it. *Equality* is being interpreted often as a matter of equal opportunities, which stand for specific chances that are available to all and ensured in a way that an individual is capable of making its own choices that lead to his or her specific development. The following question appears immediately; when or how many times should those chances be available? What is fair in this context? Some parties tried to solve it replacing *equality* with *equity*, which however carries a risk of overlooking all the constraints that everyone has, while grasping the opportunities. The problem with all these definitions seems to be that these deliberations are only loosely connected with the grand societal question of the modern times.

**Increasing diversity within societies, growing acceptance that there are legitimised differences among groups, clear limitations on available (economic and financial) resources – they all seem to be factors contributing to an idea that *equality* is either about pulling all down to a common denominator or providing for insufficiently in both quality and quantity.** This is where the disbelief in the welfare state hits most effectively. Despite all that has been written about benefits of living in equal societies<sup>18</sup>, people tend to believe that the burden of all social security and public services systems is what pulls them down. This is where social democrats lost the debate about the causes of the recent crisis; public opinion is more likely nowadays to believe that this is caused by an overspending on social policy than wrongdoing of neo-liberalism. The challenge in front of progressivism is therefore to **make *equality* a value that is associated with the future. It is necessary to make this notion bridge between *equal opportunities* and *equal outcomes*<sup>19</sup> and provide new answers to four key questions: what kind of education, what kind of labour market, what kind of care system**

18 i.e. R. Wilkinson & K. Pickett, *The Spirit Level. Why Equality is Better for Everyone*, Penguin Books 2010

19 For more, see work of Paul Krugman.



and what kind of inter-relation in between them? This must be the first step. Only then there is a chance to formulate a framework in which a social deal can in fact be anchored in. This is the core response to Rousseau's demand for an adequate political organisation.

### 1.3. Sustainable solidarity

Finally, in the course of history, *solidarity* replaced the original *brotherhood*. This change broadened the scope of the notion from an ideal that was to serve movement internally to a value on which relations among individuals were to be based on in a just society. In the light of the FEPS study, solidarity has been seen by the respective PES member parties as a historical value, as a motivation, as *awareness of togetherness* and common destiny. On the bases of the interpretations that the parties have been operating with, *solidarity* can either refer to concrete addressees ("solidarity with whom") or encompass the issues of an institutional arrangements (within a state, transnational arrangements). An example of the first category is i.e. *intergenerational solidarity*, and of the second i.e. *international solidarity*. The difficulty that accompanies them both currently is a question of credibility.

There are two reasons for popular disbelief. The first one is the issue of sustainability. **With all the statistics thrown at people concerning the crisis, overspending, necessity to apply austerity measures, but also demographic developments – it comes as no surprise that people no longer think that the welfare system that provides for all can be sustained.** And if that is the case, they neither trust that the state can uphold its commitments as far as external policies (such as relief and development) are concerned. This logic points the feelings towards a different direction than the one that the progressives would like to society to embark on. The second results from the perception that social policies are a sort of charity policies. Somewhat the relation between security, opportunities and progress has been lost. On the fringe of this tendency, it is also that care is not seen as an issue of responsibilities for one another, but rather mercy. This is eminent evidence that the understanding of services is no longer related to any issue of a social deal.

The challenge for progressives is to **re-define solidarity as a notion of progress, which needs to become an ideological category** <sup>20</sup>. **It has to break out of the entrapment of "for certain groups, certain regions", but it has to be a holistic one showing interdependence between individual, societal and global policies.** It must embrace the principles of justice, of reciprocity and responsibility, and finally of sustainable development. Understood in this way, it will be of a great significance for social democrats to frame a vision for all the global, European, national, regional and local levels.

<sup>20</sup> A. Gusenbauer, *Making progress a meaningful concept*, FEPS Queries N°2 (5) / 2011

The study of FEPS focus is primarily on the core values, as described in the diverse PES member parties' documents. It does not confront them with the respective manifestos of their political opponents. Even though it was a conscious methodological choice, it must be said that such a comparative research could be beneficial to break out of another circle of myths. It is widely spread by social democrats that "the others" have adopted the values of the left, and this is why the ideological cleavage has become somewhat blurred. This conclusion is too simplistic. The second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has observed a settlement around what could be called a socialist compromise, reached between the worlds of labour and capital, that laid the foundations for work and welfare legislation. **Nowadays it is nobody's agenda to strip the workers from their respective rights. But this does not mean socialdemocratisation of conservative and liberals. It rather could be read as a certain pragmatism of their politics.** At the same time, it should also not be forgotten that it is the left that from the position of resistance to capitalism accepted the philosophy of a social market economy. It is social democracy that discusses nowadays *good* and *bad* capitalism, as also *good* and *bad* austerity. The point is that **if social democracy really wishes to distinguish itself from what seems to be a contemporary, overall compromise among the well-established parties, it needs to call for the Next values-based Social Deal that is in all the possible ways different to what the others proposed.** It cannot be a mere reaction, response and willingness to preserve past achievements. It must be outspoken and it must show that the progressives interlink their values in a unique system of beliefs, which embrace all the inimitable progressive principles (such as work, welfare, education, progress).

## **2. Building new identities, constructing a Next Social Deal**

The FEPS study shows that the vast majority of the social democratic parties have undergone an ideological renewal within the last fifteen years, if one looks at the dates in which the current fundamental programmes (as also interim programmes and parties' constitutions) were adopted. The processes had been shaped in different ways (designed to suit the needs of a respective party) and their respective durations vary (however generally they took several years to complete). Though these differences exist, one principle seems to have been common for all examined parties; **ideological debates meant to be about creating identity.** This is why they consisted of several phases and were aimed at involving different people: party members, party branches and networks; party-related organisations (among them think-tanks and related to them experts-sympathisers); partners (trade unions, women organisations, etc.).



This style of ideological debate has served for several decades as a process that embraced all the different streams in the scope of activism of a respective party. It created an opportunity for all to get involved again, to re-define and re-discover their motivations, and also to re-shape the overall direction of the party in question. The deficiency with this sort of a renewal process however is that it has an expiration date, even if certain parties mastered remaining in a campaigning mode throughout all the legislative years regardless of proximity of the elections, there seem to be no example known in the history of a party that would achieve a state of permanent ideological restitution. There is usually a short time for reflection after elections, and then a time of delivery just before the next ones. Hence also hopes entrusted in a renewal (even if that is a decade lasting one) are regularly short-term ones.

Furthermore, this format has placed always a party in the centre of it. Even if the party was to open up to the voices from outside or to grass-root activists, it would always be steered from somewhere "above". The process would eventually always be centralised and hence would be the ideas; hardly a possibility for any radical distortion. The question is if realistically this can be organised in that way in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? There are reasons to believe it can't, and those are the same as mentioned in the introduction: people on the streets of Europe, growing gap between citizens and politics, deterioration of the political party system and representative democracy. It is hard to say what it means nowadays to be a member of a party, but it can't be a powerful social notion looking at the numbers of people affiliated in general.

It seems that there is a need to rethink the renewal and hence place the hopes elsewhere. In the introduction of this essay it was suggested that **the potential of creating a true alternative lies in combining three elements: set of contemporary values, vision of the next social deal and new socio-economic paradigm**. In order to frame the last two, progressives would need to place their debate outside of their interior, on a broader stage, and through it frame a broad alliance with civil society and social movements and academics. Both are more difficult than it may seem.

As for the civil society and social movements, the relations between those organisations, groupings or gatherings and political parties have been based on mutually taking each other for granted. Social democrats are aware that not always, while in the government, they delivered all what was expected by the different groups (it would also never been possible to satisfy all the pledges). Nevertheless, at the same time they are confident that their agenda carries enough of common proposals to count on certain organisations' support. This is also because they perceive themselves as appearing more susceptible to progressive civil society than conservatives. The civil society organisations and trade unions from the progressive spectrum are on the other hand naturally interested to uphold certain degree of relationship, which enables them to gear political interest around their affairs, get certain amount of issues

fixed and allows them also to keep a safe distance needed to raise sporadically criticism. This construction has become challenged. People not only refrain from joining political parties, but also from volunteering in different associations. **The time is therefore ripe to pick the debate not from an angle on how the renewal process of the social democracy should look like from the grass-roots' perspective, but rather how to re-establish both worlds of trade unions, civil society and party politics altogether.** The progressivism must become not an exclusive party notion (which will limit its impact), but a determinant of a certain spectrum of a society.

The other challenge is the world of academia. The role of intellectuals is often underestimated in different political processes<sup>21</sup>, and surely it is overshadowed in the parties' rhetoric – it is often heard that a party aims at mobilising the grass-root activists, and it is hardly ever popularised that it wants to seriously reach out to academics. There are many possible explanations why, among them there is a fear that a party appealing to intellectuals could come across as an elitist one. This anxiety must however be overcome. The first reason is that no vision and no social deal will successfully be put in place, without a supportive paradigm. There is a need for a *new, empirically provable socio-economic theory* that would go hand in hand with modern values and would give credibility to a proposal of the Next Social Deal. Filling the vacuum with statistics and numbers will not work, as practice has shown. The second reason is that no party can win the prevailing argument having no influence in the world of science and teaching<sup>22</sup>. The emotions that accompany university papers' presentations on the situation of social democracy are usually those of outspoken criticism, pessimism or even resignation. This will escalate, unless the bridge is built and unless those intellectuals, who care for the left, are made co-responsible for the renewal (in its new form). The think tanks may need to play in the future by far more important role – deriving from a consultant to an intellectual development enabler.

### 3. Transposition of values in a pluralist left

The FEPS study showed, among others, that the socio-economic, political and cultural context predetermines, which values are being considered as relevant and also how they are interpreted. This has served also as an explanation on why such a high degree of diversity exist among the PES member parties, as far as the definitions and their scopes are concerned. Following that conclusion, the findings concerning the parties on the national level were confronted with an ideological evolution on the European level. There have been several observations made, among them two that perhaps could indicate why European social

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21 Th. Sowell, *Intellectuals and society*, Basic Books New York 2009

22 G. Lakoff, *The Political Mind. Why can't you understand 21st century American Politics with 18th century Brain?*,



democratic identity remains a relatively weak concept. The first one is that **there seems to be a missing link between the values as they are interpreted on the national level and their respective interpretations in the European context. These two dimensions seem to exist somewhat independently from one another.** The second is that however **for the respective national parties upholding the values is a matter of remaining faithful to a certain tradition, this very same notion of political heritage seems to be absent on the European level.** The values are being used more in a role of supportive guidelines for certain reactions (in the past an example of this practise was the opposition against a Europe understood as a market only), than as something that predetermines a unique progressive vision of Europe and its society.

This of course is an issue of a great relevance. The recent renewal of social democracy debates linked its chances for success strongly with the question of renaissance of Europe<sup>23</sup>. Even though there seems to be a general consensus among social democrats that with a common set of external and internal challenges, and especially with a common European labour market, there is no other way – may be hard for a broader public to understand. In the aftermath of the crisis, it seems even more complicated nowadays than it has ever been before to argue for the European case.

**Social democracy is finding itself in a particularly vulnerable position. Since in 1990s it accepted to adopt an overall pro-European character, it has not really explored the shades of this pro-Europeanism.** It continued to unite behind subsequent electoral manifestos, which constitute an important symbol of the respective parties' unity, but which nevertheless remain a sort of the highest possible common denominator only. This is a weakness, which makes it difficult to speak about Europe, both positively and negatively. The trouble lies therefore in both feasibility of a process of *Europeanisation* and *internationalisation* of the left, as also in how far this process could be realised accordingly to the principles that were earlier outlined. It is self-evident that both would have to be understood not as merely bits of the "renewal" processes, but rather as a mission of translating progressivism into an age of globalisation.

The challenge is a triple-folded. First of all, it indicates a necessity of defining the core values and hence a progressive vision in the context of both contemporary Europe and the world. They cannot remain a part of a section on "international affairs", but it must be an integral dimension of the ideological core that is proclaimed. Secondly, it is about placing that vision in a context of the trio – values, social contract and new paradigm. Again, it must be an incorporated part of the reflection on each of those, not a loose or additional element. This is the only way to make them complete and comprehensive. This

23 A. Gusenbauer, *Responding adequately to contemporary challenge, [in:] Next Left. The Leaders' Visions for Europe's Future, (eds.) E. Stetter, K. Duffek & A. Skrzypek, FEPS 2010*

seems to appear as a natural difficulty, especially when the interpretations would need to, as on the national level, abide by the criteria of tangibility and utilitarianism. Nevertheless they may be positively overcome – populations already live in this mystical globalised world and in the *united Europe*. The problem remains being seen as a-political grounds. Thirdly, to successfully accomplish that all, it is necessary that the process is built according to the logic of looking beyond the usual format, away from the regular organisational constraints. As on any other level, a new progressive alliance is needed. The query remains on how to successfully build it, embracing new mobilising formulas and accepting that the institutionalised social democracy and its political programme may be well at the core of it, however not the only spin of it.

Regarding the alliance and its role, it is worth to return to some other findings of the FEPS study. The comparative research showed that *humanism* is both a tradition in which parties anchor their system of beliefs and for some parties even a core value. The respective parties refer to *humanism* as a reflection of their conviction that everyone has the same value and the same rights, but beyond this understanding there are two more ideas that a progressive understanding of humanism embraces. The first of them is a *qualified optimism* about people – which mirrors realism about human constraints and hopeful optimism as far as the potential to develop. The second is attention to reason, to the fact that the empowerment of individuals depends on opportunities to emancipate intellectually. This can be seen as an explanation why national parties perceive civic education directed to build critical thinking mechanisms as an indispensable part of socialisation, as also crucial for democracy building and preserving (to which both respective national PES parties, but also PES attaches much relevance). These notions are not really explicitly adopted on the European level, which the FEPS study shows in its Chapter 3. And here is where the challenge perhaps lies.

**The contemporary world may be perceived as very *de-humanised* – it seems from the news that all that moves it forward is casino capitalism, unregulated financial markets and natural disasters.** This adds to the uncertainties that have been described above. People feel in no control of the world's affairs and the corrosion of the post-war system additionally induces an anxiety that there is no longer an institutional system that would ensure (global) governance, which would be subjected to their democratic control. The situation on the European level does not appear much better. The European Union is seen by its citizens as a bureaucratic monster, which remains out of touch with the everyday life in which it at the same time wishes to intervene. These all are matters to what any next vision, next social deal and next paradigm must be a credible answer to. **The progressive translation of *humanism* into the 21<sup>st</sup> century global philosophy can be a way to provide an overall frame.**





For this transformation to be complete, one should perhaps also consider complementing that with a strong pillar that would embrace *internationalism*. The findings of the FEPS study show that this notion however does not take a dominant place in the respective member parties anymore. It is perhaps a linguistic matter (which the scope of the research does not include), but it seems to be partially replaced by the concept of *international solidarity* and partially clinched among the principles of peace or concepts for sustainable development. All in all, it does not appear any longer as an outstanding conception that could be described as a sort of a-priori characteristics of the progressive movement.

It is doubtful that the solution lies in revitalising the concept by giving it a new interpretation. The detachment from its meaning is too profound. It is more likely that a new notion is needed, that would include the noble tradition and the elements needed to build a new vision. One of the proposals that emerges from the contemporary renewal debates, and could be taken into consideration, is the concept of *cosmopolitanism*. This thought has naturally its roots in antiquity and then was developed by such thinkers as Immanuel Kant and Jacques Derrida. The contemporary understanding of internationalism lies in bridging between philosophical acknowledgements, such as that all human belong to one community, and the ethical interpretation, about the hospitality and responsibility of one another. This is why it also provides such an attractive possibility for the progressives to embark on. It is offering a crucial element for the transposition of a next social deal onto the European and international levels – namely the concept of *global citizenship*. This supports **global humanism as an idea to refocus on individuals and the community they live in; it enables showing the relation between progressive values (and their respective global and European dimension) and the Next Social Deal, reserving a space to outline mutual rights and duties**. Finally, it can also help building herewith new progressive ethics and identity that is needed for the next social contract to be fulfilled by the next socio-economic paradigm.

Recapitulating the three chapters of this essay, the thesis is that social democrats need to break free from the limitations of their traditional renewal processes. The crises, in which they find themselves in as also the overall circumstances, are profound and hence call for new 21<sup>st</sup> century measures. **Historical parallels, as also teachings of social science led to the construction of the following proposal as for the way forward; a triad of developing new values based vision, a Next Social Deal and a new socio-economic paradigm. The formulation of this triad must be seen as a process, which in itself must reflect the state of affairs in the new century and hence be a way to create a new progressive alliance for the future.**

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Rémi BAZILLIER

## **The economic meaning of progressive values**



## **Key words**

**Values – Normative economics – Justice – Equality – Altruism**

## **Summary**

This paper reviews the main insights of economics to the normative debate on values. The first section deals with issues related to the individuals. We show that focus on well-being gives a more satisfactory approach. It is necessary to analyze policies using multiple criteria including subjective evaluations of well-being, and objective non-monetary measures such as level of education, health, social capital and rights. We also explore the analyses of other-regarding motivations such as altruism or strong reciprocity and show their political implications. The second section deals with collective issues. The bases of a progressive theory of justice are needed. We firstly review the main theories of justice before proposing some implications for progressive. In particular, we point out some limitations of the equality of opportunity concept and propose to work on the concept of equality of autonomy developed by Fleurbaey (2008).

## Introduction

According to a recent poll<sup>1</sup>, 67% of likely US voters consider that their society is “fair and decent”. Since 2006, this number has ranged from 54% to 74%. The picture is radically different in France. Only 31% consider French society is fair. Among the working class, they are only 11%<sup>2</sup>. How can we explain such differences? Based on the citizens’ perception, can we conclude American society is fairer than the French one? It is thus very complicated to draw such conclusions. In particular, we first need to agree on a common definition of *fairness*. What is a fair society? The answer clearly depends on the values and perceptions of individuals. It is not clear whether it is possible to find an objective definition based on universal principles. Researches in different social sciences have found different ways to answer these questions. The debate has always been strong in Economics. This paper aims at describing the contribution of economists to the debate on values.

Lots of economists are claiming a *positive* approach, describing the society and the individuals as they are and not as they *should* be. Despite this tradition, normative economics has always had a significant influence. **Classical economists were very often also philosophers. This tradition has remained.** *Welfare economics*, for instance, is defined as a branch of economics using microeconomics tools to evaluate economic well-being, and the economic consequences of policies in terms of economic efficiency and income distribution. In 1998, the *Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel* was attributed to the philosopher and economist Amartya Sen, attesting the vitality of this branch. The Swedish Royal Academy of Science justified this choice as follow: *Sen has clarified the conditions which permit aggregation of individual values into collective decisions, and the conditions which permit rules for collective decision making that are consistent with a sphere of rights for the individual.*

In this paper, we will use a normative approach, in order to contribute to the debate on progressive values<sup>3</sup>. However, a positive analysis is necessary and therefore will be used to describe actual individual behaviours. The goal of this paper is thus to clarify the theoretical

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<sup>1</sup> The Rasmussen Report, survey of 1,000 Likely US Voters, conducted on April 21-22, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> IFOP, 4/02/2010, Les français et l'injustice, Challenges

<sup>3</sup> The goal of this paper is not to define what is *progressivism*. By *progressive values*, we understand values defended by the Left, whether they define themselves as socialist, social-democrats, democrats or progressive. We however underline that there is a need of a proper definition of *progressive values* or *progress*. But this difficult task goes beyond the goal of this paper.



debate on values and draw to the progressives' attention the need of a long-term and coherent vision. Therefore, the goal is not to propose concrete and short-term policy measures but rather to contribute to the definition of a progressive narrative on our final goals and values. In spite of certain confusion in given definitions of some core values such as equality, progressives already have in mind some of these implications. The goal is therefore rather to give a more coherent framework to their actions.

The main question in economics is how to allocate in an efficient way scarce resources within a population composed by individuals with heterogeneous preferences, tastes and capacities. Two main issues can be raised from this perspective. First at the individual level, it is important to understand different behaviours and the influence of values on such behaviours. Second, at the collective level, the underlying question is about the *fairness* of such allocation. One can classify different economic theories of justice (see for instance Konow<sup>4</sup>). **If justice can be defined as such as a value, we will see that it is crucial to define the content of such value. Only some theories of justice can be characterized as progressive.** These two questions will be the core of the structure of this paper. In the first section, we will mainly focus on individual ethics, while in the second section; we will look more deeply into policy decisions.

In the section on the individual aspects of the debate on values, we will firstly study what individuals are looking for. Is their goal to maximize their individual income, their welfare, their utility, their happiness? Standard microeconomic theory assumes each individual is maximizing his welfare or his utility but the concept is rather vague and it is not clear how to measure it. At the aggregate level, the debate has been relaunched recently with the growing concerns about the appropriate way to measure economic performance. Gross domestic product is considering as the main indicator in macroeconomics, reflecting the wealth and the development of countries. This index is only the aggregation of individual level of income or production. But it is widely accepted that this indicator is too restrictive to give a good overview of the overall economic situation. We will review different conceptions and raise important policy implications. One specific concern is that it is not clear whether increasing individual welfare should be a policy goal in all cases. In other word, we have to answer the following question: Is the role of the State to contribute to the maximization of individual welfare?

A second point which is crucial to analyze is whether individuals are purely individualistic or take into account the interest or welfare of other individuals. It may be seen as paradoxical to ask this question in the frame of a broader debate on progressive values. However, one should notice that neo-classical economists have always based their economic models under the

4 J. Konow, *Which is the Fairest One of all? A positive Analysis of Justice Theories*, [in:] *Journal of Economic Literature*, XLI (December 2003), pp. 1188-1239.

hypothesis of the existence of the *homo economicus*<sup>5</sup>. This theoretical representation is based on rational individuals, maximizing their personal utility. All subsequent models are thus based on the idea that individuals act only according to their own interest. In this framework, the value of solidarity is somehow difficult to analyze. It is nevertheless coherent with the classical and neo-classical framework, assuming that the optimal equilibrium can be reached through the maximization of individual interest. Fortunately, a growing literature is studying the economic consequences of altruism and cooperation (see for instance Rose-Ackerman<sup>6</sup>). This is of particular interest when studying the determinants of the demand for redistribution. Implications on the vision of the Welfare State are also numerous<sup>7</sup>.

The second section will be devoted to the issue of justice and equality. From a normative point of view, economists have various criteria to define a *fair* allocation of resources within a society. It is then important to draw a progressive perspective concerning these issues. *Utilitarian* consider only the need to maximize aggregate welfare. On the other side, *egalitarian*'s aim is to ensure equality between individuals. But the concept of equality needs also to be clarified. Defenders of equality come from a large and heterogeneous political spectrum. There is thus a need for progressive to define their own conception of equality. From a *positive* perspective, it is also interesting to confront different conceptions of equality to the real representation of individuals. Researches in behavioural economics follow this goal. We will briefly review the main implications of these researches. In particular, there is a commonly accepted trade-off between *equality* and *responsibility*. Conservative approaches of equality are then based on the need to equalize opportunities between individuals<sup>8,9,10</sup> and then let them live up to their responsibility towards their individual choices. Policy implications will then depend on the concrete definition of *opportunities* and the real possibility to equalize them. Also this perspective neglects the different capacities of individuals to exploit their own *opportunities*. This approach appears clearly too restrictive to give a progressive definition of equality. Several authors have tried to enlarge the scope of *equality of opportunities* in order to take into consideration these limitations<sup>11</sup>. Other approaches based on the equalization bundles of "primary social goods"<sup>12</sup> or the equalization of *capabilities*<sup>13</sup> give interesting insight but raise several problems. We will instead build on the idea of the *equality of autonomy*, proposed by Fleurbaey<sup>14</sup> and show what the implications for progressives are.

5 V. Pareto, *Manuale di Economic Politica*, Milano, Italia: Societa Editrice Libreria 1906.

6 R. Rose-Ackerman, *Altruism, Nonprofits and Economic Theory*, [in:] *Journal of Economic Literature*, XXXIV (June 1996), pp. 701-728

7 Ch.M. Fong, *Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution.*, [in:] *Journal of Public Economics* 82 (2) / 2001, 225-246.

8 R.J. Arneson, *Equality of Opportunity for Welfare*, [in:] *Philosophical Studies* 56 (1989): 77-93.

9 R.J. Arneson, *Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare*, [in:] *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 9, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 158-94.

10 G.A. Cohen, *Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities*, [in:] *Recherches economiques de Louvain*, 1990, 56: 357-82.

11 J.E. Roemer, *A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner*, [in:] *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 146-166

12 J. Rawls, *A theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press 1971.

13 A. Sen, *Equality of What?*, [in:] *The Tanner lectures on human values*, vol. 1. S. McMurrin, ed. Salt Lake City: U. of Utah Press 1980.

14 Fleurbaey, M., *Fairness, Responsibility and Welfare*, New York: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 295





## 1. Individual behaviours and values

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### What are individuals' expectations and how can we measure them?

The most used economic indicator is clearly the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is the market value of all final products and services produced in a country. Increasing the growth rate of the GDP is a universal goal, shared by all governments. It is a way to create employment and finance social policies. GDP represents the total production in a country. In a closed economy, it is also the sum of income of each individual. One can thus consider that the goal is then to maximize income. But as it is stated in the report of the commission on the measurement of economic performance and social progress (2009) led by the economists Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, it is not the case in an open economy: *production can expand while income decreases or vice versa when account is taken of depreciation, income flows into and out of a country, and differences between the prices of output and the price of consumer products*. Focus has to be given to income of households rather than production. But this is not enough.

Increasing the level of production may also have adverse consequences and may be not desirable in some cases. At the national level, some activities create negative externalities that are not taken into account in the national accounts. Pollution and environmental damages are one of the most important ones. Also, an increase of production is not necessarily good news. Insecurity for instance has a positive impact on GDP. The State has to build new jails, hire policemen. Households have to equip themselves against burglaries... Individuals also are not always looking for a maximization of their income. Increasing leisure time, enjoying time with family for instance can be alternative goals. Both at the individual level and at the aggregate level, maximization of income cannot be seen as a unique goal. The scope of policies should therefore be broader than a focus on the level of production, income and the growth of these aggregates.

One important factor to take into account, together with the level of income, is the level of wealth. As stated in the Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi<sup>15</sup> report, *what is carried over into the future necessarily has to be expressed as stocks – of physical, natural, human or social capital*. It is fundamental in order to take into account the need of sustainability of the economic system. If growth of income goes along with a fall of these stocks, growth won't be sustainable and will lead to a fall of income in the long-run. **Policy makers should therefore take into consideration the long-term**

15 A. Sen, J. Stiglitz, J.-P. Fitoussi, *Rapport de la Commission sur la mesure des performances économiques du progrès social*, [http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport\\_francais.pdf](http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_francais.pdf)

**prospect and sustainability.** Ways of producing but also ways of consuming should therefore change in order to take into account the need of sustainability. This is not compatible with the constant look for increase of consumptions' level. On contrary, this implies a reduction of consumption for lots of goods and services. Maximization of production, income or consumption is not a panacea. Instead, individuals may look for an improvement of their *living standard*, taking into consideration the long-term sustainability of such standards. At the collective level, the role of governments is therefore to give the right incentives to ensure this long-term sustainability, allowing a balanced improvement of living standards.

For the reasons explained above, **GDP per capita cannot be seen as a good proxy of living standards.** One additional reason is the shift of non-market activities to market-activities. As noticed in the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report, *despite a strong increase of GDP per capita, why citizens do not have the feeling to live better? A share of this increase can be explained by a shift from non-market to market provisions of services. What was freely provided has now a price. It is a "positive" shift from the GDP perspective but individuals are not better off.* It is another limitation of the GDP. A last one is the aggregate measure does not take into account income inequalities and the distribution of such outcome.

In order to take into account all these limitations, the commission gave five main recommendations:

1. Look at income and consumption rather than production,
2. Consider income and consumption jointly with wealth,
3. Emphasise the household perspective,
4. Give more prominence to the distribution of income, consumption and wealth,
5. Broaden income measures to non-market activities.

Microeconomists generally use the broader concept of utility, following the conception of Bentham. *Bentham took for granted that pleasure, including freedom from pain, is a single kind of agreeable feeling whose properties are invariant across different sentiment beings. Any competent person can estimate the amount of pleasure which he or she experiences in any situation, he argued, by considering factors such as intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity and purity.* But as stated by Bentham himself, it raises some methodological problems. If individuals can evaluate themselves their level of pleasure, defining their utility, interpersonal comparisons are very difficult and "intensity of pleasure" cannot be measured. Following this tradition, utilitarians consider each policy should be evaluated by its impact on the level of utility. We will see in the second section that this approach neglects the distribution of welfare within a population.



More generally, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report proposes to focus on the *quality of life*, which is a broader concept than income or living standards. It rises however three problems. The first is that **individuals have different capacities to exploit their own resources**. In other words, two peoples with equal means but different background, level of education or social capital, won't be equal in the satisfaction they will get from these means. That's why Amartya Sen<sup>16</sup> focuses on the need to increase the level of *capabilities* of each individual. These capabilities characterize the individual's opportunity and ability to generate valuable income, taking into account his own characteristics and the external factors. Poverty is then defined as a *deprivation of capabilities*. Poverty is then seen as a multidimensional phenomenon, characterized by the lack of financial resources, but also the lack of freedom, education, and access to public services...

The second problem is the evaluation of non-market resources. These resources may not have price, or the price may differ among individuals. The last problem is that individual well-being depends on lots of individual characteristics or people's life circumstances. Most of these circumstances cannot be monetary valuable. Evaluation of quality of life and inter-individuals comparability may therefore be a complicated task. The commission on the measurement of economic performance and social progress review the main approaches used to do so. The first approach relies on the subjective evaluation of well-being by the individual. The two other approaches are based on objective criteria: the capabilities approach and the fair allocation.

Concerning the **subjective evaluation of well-being**, according to the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report, *the greatest strength of this approach is its simplicity: relying on people's own judgments is a convenient shortcut and potentially provides a natural way to aggregate various experiences in a way that reflects people's own preferences. Further, this approach makes it possible to reflect the diversity of people's views about what is important in their lives*. Subjective well-being has three dimensions<sup>17</sup>: life satisfaction, the presence of positive feeling or affect, and the presence of negative feeling or affect (hedonic preferences). The first one is easier to measure through representative surveys (such as the World value survey). There are however several bias that may alter international comparisons<sup>18</sup>. Despite these biases, these surveys give interesting insights. Easterlin<sup>19</sup> showed that average national life satisfaction does not increase

16 A. Sen, *Equality of What?*, [in:] *The Tanner lectures on human values*, vol. 1. S. McMurrin, ed. Salt Lake City: U. of Utah Press 1980.

17 E. Diener, *Subjective Well-Being*, [in:] *Psychological Bulletin*, 93 /1984: 542-575.

18 A. Deaton, *Income, Health and Well-Being around the World: Evidence from the Gallup World Poll*, [in:] *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22 (2) / 2008: 53–72.

19 R.A. Easterlin, *Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?*, [in:] *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 27(1) / 1995: 35-47.

over time in spite of large increase in income. Within countries, studies found small<sup>20</sup> or nil<sup>21</sup> effect of income on individual life satisfaction. Using Gollup survey, Deaton showed that high-income countries life satisfaction is higher than the one in low-income countries. But, conditional on the level of GDP per capita, the effect of economic growth on life satisfaction is negative. These ambiguous results on the linkages between life satisfaction and income can be explained by Clark et al.<sup>22</sup> by the importance of *relative* income (social comparisons) and past income (habituation). Absolute level of income thus plays a little role. This is another justification for policy-makers to have a closer look to the *distribution* of income.

The **capabilities approach** is based on a combination of various *functionings*, defined as a collection of the observable *achievements* of each person, and the *freedom* to choose between different functionings. It is based on the work of Amartya Sen. Well-being is thus evaluated through the concept of *human need*, acknowledging that these human needs may differ between individuals. The evaluation of well-being is thus dependent on the choice of several dimensions that are needed by individuals in order to increase their capabilities to reach various functionings. These dimensions can be measured and thus be evaluated objectively, once there are chosen. In practice, this approach has influenced the building of the *Human development index* by UNDP. This index measures human development through three dimensions: economic development, education and health.

The **theory of fair allocation** is the third way of evaluating quality of life. Subjective life satisfaction was based on individual perception. The capabilities approach was based on the recognition of the multidimensional aspect of human need. This third approach is explicitly referring to *equity* criteria: *the theory of fair allocations studies the allocation of resources among people with different tastes and abilities, subject to a number of fairness criteria, such as "no-envy" (i.e. no agent should prefer another's bundle), "solidarity" (e.g. no agent should be hurt by an increase in available resources) and "lower-bounds" (e.g. no agent should prefer the equal-split solutions.* (Fleurbaey<sup>23</sup> quoted by Sen-Stiglitz-Fitoussi). The method is based on the comparison of individual situations, based on different criteria: *the conditions of any given person are assessed by identifying the particular situation in this reference set that is equivalent to his current situation according to his own preferences.* The ranking of individual situations are then based on justice criteria. It will thus be dependent to the definition of fairness which is retained (see section 2).

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20 D.G. Blanchflower & A.Oswald, *Well-Being over Time in Britain and the USA.*, [in:] *Journal of Public Economics*, 88 (7- 8) / 2004 : 1359 - 86.

21 D. Kahneman, A. B. Krueger, D. Schkade, N. Schwarz, & A. A. Stone., *Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion.*, [in:] *Science*, 312(5782) / 2006: 1908-10.

22 A.E. Clark, P. Frijters, M.A. Shields, *Relative income, Happiness and Utility: An explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles*, [in:] *Journal of Economic Literature*, 46(1) / 2008; 95-144.

23 M. Fleurbaey, *Fairness, Responsibility and Welfare*, New York: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 295



Sen, Stiglitz and Fitoussi (2009) sum up the criteria used to evaluate the global level of quality of life. By answering the five following questions, we may have a more precise idea of the development of a society.

1. Is society doing well?
2. Are people living well?
3. Are people happy in their life?
4. Are people satisfied with their lives?
5. Do people have the quality of life they want?

The first two questions relate to the capabilities approach, the third and fourth to the subjective well-being approach and the last one to the theory of fair allocation. Combining subjective and objective criteria is needed to take into account the need of individual emancipation and social progress. Income is not sufficient to define the level of development. One should also take into consideration human needs, and the multidimensional aspect of deprivations.

OECD launched an initiative aiming at measuring well-being and social progress (OECD 2011), following these recommendations. They propose a set of indexes reflecting material living conditions (economic well-being)<sup>24</sup>, quality of life<sup>25</sup> and the sustainability of the socio-economic and natural systems.

One remaining question is whether it is possible or not to build an aggregate index. As noticed by Stiglitz et al. (2009) and the OECD (2011), *different philosophic perspectives will inevitably lead to different views on the relative importance of different dimensions, and on the attention to be paid to the conditions of different people within society*. In other words, the choice of different weight for different dimensions of well-being is political and reflects values and ideologies. That's why the OECD decided to not impose a weight for different dimensions and let users choose their own weight in order to build their own aggregate index.

As we will see in the second section, it is important for progressives to build on a justice theory corresponding to a vision and values. Statistical tools exist to measure well-being and progress but progressive should agree on the importance they give to each dimension. As John E. Roemer<sup>26</sup> said, the need is not necessarily to find new ideas: *we need new tricks to convince voters who have been taught by the Right that it is OK to be selfish to choose policies that are progressive*. In order to do so, it is important to clarify the meaning of progressive values such as equality or solidarity. We will see in the second section how the economic research may bring interesting insights.

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24 Including measures of i) income and wealth, ii) jobs and earnings, and iii) housing.

25 Including measures of i) health status, ii) work and life balance, iii) education and skills, iv) civic engagement and governance, v) social connections, vi) environmental quality, vii) personal security, and viii) subjective well-being.

26 J.E. Roemer, *Some thoughts on the prospects for achieving equality in market economies*, mimeo 2006

Policy-makers should analyze the policy's impact using multi-criteria analyses. GDP growth cannot be seen as a panacea. Progressive should aim at improving daily life of the people. GDP growth can be a tool to achieve this goal, if this growth is also compatible with the achievement of other priorities such as the fulfillment of human needs and the sustainability imperative. The nature of growth is more important than growth itself.

Before reviewing justice theories and drawing implications for progressive, we want to come back on the hypothesis of *homo economicus*, which underlines most economic models. The *homo economicus* is supposed to be a *rational* individual, maximizing his selfish interest. This is completely consistent with a conservative ideology. However, a significant part of the literature studies the implication of altruism or reciprocity on human behaviour, but also for the welfare state. This opens new perspectives for the progressive.

### **Homo economicus, strong reciprocator or pure altruism?**

First, we have to recognize that lots of classical economists were fully aware of the importance of social relations in the behavioural choices of individuals. Adam Smith<sup>27</sup> (1789) for instance considered that how we are seen by others is as powerful as the material self-interest. But the idea of selfish individuals was a methodological tool, considered as much powerful to analyze human behaviour. It became predominant among neo-classical economists. Putterman<sup>28</sup> considers that the myth of the economic man of Mills and Edgeworth "dictum" that *the first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest* may explain this predominance. It is only at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century that preferences other than self-interest began to be considered in the most influential per-reviewed economic journals.

One other underlying assumption of most economic models is the rationality of agents. Individuals are rational, that's why they maximize their welfare. And in order to do so, they take into account their selfish material interest. Economics assume that social phenomena must be explained by individual actions, which can be explained by individuals' motivations. Rationality principle is then defined as the fact that *individuals act in their best interest as they perceive it*<sup>29</sup>. Rationality and selfish individualism are then interconnected. It is seen as a normative principle by their defenders. Harsanyi<sup>30</sup> stated that: *this theory is a normative*

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27 A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. London: Dent, 1954.

28 L. Putterman, *Reciprocity, Altruism, and Cooperative Production*, [in:] S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity*, vol. 2, 1409-1435, Elsevier 2006.

29 L.E. Blume & D. Easley, *Rationality*, [in:] *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

30 J.C. Harsanyi, *Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1977.



(prescriptive) theory rather than a positive (descriptive) theory. At least formally and explicitly it deals with the question of how each player should act in order to promote his own interests most effectively in the game.

As noticed by Sen<sup>31</sup>, these assumptions (self-interest and rational behaviour) play a central role in various fundamental theorems in economy. Pareto optimality is a situation no one's self interest can be further enhanced without hurting the self-interest of somebody else. Because of the rational behaviour hypothesis, this optimum is equivalent to the competition equilibria. But it has been shown that in some cases, the equilibrium coming from atomistic selfish behaviour can be sub-optimal. The most famous example is the so-called *Prisoner's Dilemma*, which showed that a cooperative behaviour would lead to a higher outcome than selfish interest. The dominant behaviour however always leads to a sub-optimal equilibrium. From the individual perspective, it will be always optimal not to cooperate (the individual outcome would be higher whatever the other behaviour). The first problem is therefore the possible sub-optimality of selfish interest.

Second, lots of economists criticize this hypothesis because it actually does not fully describe the actual behaviour of individuals. First, as we saw in the previous subsection, individual well-being depends on much more factors than the only selfish material interests. Evidences clearly show that lots of people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences (See Fehr and Schmidt 2006 for an extensive survey). Hundreds of articles in *experimental economics* tend to prove that other-regarding behaviours were often observed.

The first example is **altruism**<sup>32</sup>, which is a form of "unconditional kindness"; that is "a factor given does not emerge as a response to a factor received"<sup>33</sup>. A pure altruist is ready to sacrifice his own resources in order to improve the well-being of others. The opposite case is *envy or spitefulness*. A spiteful person always values the material payoff of relevant reference agents negatively.

A conditional type of altruism is **inequality aversion**<sup>34</sup>. An inequality-averse individual increases its utility when the allocation of resources becomes more equitable. If another individual receives additional payoff, the utility of the inequality-averse individual will increase or decrease depending if the new allocation is considered as more equitable than the previous one. Of course, this definition depends on the equity criteria retained (see section II).

31 A. Sen, Justice. [in:] *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition*. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online*.

32 J. Andreoni, Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence. [in:] *Journal of Political Economy* 97 / 1989, 1447–1458.

33 Fehr, E. & K.M. Schmidt, *The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – experimental evidence and new theories*, [in:] S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism*, Elsevier 2006.

34 Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M., A theory of fairness, competition and co-operation., [in:] *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114 / 1999, 817–868.

Also, an individual may act differently, depending on the fair or unfair behaviour of other agents. According to Rabin<sup>35</sup>, a **reciprocal individual** “responds to actions he perceives to be kind in a kind manner, and to actions he perceives to be hostile in a hostile manner”. **Strong reciprocity** is a one-shot interaction that does not require an additional material benefit for the reciprocal individual. It is defined by Fong<sup>36</sup> as *a propensity to cooperate and share with others similarly disposed, even at a personal cost, and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative and other social norms, even when punishing is personally costly and cannot be expected to entail net personal gains in the future*. It thus goes beyond self-interest forms of cooperation and suppose adherence to certain norms. One underlying idea is that these norms should be beneficial to most group members<sup>37</sup>.

On contrary, **weak reciprocity** is driven by long-term self interest in repeated interactions. In the Prisoner Dilemma mentioned above, two individual who decide to cooperate in order to reach an optimal outcome would then be characterized as weak-reciprocal individuals.

It is possible that a same individual will act in different ways depending on the context. In particular, Fehr and Schmidt<sup>38</sup> argue that economic competition may completely remove the impact of other-regarding preferences. It does not mean that in that context, individuals are purely selfish but that competition makes any kind of other-regarding behaviour impossible or too costly. One implication of this observation is that the institutional context may play a role to influence such kind of behaviour. In a system that gives incentives to cooperative behaviour (in the public sphere, within firms, or within a community), it is highly possible that it will reveal other-regarding preferences.

## Main implications of this research

### Cooperation and cooperative behaviour

As stated by Fehr and Schmidt<sup>39</sup>, a key to the understanding of cooperation problems is the interaction between selfish individuals and individuals with other-regarding preferences. The first example is when selfish individuals decide to cooperate, only if they are interacting with reciprocal or inequality-averse individuals. These individuals are willing to punish the ones that do not cooperate. Thus, if potential free-riders face reciprocal or inequality-averse individuals, they may have an incentive to cooperate to prevent being punished. This can

35 M. Rabin, *Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics*, [in:] *The American Economic Review*.83 / 1993, 1281-1302.

36 C. Fong & S. Bowles & H. Gintis, *Strong reciprocity and the welfare state*, [in:] S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism*, Elsevier 2006.

37 *Ibidem*

38 E. Fehr & K. M. Schmidt, *The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – experimental evidence and new theories*, [in:] S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism*, Elsevier 2006.

39 *Ibidem*





explain why for example individuals are much willing to cooperate when they have the possibility to communicate. To come back to the example of the Prisoner's Dilemma, communication allows individuals to coordinate on the superior equilibrium. It is thus very difficult to distinguish between other-regarding behaviour led by values or inequality-adversity and cooperative behaviour led by selfish interest. **In order to increase the general level of cooperation and improve for instance the financing of public goods, the institutional design is crucial.** Keser and van Winden<sup>40</sup> show that many individuals adjust their level of cooperation to the average previous level of cooperation. Also, if people believe that the others will cooperate, they will increase their level of cooperation. As stated by Fehr and Schmidt<sup>41</sup>, individuals may decide to cheat on tax or to take bribes if they consider these practices are widespread. The dynamic of non-cooperative or non-civic behaviour may be strong and public policy should prevent them quickly.

### Cooperative production

An influential paper of Alchian and Demsetz<sup>42</sup> consider that the optimal organization within firms is a monitoring by owners of the firms and a clear distinction between owners and workers without any profit-sharing for the latter. As noticed by Putterman<sup>43</sup>, there are several empirical facts that clearly contradict this theory. First, profit-sharing is very often observed in lots of capitalist firms. Second, studies tend to show that profit-sharing has a positive impact on productivity and induces more work-incentives and less supervision costs. Also, there are strong evidences that work incentives are higher in workers-owned enterprises<sup>44</sup>. There are strong limitations to these kinds of organizations but it seems that capitalist firms are predominant firstly because workers cooperative suffer from strong financial constraints. Paradoxically, until a recent period, literature focused on the incentives problems of workers cooperative, using the underlying assumption of the homo economicus. One noticeable exception is the work of Sen studying the agriculture cooperative by introducing a factor of sympathy (defined as the importance for a cooperative's member of other cooperative's member utility on his own objective function). If the level of sympathy is zero, then the agriculture cooperative is clearly sub-optimal. But when level of sympathy is positive, it helps reducing free-riders behaviours. When "complete sympathy" is obtained, cooperative production becomes optimal. Sympathy, or altruism, may have an influence on the efficiency of workers cooperative. Reciprocity gives even more interesting insights.

40 C. Keser, & E. van Winden, *Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods*, [in:] *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 102/2000, 23–39.

41 E. Fehr & K.M. Schmidt, *The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – experimental evidence and new theories*, [in:] S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism*, Elsevier 2006.

42 A. Alchian & H. Demsetz, *Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization*, [in:] *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 62, No. 5 (Dec., 1972), p. 777-795

43 L. Putterman, *Reciprocity, Altruism, and Cooperative Production*, [in:] S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity*, vol. 2, 1409-1435, Elsevier 2006.

44 G. Dow, *Governing the Firm: Economic Theory and Workers' Control*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2003.

Profit-sharing leads to mutual monitoring of workers by their fellow workers. It appears to be an effective disciplinary tool. Participatory decision making process may also increase workers incentives and reduce “free-riders” behaviour. The reason is simple: *an additional benefit of getting workers together to discuss the tasks facing them may be that communication fosters commitment to team goals*<sup>45</sup>. However, Putterman considers that it is important that the cooperative may choose its members and that individuals are free to enter or not in such cooperative.

To conclude on this point, we can say that the traditional tools of economists were not appropriate to study the economic effects of workers cooperative. By introducing altruism and reciprocity to explain the behaviour of workers, we can show that cooperative may be an efficient ways of organizing a firm. It may help reducing free-rider behaviours and increase workers incentive through a combination of pure involvement and peer pressure. The main constraint on workers cooperative is not that it does not provide the right incentives to cooperative’s members. The main one is certainly financial constraints and the difficulty to find external financing. As workers are owners of their firm, they cannot open the capital and thus use loans. But banks are often reluctant to borrow to such organizations.

### Understanding the development of institutions

Experiences on the willingness to punish free-riders in order to stimulate cooperation give interesting insights and can explain the endogenous development of institutions. In modern societies, cooperation is mainly driven by powerful institutions sanctioning the norm violations. These experiences show that inclinations to punish free-riders and the ability to understand the cooperation enhancing effects of punishment institutions are seen as an explanation of those institutions.

### Welfare State and redistribution

Lots of models in Economics try to explain the *demand for redistribution*. The most widely accepted model is the *median voter model*. According to this model, each voter maximizes its individual interest by choosing the wealth-maximizing level of redistribution. The level chosen by the median-income voter would be chosen. One implication is that the demand for redistribution should decrease when level of income increases. But evidences are not so clear. Demand for redistribution is high in some very rich countries where median of income is very high. Also, within countries, lots of poor people refuse redistribution while some rich people

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<sup>45</sup> L. Putterman, *Reciprocity, Altruism, and Cooperative Production*, [in:] S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity*, vol. 2, 1409-1435, Elsevier 2006.



clearly support it<sup>46</sup>. According to the World Value Survey<sup>47</sup>, in Spain for instance, 41% of people considering themselves as being member of the upper class consider that “governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor” is an “essential characteristic of democracy”. They are 27.1% from the lower class and 14.9% from the working class. If income may, in some cases, be an important determinant of redistribution’s demand, one should find other explanations to understand and analyse people’s reaction towards redistributive policies. Fong et al. (2006) argue that strong reciprocity behaviour may explain large differences in support for redistribution. **They identify three types of individuals: homo economicus, strong reciprocator and pure altruist who are represented in all groups.**

**When people blame the poor because of their poverty, support for redistribution is much lower than when people consider poverty is explained by unlucky circumstances.** Alesina<sup>48</sup> using also data from the World Value Survey highlight differences between the size of Welfare States in the US and in Europe. Their explanation is that much more Americans consider poverty is caused by laziness (60%), compared to 27% of Europeans.

Fong et al. then argue that *people are willing to help the poor but they withdraw support when they perceive that the poor may cheat or fail to cooperate by not trying hard enough to be self-sufficient and morally upstanding*. People that do not support redistribution may invoke the laziness of the poor to justify their selfishness. This is particularly important in the United States but they also show that this perception is “far from absent” in Europe. Using data from a Eurobarometer survey, they show that the concern about poverty is strongly negatively correlated with the belief that poverty is due to laziness. *Because of strong reciprocity, people wish to help those who try to make it on their own, but for reasons beyond their own control, cannot. People wish to punish, or withhold assistance to, those who are able but unwilling to work hard*. In other words, selfish motivations alone cannot explain support for redistribution. More precisely, Fong<sup>49</sup>, using Gallup surveys in the US, show that support for redistribution is explained both by selfish interest and by strong reciprocity. As shown in figure 1, people who believe that bad luck only cause poverty are 0.50 standard deviations higher in their support for redistribution; the ones who consider that luck causes wealth, 0.39. On contrary, people who consider that there are plenty opportunities in the US are 0.42 lower to support redistribution. Concerning selfish motives, those who earn more than USD150000 are 0.47 standard deviations lower to support redistribution and the ones also who never worry about bills support less redistribution.


46 Ch. M. Fong, *Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution*, [in:] *Journal of Public Economics* 82 (2) / 2001, 225–246.

47 <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>

48 A. Alesina, E. Glaeser, B. Sacerdote, *Why doesn't the United States have a European-style welfare state?*, [in:] *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2 / 2001, 187–278.

49 C. Fong, S. Bowles, S. & H. Gintis, *Strong reciprocity and the welfare state*, [in:] S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism*, Elsevier 2006.

Figure 1 : Determinants of support for redistribution



Source: Fong et al. 2006

The main implications of this research are:

1. *people exhibit significant levels of generosity, even towards stranger,*
2. *beliefs about the causes of high and low incomes matter,*
3. *people contribute to public goods and cooperate to collective endeavours, and consider it is unfair to free-ride on the contributions and efforts of others, and*
4. *people punish free-riders at substantial costs to themselves, even when they cannot reasonably expect future personal gain therefrom.*

This framework may explain in some ways why support for Welfare States has declined in some countries. It may be not because individuals have become more selfish, but because a growing share of the population has considered that violations of reciprocity norms have increased. There is strong evidence showing the support of people for generosity. The design of social policies should therefore take into account both egalitarian goals but also to minimize “free-riders” problems. When support for redistribution has decreased, lots of governments have answered to this lower support by decreasing social protection expenses and welfare cuts. The answer is clearly inappropriate as support for redistribution is strong and there are evidences showing that it is not the cost of such programs which was considered as problematic but the violations of reciprocal norms. One important aspect is that free rider problem is not as such inherent to the development of the Welfare State. This problem was observed in any kind of mutual agreement, coordination



process or organization. Reducing the Welfare State because of this problem is therefore not the solution. Instead, researchers specialized in game theories propose sharp designs to minimize such problem. Institutional mechanisms should therefore take into account the need to reduce possibilities of free-riding without reducing the level of solidarity towards all individuals who need it.

### 3. Justice and Equality

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Justice in Economics was traditionally seen as a component of social welfare maximization. According to Sen<sup>50</sup>, three pillars could be identified, underlying utilitarianism: welfarism, sum-ranking and consequentialism. Welfarism assumes that the goodness of a state must be evaluated entirely by information about individual utilities. Sum-ranking assumes that social utility is simply obtained by summing all individual utilities. Consequentialism assumes that all choices variables are evaluated in terms of their outcome and consequences. Each of these principles has largely been challenged. The first concern is about equality. The concept of sum-ranking ignores the distribution of utilities. If the richest individual in a society receives a subsidy by the State and his welfare is improving, this situation would be considered as Pareto-improving as soon as the wealth of others in the society is not weakened. From a welfarist perspective, it would then be seen as a positive change. But it will also increase the level of inequalities and it cannot be considered as fair from a progressive perspective. **As equality is a central concept for progressives, using welfarism to analyze justice issues is clearly irrelevant.** However, as we will see later, concept of equality is very heterogeneous and it is then necessary to define which equality criteria should be retained.

Lots of other theories do however take into consideration inequalities in the distribution of utilities. One of the most famous approaches is developed by Rawls<sup>51</sup>. Rawls was not focusing on utilities but on the indices of primary goods<sup>52</sup>. His criterion of justice is then based on the individual level of access to primary goals for the worst-off individual. The *difference principle* is derived from this idea. If the worst-off have a good access to the bundle of primary goods, then inequalities can be justified if it does not weaken the well-being of the worst-off. As rights are also a component of the boundaries of primary goods, the difference principles contradicts *consequentialism*. As it takes into account the well-being of the worst-off, it goes against *sum-*

50 A. Sen, *Justice*. [in:] *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online*.

51 J. Rawls, *A theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press 1971.

52 Primary goods are "things that every rational man is presumed to want, including rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect" (see Sen 2008).

*ranking*. Priority is given to access to liberty and not to the maximization of welfare. This latter is based on individual preferences but Rawls considers that all preferences are equivalent and a fair society cannot be a society where all individual preferences are fulfilled. The type of pleasure can be a matter of moral judgment. If a group of people likes discriminating people, what should be the responsibility of the State? From a welfarist perspective, the State should weight this specific preference “according to their intensity” together with others<sup>53</sup>. This cannot be a sustainable policy. This reason given by Rawls is a good example of why values should be taken into account when analyzing policies. Economists must therefore go beyond the fundamental principles and hypothesis underlying neo-classical theories.

If Rawlsian theory is a positive shift of justice theories for progressives, it cannot be considered as fully satisfactory. *Egalitarianism* goes beyond the goal of maximizing the well-being (or the access to primary goods) of the worst-off but take into account the *general* distribution of income and well-being among all society.

One first answer is given by Sen<sup>54</sup> that emphasizes the limits of focusing on primary goods. With the same level of income, the ability to convert primary goods into useful capabilities will differ among people. That’s why Sen’s conception of justice is based on the distribution of basic capabilities of people rather than primary goods. According to Sen, this view is closer to the focus on *fulfilling needs* that we found in Smith<sup>55</sup> or Marx<sup>56</sup>. As Sen<sup>57</sup> argues, *The achievement of capabilities will, of course, be causally related to the command over primary goods, and the capabilities, in their turn, will also influence the extent to which utilities are achieved, so that the various alternative measures will not be independent of each other. However, the basic issue is the variable that should be chosen to serve as the proper metric for judging advantages of people – the equity and the distribution of which could form the foundations of a theory of justice.*

## The role of liberties and rights

**One important question for progressives is the importance they give to the value of liberty in their conception of justice.** We saw that this notion has a central role in Rawlsian theory, as a pillar of the primary social goals. Sen also considers that freedoms define the scope of capabilities, which means that human deprivations may be explained by the lack of freedom. This view is coherent with the progressive idea of individual emancipation.

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<sup>53</sup> One should note however that some utilitarians tried to take into account this critics, for example by excluding “anti-social preferences” (Haranyi 1982).

<sup>54</sup> A. K. Sen & W. B., *Utilitarianism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982.

<sup>55</sup> A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. London: Dent, 1954.

<sup>56</sup> K. Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. English translation, New York: International Publishers, 1938.

<sup>57</sup> A. Sen, *Justice*. [in:] *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online*.



One problematic conception however is the one developed by Nozick<sup>58</sup>: the theory of entitlements. Rights are given full priority. This view goes against any consequentialist analyses. In other words, Nozick considers that the outcome does not have to be taken into account as a justice criterion. The only aspect to take into consideration is the full recognition of individual rights. Nozick includes personal liberty of course in his list of rights, but give also a prominent role to ownership rights over property. Any limitation to ownership rights must be rejected according to this theory of entitlements. This concept clearly goes against any *egalitarian* theories. Without any consideration for outcomes, it justifies any inequalities that may appear as soon as ownership rights are *formally* recognized in the society. Even unequal access to ownership rights (due to lower capabilities, lack of freedom, education, access to credit, or discrimination) are out of the scope of the theory.

If the rejection of Nozick's theory seems obvious for progressives, the question is more complicated when dealing about the issue of workers' rights. Marxist theories give a prominent role to these rights. Concept of Marxian *exploitation* is based on the idea that workers sell their labour force at a lower price than its real value. Their wages paid by capitalists allows them to satisfy their primary needs. But the value created by their labour is much higher, and the rent is captured by capitalists. An increase of workers' rights may be seen as a way to protect workers and to decrease the size of the rent captured by capitalists. This conception goes however against the principle of *consequentialism*. If workers' rights are seen as a tool to reduce exploitation, the outcome is not analyzed. It is therefore insufficient to define a progressive conception of justice. Nevertheless, workers' right can surely be included in the Rawlsian list of primary goals and Sen's capabilities.

Rights and liberties should be seen as *instruments* to achieve other goals such as improvements in well-being.

## Equality of what?

From this brief review of main justice theories used in economics, we can raise some preliminary conclusions:

### 1. Focus has to be given to individuals' well-being rather than income or primary goods.

One should take into account the different individuals capacity to transform opportunities in effective well-being achievement

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<sup>58</sup> R. Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. Oxford: Blackwell 1974.

**2. Focus has to be given to the distribution of income and well-being within society.**

The sum-ranking criterion is clearly insufficient to analyze social welfare. But the Rawlsian idea of maximizing the well-being of the worst-off cannot be seen as the only achievement. Progressives should have a closer look to the whole distribution. Egalitarian theories should therefore be used.

**3. Rights and liberties are fundamental instruments to achieve individuals' emancipation.** They cannot be seen as a goal per se, but as a tool to improve individuals' well-being.

One remaining question is the conception of equality that has to be promoted by progressives. It is one of the main debates between progressives and conservatives. But concepts are not clearly defined. A huge literature tried to clarify the debate by answering the question: what should be equalized? Progressives should learn from this to defend an ambitious and well-defined conception of equality.

The new perspectives on justice focused on the trade-off between equality and responsibility. The principle of equalization states that two people who have the same level of responsibility should obtain an equal outcome. The principle of responsibility states that inequalities can be justified if the level of responsibility was different between individuals. In other words, it is fair that an individual that make more efforts receive a higher outcome than another. This is the basic principle, but as we will see, authors largely differ in their understanding of individual responsibility. In the first part, we saw that *strong reciprocal* behaviour require a responsibility towards others. A reciprocal individual is ready to be generous and to feel solidarity with another individual unless he considers that this individual is acting as a free-rider. It is therefore crucial to understand this responsibility principle from a positive perspective (how do individuals perceive it?) but also from a normative one (Which responsibility principle should be promoted to define a progressive conception of justice)? As noticed by Dworkin<sup>59</sup> and Roemer<sup>60</sup>, the basic ethics of equalitarism can be defined as follow: *the distribution of resources should be ambition-sensitive, but not endowment-sensitive, endowments being the "circumstances" a person has no control over, and ambitions being formed and carried out by virtue of a person's will.*

The first theories focus on **equality of welfare**. It can be understood as idealized preference satisfaction or as internal states such as happiness<sup>61</sup>. The less talented and disabled should be compensated up to the level where they enjoy as much welfare as the others. The

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<sup>59</sup> R. Dworkin, *What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare*, [in:] *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, X (Summer 1981), 185-246 and R. Dworkin, *What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources*, [in:] *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, X (Fall 1981), 283-345

<sup>60</sup> J.E. Roemer, *A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner*, [in:] *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 146-166

<sup>61</sup> H. Brighouse & A. Swift, *Egalitarianism.*, [in:] *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition*. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.





main problem is that people with expensive tastes will receive more resources than people with cheap preferences. One famous example is the comparison of two peoples: one rich who likes very expensive Champagne and one poor who prefers beers. In order to equalize welfare, the rich should receive more resources to finance his expenses of Champagne. This is clearly anti-redistributive.

To take into account this possible source of unfairness, Dworkin<sup>62</sup> proposes to focus on **equality of resources** instead. Equality is then obtained when everyone faces the same financial constraint, without looking at the level of welfare derived from these resources. Preferences are the responsibility of every individual, and people should not be compensated for having expensive tastes. Distribution is equal if no one prefers other boundaries of goods detained (according to the non-envy principle). Here, resources may be transferable (such as money) or not transferable (talents). One limit of this approach is that it does not take into consideration the ability of people to transfer resources into effective well-being's improvement. Also, this theory was seen as a response to the critics made on the equality of welfare but Roemer<sup>63</sup> shows theoretically that equality of resources implies equality of welfare.

We can also mention the idea of equalizing **bundles of primary social goods**, derived from the theory of justice of Rawls<sup>64</sup>. As we said above, the problem of this approach is that there is no consideration for inequalities beyond this level of primary social goods. Also, there are methodological difficulties when aggregating different kind of primary social goods. It is thus very difficult to compare the situation of different people with different endowments.

Sen<sup>65</sup> proposes to equalize **level of functioning** which is the observable "doing and beings" of persons. People with different capabilities should get the same access to functioning.

All these theories tackle different interesting issues. Dworkin contributes to the understanding of equality of welfare's unfairness and its possible anti-redistributive consequences. Rawls focuses on the well-being of the poorest and Sen insists on the need to equalize the capacity to exploit opportunities into effective outcome. But **we are still lacking a global understanding of what should be an equalitarian policy for progressives. Equality of opportunity was therefore seen as a comprehensive theory proposing an acceptable trade-off between responsibility and equality.** We will now see the inputs and limits of this approach.

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62 R. Dworkin, *Ibidem*

63 J.E. Roemer, *Equality of Resources implies Equality of Welfare*, [in:] *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 1986, 101(4), 751-784

64 J. Rawls, *A theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press 1971.

65 A. Sen, *Equality of What?*, [in:] *The Tanner lectures on human values*, vol. 1. S. McMurrin, ed. Salt Lake City: U. of Utah Press 1980.

## Going beyond equality of opportunity

One important debate is thus about the relevance of **equality of opportunities**. Arneson<sup>66</sup> proposes to equalize “opportunities for welfare” while Cohen<sup>67</sup> focuses on “access to advantage (or opportunities)”. Both concepts are relatively similar. Arneson criticizes the concept of equality of resources build on the distinction between resources (that people are not responsible for) and preferences (which is part of individual responsibility). He proposes an alternative distinction between *opportunities* and *outcome*. An individual is not considered as responsible for the opportunity he gets. His individual responsibility is to transform opportunities into outcome. Roemer proposes the following definition of equality of responsibility: *equality of opportunity for X holds when the values of X for all those who exercised a comparable degree of responsibility are equal, regardless of their circumstances*. Circumstances are a set of socioeconomic and genetic characteristics. This set is chosen by each society. His proposal is then political. Each society defines a set of circumstances that call for compensatory transfers. Level of individual responsibility may therefore change between countries. It is seen as a collective choice. The main difficulty is to evaluate when two individuals in different circumstances have exercised a “comparable degree of responsibility”.

According to this view, inequalities in outcome are fair unless opportunities were equalized *ex ante*. But a remaining question is the definition of these opportunities that should be equalized<sup>68</sup>. *Conservative equalitarian* will have a very limited list of opportunities, considering that individuals are mostly responsible for all their actions. Equality of opportunity policies would there be limited to an equal access to education and public services and prohibition of discrimination. But as Sen pointed out, individuals are not equal in exploiting the same opportunities. That’s why Fleurbaey proposes to focus on *equalitarian opportunities*, rather than equal opportunity. An equalitarian opportunities policy should therefore take into account different social, familial or cultural background in order to be effective and not reproduce inequalities.

Fleurbaey<sup>69</sup> then argues that that it is not clear whether equality of opportunity is a sufficient condition for distributive justice. We may consider that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for if there are preferences for a particular set of opportunities. What it is clear is that the *principle of compensation* only applies to circumstances and not to individual responsibility. In other words, in the common understanding of the principle of equality of opportunity, the State cannot compensate individual for their own individual responsible choices. This is called

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66 R.J. Arneson, *Equality of Opportunity for Welfare*, [in:] *Philosophical Studies* 56 (1989): 77-93.

67 G.A. Cohen, *Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities*, [in:] *Recherches économiques de Louvain*, 1990, 56: 357-82.

68 M. Fleurbaey, *Egalitarian Opportunities*, [in:] *Law and Philosophy*, 20(5) / 2001, 499-530

69 *Ibidem*



by Fleurbaey the *principle of natural reward*. This may be problematic. The State should therefore compensate only for different circumstances without compensating for consequences of individual action. As Fleurbaey writes: *“the amount of transfer which may compensate exactly for different circumstances may be a function of responsibility variables as well.”* Is this view acceptable for progressive? It implies that the State should not provide for instance unemployment insurance if a worker loses his job because he has committed a mistake. *A small mistake may have huge or long-term consequences which amount to a disproportionate punishment*<sup>70</sup>. That’s why it is necessary to have a closer look to inequalities of outcome also. We then come to a vision which is closer to progressive values: *the bulk of egalitarian program is precisely to (. . .) look for institutions that would enable the population to form a community in which values of solidarity and mutual care would be embodied in institutions and would guarantee that every individual would benefit from equal status, equal respect, equal ability to provide for oneself and one’s family, and would be preserved from subordination, exploitation or humiliation*. In other words, principle of individual responsibility should not overcome the rejection of any forms of domination. If a society let an individual fall into poverty because it considers it is his own responsibility, then this individual becomes dependent on private charity, or exploitation. A society should give to every individual at each moment of his life the possibility to preserve his dignity and to reach an average level of affluence. This is a first argument to consider that equality of opportunity principle cannot be seen as fully satisfactory for progressives: this theory may neglect the right of every individual to be treated with dignity.

A second point is the distinction between responsibility and opportunity becomes very fuzzy once we take into account uncertainty. Any economic activity may have very different outcomes, depending on a set of factors that cannot be controlled by individuals. “Luck” or “Bad luck” (defined as the impact of exogenous circumstances) may influence the probability to succeed or to fail, whatever is the level of effort. How can we distinguish the situation of two people who have failed, one because of laziness and the other one because of adverse environment (or bad luck)? It is therefore very complicated. One negative consequence of equality of opportunity principle is that it may discourage risk-taking activities and thus have harmful economic effects. Uncertainty about future outcomes represents therefore a serious limit to the concept of equality of opportunities. One cannot consider that all inequalities are fair even if opportunities are equalized. Role of the State is therefore to provide extensive insurance and remove risks that may cause social inequalities.

Building from these limits, but also learning from the inputs of other theories of equality, Fleurbaey<sup>71</sup> proposes the concept of **equality of autonomy**. Concept of autonomy is

70 M. Fleurbaey, *Egalitarian Opportunities*, [in:] *Law and Philosophy*, 20(5) / 2001, 499-530

71 M. Fleurbaey, *Fairness, Responsibility and Welfare*, New York: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 295

broader than the one of opportunity: *autonomy is, more transparently, something that depends not only on the quality of the menu but also on the quality of the agent.* It is closely linked to the principle of freedom. Freedom has to be understood as an individual right: making choices concerning individual life; but also as a collective right. Freedom is also the possibility to participate in collective choices and is therefore closely linked to the concept of *democracy*. It requires strong institutions to help citizens attaining a good level of competence allowing them making their own choices. A high minimum income is needed to respect the dignity of every individual, whatever are the circumstances. These institutions also should preserve equalities in social relations, ie. ensuring that social inequalities do not hurt social cohesion.

Fleurbaey concludes by summing-up the main components of equality of autonomy:

1. It requires basic freedom. Individuals should be guaranteed equal status and a basic bundle of freedoms and the basic means of autonomy (like in Rawls or Sen Theories).
2. Priority is given to the worst-off which implies compensation and respect of individual preferences over dimensions of life, including the quality of social relations.

One important difference between equality of opportunities and equality of autonomy is the *principle of forgiveness*<sup>72</sup> embodied in the latter one. The goal of equality of opportunity is to give every individual the same opportunities and then let them behave as they want, taking all responsibilities in the consequences of their choice. But individuals also have the right to make wrong choices or to face an adverse environment, which explain the failure of an individual project. The role of the State is then to give other opportunities to these individuals in order to preserve their dignity and conduct new projects. The State should therefore give to every individual, *at any stage of his life*, the opportunity to make his own choice. Rejection of any forms of domination should therefore goes beyond the principle of responsibility. It may help policy-makers to get a more coherent vision of equality, taking into account the traditional trade-off between equality and responsibility. Also, progressives should give modern answer to the combined need of collective rights and protection but also individual emancipation and freedom. **There is still an ambiguity on the level of this trade-off. Further investigations on this concept of equality of autonomy may bring interesting insights and clearer policy implications on what should be an egalitarian progressive policy.**

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72 M. Fleurbaey, *Freedom with forgiveness*, [in:] *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* 4 : 29-67, 2005.



## Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to give an overview of the debate in Economics about values. We show that two distinct approaches have given interesting insights: an individual and a collective one. At the individual level, the first aspect is to understand what individuals are really looking for, beyond the economic goal of income or profit maximization. This has strong implications for the measurement of economic performance and more broadly for the evaluation of individual well-being. To give appropriate answers, policy-makers should therefore have a clear picture of the living standards and expectations of the citizens. First, they should have a closer look to income, rather than production level. But this is only one part of the story. Income maximization cannot be the only goal of a policy. In order to evaluate individual and collective well-being, policy-makers should use multiple criteria, including subjective evaluations of well-being, but also the level of achievement in non-monetary aspects of individual daily-life: level of freedom, education, health, working conditions, civic and political rights, social capital... The evaluation of any policy should therefore take into account the impact on those aspects.

The economic analysis has made a lot of progress in recent years, analyzing other-regarding preferences. Analysis of altruism or reciprocity leads to strong policy implications. The role and consequences of cooperation can be seen from a completely different perspective. The will of individuals to sanction free-riders may explain the development of institutions. Also, the crisis of support for Welfare-States observed in lots of countries does not necessarily come from a rise of selfishness. It may also be explained by a breaking-off in the social contract and an increase of free-riders behaviour. **The answer is not a reduction of the size of the Welfare-State, but a political work and a renewal of the social contract within societies.**

The second main contribution of economists is about justice and equality. At the cross-road between economics and philosophy, it emphasizes the need to clarify some concepts. **For progressives, there is a need to give a closer look to the distribution of income within countries. There is also a need to find a balanced trade-off between equality and responsibility.** Concept of equality of opportunity has influenced a growing number of policy-makers events within the progressive family. Our view is that this concept is insufficient to tackle all the challenges the progressive should answer. Equalitarian must also have a look to the outcome and not only to the initial conditions and circumstances. **The role of the State is to give every individual, at any stage of his life, the capacity to emancipate and to preserve his dignity.** A progressive and modern vision of equality should therefore not forget the principle of responsibility but also the need of social cohesion and strong institutions to give equal autonomy to everyone. Concept of equality of autonomy appears as a good starting point to tackle all these issues. From a normative point of view, this approach may be promising for progressives.

We do not give in this paper a clear answer on what should be a progressive policy or what are the implications of the concept of equality of autonomy in daily-life politics. Our view is that **progressives need a more coherent narrative, and therefore a clearer vision on what is the theoretical background of the values they are promoting.** Next step would be to work on the linkages between this theoretical vision and concrete policies promoted in different fields. Equality of autonomy may be a good framework to make such a link.

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PROGRESS  
VALUES FOR





SIVE  
R THE

# 21<sup>ST</sup>

CENTURY



Patrick DIAMOND

# **Social Democracy and Social Justice in Europe**



## **Key words**

**Social justice – Poverty – Life-chances – Public attitudes – Solidarity**

## **Summary**

This chapter will examine current attitudes to social justice in the European Union across David Miller's four dimensions of justice, while adding a fifth dimension, namely power, civic responsibility, rights and duties. The chapter will explore public attitudes in relation to equal citizenship (civil liberties and social rights), the social minimum (attitudes to income poverty), fair distribution (relating to recent concerns about top pay and income inequality), equal opportunity (childcare, education, and inter-generational solidarities), and power and civic responsibility (personal control, desert and empowerment). It will draw on existing data-sets including the Euro-barometer and European Social Survey (ESS), while identifying gaps in the data that need to be remedied by further research.

## Introduction

Social justice has been the animating ideal of European social democracy for much of the last century. It reflects the core commitment of the centre-left to *substantive* freedom, not only access to basic liberties and the chance for self-determination, but the ability to exercise individual autonomy through the opportunity and security afforded by an active and enabling state. The role of government is not to act as a barrier to freedom, but to enable and enrich personal liberty. Nonetheless, **despite its evident political resonance, social justice is an ambiguous and contested concept, and it has varying degrees of purchase both within and between European societies.** The political theorist David Miller has famously identified four pre-eminent dimensions of social justice:

- **Equal citizenship:** every citizen is entitled to an equal set of civil, political and social rights including the means to exercise those rights effectively.
- **The social minimum:** all citizens must have access to resources that adequately meet their essential needs, and allow them to live a secure and dignified life in today's society.
- **Equality of opportunity:** an individual's life-chances, especially their access to jobs and educational opportunities, should depend on their own motivation and aptitudes, not on irrelevant markers of difference such as gender, class or ethnicity.
- **Fair distribution:** resources that do not form part of equal citizenship or the social minimum may be distributed unequally, but the distribution must reflect legitimate factors including personal desert and individual choice.

Miller's aim was to ascertain the principles on which citizens draw in judging whether societies are just or unjust. Of course, it might be argued that Miller's list is deficient or at least inadequate. The principle of equality of opportunity does not explicitly take account of increasingly important inter-generational inequalities, particularly in the light of climate change and its impact on future generations, as well as the reform of the welfare state including de facto redistribution towards older citizens and retirees. At the same time, Miller's conception of social justice is framed in terms of rights and entitlements, but has relatively little to say about reciprocity

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<sup>1</sup> D.Miller, *Principles of Social Justice*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994.



and civic responsibility: the mutual rights and duties that bind together political communities. Another gap in Miller's account relates to power: any persuasive account of social justice must reflect the importance of giving individuals the power to shape their own lives, rather than being held back by the destiny of circumstances or birth.

Miller's framework undoubtedly offers an engaging and fruitful starting-point for further debate and discussion. However, merely developing metaphysical and theoretical understandings of social justice is plainly inadequate. As Peter Taylor-Gooby<sup>2</sup> has suggested, **it is also essential to understand the complexity of public attitudes, how public policy can work with the grain of public views, and where political parties might also need to challenge the attitudes of voters.** The evidence suggests that the public generally do not conceive social justice in terms of grand theories, but tend to relate conceptions of justice to specific life events, contexts and particularities. This is an important reminder to politicians, namely that to capture the public imagination they must always relate values to specific and tangible policy goals, rather than abstract philosophies or intangible theoretical principles. **The role of political theory is to help frame the narratives and discourses of social justice on which politicians can subsequently draw.**

**Attitudes do matter, not least because the literature indicates that how the public perceives inequality, poverty and income distribution are an important aspect of a country's welfare culture<sup>3</sup>. This shapes both the perceived legitimacy of particular welfare programmes, but also the overall shape and design of the welfare state.** An important distinction is emphasised between those countries where poverty tends to be blamed on the irresponsible behaviour of the poor (notably the United States), and those states where structural explanations are strongly emphasised in interpreting the prevalence of poverty (particularly the Continental and Nordic countries in Europe). The point to stress is that underlying public attitudes have implications for the viability and legitimacy of particular social policy programmes, as well as for the capacity of European social democratic parties to frame their public agendas in terms of enduring social justice principles.

Attitudes are also inherently complex: for example, findings from the most recent UK social attitudes survey show that public attitudes towards poverty and the poorest in society have hardened since the 1980s, despite the election of a Labour government committed to eradicating poverty. For example, in 1989, 51% backed policies to redistribute income from rich to poor, but this had fallen to 36% by 2010, although 78% remain concerned about the extent of wealth inequality in the UK. Some commentators argue that the decline in support

2 P.Taylor-Gooby, *Attitudes to Social Justice, Research Paper*, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2005.

3 D.Lepianka, W.Van Oorschot & J.Gelissen, *Popular explanations of poverty in Europe: Effects of contextual and individual characteristics across 28 European countries [in:] Acta Sociologica 2009, Volume 53, Issue 1, pp. 53-72.*

for policies to tackle poverty reflects the unwillingness of leading social democratic politicians in Britain to talk more explicitly about the case for redistribution and a comprehensive welfare state.

It is important to underline that while public perceptions affect policy-making, there is even greater potential for governments to influence perceptions in order to enhance the legitimacy of their policies. **Political parties are not the passive beneficiaries of underlying shifts in public opinion, but rather have the capacity to frame and shape the perceptions of voters.** The centre-ground of politics is not given, but can be shaped on the basis of a compelling ideological and programmatic appeal. Parties help to set the public mood, rather than being imprisoned by a particular instinct as to what voters will, or will not, accept.

This concern with public attitudes has focused increasing attention on the processes of perception formation among citizens, notably the role of the media. At the same time, it is important not to underestimate the importance of wider social influences and networks in shaping public sentiment and values, as well as the importance of ideas in framing public agendas. **It is wrong to suppose that interests matter more than ideas,** since the interests which individuals pursue have to be articulated as ideas before they can be pursued as interests<sup>4</sup>. Indeed, ideas can also be weapons in the struggle to define the dominant discourse and conceptions of political “common-sense”: shifting the axis of politics irreversibly in a social democratic direction. So ideas matter, and **there will be no revival of centre-left politics in Europe without a thorough-going and fundamental renewal of ideas.**

While levels of trust in governments and politicians are another crucial dimension of social justice, citizen’s views of poverty, social exclusion and equal opportunity are framed as much by the ideas they hold about the general shape of society and the economy than their own economic and material self-interest. This observation emphasises that the importance of *ideas* have generally been underestimated in favour of interests, reflecting the continuing hold of latent Marxist assumptions in social and political analysis. It is important to redress the balance in considering the salience of social justice among the citizens of Europe, taking into account the interaction between institutions, interests and ideas.

This chapter will examine current attitudes to social justice in the European Union across Miller’s four dimensions, but will add a fifth dimension, namely power, civic responsibility, rights and duties. The chapter will explore public attitudes in relation to equal citizenship (civil liberties and social rights), the social minimum (attitudes to income poverty), fair distribution (relating to recent concerns about top pay and income inequality), equal opportunity (childcare, education, and inter-generational solidarities), and power and civic responsibility (personal control, desert and empowerment). It will draw on existing data-sets including the

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<sup>4</sup> A.Gamble, *The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 142




Euro-barometer and European Social Survey (ESS), while identifying gaps in the data that might need to be remedied by further research.

The quantitative research findings will be used to ascertain which inequalities people find most acceptable and unacceptable, the changing role of the state in welfare provision, and the circumstances in which different groups are deemed to merit help from government. It is important to recognise that public views are often ambiguous, and that notions such as fair distribution and the social minimum are more widely supported for some groups than others. Children and pensioners are deemed to merit support from the state whereas migrants and workless adults are not, although there is considerable variance in attitudes across the EU.

The sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen famously spoke of *three worlds of welfare capitalism* in Europe. The three models of Continental, Nordic and Southern European welfare have since been augmented by the emergence of Eastern and Central European welfare states, alongside the UK's uniquely liberal Anglo-Social model. It is important to trace commonalities and divergences across Europe, as well as the implications for public policy. Despite significant disparities and differences on particular measures, it is also clear that there are common threads of social justice uniting not only the European social democratic movement, but the citizens of Europe. This makes social justice important not only in its own terms, but as an animating principle of European integration in a post-crisis world where arguably **more not less Europe is needed in order to solve the most pressing economic and environmental challenges.**

Europe has clearly been afflicted in recent decades by rising inequalities. The table below illustrates the prevalence of inequality across the EU as measured by the gini co-efficient for income inequality:



Source: EU Community Statistics on Income and living conditions; the data is for 2006; updated Jan 2008

Structural trends in the global economy have driven substantive inequalities in the wage and income distribution, exacerbated by the financial crisis of 2008-9. Governments at all levels have struggled to live up to the challenge of equipping individuals to face new uncertainties in their working lives, coping with risks such as obsolete skills and inadequate education. Nearly one in seven (around seventy eight million people in Europe) are at risk of poverty. Shockingly, child poverty has continued to rise across member-states over the last decade. Children (0-17) have a particularly high rate of poverty at 19%. One parent households and those with dependent children have the highest poverty risk; for single parents with one dependent child, the risk is currently 33%. Other age groups at a high risk of poverty are young people (18-24) at 18%, and older people (65+) at 19%; older women are at a considerably higher risk than men (21% compared to 16%). As highlighted earlier, these figures do not include some of those in the most extreme situations such as those faced by certain ethnic minority groups. Of course, poverty rates are necessarily only one dimension of social injustice.

Welfare states have arguably placed too much emphasis on passive income redistribution and “insider” guarantees of social protection, without helping to equip Europe’s citizens for the competitive challenge of the future. The more recent labour market research demonstrates that wage inequality in Europe has intensified since the late 1990s: while income redistribution has been strengthened, labour market regulation and wage protection have eased<sup>5</sup>. This has, in turn, fuelled the legitimacy crisis facing the EU which is increasingly blamed for the negative consequences of globalisation, liberalisation and austerity measures.

The main drivers of growing inequality inevitably vary across the Europe continent. In the core continental member-states, slow growth and rising unemployment have been a particular challenge for the last three decades. For the ten member-states that joined the EU in 2004, including the eight former Communist countries, this has been a fraught period of transition and adjustment. For the “periphery” countries, namely Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Spain, there has been a phase of rapid modernisation, at least until the financial collapse of 2007-8. In contrast, the Nordic countries have developed social models that led to outstanding growth performance since the early 1990s<sup>6</sup>. It might be expected that these factors are reflected in public attitudes to the varying dimensions of social justice.

At the same time, while there is great diversity between, as well as *within*, countries, all member-states face common challenges such as demography, increased ethnic and cultural diversity, and the individualisation of values. Every member-state in the EU is a

<sup>5</sup> M.Goos, M. & A.Manning, *Lovely and Lousy Jobs: The Rising Polarization of Work in Britain*, [in] *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Volume 89 (1), pages 118-133, 2003.

<sup>6</sup> See R. Liddle & F. Lerais, *Europe’s Social Reality*, Bureau of European Economic Advisers (BEPA), Brussels: European Commission, 2006.





relatively open society shaped by the forces of international capitalism, alongside global cultural trends and values. In many societies, there is an increasing cultural gap between “cosmopolitans” who are portrayed as the “winners” of globalisation and social change, and those who are left behind through the economic transition, perceiving their traditional values, communities and sense of belonging to be under immediate threat. This new divide between “liberals” and “communitarians” forms an important backdrop to public attitudes in relation to social justice.

The chapter will address each of the five key social justice principles in turn, undertaking a brief review of the existing research data, following by broad conclusions and an agenda for future research on public attitudes to social justice in Europe. There is an important caveat, namely that much of the data relates to the period prior to the financial crisis, and the impact of austerity and adjustment programmes across Europe. There are important issues which have increased in public salience, notably negative attitudes towards the wealthy, and the remuneration of those who trade in financial markets but who rely on state-funded “bail-outs” when financial institutions collapse.

It is hoped that emerging social surveys and new data sets will help to address this lacuna in evidence concerning public attitudes after the global financial crisis. It should also be emphasised that this chapter is concerned with how citizens conceive and interpret different aspects of social justice, rather than proposing new policy programmes that might help to combat injustice. That said, it is important to reflect on what obstacles might exist to a more expansive egalitarian agenda such as the new rationale for welfare state universalism, the willingness of citizens to pay higher taxes, the requirements of competition and fiscal discipline, and the constraints on what public policy might achieve in an increasingly globalised and fragmented world.

## Equal Citizenship

The first social justice principle relates to notions of equal citizenship, in particular the connection between notions of social justice and civil, political and social rights. The concept of “social rights” has played an influential role in the development of the European Union since the 1950s, marking out Europe as distinctive from other parts of the world, notably the United States. When asked to select the values that best represent the EU, citizens give priority to values such as human rights (38%), democracy (38%), and peace (35%), all of which are consistent with the notion of social rights (Eurobarometer, 2010). The 2009 Eurobarometer survey revealed a rise in

*7 It is also important to acknowledge that cross-national comparisons have to be treated cautiously, as cultural factors can influence how respondents interpret particular questions. For example, there may be social factors that affect whether respondents are willing to tell researchers that they have strong views in a particular area.*

“individualistic” values (respect for human life, tolerance and self-fulfilment), but those values have since lost ground to more universal values such as solidarity and equality.

T.H. Marshall<sup>8</sup> defined social rights in terms of economic welfare and security, the right to access services and public goods, and the right to be treated fairly and equitably by the state. The implication of various conceptions of social rights is that freedom consists of more than mutual non-interference: it involves positive obligations to provide resources which enhance human welfare and enable each individual to fulfil their true potential in life.

**The tradition of social rights is integral to the European economic and social model, but it is still necessary to explore how far the social rights approach is rooted in public values and public sentiment across Europe. If the basic values underpinning social rights are no longer widely supported, the legitimacy of social rights will be undermined.** As Daly<sup>9</sup> has noted, the existing bases of solidarity, cohesion and social rights have been undermined by changing politics and values, as well as increasing scepticism about the quality of centralised state provision and public services, particularly prevalent in Eastern and Central Europe.

Whiteley (2008) has drawn on international social survey evidence to examine the rights that individuals feel the state should guarantee<sup>10</sup>. There are striking and important commonalities: for example, 73% of citizens believe it is very important that “government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of their position in society”, while 69% believe that “all citizens should have an adequate standard of living”. Social rights appear to have some grounding in intuitive public sentiments relating to social justice, and are an important means of connecting citizens to the welfare state. However, this chapter will emphasise that on the basis of data on public attitudes, rights-based conceptions of social justice are likely to be insufficient. It is essential to marry the language of rights with reciprocal duties and obligations.

Nonetheless, the principle of ensuring that all citizens have access to a minimum guarantee of social protection continues to have purchase among the populations of Europe. This may relate to evidence that both Europeans and Americans are less happy when inequality is high<sup>11</sup>. European citizens are generally more averse to inequality, believing that the poor may easily become stuck without any meaningful possibility of escape, and that those on very low incomes are deserving of additional support through the welfare state so they have the means to realise new opportunities and life-chances.

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8 T.H.Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.

9 M.Daly, *Access to Social Rights in Europe*, Report for the European Committee for Social Cohesion, October 2002.

10 It should be noted that the International Social Survey (ISS) sample draws on OECD countries, not just the EU. Nonetheless, the data is based on more than 50,000 respondents in over thirty countries.

11 A.Alesina, R.Di Tella & R.MacCulloch, *Inequality and happiness: are Europeans and Americans different?*, [in:] *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 88, pp. 2009-2042, 2004.



## The social minimum

The second principle of social justice concerns the importance of a social minimum. This relates to how “real” the public perceive poverty to be in Europe, whether citizenship involves contributing to the worse off in society, and the limits to redistribution of wealth and income. Taylor-Gooby<sup>12</sup> has drawn on European Social Survey (ESS) data to trace people’s views of poverty in EU15 member-states. The survey asked, “To be a good citizen, how important is it to support those who are worse off” and respondents marked a scale from 1 to 10 with the score of one representing the strongest approval and ten the lowest. The chart below shows the percentages responding on the scale of one to three, and three to five:

**Table 2: To be a good citizen, how important is it to support those who are worse off?**

	One-three	Three-five	Cumulative score
United Kingdom	48	30	78
Germany	54	25	79
France	48	30	78
Netherlands	68	20	88
Belgium	53	27	80
Luxembourg	40	21	61
Spain	59	19	78
Greece	49	11	60
Italy	52	18	70
Portugal	56	12	68
Denmark	60	15	75
Norway	65	19	84
Finland	68	10	78
Sweden	56	20	76

The Netherlands and Norway record the highest responses in favour of the statement that being a “good” citizen means helping the worst-off in society. Greece and Luxembourg are among the lowest, emphasising the importance of differences that exist within particular welfare state regimes. Interestingly, the cumulative percentage for the UK is similar to other countries, although the percentage replying “one to three” is lower at 48% than the European average of 55.5%. There is some evidence that the salience of income inequality in many European countries, while still important, had begun to diminish prior to the financial crisis.

<sup>12</sup> P.Taylor-Gooby, *Attitudes to Social Justice, Research Paper*, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2005.

According to a more recent Eurobarometer survey, people feel that poverty in their own country is widespread (73%), ranging from 96% in Hungary and 92% in Bulgaria to 34% in Cyprus and 31% in Denmark. 84% of citizens across the EU believe that poverty has increased in their own country over the last ten years. The causes of poverty are chiefly seen as too much unemployment (52%) and low wages (49%), as well as people themselves lacking training and skills (37%). The unemployed (56%) and the elderly (41%) are considered most at risk of poverty in Europe<sup>13</sup>.

The most recent Eurobarometer survey undertaken after the financial crisis found that 72% of EU citizens felt that poverty had increased in *their country* in the 12 months prior to the survey, but they were less likely to think that poverty in their local area had increased in that timeframe; this opinion was held by 55% of interviewees<sup>14</sup>. 61% of EU citizens estimated that *at least 20%* of their country's inhabitants lived in poverty. The countries where respondents were the most "pessimistic" about the poverty rate in their country - where a large majority believed that *about 1/3* of their fellow citizens lived in poverty - were Romania (68%), Hungary (62%) and Bulgaria (59%). This indicates that there is strong awareness of the prevalence of poverty among Europe's citizens: significant potential exists in building public support for a renewed commitment to a social minimum across member-states. Of course, it should also be remembered that the primary purpose of the welfare state is not to help the "worst-off", but to pool risks across society and to forge a cross-class coalition in favour of universal social policies. Contributing to the welfare state is primarily an act of enlightened self-interest, rather than an expression of altruism.

## Equality of opportunity

However, the most politically salient terrain for social justice is considered to relate to notions of equality of opportunity. The third domain in Miller's framework relates to conceptions of equal opportunity. The concept of equality of opportunity is particularly important since there is evidence that the principles relating to fair and equal life-chances are highly resonant within public opinion across European countries<sup>15</sup>. The intuitive normative claim that each individual should be able to progress in life on the basis of their aptitudes and innate talents is deeply ingrained in the moral sentiments of most citizens in Europe.

Nonetheless, equality of opportunity in Europe is seen as generally weak. Europeans and

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<sup>13</sup> The European Commission, *Eurobarometer Survey on Poverty and Social Exclusion, 2009, Luxembourg*.

<sup>14</sup> The European Commission, *Monitoring the Social Impact of the Crisis: public perceptions in the European Union - Wave 5, 2010, Eurobarometer*.

<sup>15</sup> P.Taylor-Gooby, *Attitudes to Social Justice, Research Paper, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2005*.



Americans differ in their attitudes towards inequality because while Americans have a high degree of confidence in the opportunities for social mobility if individuals are prepared to work hard, Europe is seen as more immobile where the poor can easily become caught in a long-term spiral of poverty<sup>16</sup>. While 60% of Americans believe that the poor are lazy, only 30% of Europeans have the same beliefs<sup>17</sup>. This helps to shape and determine preferences for redistribution. Hence citizens in Germany, Spain and Italy are generally reluctant to consider cuts in welfare programmes<sup>18</sup>, while higher unemployment benefits are favoured in five out of six European countries surveyed<sup>19</sup>.

However, this section focuses predominantly on inter-generational solidarity as an aspect of equality of opportunity where there is some evidence of growing friction across generational cohorts. In a recent Eurobarometer survey, EU citizens were most likely to accept that young people and older people do not easily agree on what is best for society (69% agreed), and most likely to disagree that older people are a burden on society (85%)<sup>20</sup>. In all EU Member States, at least half of respondents thought that the generations do not easily agree on what is best for society: the proportion ranged from 50% in the Netherlands to 88% in Sweden. At least two-thirds of interviewees in each member-state, however, disagreed that older people are a burden on society.

There is further evidence of inter-generational conflict, according to this survey. The youngest respondents (those under 25) were most likely to believe that younger people and older people do not easily agree on what is best for their country (75% compared to 66-69% in the other age groups). The oldest respondents (over 64) were twice as likely as the youngest ones to agree that older people are a burden on society (25% versus 12%). Roughly half of EU citizens disagreed that because there will be a higher number of older voters, decision-makers will pay less attention to young people's needs. Younger respondents were unsurprisingly less likely to disagree (45% of 15-24 year-olds versus 53% of those over 64).

A majority (56%) agreed that as older people work until a later age, fewer jobs will be available for younger people. Seven in 10 EU citizens disagreed that companies that largely employ young people perform better than those that employ people from different age groups. Cypriot and Greek respondents appeared to be the most likely to agree with the two previous statements, while Danish, Dutch and British interviewees were the most likely to

16 A.Alesina, R.Di Tella, & R.MacCulloch, *Inequality and happiness: are Europeans and Americans different?*, [in:] *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 88, pp. 2009-2042, 2004.

17 A.Alesina, E.Glaeser, & B.Sacerdote, *Why doesn't the United States have a European-style welfare state?*, [in:] *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, pp. 187-277, Autumn 2000.

18 T.Boeri, A.Borsch-Supan & G.Tabellini, *Would you like to shrink the welfare state? A survey of European citizens*, [in:] *Economic Policy*, Volume 32, pp. 7-50, 2000.

19 R.Di Tella & R.MacCulloch, *An empirical study of unemployment benefit preferences*, Discussion Paper 179, IES: University of Oxford, 1996.

20 The European Commission, *Analytical report on intergenerational solidarity*, Eurobarometer Flash report, 2009, Luxembourg.

disagree. For example, 78% of Greeks and Cypriots agreed that fewer jobs will be available for younger people if older people extend their working lives, compared to 26% of Danes and 45 and 46% of British and Dutch respondents respectively.

EU citizens largely agree that their national governments must make more resources available for pensions and care for the elderly. In 18 Member states, at least 8 in 10 respondents agreed, and not more than one-sixth disagreed with this proposition. The statement that in coming decades, “governments will no longer be able to pay for pensions and care for older people”, received a total level of agreement ranging from approximately 4 in 10 interviewees in Bulgaria and Romania, to twice as many in Portugal (81%). Respondents aged between 25 and 54 were the most concerned about the affordability of pensions: slightly more than 6 in 10 of these respondents agreed with this statement, compared to only a slim majority of respondents in the other age groups (53-55%).

EU citizens were almost as likely to agree that people in employment will be increasingly reluctant to pay taxes and social contributions to support older people, as they were to agree that older people accept the case for major pension reforms that ease the financial burden on working-age adults (52% versus 48%). Although respondents in Sweden and Denmark were the least likely to believe that those in employment will be increasingly reluctant to pay taxes and social contributions to support older groups, they were among the most likely to disagree that older people accept major pension reforms are needed to ease the burden on those of working-age.

Almost 6 in 10 of 15-24 year-olds agreed that those in employment will be increasingly reluctant to pay taxes and social contributions to support older people, compared to approximately half of older respondents. 2/3 of EU citizens agreed that their government “should make it easier for older people to continue working beyond the normal retirement age”. Only in Greece, Italy and Slovakia was the number of respondents who disagreed higher, or equal to, the number who agreed.

Another crucial aspect of equality of opportunity in the EU relates to the availability of education. Social democrats have pursued educational policies which presuppose that university degrees, accessible to as many school leavers as possible, are a pathway to employment and prosperity in the knowledge economy. A majority of voters, however, think they raise career expectations which ultimately cannot be fulfilled according to recent research undertaken by *Policy Network* (2011). In the UK and Germany, for example, pessimism about the current value of a university education is rampant. Sweden, however, offers an alternative picture with only 28% of voters questioning the worth of further education, and 37% holding the opposite view. The older people become, the more likely they are to believe that a university degree today “is not really useful”. This reflects anxiety about entrenched levels



of youth unemployment, as well as fears that increasing numbers of recent graduates will become part of a “lost”, workless generation, fears which are likely to be further exacerbated in many European countries given the prevailing economic situation.

### Fair distribution

However, many political theorists argue that equality of opportunity is impossible without a fairer distribution of income and resources; such a view also has wide purchase among the public. The final social justice principle proposed by Miller concerns the notion of distributive fairness. Of course, the basic principle of fair distribution is deeply contested, and there is a lively debate across Europe about what constitutes “social fairness” in today’s world. This is exacerbated by debates about immigration and what it means to contribute fairly to the welfare state. Nonetheless, **it is important to establish the extent to which the public are prepared to accept redistributive strategies, particularly in the light of new concerns about burden-sharing and spreading the pain of adjustment equitably within, and between, European societies: a theme that has emerged powerfully since the global financial crisis.**

Taylor-Gooby has again undertaken analysis of data from the European Social Survey (ESS) in terms of whether people agree with the statement that “government should reduce differences in income levels”. This question combines two distinct issues, namely whether voters believe that existing differentials are too great, and whether government has a legitimate role to play in reducing them. Both the percentage of people who “agree” and “agree strongly” are shown:

**Table 3: Government should reduce differences in income levels**

	Agree (%)	Agree Strongly (%)	Total
United Kingdom	50	11	61
Germany	40	12	52
France	42	43	85
Netherlands	49	10	59
Belgium	48	22	70
Luxembourg	38	25	63
Spain	50	30	80
Greece	45	45	90
Italy	33	47	80

Portugal	50	42	92
Denmark	34	8	42
Norway	55	15	70
Finland	40	36	76
Sweden	53	15	68

There are evidently differences between countries within each of the Nordic, Continental and Southern European welfare regime clusters. Somewhat surprisingly, it is Germany and Denmark who are outliers on this question, rather than the traditionally liberal United Kingdom. However, Britain is substantially below the European average of 76%, and most other countries have significantly more who “strongly agree” with the statement. Not surprisingly, concern has been somewhat lower in more equal social democratic countries where income disparities may be a less salient issue, and much greater in Southern Europe where there is a markedly higher gini co-efficient in relation to income inequality.

This data originates from before the financial crisis which presents an opportunity to test what has changed since the crisis. It might be expected that concerns about inequality have intensified, particularly given the fear that the burden of adjustment will fall on the poorest in society. However, there is also some initial evidence that voters are no more confident in the capacity of the state to redistribute income and challenge corporate interests.

For example, recent research carried out in Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden and the United States indicates that voters are “very worried” by concentrations of corporate power. 85% in the UK, 83% in Germany, 69% in the US, and 60% in Sweden agree with the view that, “big companies care only about profits, not about the wider community or the environment”. But concerns about market power are not offset by a resounding faith in the state. People have a very low estimation of government’s ability to stand up to vested interests. Numbers citing the ability of government to stand up to those interests as an advantage of state action remain low, ranging from a mere 15% in the US, 16% in the United Kingdom, and 21% in Germany, to a more respectable but still worrying 27% in Sweden. Correspondingly, considerable numbers of voters count the hijacking of the state by vested interests as a major disadvantage of state action: Germany 48%, United States 47%, United Kingdom 38%, and Sweden 17%<sup>21</sup>.

Nonetheless, the Eurobarometer survey demonstrates the majority of citizens believe that the state is primarily responsible for reducing poverty (53%), compared to citizens

<sup>21</sup> The fieldwork was undertaken by You Gov for Policy Network between 18th and 22nd March 2011. Total sample size was 1063 British, 1086 US, 1010 Swedish and 1184 German adults.





themselves (13%), the EU (9%), regional or local authorities (7%), NGOs and charities (7%), and religious institutions (2%). There are also some outliers: the Dutch, for example, regard citizens themselves as important (25%), while 26% of French citizens believe that NGOs and charities also play a crucial role in combating poverty. At the same time, 74% of citizens see the EU's role as "very important" or "somewhat important".

Further evidence is needed about the extent to which the public in Europe perceive inequalities as too large, requiring further intervention by the state. This includes whether people think wage levels for particular occupations are fair, including extremes such as the wage differential between footballers and shop assistants, for example. It is also important to test levels of support among the public for the redistribution of income by the state, and whether citizens trust governments to redistribute wealth and income. This includes how accurately the public judge levels of state provision and public spending in key areas, particularly benefit levels across the welfare state.

### **Responsibility, reciprocity and empowerment**

The dimension that is absent from Miller's typology of social justice concerns civic responsibility and empowerment: both the mutual rights and obligations that citizens owe one another, and the extent to which social justice entails individuals having the power and control to shape the lives they want to lead. In that sense economic inequality in industrialised societies relates not only to material deprivation, but the absence of freedom and autonomy which is necessary in order to pursue the good life. Amartya Sen's (2008) capabilities approach has captured the imagination of many governments both in the developing world and the industrialised nations, while influencing the internal deliberations of the European Commission<sup>22</sup>.

The Eurobarometer survey suggests that the majority of European citizens take a "structural" rather than a "personal" view of poverty and social exclusion. This reflects differences in national political cultures, whereby people in Europe tend to blame inequalities on institutional characteristics such as unemployment and wage stratification, whereas in the United States poverty is believed to originate in the capacities and efforts of the individual citizen (although there are important differences in social attitudes between citizens in the United States too). The 2009 survey shows that 53% of European citizens believe that national governments are responsible for poverty levels, compared to 13% who cast citizens themselves as primarily responsible.

**It is important to test further whether there is a link between support for strong welfare states among citizens, and how people themselves behave.** For example, it might

<sup>22</sup> R.Liddle & F.Lerais, *Europe's Social Reality*, Bureau of European Economic Advisers (BEPA), Brussels: European Commission, 2006.

be important to emphasise that in order to receive state support, citizens must pursue paid work or other socially useful activities. Single parents, for example, might be judged to merit additional support if it is in the best interests of children, who most citizens regard as “deserving” of welfare state entitlements and resources. However, this raises the question of how far governments are prepared to go in strengthening reciprocity. North American, British and Scandinavian welfare policy has increasingly involved “conditionality”, setting minimum requirements for those in receipt of benefits such as job-seeking or attendance at college. In its most overt form, families may be required to attend “family intervention programmes” which provide intensive challenge and support to “hard-to-reach” parents. This raises moral concerns about how far it is legitimate for the state to go in ensuring that individual citizens meet their obligations, and will continue to be the subject of lively debate among social democratic parties.

### **Implications and the future research agenda**

There are some important findings which result from this survey of the existing data concerning underlying attitudes to social justice in Europe. The most obvious conclusion is that the five dimensions of social justice which build on Miller’s framework all have real purchase and salience among European citizens. This is more measurable in some cases than others due to the availability of data; for example, it is clear that recognition of poverty is widely shared, and that government ought to help guarantee a social minimum. There is less evidence available concerning responsibility and personal behaviour, which is more difficult to subject to cross-national comparisons. This needs to be addressed in the future research agenda concerning public attitudes to social justice in Europe.

**The data indicates that how European social democratic governments frame their appeal to social justice has major implications for their electoral salience and governing success.** The various dimensions of social justice, to a greater or lesser extent, reflect intuitive understandings of fairness and desert, as such they help to ground centre-left politics in a broader conception of the common good. There are arguably three key challenges ahead in the politics of social justice<sup>23</sup>.

**The first challenge concerns the importance of building reciprocity in the welfare system. There is concern about the extent of income inequality, and broad support for redistribution from rich to poor.** The needs of children are valued particularly highly, while able-bodied adults are expected to make a fair contribution, either through paid work in the labour market or by caring for dependents. There is strong evidence that European citizens

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<sup>23</sup> P.Taylor-Gooby, *Attitudes to Social Justice, Research Paper*, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2005



favour “participation” in socially valued activities, and are intolerant of “free-riding” from the welfare state. This would suggest that the public will support measures that help people into work (such as free childcare and activation policies), and which also address the adequacy of rewards (for example, measures to narrow the gender pay gap).

**The second aspect relates to the importance of public trust in governments and politicians.** While citizens in most EU member-states do lean towards support for redistribution, there is greater scepticism about whether national governments have the capacity to carry out redistribution fairly and legitimately. An issue that has been inflamed by the global financial crisis concerns tax reform strategies which clamp down on evasion and non-payment of taxes. The evidence here suggests that this would do a great deal to restore public confidence in the capacities of the state. **This also suggests that social democrats who rely on collective institutions to pursue their goals cannot afford to let government and politicians slide into public disrepute. Political trust is inextricably intertwined with the pursuit of social justice, and the centre-left has to help improve the quality and transparency of public debate.**

**The third challenge involves using political instruments to help reshape public attitudes and views.** It is dangerous merely to acquiesce to public opinion, for example engaging in a “race to the bottom” on income and corporate tax rates. As Taylor-Gooby makes clear, this might actually serve to harden public attitudes in a negative direction. At the same time, centre-left parties have a responsibility to lead public attitudes, not merely to follow. There is nothing inexorable about trends in society such as individualisation and growing diversity invalidating social justice policies or destroying the basis for collective action. It is important that social democratic parties take responsibility and show that they can reframe public agendas.

All three key challenges are relevant to major debates in contemporary welfare policy, chiefly the future of universalism. A universal welfare state has been one of the core pillars of social justice in Europe since the Second World War. In many European countries, centre-right governments have sought to question the sustainability of universalism in the wake of the global financial crisis. A number of arguments have been used to justify this approach<sup>24</sup>. The first practical argument is the need to reduce government deficits, and therefore to scale back the coverage of major social programmes such as child benefit and universal pensions. The second case is more principled, suggesting that universality involves transferring resources from the poor to the rich, and that targeting resources on the poorest is the best way to help the poor. It is difficult to justify taxing those on low incomes, it is argued, in order to pay child benefit to those on higher incomes.

24 T.Horton, *The Fight for Universalism: Cuts, targeting and the future of welfare*, [in:] *Public Policy Research*, Volume 18 (2), pp. 105-114, July/August 2011.

However, centre-left parties in Europe ought to be cautious about acquiescing to the ideological right's views about the future of universalism in the welfare state. In fact, the more targeted welfare provision becomes, the less likely it is that services will be of the highest quality. Countries with higher degrees of targeting tend to be characterised by lower overall spending on the welfare state as a share of national income<sup>25</sup>. What such arguments disguise is a familiar ideological claim on the part of the right, namely that all forms of state provision inculcate dependency, and that the purpose of government should be to keep spending and tax rates as low as possible.

This is diametrically at odds with social democratic philosophy: the welfare state was never chiefly concerned with charity or philanthropy, but with the idea of risk sharing and resource pooling – buying services and insurance through the state encompassing the entire population, not only the poor. At the same time, Nordic social democracy in particular has always seen welfare as integral to a sustainable model of capitalism: welfare is a source of wealth creation, not merely a drain on resources. This encapsulates the basic synergy between economic efficiency and social justice: for example, ensuring that talented and highly skilled women can access the labour market entails universal, high quality and affordable child care coverage for all families. This is a more substantive moral basis for the welfare state than the claim that those on higher incomes should support measures that reduce inequality which breeds social disorder and fragmentation. This argument was at the heart of the recent book, “The Spirit Level”<sup>26</sup>, but it misses the extent to which universalism directly benefits the whole of society.

The defence of universalism is about protecting the long-term interests of the poorest in society, as well as reaching out to middle-class voters. A truly majoritarian welfare state can help to meet the aspirations of middle and higher income voters, as well as preventing poverty among lower income households. It is important to continue to challenge explicitly ideological arguments against universalism, engaging in a battle of ideas not only about the future of the welfare state, but the role of government in a complex and rapidly changing world.

**It is also imperative to make the case for universalism in today's society given the rise of new social risks, increasing wage and income volatility, and the desire for redistribution over the life-course.** This can help to ease transitions, facilitating individual choices that enhance personal autonomy from caring to lifetime learning, a crucial dimension of social justice. While the chapter has not focused directly on the policy implications arising from these findings, it is worth reflecting on what public attitudes in Europe might say about how best to pursue the social justice agenda in addition to welfare universalism:

- Social democrats have to be concerned not just with social justice *per se*, but economic

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>26</sup> R.G.Wilkinson & K.Pickett, *The spirit Level: Why do Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better*, Allen Lane 2009



dynamism. Support for effective strategies to counter poverty and inequality is strongest where there is confidence that economic growth will be sustained. Social justice and economic dynamism can be reconciled, although it is important to be aware of potential trade-offs.

- Traditional redistributive mechanisms are supported, but may need to be modified in the light of social change. For example, progressive taxation has an important role to play in redistributing resources from rich to poor, but must not compromise economic needs or job creation.
- While policy legitimately focuses on the needs of the long-term poor and excluded, it is also important to be concerned with transitions, in particular the role of transitional labour markets in enabling people to escape poverty.
- There should be a strong emphasis on activating labour market strategies since active participation strengthens support for the welfare state.
- Policies that are designed to help the poorest should also focus on in-work poverty, increasing financial support for carers and ensuring that an adequate structure for the minimum wage is in place across EU member-states.
- Policies that benefit more affluent groups are important if they help to consolidate commitment to universalism in the welfare state.
- Gender-sensitive policies are also crucial, not only to continue improving the economic position of women, but also to provide greater support to parents and younger families. Exposing pay differentials between men and women will help to tackle the gender pay gap, backed by powerful anti-discrimination legislation.
- The wealthy and high earners need to be properly incorporated within the obligations and duties of citizenship. Social responsibility must be exercised at the “top” of society, not merely among the most excluded. The financial crisis appears to have opened up more space for radical action on pay and taxation.
- Reducing child poverty must continue to have a particularly central place in the social justice agenda of centre-left parties in Europe.
- Finally, policy in nation-states has to be matched by action at the EU level. Social Europe has an important role to play, encouraging member-states to benchmark progress on key indicators such as reducing child poverty; sharing best practice in solving the toughest challenges such as long-term unemployment; and evolving new mechanisms such as the structural adjustment fund to mitigate the impact of social exclusion in the

worst affected regions of the EU. Europe itself has to be a force for greater solidarity and social justice.

## Conclusion

This chapter has sought to demonstrate that a new politics of social justice in the EU cannot be built on the basis of abstract normative values, nor is it sufficient to rely on public opinion surveys which merely dictate which ideological direction parties ought to take. It is essential to bring together an account of the various dimensions of social justice with an informed assessment of the underlying nature of public opinion. Recent research on poverty and inequality in the EU has tended to focus on revealing attitudes, rather than exploring what motivates particular sentiments and values.

Cross-national comparisons help to illuminate important underlying trends and evolving patterns, while highlighting how particular issues and themes might be reframed in order to support social democratic objectives in a rapidly changing and increasingly complex world. **It is important to assess the underlying drivers of public opinion in order to build a new consensus for social justice in Europe. If social democrats articulate bold ideas that take account of intuitive public sentiments, they can reshape both institutions and interests, laying the ground for new majoritarian electoral coalitions.** The answer, as the former SPD leader Willy Brandt once passionately observed, is not to abandon traditional values but to “dare more social democracy”.



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## **Promoting Principle of Diversity in a Changing Society**





## **Key words**

### **Diversity – Values – Migration – Multiculturalism**

## **Summary**

Our societies are becoming more and more diverse, mainly as a result of migration. The responses of social democratic parties to migration and diversity have become more and more diverse as well. The rise of right wing populist parties with a clear anti-migration agenda does show that there is a need for a clear social democratic stance on this subject. The ambition of this paper is not to give such a clear social democratic narrative on the value of diversity within social democracy. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to look for foundations for a clear social democratic narrative, which takes the downsides of migration and increasing diversity in our societies into account, but which remains inclusive and is significantly based on clear values. What it will provide is an overview of the current rationale behind social democratic narratives on migration and diversity, in order to analyze how these rationales are currently under pressure. Secondly, it will show how diversity puts pressure on other social democratic values like solidarity. This analysis will lead to some foundations for a common narrative.

## Introduction

As a result of migration patterns of the last decades, our societies are getting more and more diverse, both ethnically as culturally. Different European countries face different groups of migrants, both from inside the EU as from outside the EU. What all countries do, however, have in common is that migration is changing our societies; it's making them more diverse.

The question which arises is whether these changes as a result of migration are beneficial for our societies. For some decades, the social democratic answer to this question was a straightforward yes. Migration leads to a bigger labour force, more cultural diversity and thus to economic growth and new insights and experiences. Migration and diversity was supposed to be considered as something good. Social democrats should thus be open and tolerant to all these new cultural influences which were the result of increased diversity.

**Besides our societies there is something else getting more and more diverse: the responses of social democratic parties to migration and diversity. Not only regarding migration policies, but also increasingly regarding policies aimed at dealing with challenges as a result of increased migration.** Mainly based on national traditions, responses varied from French assimilationist traditions to the Dutch institutionalized approach to a profound debate in Germany on citizenship.<sup>1</sup>

These differences in national responses can partly be explained by differences in national traditions, but are also the result of different perspectives on how to value migration and diversity. Many see migration and diversity as something which is essentially a good thing, which should thus be encouraged. We should be open and tolerant. Negative side effects are considered as mainly the result of socio-economic causes. Others point mainly to the economic benefits of migration, which means consequently that diversity is something that has to be dealt with in order to be prosperous. A third stream pays more attention to the way migration changes our societies and on policies on how to deal with that. To summarize: there is no clear social democratic position, no clear social democratic value on how to deal with migration, diversity and the challenges it poses to our societies.

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<sup>1</sup> J. Kandel, R. Cuperus & K. Duffek: *The Challenge of Diversity. European Social Democracy Facing Migration, Integration and Multiculturalism in Kandel, Cuperus & Duffek, The Challenge of Diversity, Studienverlag, Vienna (2003): p 11*



The rise of right wing populist parties with a clear anti-migration agenda does show that there is a need for a clear social democratic stance on this subject. Also other right wing parties seem to have less trouble than social democrats with finding a way to deal with the downsides of migration. Their narrative is, however, often a narrative of exclusion. A clear social democratic narrative is thus necessary.

The ambition of this paper is not to give such a clear social democratic narrative on the value of diversity within social democracy. First of all, diversity is a rather vague concept, which makes it difficult to give a clear description of what its value should be to social democrats. Besides that, the situation and thus the public debate regarding diversity and migration differ too much between countries. This is due to various reasons, such as differences in national traditions, the (development of) migration policies, history, etc. Both factors would make the attempt to come to one common and clear understanding of a narrative on migration a rather theoretical exercise.

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to look for foundations for a clear social democratic narrative, which takes the downsides of migration and increasing diversity in our societies into account, but which remains inclusive and is significantly based on clear values. It does not have the ambition to define a common social democratic understanding of the value of diversity. What it will provide is an overview of the current rationale behind social democratic narratives on migration and diversity, in order to analyze how these rationales are currently under pressure. Secondly, it will show how diversity puts pressure on other social democratic values like solidarity. Thirdly, it will discuss the effects of diversity and migration on our core electorate. This analysis will lead to some foundations for a common narrative.

Before I will go into the analysis of the concept, I think that it is important to know two things about the perspective I'm writing this paper from. First of all, I have only experience with the Dutch debate on migration and diversity. The debate on these issues in the Netherlands has been more intense than in other European countries. Secondly, I've only experienced the public debate after the rise of Pim Fortuyn. This means basically that I've only experienced the public debate on migration and diversity within a certain discourse. As a result, it is more difficult for me to understand the nuance of certain concepts which are used in the debate on these issues in other countries in other countries. The discourse on these issues has, at least in the Netherlands, significantly changed over the last decade. An interesting example of that changed discourse can be found in the difference in reception of a signature paper by Paul Scheffer, *The Multicultural Drama*<sup>2</sup>. In that paper, Scheffer, points at the negative consequences of migration and diversity on our societies. Just after publication in 2000, he was fiercely criticized for this, especially from

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 2 P. Scheffer, *Het Multiculturele Drama*, NRC Handelsblad, 29 January 2000, <http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html>

the left. He was even called a racist and xenophobe. When I read the article for the first time a couple of years ago, I would have difficulties to understand these fierce reactions, mainly because the discourse in how we discuss migration and diversity has changed, allowing debating the negative sides of migration as well.

## The concept of diversity

In order to come up with common foundations for a social democratic narrative on diversity, it is necessary to make an attempt to define the concept, also to analyze it's relation to migration. The concept of diversity plays an important role within social democratic politics. Whether it regards to ethnic diversity in our societies, diversity on the work floor or diversity within our own parties, it is generally to be considered as good to strive for more diversity. It leads to common understandings, new insights and experiences and is closely related to solidarity. **Diversity can also be considered as an indicator of equality.** The more diverse a certain group in our society is (e.g. our own parties), the more likely it is that there is equal access to these opportunities. Summarizing, diversity can be considered as of value to social democrats.

The problem with the concept is, however, that it remains rather vague. Diversity can refer to a diversity of cultures within a society, but also to gender balance. It can refer to a mixture of different generations, but also to regional origin within a country. Diversity by itself doesn't mean anything: it always has to relate to a certain characteristic, like ethnicity, gender or age. In that sense, it is comparable to the value of equality, which in itself has no clear meaning, but needs to be related to something else. As a result, the concept of diversity can be extremely broad and has many dimensions.

This vagueness means that **we have to come up with a limited concept, to enable us to analyze what the exact value of diversity is to social democrats.** By doing this, it enables us also to see how this value is under pressure, how it relates to other social democratic values and in which directions we have to look to find a common understanding of the value of diversity which answers to questions in society which have been raised over the last decades.

To come up with such a limited concept of diversity is difficult and such an exercise has the danger of being arbitrary. Therefore, it is better to try to limit the scope of diversity which we will look at rather than limiting the meaning of the concept itself.

Therefore we should look at the scope of diversity. The reason why we are looking into the meaning diversity is because it poses challenges to social democrats. In short, something what we consider as good or beneficial, is perceived differently by large parts of our electorate. For many citizens, diversity doesn't mean new insights or common understandings.



Instead, it means changing societies, insecurity, cultural tensions and questions about collective identities.

This gives already a better understanding of which aspects of diversity should be looked into. Especially ethnic and cultural diversity seems to be at the core of the question, not diversity in gender or age. It is also within this scope of ethnic and cultural diversity that our societies have changed the most over the last decades, mainly as a result of migration. Furthermore, it is exactly this scope of diversity where there seems to be a mismatch between what social democrats value and what citizens value.

This leads to the questions till what extent social democrats value ethnic and cultural diversity and based on what justifications. Only when that picture is clear, it will be possible to analyze how the value of diversity is under pressure in our societies and how it relates and maybe conflicts with other core values of social democracy. Based on that analysis, an attempt will be made to describe some general underpinnings which can serve to explain the value of diversity within our changing societies.

Due to the vague nature of the concept of diversity, it remains difficult to distinguish clear lines of argument why social democrats value diversity. The following overview is therefore not exhaustive, but it does shed a light on different arguments used within social democracy.<sup>3</sup> An important question to answer in this part is how these lines of argument relate to social democratic values, to see what it exactly is what social democrats value in diversity.

## The multicultural argument

The basis of multiculturalism is the notion that cultural diversity is essentially good for individuals and societies. This idea is codified in the *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* of UNESCO, which states that “cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature”. According to this declaration, it should be an ethical imperative to strive for policies that defend cultural diversity or cultural pluralism.<sup>4</sup>

The problem, however, is that multiculturalism is anything but a clearly defined stream of thought. It entails a wide variety of theories and policies, sometimes even competing ones. Sometimes it is used descriptively, sometimes normatively. What makes it even more complex is that nowadays the word “multiculturalist” is being used as a term of abuse for the left by right wing populists. All the different uses of the concept, even the one of right wing populists,

<sup>3</sup> The categories are derived from J. Kandel, R. Cuperus & K. Duffek, *The Challenge of Diversity. European Social Democracy Facing Migration, Integration and Multiculturalism*, [in] Kandel, Cuperus & Duffek, *The Challenge of Diversity*, Studienverlag, Vienna, 2003, pp16-17

<sup>4</sup> *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, UNESCO November 2001

have, however, in common that cultural diversity is considered as something good.<sup>5</sup>

There are some other common denominators which are relevant. First of all, multiculturalism challenges the relevance of cultures for individual identity. Furthermore, it stresses the importance of cultural diversity for modern societies and the importance of culture as a moral resource. Essential are also the claim for the necessity of a cultural dialogue and the recognition of collective cultural rights.<sup>6</sup> Lastly, multiculturalism regards group identity as an important aspect and even a tool within the process of integration.

The value of equality plays a very important role in the debate regarding diversity. All people are equal and should thus be treated equally. Differences between people, especially cultural and ethnic ones, should never lead to discrimination. We should always be open and respectful to other cultures, to differences.

Despite the broad and often vague use of the concept of multiculturalism in the public debate, it can be concluded that it considers cultural and ethnic diversity to be of value, to be something good, because it is a moral and cultural resource and leads to common understanding which can bridge differences. People with different backgrounds can and should learn from each other. These ideas have been and still are central to social democratic thought about diversity and migration, especially during the nineties.

## The economic argument

Another argument focuses less on the value of ethnic and cultural diversity, but more on the necessity of it. Ethnic and cultural diversity is primarily a result of migration and migration is here to stay, if we want to continue as prosperous as we do now. The basic argument is that we need immigrants to keep the economy going, because European labour markets will not provide sufficient workers without it.<sup>7</sup>

The economic argument for migration and diversity is based on several mechanisms. First of all, our population is aging, which means that in order to prevent a shortage of labour, we need migrant workers. Without the contribution of migrant workers to both the labour force as our welfare state, Europe might end up with trends of stagnation and decline as in Japan.<sup>8</sup>

Secondly, many jobs can be unattractive to existing residents, especially low skill low

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5 J. Kandel, R. Cuperus & K. Duffek, *The Challenge of Diversity. European Social Democracy Facing Migration, Integration and Multiculturalism*, [in] Kandel, Cuperus & Duffek, *The Challenge of Diversity*, Studienverlag, Vienna, 2003, pp16-17

6 Idem

7 S. Spencer, *Migration Policies in Europe: the Challenge for Social Democracy* [in] Kandel, Cuperus and Duffek, *The Challenge of Diversity*, Studienverlag, Vienna 2003, pp 83-84

8 P. Legrain, *Progressives should embrace diversity* [in:] *Exploring the cultural challenges to social democracy*, Policy Network, London 2011, pp 37-45



wage jobs. As Romano Prodi once stated: *immigration is indispensable for a simple reason. No German, no Italian, no French of the younger generation wants to do night shifts in a hospital. No one wants to work in agriculture, or public works. Immigration is obviously needed.* This might be a blunt overstatement, especially regarding the massive unemployment as a result of the current crisis, but it does address an important mechanism: migrant workers are often willing to take jobs for lower wages and work longer hours, filling up gaps between the labour market and the labour force.<sup>9</sup>

A third economic argument for migration is based on the individual characteristics of migrants. Migrants tend to be on average younger, more hard-working and more enterprising. According to some studies, migrants in the UK are twice as likely to be an entrepreneur than people born in the UK.<sup>10</sup>

To summarize, the economic part of the reasoning on why ethnic and cultural diversity is good, is because it is the result of migration, which leads to economic growth. Furthermore, diversity increases the entrepreneurial spirit within a society. Lastly, it is also something which should be embraced by social democrats because it is a reality that migration will only keep increasing, if we want to continue our level of wealth, which means that diversity will remain increasing. This line of argument seems to be purely economic and not directly based on any clear social democratic values. It legitimizes diversity by pointing towards the economic necessity, not to any social democratic value.

## Diversity and migration

Now that the two core arguments in the discussion on diversity are clear, it is important to look into the way these arguments are under pressure. What is the implication of increasing ethnic and cultural diversity as a result of migration for our societies? And how does this affect other social democratic values, like solidarity? The core question here is to find out the essential dilemmas for social democrats regarding diversity and migration, to find a strong value basis for a narrative, but also understand where diversity leads to problems with other basic social democratic values. To do this, we will look at some aspects regarding diversity and migration which are at the heart of the public debate at the moment.

There are broadly two lines of arguments used for why diversity is good: one based on multiculturalism and one based on more economic arguments. Both lines of argument connect diversity to migration, but diversity is not the same as migration. Even without

9 S. Spencer, *Migration Policies in Europe: the Challenge for Social Democracy* [in] Kandel, Cuperus and Duffek, *The Challenge of Diversity*, Studienverlag, Vienna 2003, pp 83-84

10 P. Legrain, *Progressives should embrace diversity* [in:] *Exploring the cultural challenges to social democracy*, Policy Network, London 2011, pp 37-45

migration, societies can be diverse. This has been explained before, but it is important to do it again: one of the reasons why there is significant debate on the value of diversity, is mainly related to the issues around migration. For our analysis, it is important to make sure that we are aware of the difference. In short, the difference is that diversity within societies can be something which can be valued, whereas migration is a phenomenon, a process. Migration leads to diversity, but it is not a value which is at the core of social democracy. In that sense, the economic arguments put forward before are also more related to the process of migration and less to the value of diversity.

This conceptual difference between the process of migration and the value of diversity seems to be rather abstract, especially in the current public debate in which migration and diversity are both considered to be more or less the same and talked about in a rather negative sense. The difference is important however, especially for social democrats, because it creates the possibility to talk about diversity and migration on the basis of values and make a difference between arguments which focus on migration and arguments which focus on diversity as a value. It disconnects the debate on values (why is diversity valuable?) from the debate on migration (is migration good for our societies?).

It is important to make this distinction before looking into the issues and challenges regarding diversity. By making the distinction, it becomes possible to look for solutions and a narrative based on clear values, instead of looking for policies based on economic arguments. It gives the start of a clear foundation for a social democratic narrative on diversity which is based on values.

This distinction enables us to have a closer look at the lines of arguments presented before, to see which arguments are really based on social democratic values and which arguments aren't. The multicultural argument is strongly based on the value of equality: all humans are equal and should therefore be treated equally. Therefore, cultural differences should not lead to tensions or discrimination, but we should be open to these differences and learn from it. The assumption here is that diversity will lead to new common understandings and can lead to more cultural and moral resources, which leads to richer societies. Therefore, the process of migration is considered to be something good.

The economic argument, on the other hand, doesn't focus on the value of diversity. It focuses solely on the economic value of migration and diversity. Diversity is good because it is the result of migration, which is good for the economy. Furthermore, migrants are more entrepreneurial, which is good for the economy again. Economic value is the only value which is looked at, but that's not the concept of value we're looking for. Therefore, the line of argument focusing on the economic value of diversity should be treated separately from





the dilemma's which concern the value of diversity for social democrats, because it focuses mainly on the economic benefits of migration, not on the value of a diverse society. The starting point for social democrats should not be the economy, but the value of a diverse society.

### The value of diversity under pressure

Disconnecting the value of diversity from the process of migration enables us to look a step further into the dilemma's which social democrats face around this issue. For political parties, it is essential that the values which are at the core of a party, find resonance within society. Only if the electorate can relate to the values of social democrats, it will support our goals. The question thus is what the public attitude towards diversity is. Looking at some recent data from the UK, it shows that there is a gap in support for diversity between what David Goodhart calls liberal graduates and working class communitarians. The support for the value of diversity and thus for migration amongst liberal graduates is strong, but amongst working class communitarians it is weak. The liberal group values cultural and ethnic diversity, whereas the communitarian group perceives it negatively.<sup>11</sup>

These are rather broad and roughly defined groups within the electorate and only based on data from the UK, but it connects to the more general debate within social democratic parties about the decreasing support for social democracy within the working class: the value of diversity doesn't seem to connect enough with these groups. This is especially troublesome for social democrats, who traditionally were a Volkspartei, aiming at both the support of the working class and the middle class, organized around the support for the welfare state.

Does this mean that there is something wrong with the value of diversity? Should we as social democrats reconsider or redefine it? Not really, it is a value in which we believe, it is a common principle. It is connected to the core of our ideology and very close to the equality. We should keep defending that we value diversity, that we think that it is something good. But we should be careful in doing so. Too often we are hesitant in putting too much emphasis on the value of diversity. **We sometimes try too hard to disconnect diversity from issues related to migration. Even if diversity and migration are two different concepts, they are closely related to each other. That is something we should acknowledge.** Besides that, we should also understand the relation between the two: the way we explain the value of diversity does also influence how we discuss about migration, how we value it, on the basis of which values we make policies for migration.

11 D. Goodhart, *Liberals v communitarians: the left's civil war* [in:] *Exploring the cultural challenges to social democracy*, Policy Network, London, 2011, p15

This brings us to the core of the dilemmas for social democrats: it is the way we translate our values to a narrative, to politics and policies. We should be clear on our values. We think that diversity is good, because it is based on equality. It leads to new experiences, common understandings and as a cultural and moral resource. But we should use this same value, with the same foundations, also to acknowledge the down sides of diversity, especially when there are rapid changes in diversity.

We should understand that societies which rapidly change and get more and more diverse as a result of migration, do not automatically lead to more cultural resources and new common understandings. It is more likely to lead to tensions between groups and a sense of insecurity. Increasing diversity does in such cases put pressure on other core values like solidarity. Especially in insecure times like these, where collective identities are eroding and the solidarity organized within the welfare state is already under pressure due to austerity, even without migration. Just as for diversity, solidarity is also based on common understanding. The tension between the two, however, is that solidarity needs these common understandings, these shared experiences. Our value of diversity, however, assumes that diversity will automatically lead to new common understandings. That will, however, not happen straight away and by itself. It will take time. People have to know each other, share experiences. In our approach to diversity, we should put emphasis on the value of these new common understandings, but also acknowledge that they will not come into existence automatically. It means that we have to acknowledge that it will take time and that until then, diversity might also put pressure on other core values, like solidarity and fairness.

We should be aware that these values are not separated from each other, but that they influence each other. **Social democrats have to connect their approach to diversity directly with solidarity and fairness**, also in their policies and acknowledge that diversity does have negative effects as well. We should be open to other cultures, build our narrative around the value of diversity, not around the economic value of diversity. The way we use the value of diversity, should, however, become more realistic.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> David Goodhart, *Liberals v communitarians: the left's civil war* [in:] *Exploring the cultural challenges to social democracy*, Policy Network, London, 2011, p16



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Eric SUNDSTRÖM

**The future is unwritten.  
The optimistic nature of social democracy**



## Key words

### Olof Palme – The Enlightenment – Modernism – Social democracy – Optimism

## Summary

Inspired by an anecdote about optimism as the “red thread” in Olof Palme speeches, the essay tries to answer a few rather original questions. Is there episodes in Palme’s life that can explain the constant optimism in his political speeches? A new biography stresses Palme’s time as a student in the U.S. and suggests that he stood on a platform from the Enlightenment, summarized in the formula: *“Modernity + Equality = Freedom”*. A suggested closeness between social democratic ideology and the Enlightenment is then examined, and a few elections characterized by optimistic messages - in the past as well as in the present - are monitored. A period starting in the late 1960s, when left-wing ideology has been accused of becoming “anti-modernistic”, is also discussed. While it is impossible to prove that social democracy by definition is an ideology marked by optimism and modernism, and that this acknowledgement would lead to more electoral success, the essay concludes with a warning. In Sweden, the “new” Moderates are trying to embrace modernism more than their historic mix of conservatism and neoliberalism – attempting to depoliticize the historic achievements of the labour movement at the same time. Their goal is to become the natural, new pragmatic caretaker of the welfare state as social democrats run out of steam. In five concluding bullet points, this challenge for modern day progressives is discussed, indicating that the formula *“Modernity + Equality = Freedom”* might be an important complement to the ideological set of values called social democracy.

## **Introduction: That optimistic, red thread**

In September 2010, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) suffered a second straight election defeat, confirming a worrying trend of progressives losing elections in Europe. The defeat caused a great deal of confusion and in Stockholm, a communications agency acted swiftly. An evening for dazed and confused social democrats was organized, giving politicians and their spinners the opportunity to be disillusioned together – accompanied by free drinks and nicer finger food than the party HQ would ever offer.

In a dark corner, the present author ran into a former state secretary, now earning better money at the hosting agency. In the good old days, he had served under the late Kjell Larsson (1943-2002), Minister of Environment and one of the architects behind the Kyoto protocol. However, Larsson is also known as one of Olof Palme's (1927-1986) trusted advisors, working formally as Palme's speechwriter in the 1970s.

The former state secretary began to tell a fascinating anecdote. When social democracy was going through one of its earlier crises, in the early 1990s following a decade of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, Larsson had returned to Palme's speeches. Larsson re-read the early speeches, before Palme became party leader of SAP and Prime Minister of Sweden (in 1969). He then turned to the speeches they wrote together in the 1970s. Finally, he examined the speeches conducted in the 1980s, before Palme was assassinated in 1986.

It was a search for the social democratic Holy Grail. Was there a common "red thread" that could explain the old recipe for success? An underlying set of values that could be traced in the speeches of the 1960s, as well as in the ones from 1985? Had something been lost along the way?

**Larsson found a "red thread", present in almost all of the speeches. But it was not international solidarity, which Palme perhaps is most associated with (that was also the present author's first guess). Nor was it classic, social democratic themes such as equality, justice or economic redistribution. As a matter of fact, it was optimism, modernism and a belief in progress.**



Larsson had found an ever-present belief that society can be changed for the better, as long as you present universal reforms based on science and backed up by empirical evidence. Speech after speech was filled with optimistic examples and references to concrete reforms that would not achieve socialism tomorrow, but push us a little closer to a more social democratic society.

Social democracy as an optimistic ideology, a sort of modernism, with a belief in better days thanks to universalism and reforms backed up by the latest evidence in a policy journal. It sounded very good. As the evening at the communications agency wound down, a few questions continued to bewilder this author.

- What does the literature about Palme's life say? Can the anecdote be explained?
- If the anecdote is correct, does it also describe an important and overlooked part of the set of values underlying the ideology we call social democracy?
- Any important part of social democratic ideology, even if it is overlooked, must also be found in concrete examples, past and present. Which famous examples fit this theory?
- However, if it is presently overlooked, we also need to think about how optimism and modernism got lost. What might have happened?
- Finally, given the answers to the four questions above, are there any important lessons for modern day progressives?

As you might have guessed, these bullet points correspond to the five chapters of this essay.

### **Olof Palme: The progressive and modern optimist?**

The formula is to be found on page 334 of the book that is the most recent and arguably the best biography of Olof Palme so far. According to the author Henrik Berggren, the formula describes Palme's political belief in the future in general, and his pledge for change in particular. It is summarized as follows: *Modernity + Equality = Freedom*.

Olof Palme was 20 years old when he started his studies at Kenyon College, a liberal arts college in Ohio, on the First of October 1947. Berggren concludes that his time and studies in the USA was:

A decisive experience for the young Olof Palme, which formed him as a politician and statesman [...] He found a new and different way to look upon the world and his own role in it, an American leftish liberalism that would mark his fundamental attitude to life throughout the years.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> H. Berggren, *Underbara dagar framför oss. En biografi över Olof Palme*, Norstedts 2010, p. 119.

Palme was brought up in a conservative family in the bourgeoisie part of Stockholm. He was sent to boarding school and did his military service – as was expected from him. His decision to study in the US was his “first real independent act as a young adult”. When he entered the ship “Marine Jumper” in the port of Gothenburg on September 6, 1947, he did so with an open mind – ready to be influenced and stimulated by new ideas.<sup>2</sup>

At Kenyon College, Palme pursued courses about American history and political science, including subjects such as the role of the constitution (based on the ideas of the Enlightenment) and “Jacksonian democracy”. He was taught economics – Adam Smith as well as Karl Marx – by a rather radical professor, Paul M. Titus. Palme also wrote a critical essay about Friedrich Hayek’s book “The road to Serfdom”.

One of Henrik Berggren’s new and main contributions to our understanding of Palme’s life is the profound importance of his time in the U.S. In the classes with professor Titus, Palme was introduced to subjects such as industrial relations and the role of trade unions. The U.S. economy was growing at incredible levels; consumerism replaced the scarcity of wartime. New technological developments made everything and anything possible. Palme’s fascination with American equality and freedom was only shadowed by a journey to the South, where the poverty and discrimination of African-Americans were appalling.

*In America he was confronted more directly, without the protective cover of his family and the traditions of the bourgeoisie upper class, with a democratic every day culture where everyone was assumed to have equal value – if not capacity and ambition. [...] You can call the American dream a myth, but the point is that it is democratic: everyone can participate. That included a young Swede of highly bourgeoisie traditions.<sup>3</sup>*

In order to show how the time at Kenyon College shaped Palme as a politician, Berggren analyses a speech Palme gave in May 1964. The speech starts and ends with the same sentence, indeed the phrase most associated with Olof Palme: “Politics is nothing but will”. Palme had two central themes in his speech. The first is about the speed of economic progress, which will help to double the present resources within 20 years. This will be used to abolish a society marked by its social classes. Secondly, Palme underlines that socialism is about freedom. The goal is to give every individual the freedom to form her own life in accordance with her own wishes. Berggren then concludes:

*These were Palme’s fundamental ideas that he embraced already during his time at Kenyon. They were not [...] particularly complex. Strictly speaking, Palme was still standing on the platform of the French Revolution: The philosophy of the Enlightenment and social equality. [...]*

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 118-121; quote from p. 120. Palme lived in the T-Barrack on campus, where a certain Paul Newman (as a junior student) picked up the laundry. Ironically enough, Newman won the Academy Award for Best Actor the year Palme was assassinated (1986).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid p. 134.





*His temperament was closer to that of a Jacobin; a middle-class radical ready to go far when creating equality and freedom through state intervention, but he did not regard society as class warfare.*

*His technological optimism and certain preaching about the future would be proven to be presumptuous. What holds is his belief in the future, his pledge for change: **Modernity + Equality = Freedom.**<sup>4</sup>*

According to Berggren's interpretation of Olof Palme's political life, summarized in the formula above, the anecdote told at the communications agency seems to pass muster. Our next question must be: **Is Palme's platform – the ideas of the Enlightenment and a belief in technological optimism, modernity and equality – also part of the basic values of social democracy?**

### **Social democracy: Not only gloom and Marxism**

The economic and socio-political worldview called Marxism is often and rightly portrayed as cynical and pessimistic. However, as is often the case when Marxism is discussed, you can also argue that Marxism contains an optimistic view of, for example, growth and economic development. The "means of production", mankind's possibility to handle and master nature, is the decisive factor. The basic dialectic method means that the exploitative economic system of a certain historic period seeds its own destruction. But this also implies that a new era will follow, eventually resulting in a classless, socialist society. In other words: There is a lot of gloom and doom right now, but everything will be improved when we arrive at our last stop. And determinism will take us there.

However, it should be noted that a modern progressive must be sceptical of the Marxist concept of growth. For example, sustainability and environmental protection are not discussed at all, giving total dominance to economic determinism ("vulgar Marxism" is a phrase that is sometimes used). Moreover, as Berggren notes, Palme's political orientation was not very Marxist – as we have seen he was rather standing on a platform from the French revolution.

When trying to understand the optimism and belief in progress in Palme's speeches, one should not only wander in the Marxist maze. We should consider Berggren's analysis, giving serious attention to the alleged closeness between social democracy and liberalism. Henry Pettersson wrote about these topics in his doctoral thesis, as connected through the Enlightenment<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid* p. 333-334.

<sup>5</sup> H. Pettersson, *Den försiktiga kameleonten: Europeisk socialdemokrati och brittiska Labour*, Örebro Studies in Political Science 2004. The title translated into English: "The Cautious Chameleon: European Social Democracy and the British Labour Party". The following paragraphs are based on Pettersson's doctoral thesis.

Pettersson notes that at American universities, the history of political ideologies is often simplified in the following way: Social democracy is a mixture of socialism and liberalism. This school of thought is associated with the political scientist Michael Harrington (1928-89), who was the deputy chairman of the younger of the two American social democratic parties; Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). Moreover, Joseph Schumpeter's description of how society will move from capitalism into socialism through the expansion of the welfare state is also based on the idea of a mixture of socialist and liberal ideas.<sup>6</sup>

The work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is also stressed as the link from the ideas of the Enlightenment to the proximity of social democracy and liberalism. There is plenty of evidence underlying Kant's influence, especially with regards to German social democracy. Among Eduard Bernstein's supporters, the idea to replace Marx with Kant was advocated. Pettersson also notes some interesting personal relations when searching the archives. For example, a certain Willi Eichler was the secretary to professor Leonard Nelson in Göttingen. Nelson was an interpreter of Kant who liked to stress individualism and pluralism. Eichler later became the chairman for the commission that wrote the SPD's legendary Bad Godesberg program in 1959 – the document that modernized SPD and arguably made it electable.<sup>7</sup>

According to Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, the ideas of the Enlightenment connecting social democracy to liberalism are the following: Humanism, rationalism, secularisation, progressivism and universalism.<sup>8</sup> They have been defined and summarised by Pettersson as follows:

***Humanism** is the belief that mankind and human dignity is the outermost foundation for society, an anthropocentric standpoint in relation to nature and other species.*

***Rationalism** is an expression for an outlook on mankind as well as a worldview based on reality and science (ontology and epistemology).*

***Secularisation** implies a separation between the worldly and the spiritual. Politics is regarded as a worldly activity while the spiritual; religion is one's private matter.*

***Progressivism** has for social democrats often included both a scientific and societal belief in progress, the latter united with rationalism in what sometimes has been called social engineering and ideas about "putting life in order" through the welfare state.*

***Universalism** implies the thought that there is a common, human nature that unites us all regardless of sex, ethnicity, religion and culture.<sup>9</sup>*

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<sup>6</sup> See for example: S. Padgett and W. E. Paterson, *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe*, Longman 1991.

<sup>7</sup> H. Pettersson, *Den försiktiga kameleonten: Europeisk socialdemokrati och britiska Labour*, Örebro Studies in Political Science 2004, p. 61

<sup>8</sup> T. Ball and R. Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, Longman 2002, p. 179

<sup>9</sup> H. Pettersson, *op.cit.*, p. 61



But how did the ideas of the French Enlightenment and the American Revolution end up in European social democracy? A general belief – we can call it a mix of a plausible interpretation and a cross-Atlantic theory – goes as follows. The Enlightenment in general and these concepts in particular influenced the “founding fathers” in the United States. John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, George Washington – and several others – were political leaders who participated in the American Revolution, signed the Declaration of Independence and then established the Constitution. The United States gradually rose to prominence and became an inspiration for others – for example philosophers and statesmen in Europe. The story of the “founding fathers” and the ideas behind the construction of the new growing power most naturally influenced Europe – and the other way around. Ideas travelled, even before our time.

However, when social democratic history has been written down, the Marxist heritage tends to dominate. But in a major piece of work published in 2001 – 711 pages in all – Sten O. Karlsson challenges the traditional view.<sup>10</sup> The title of his book in English would be: *“The Intelligent Society: A Reinterpretation of Social Democracy’s History of Ideas”*. The main thesis of Karlsson’s book, which focuses mostly but not only on the SAP, is that social democracy does not have a solely Marxist extraction.

*From the 1880s to today the goal of the SAP has been to improve the functioning of market economy and to integrate marginalised classes in society [...]. The roots of this communitarian view of the future [...] are to be found in the alternative reform movements that had been combating the Marxist revolutionaries: lectern socialists, Fabians, and American pragmatists.”*

Karlsson closely analyses the impact of these three alternative movements by examining exchange of old letters, memoirs, speeches, documents from congresses. In general, they have a thing in common: Certain elitism combined with a belief that society can be made better through a scientific approach.

The lectern socialists originally constituted of conservative German scientists who proposed social reforms in order to subdue the discontent among the working classes. The backdrop was the revolutions of 1848 and 1870.

*The economist Wilhelm Roscher criticized the Manchester-liberal laissez-faire policy already in 1843, arguing that the state should intervene to reconcile social classes. [...] The three professors Gustav Schmoller, Adolph Wagner and Albert Schäffle outlined in their works the blueprints for the modern welfare state with socio-political reforms, progressive taxation and a high degree of state*

<sup>10</sup> S.O. Karlsson, *Det intelligenta samhället. En omtolkning av socialdemokratiens idéhistoria*, Karlsson 2001.

<sup>11</sup> C. J. Gardell, *Socialdemokratiens växte ur alterantiva idéströmningar*, [in:] *Svenska Dagbladet*, 6th of November 2001, p. 4-5 (Kultur). “Lectern socialism” is called “Kathedersozialismus” in German.

*control over industry. [...] One of the writings that particularly inspired the young Uppsala student Hjalmar Branting was Schäffle's "Quintessenz des Sozialismus".<sup>12</sup>*

The Fabian Society, founded on January 4, 1884 and an influential think-tank even today, laid some of the foundations of the British Labour Party. Beatrice and Sidney Webb, as well as the authors Bernard Shaw and H G Wells, are often mentioned as early, influential and famous Fabians. Again, elitism and a belief in science are mixed when Karlsson goes through the early history of the Fabians.

*The Webb's took the initiative when The London School of Economics was founded in 1885. The idea was to create an elite school that would train future political experts. [...]*

*Bernard Shaw was the idol of the radical intelligentsia at the turn of the century. [...] In speeches and writings, he developed the vision of a future socialist welfare society whose population would consist of super-humans of pure breed. A scientifically bred elite of samurai would guide technology enthusiast HG Wells' Utopia. The intellectuals' task was to lead the working class as experts, ombudsmen, and educators.<sup>13</sup>*

Finally, Karlsson also turns to the American influence. He does not only discuss the "founding fathers" in general but moves on and analyses the pragmatic movement founded by William James in the 1890s, and the role of the philosopher John Dewey.

*James rejected the Marxist determinism, i.e. the passive fatalism of a revolution and the communist utopia in the distant future. Instead, he advocated a pragmatic policy that would take advantage of the present room for reform, step by step without regard to visionary goals in the future. In 1900 the philosopher John Dewey started an experimental school in Chicago and the goal was to educate a new generation of good citizens. For the Pragmatists, the human beings were the building blocks and society a social organism that could be improved constantly.<sup>14</sup>*

There is no need to underline that this chapter can never, and does not aim to, prove anything with regards to the set of values called social democracy. However, we might conclude that there is evidence to suggest that social democracy do have several interesting threads that seem to stem from sources outside the predictable Marxist package. And here, we found closeness between social democracy and the Enlightenment, and as we have seen Berggren suggested that Olof Palme "stands on the platform of the French Revolution".

Moreover, Karlsson's research presented three alternative reform movements that were not all pleasant with regards to our modern day view of elitist solutions, but they all included

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid. Hjalmar Branting went on to become the first social democratic Prime Minister of Sweden, and he also received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1921.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.



a very clear orientation towards science and policy-oriented solutions. So in all, haven't we discussed parts of social democracy that are somewhat overlooked? And haven't we shed some light on the optimistic "red thread" in Olof Palme's speeches? If so, there is time to see if we can find some concrete examples in social democratic history.

### **Past and present: Some practical examples**

If you go, plan to spend a day – not only an hour or two. The "People's History Museum" in Manchester, located in a former hydraulic pumping station, tells the history of working people in general and the Labour party in particular. When you wander around the exhibitions – full of election posters and trade union banners – your eye cannot help collecting some anecdotal evidence: Optimism, modernism and a belief in progress seem to be a "red thread" in the history of the Labour party as well.

"Labour clears the way" screams one colourful poster, portraying healthy-looking men breaking the door into the House of Lords. In the distance, the factories giving the men work can be seen. "Tomorrow when Labour rules" says another, showing a mixed group of working-class people walking down a grassy hill, welcoming the new dawn with open arms and almost religious smiles. Another one is even more explicit: "Greet the new dawn: Give Labour it's chance". A man celebrates the sunrise over an industrial town with raised arms, his wife sitting behind him with a newborn baby. "Let's build the houses quick: Vote Labour" is another example, the "V" in "vote" being illustrated by a bricklaying trowel. The romanticism of the progress of the industrial age is present as well: "Smoke from chimneys, not from guns" says one poster used during the Second World War.<sup>15</sup>

Naturally, this is patchy anecdotal evidence at best. To prove that a belief in progress and science is not only part of social democratic ideology, but also makes a party more likely to win an election, cannot be done within the scope of this essay. But let us have a look at a few interesting examples.

The general election in Britain in 1945 was held against the backdrop of the horrors of the war. Labour's idea was to turn the sacrifice made during the war into substantial achievement at home. The word "modern" is used no less than eight times in the 1945 Labour Election Manifesto "*Let us face the future*".

*The nation wants food, work and homes. It wants more than that – it wants good food in*

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<sup>15</sup> The visit at the "People's History Museum" in Manchester ([www.phm.org.uk](http://www.phm.org.uk)) was conducted on the 11th of August 2011 and inspired the theme of this essay.

*plenty, useful work for all, and comfortable, labour – saving homes that take full advantage of the resources of modern science and productive industry. [...]*

*The nation needs a tremendous overhaul, a great programme of modernisation and re-equipment of its homes, its factories and machinery, its schools, its social services. [...]*

*In the new National Health Service there should be health centres where the people may get the best that modern science can offer.<sup>16</sup>*

The theme of the campaign in 1945 was “Labour – For Security”. Laura Beers, Assistant Professor at the American University in Washington DC, has described Labour’s attempt to connect three themes into one single message: Modernisation, the need for security, the sacrifices made.

*While several posters [...] featured civilians, the two most famous were an image of a soldier with the accompanying caption ‘This is our chance to Labour for him’, and a composite portrait of the armed forces – ‘Help them finish their job’. These posters explicitly associated the Labour Party with the sacrifices of Britain’s armed forces and insisted that only Labour could guarantee these men the future they deserved.<sup>17</sup>*

Labour’s victory in the general election 1964 ended a period of 13 years in opposition and might serve as another example.<sup>18</sup> The slogan cooked up by the strategists was “Let’s go wjth Labour and we’ll get things done”. The message and the campaign has been described in the following way by Steven Fielding, Professor of Political History at the University of Nottingham.

*Together with a thumbs up logo, ‘Let’s Go’ was meant to give the impression that Labour was no longer the old-fashioned organisation some voters had thought it in 1959 and was now intent on change, ‘modernisation’ and a ‘New Britain’. It was of a piece with Harold Wilson’s promise to unleash the ‘white heat’ of technology to kick start the failing British economy should he become Prime Minister. [...]*

*The campaign shows very clearly that Labour’s interest in the power of image and slick presentation long pre-dated Tony Blair and Peter Mandelson. ‘Let’s Go’ was also a nationally generated and carefully coordinated campaign.*

But being modern in the 1960s does not help you forever. As the political winds changed quickly in the 1970s and 1980s, Labour seemed to be stuck with Wilson’s “white heat of

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<sup>16</sup> Labour Party, 1945 Labour Party Election Manifesto. *Let Us Face the Future: A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation*. At the People’s History Museum, you can also read the draft adapted by the Labour National Executive Committee (NEC) with last minute remarks made by hand in the manifesto.

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.phm.org.uk/our-collection/exhibitions-picturing-politics/labour-for-security>.

<sup>18</sup> The mood among the working class in Britain and the expectations before the 1964 election is portrayed in the first episode, called “1964”, of the BBC television drama serial *Our Friends in the North*. The phrase “the white heat of technology” is mentioned in the dialogue.



technology". The mantle of modernity was lost, which contributed to several elections defeats and 18 years in opposition (1979-1997).<sup>19</sup>

*In Britain, the Labour Party remained trapped, culturally and psephologically, in the past: a product of steam, hobbling arthritically into the age of the computer. It spoke to the casualties of change rather than to the pacemakers; to declining areas rather than to advancing ones; to those who looked back in resignation rather than to those who looked forward in hope.*

Labour modernised in the 1990s to get rid of the image described above. This ambition was over-explicit when Tony Blair concluded his speech to the Labour Party conference in Brighton on October 3<sup>rd</sup> 1995.

*The prize is immense. It is new Britain. One Britain: the people united by shared values and shared aims, a government governing for all the people, the party founded by the people back, truly, as the people's party. New Labour, New Britain. The party renewed, the country reborn.*<sup>20</sup>

We have already seen the focus on "Modernity + Equality = Freedom" in Olof Palme's speeches, and the influences from alternative reform movements analysed by Sten O. Karlsson. Given the British examples cited above, the focus on being in tune with the present time might explain some of the success. However, some very practical examples can also be found during Tage Erlander's impressive tenure as party leader of SAP and Prime Minister of Sweden: 1946-1969 – without losing an election.

*For Tage, a social reform was just the flipside of the Nobel Prize in Physics, says Jan O. Karlsson when asked about Erlander's interest in science. Karlsson has held various positions in SAP-governments since the early 1970s, most notably as deputy Foreign Minister (2002-2003). He underlines that Erlander was interested not only in social sciences, but also in the latest research in sciences such as physics. This was also manifested in regular conferences, as Erlander himself describes in his memoirs.*<sup>21</sup>

During the 1700s the natural sciences and hence the Enlightenment broke through. This reveals a deep connection. [...] The new thoughts played a significant role in the American and French revolutions, and thus for political development to the present day. [...]

*During the conferences, the researchers felt a need to bring forward ideas about science and society for all those who were responsible for making decisions in these matters. The so-called "Rigoletto-conference" in November 1955 gathered 400-500 people, politicians, union leaders, industrialists and academics.*

19 <http://www.phm.org.uk/our-collection/exhibitions-picturing-politics/lets-go-with-labour>.

20 D. Marquand, *The progressive dilemma. From Lloyd George to Blair*, Phoenix Giant, Second edition 1999, p. 212.

21 T. Blair, *New Britain. My vision of a young country*, Fourth Estate 1996, p. 72.

Henry Pettersson's also notes Erlander's interest in science and progress in his doctoral thesis. In a document presented to the SAP-congress in 1956 called "The politics of progress", Pettersson underlines that Tage Erlander personally expressed "a strong belief in technology and development".<sup>22</sup>

Is it then fair to assume that social democratic parties fare better when they are optimistic, modern, and have a party leader who is interested in research and thinks more about tomorrow than yesterday? No, this must still be regarded as anecdotal evidence. But maybe it is fair to assume that when social democratic parties are perceived as strong on economic issues in general, giving them credibility and an image of being up to date, results are better?

Odd Guteland, responsible for the analysis of opinion polls at the SAP, puts numbers on the theory. In the post-war period, the SAP has regularly been the most trusted party with regards to economic issues. Five exceptions exist: 1976, 1979, 1991, 2006 and 2010. These are the five times when elections have been lost. The same pattern only exists for one other political issue: Schools – another question that is often stated by swing-voters as a reason to change political allegiance.<sup>23</sup> And what about welfare? That is an issue that voters always trust social democrats with, even when elections are lost.

But what about present day examples? It is not easy to find convincing social democratic victories in the year of 2011. But on February 20th, a state election was held in a rather rich city in Europe: Hamburg. In a city where no less than 1 500 millionaires live, the SPD got 48.4 percent. If you add the Greens (11.2), the Left Party (6.4) and the Pirate Party (2.1), almost seven out of ten voters voted for a progressive party to the left of centre.

The formula for success is not surprising. The SPD and its candidate for Mayor Olaf Scholz had a strong focus on its economic message. Scholz and his party also have a history of working closely with the local economic actors in Hamburg (major companies, the media sector, entrepreneurs, etcetera). The message in the campaign was very hands on and gave priority to just a few reforms that Scholz promised to get done right away. One such thing was the dredging of the river Elbe so that the port of Hamburg, Europe's third largest and the engine of the city's economy, would be ready to accommodate the next generation of super-tankers. This was an issue that was stalled during the previous black-green cooperation between CDU and the Greens.

Investment in the port included several infrastructure projects, such as roads and railways. This major reform was accompanied with a promise to build 6 000 new apartments per year

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<sup>22</sup> Interview with Jan O. Karlsson, October 20th 2011.

<sup>23</sup> T. Erlander, 1955-1960, Tidens Förlag, 1976, p. 30-31.





– a true necessity since the city grows by some 100 000 new inhabitants annually. The message did not only focus on the social need, but also on the simple fact that rents are going through the roof and that there is an evident lack of affordable apartments. Again, the previous city-government had talked about an expanding city, but did little to solve the problem.

Another underlying economic message had to do with the city's budget. A new concert hall turned out to be three times more expensive than anticipated. The SPD promised to install fiscal discipline and balance the books by 2020 through a detailed and sound plan.

To act according to Palme's formula, the message about modernising the port was combined with reforms that would increase equality. One example, in addition to the 6 000 new apartments, was vocational training and the need to give individuals the skills needed to get a job in an ever-changing economy. As German Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (2007-2009), Scholz had noticed how young people dropped out of school and then disappeared off the radar for a few years, before they turned up again as dependents on welfare. To tackle this issue was not at the absolute forefront of the campaign, but it was an example of a social reform that was important to Scholz personally and to the campaign in general.<sup>24</sup>

If Hamburg feels like the odd exception to an old rule, we must ask another question. Can we find historical examples of when Palme's old formula was modified?

### **What happened to the progressive optimist?**

Following two heavy election defeats, Swedish Social Democrats have extensively examined what went wrong. One phrase that has been used is "intellectual stagnation". According to this theory, the party that governed Sweden from 1932-76, 1982-91 and 1994-2006 never built up an intellectual infrastructure outside the party. Why form even the tiniest think-tank when the Governmental Offices could investigate any possible question for you?

At the same time, the Prime Minister's Office always attracted the best and the brightest, generation after generation. Leading professors and other experts were naturally involved in, or more loosely tied to, the machinery of government. But as consecutive election defeats eventually happened, combined with some righteous sleepiness after years of governing, intellectual stagnation followed.<sup>25</sup>

But a phenomenon like simultaneous social democratic stagnation across Europe must

<sup>24</sup> H. Pettersson, p. 304.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with Odd Guteland, October 29th 2011.

have a quite a few additional causes. When explaining the historic success, writer Henrik Arnstad underlines the social democratic advantage when deciding and describing the present age. Modernity, quite simply. The social democrats built the future, replacing squalor with a modern welfare state, and the conservatives tried to stop them.

But after a few decades, carpentry work on a bigger and bigger welfare state was not regarded as "modern" anymore. As the radical winds of 1968 started to blow, Arnstad argues that a change occurred. To be "politically to the left" in general started to be associated with anti-modernity:

*It started with the tribute to the peasant guerrilla in Indochina and Chinese farmers during Mao. After the ending of the Vietnam War in 1975, the opposition against nuclear power followed – partly in direct opposition to the advocates of modernity.<sup>26</sup>*

Arnstad notes that the sign of the times – even among some social democrats – was a red star on your jacket, protests, environmentalism, and wooden shoes ("clogs"). And even if progressives have scrapped the impractical and uncomfortable idea of shoes made out wood, "anti-modernism and pessimism about the future remained a distinguishing-mark for the collective identity of being politically to the left", Arnstad argues.<sup>27</sup>

This "wooden shoe" theory might be one piece of the puzzle explaining why social democrats today seem to be more out of touch and less optimistic and modern. Probably even more important, however, is the development to the right of the political aisle. As the left turned its back on modernity, there was a vacuum to be filled.

*A political space was opened for neo-liberalism as "the future", so to speak, became vacant. Today, these right-wing dreams regarding privatization and deregulation are being implemented [...] Nostalgia generally does not win any elections. This anti-modernity, which currently dominates the SAP, is potentially dangerous for the whole of Swedish society.<sup>28</sup>*

The ideological closeness between social democracy and liberalism, for example manifested in concepts such as optimism and progress, have recently been noted by the parties of the political right. Per Schlingmann, State Secretary for Communication in the Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt's Office, is regarded as the PR-guru of the "new Moderates" – Sweden's increasingly centrist conservative party. An article in "Fokus", Sweden's leading magazine about current affairs, recently described why Schlingmann is so interested in what can be described as the first part of Palme's formula.

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<sup>26</sup> This section is based on two interviews: Wolfgang Schmidt, State Secretary for the city of Hamburg, October 6th 2011. Carsten Brosda, worked with media relations for the SPD in the campaign in Hamburg, October 28th 2011.

<sup>27</sup> H. Arvidsson, *Intellektuell stiltje är S stora problem* [in:] Svenska Dagbladet, October 18th 2011, p. 12 (Kultur).

<sup>28</sup> H. Arnstad, *Visionerna saknas i S* [in:] Svenska Dagbladet, 22nd of October 2011, p. 16 (Kultur).



*What the Moderate party desperately is searching for is a history in which their Government does not appear as an anomaly in a fundamentally social democratic country, but as a logical extension of a long-established Swedish social contract.<sup>29</sup>*

What Schlingmann openly acknowledges is that he aims to amend the picture of Sweden as a social democratic country. Sweden's progress in the 20th century was a result of openness, technological achievements, capable individuals made even stronger and healthier by the welfare state. Palme's political beliefs, as we have seen.

Given the present state of neo-liberalism, this seems to be a very tactical move made by the Moderates. Instead of elaborating on their heritage from Thatcher and Reagan, they aim to overtake the Swedish societal contract from social democrats that ran out of steam and ideas. The new party platform adopted by the "new Moderates" in October 2011, confirms Schlingmann's ambitions.

*Sweden has become one of the best countries in the world to live in thanks to openness, individualism and market economy. The affluence that freedom brought with it made it possible for us to increase the security and through education, medical service and care for everyone we created one of the most coherent countries on earth. [...] The Moderates would like to continue to develop Sweden further based on the values that many regard as typically Swedish.<sup>30</sup>*

The Swedish case should be a warning cry for European social democrats. "Intellectual stagnation" and the "wooden shoe"-theory might in part describe how an optimistic party in tune with the future can be turned into a defensive and nostalgic political force. But at the same time, pragmatic conservatives seem ready to embrace modernism more than their historic mix of conservatism and neo-liberalism – attempting to depoliticize the historic achievements of the labour movement at the same time.

The next question is inevitable. What should the progressive optimist do now?

## **Potential lessons for modern day progressives**

One thing must be made clear. How political challenges ought to be dealt with is always a responsibility for progressive parties themselves. And the prerequisites vary within Europe. A common quick fix for all European social democratic parties does not exist.

But given the thoughts presented in the paper – originally provoked by an anecdote about Olof Palme – the following conclusions are suggested.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> C. Lönegård, *Propagandaministerns plan* [in:] *Fokus*, 21st of October 2011, p. 20-29. Quote from page 22.

In his acclaimed book *"Ill Fares the Land"*, the late Tony Judt offers an astute analysis of the lay of the land. Mankind have thrown away the two decades since the Berlin Wall came down – a sad time marked politically by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. *"Something is profoundly wrong with the way we live today"*, argues Judt, and continues with a rousing critique of how the social democratic project – the best society we ever had – is falling to pieces from the pressure of unregulated markets.<sup>31</sup>

This general line of thought – a sharp but vague critique of the terrible state we are in – has recently been repeated in two important speeches: Håkan Juholt's installation speech as new party leader of the SAP, and Ed Miliband's speech to Labour conference in Liverpool.

In the first sentence below, taken from his installation speech, Juholt is more or less quoting Judt.

*Most naturally we welcome that our modern welfare state is perhaps the best and most humane society ever created. But it says a lot about where Sweden is heading, when the gain from the more expensive medicine in pharmacies end up in foreign tax havens. When global school- and healthcare companies are handing out taxpayer money to their owners, rather than using them for a teacher's salary, for a care worker who can hold the hand of the sick and old.*<sup>32</sup>

Ed Miliband, on the other hand, famously agitated against the "predators" in his speech in Liverpool.

*You've been told that the choice in politics is whether parties are pro-business or anti-business. But all parties must be pro-business today. If it ever was, that's not the real choice any more. Let me tell you what the 21<sup>st</sup> century choice is: Are you on the side of the wealth creators or the asset strippers? The producers or the predators?*

The present author heard both these speeches live and they made the audience jump to their feet. We all felt very good as the hall applauded the poignant harsh attacks on profits made out of taxpayers' money, and the asset strippers.

However, progressives might end up in a dangerous position if the ongoing scenario will conclude as one might fear. Smart and reformed Conservatives parties are starting to claim the first half of Olof Palme's formula, modernity – the platform from the Enlightenment. As we saw in the Swedish case, the Moderates are already trying to rewrite the history of the welfare state, claiming that it was built on Swedish – not social democratic – values.

**Conservatives will then point out that the social democrats are not offering any solutions; they are only talking about the golden past and painting the present in black colours. Hence the Conservatives will argue that they are more suited to solve the evident**

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<sup>31</sup> Moderaterna, *Idéprogram. Ansvar för hela Sverige*, 2011, p. 8.

<sup>32</sup> T. Judt, *Ill fares the land*, Penguin Books 2010, see for example p. 41.



problems with market forces being allowed to dominate our societies to the extreme. We are the modern and reformed caretakers of the welfare state after all, not that tired red lot with the big rear-view mirrors, Conservatives will try to make us think.

If we take Juholt's and Miliband's speeches as examples, the evident shortcoming is the distance between the feel-good rhetoric in the hall, and the need to turn these phrases into plausible reforms that speaks to a majority of the voters. Put differently, what seems to be lacking is the "red thread" of Palme's speeches: The optimism, modernism, belief in science and progress – combined with a concrete reform agenda. Dare one ask: When did the SAP or Labour most recently organise a conference like the one Tage Erlander talks about in his memoirs, with 400-500 people – including industrialists and academics?

Therefore, the most worrying sign is not that Conservatives in Sweden are trying to rewrite the history of the welfare state. What progressives ought to spend more time discussing is how we can use the current climate of gloom and crises in Europe, and re-emerge as the political force with modern solutions, in tune with our times.

So, given the ideas put forward here, where should a progressive start? One idea is to go back to the formula you know by now: Modernity + Equality = Freedom. Perhaps these bullet points can give some further food for thought.

- **Whenever there is a debate about social democratic ideology, you should not forget the part of our roots discussed here.** We are better when we remember that we are not only standing on Marx's shoulders. The platform from the Enlightenment that Olof Palme so often stood on should be remembered as well.
- **One practical way to do so is to always stay close to research, the life at universities, the frontiers of science, and technology.** It will probably help you to find policy solutions. Maybe it will also help you to keep up to date with the first part of the formula, modernity. And remember, your next social reform might only be the flip side of the latest Nobel Prize in Physics.
- **Speaking of social reforms, this paper dealt very little with the second part of the formula: equality. The reason is simple: If you are a social democrat, that concept will always be at the very heart of your political agenda.** This paper dealt with less covered social democratic ground. Just remember something very obvious: As the political right realises that it is better to be modern than conservative, the view of equality is still the big trench dividing social democrats from conservatives.
- If you are a politician, you are likely to conduct your next speech rather soon. Then it might be a good idea to remember that black is not the only political colour. Yes, times are tough in

Europe, but the political force that convincingly can offer a way forward may get the upper hand for decades to come. **It is more difficult to find a way out of a mess, than to paint the mess in black.** But given the political history cited here, it seems like the right thing to do.

- But if you are a social democratic politician, what should you say about a “new progressive modernity”? Is there such a thing? If so, and since we are to the left, how does our concept of modernity differ from what others are saying? Maybe the opportunity for progressives is to become the party of modernity again? Six years ago, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and the iPhone did not exist. Where will we be in another six years? What would happen if progressives could manage to turn this evolution into a political agenda that will help us to achieve sustainable development, energy efficiency, new jobs, a better functioning of our schools and hospitals? Olof Palme modernised the welfare state through reforms that increased gender equality in the 1970s, a job still unfinished. Can we find a new modernity at the crossroads where technology and equality meet free individuals in a stronger and reborn state? As you have noticed, this interesting question fell outside of the scope of this paper. However, maybe it would be a suitable topic for another essay within the framework of which this text was written (the FEPS Next Left Focus Group). Stay tuned.

### **Conclusion: A “red thread” or a vain attempt?**

It might be impossible to prove the anecdote about the “red thread” of optimism and modernity in Palme’s speeches. But hopefully we have shed some light on Palme’s life. It seems reasonable to believe that he stood on a platform from the Enlightenment. The description of the closeness between the Enlightenment and social democratic ideology has hopefully provided the reader with some new insights about a heritage that has never been entirely about Marx.

We also found some practical examples that suggested that this “red thread” is important if you want to win elections. Was it proved? No. Does it seem likely? Some readers might have become more convinced.

A theory about why the “red thread” almost disappeared was added, and complemented with a description of an attempt by the political right to claim it.

Now it is up to the leading progressive politicians of this day: Is this line of thought a crucial one for a social democratic comeback? Or has this exercise just been a vain attempt to justify an anecdote that was too good not to be true?

As a born optimist, I know what I believe.



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Dimitris TSAROUHAS

## **Social Democracy and the Trade Unions: Facing the Challenge**





## **Key words**

**Social democracy – Trade unions – Crisis – EU – Progressive politics**

## **Summary**

The link between social democratic parties and trade unions has traditionally served the purpose of solidifying the mass base of the progressive movement. Yet over time this link has weakened, even in countries where its existence has provided both sides with hard-won benefits of a political, organisational and financial nature. I hereby examine the evolution of the link through time, articulate the challenges it faces and ask whether its existence adds value to the progressive causes of today.

## Introduction

The contemporary crisis of the European centre-left is a multifaceted phenomenon and open to various interpretations. Yet all of them are underpinned by one theme that one comes across in debates and analysis all the time: the centre-left is bereft of social alliances and accused of aloofness and disengagement with popular concerns.

This is a very strange position to be in if you are a progressive. Surely, the history, tradition and road to success for progressive forces is intrinsically connected to their ability to foster broad societal alliances and articulate an agenda for change that benefits those dependent on their labour to earn a living. Changes in our contemporary societies, important as they are in the age of the Internet and diverse lifestyles, surely cannot undermine the centrality of mass participation in progressive movements. However, that is where the centre-left is today and the question that begs answering is in what ways can the current predicament be overcome and the courage of the left's convictions can shine again. Moreover, the goals of social democracy through history have in no way been sectarian and isolated from the wider political milieu. The social democratic agenda regarding the welfare state and universal suffrage, to name but two examples, has more often than not been shared by other parties too.

**What makes the current predicament particularly troublesome for progressives is that their old alliances are also on their way out.** The link between social democratic parties and the trade unions is a case in point: what used to be the bedrock of popular support for the progressive cause has become a loose and increasingly strained relationship. It is no coincidence that both social democracy and the European trade union movement find themselves in crisis at the same time, and both struggle to retain their relevance as politics becomes ever more complex and unpredictable.

In that context, then, **does the party-union link still matter?** Is this debate a purely theoretical exercise bereft of meaning, or does it contain lessons for progressives as they seek to articulate a new agenda befitting our times? In what ways, if at all, does the party-union link make sense today, and how can it further the progressive cause in Europe and beyond?

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<sup>1</sup> P. Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.



Answers are not easy to come by, and it would be absurd to pretend otherwise. The current crisis of social democracy is deep and persistent, made all the more pressing due to the Eurozone crisis, but it is not a new phenomenon. The 1990s victorious comeback of the centre-left in its Third Way version offered relief and reinstalled the hope of a new progressive coalition, but its impact proved only temporary. Still, the centre-left's comeback was a potent reminder that the formation of broad alliances in favour of progressive causes remains a realistic goal, and flies in the face of pessimism, apathy and resignation. In fact, the current crisis has once again highlighted the centrality of politics in organizing our diverse societies in ways that strengthen their cohesion and enhance peoples' sense of security and belonging. The current crisis has made the search for fresh solutions all the more pressing, and the need to critically assess current conditions a precondition in moving forward. It is hardly a coincidence that, with the exception of Denmark, social democrats have failed thus far to capitalize on the crisis to return to power.

This contribution explicitly addresses the question of the link between social democracy and the trade union movement. It seeks to contribute to progressive thinking by making use of all valuable resources in or around the centre-left, and convinced that broad alliances are the way forward in tackling the crisis of political representation evident today.

In what follows, I begin with a discussion of the link between social democratic parties and progressive trade unions in the post-war era, the "Golden Age" of welfare capitalism as well as party-union relations. As the conditions that laid to that flourishing partnership are unlikely to repeat themselves any time soon, what lessons could possibly be derived from the "golden past"? The next section deals with the tensions and problems inside both social democracy and contemporary trade unionism, and links these up to the European Union project and the additional set of challenges this entails. The next part takes stock of the most recent social democratic moment in European politics, the "Third Way" era and its legacy, before concluding with a "going forward" sub-section where practical examples of how a new party-union link could look like are discussed.

### **The party-union link during the Golden Age**

To derive useful lessons from the age of "welfare capitalism", it is important to concentrate on those elements that made it possible. To do so, one has to pay particular attention to the dominance of neocorporatism in Western Europe during that time, and the factors that

allowed for its successful application. Ferdinand Karlhofer<sup>2</sup> has succinctly discussed the most important factors:

1. The number of labour and employer organizations was generally small. A high degree of concentration made those organizations powerful vis a vis the government of the day;
2. Being small in number, the organizations representing labour and capital were highly centralized and organizationally concentrated;
3. The elites of both trade unions and employers' associations retained a high degree of autonomy from their rank and file, whilst making sure that channels of inter-organizational representation remained open;
4. Collective bargaining took place either at the cross-industrial (sectoral) level or even nation-wide;
5. Employer and labour organizations worked in close cooperation with the government on certain policy areas, especially incomes policy, and were generally seen as legitimate partners in macroeconomic policy steering.

These conditions were crucial in facilitating the flourishing of social partnership and the class compromise. This, in turn, was a necessary precondition for the fruitful cooperation between social democratic parties and the trade unions because it created a win-win situation for both wings of the labour movement. **For the unions, working closely with social democrats meant that they could realistically aspire to improvements in their members' welfare through the expansion of state-financed and delivered services and favourable labour legislation.** Gøsta Esping-Andersen's early work emphasised the ability of labour-based associations and trade unions to impose their agenda on capital by utilising the power reserves resulting from their collaboration with Social Democrats, thus acquiring a *government culture*<sup>3</sup>. The business community is in this model forced into retreat as the labour movement articulates a clearly delineated, historical plan to combine its increasing policy influence with the best possible outcomes for the working class. It is important to underline that social policy in this model and at that time is more often than not *augmenting* the economic growth strategies of the unions and does not need to function as a corrective mechanism by the social democratic government to appease frustrated union members.

**For the social democratic parties, cooperation with the trade unions meant not only a stable pool of voters and supporters during election time but also the delivery of**

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<sup>2</sup> F. Karlhofer, *The Present and Future State of Social Partnership*, [in:] G. Bischof & A. Pelinka (eds.) *Austro-Corporatism, Contemporary Austrian Studies*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers 1996, pp. 119-46.

<sup>3</sup> M. Regini & G. Esping Andersen, *Trade Union Strategies and Social Policy in Italy and Sweden*, [in:] J. Hayward, J. (ed.) *Trade Unions and Politics in Western Europe*, London: Frank Cass, 1980, p.120.



programmatic goals regarding social justice and economic growth. Moreover, moderate trade union demands and their control over more radical members and factions enabled the social democrats to form a broad coalition between the working class and the rising middle class. For a brief period, therefore, social democracy had it both ways: both class warrior in defence of workers' rights, and mainstream political force promoting economic growth raising the living standards of all – and especially the middle class, which was co-opted in socialized welfare.

The mode of production was also crucial in allowing both for social partnership and a mutually beneficial party-union link. Fordism was premised on mass production, a necessary precondition of which were large workplaces characterized by a fairly monotonous and repetitive exercise of labour by low- or semi-skilled employees. Within those large workplaces, employee recruitment was fairly easy for well-managed and organizationally strong trade unions. Furthermore, the end product of those workplaces was geared towards a market that was also homogenous in tastes, belief and lifestyle, and who therefore did not object to homogeneity.

It is, however, also important to stress that the ability of social democracy to flourish after World War II was not a strictly material phenomenon solely derived from a political economy framework favourable to its agenda. That was only part of the story. Following World War II social democracy also became a leading *intellectual* force throughout Western Europe, as it reaped the benefits of the lessons learned from the pre-war unfettered capitalism era and its disastrous consequences<sup>4</sup>. It articulated its vision for a good society in persuasive terms through a generation of political leaders who helped in making politics and the struggle for social justice a pervasive concern. Leaders such as Tage Erlander of Sweden, Bruno Kreisky of Austria, Willy Brandt of Germany and François Mitterrand of France embodied not only centre-left principles and values but also the ability to translate those values into the politics of everyday life. That is what made them great at the time, and why progressives celebrate and miss them today as much as they do.

In addition, **social democracy was an active intellectual force in everyday economic and social life, able to shape the debate in progressive terms.** It goes without saying that the ascendancy of Keynesianism made that possible in the first place, yet there are examples of trade union economists too who made their ideas mainstream and actively shaped public policy. The example of Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner in Sweden springs to mind. In 1951 the Rehn-Meidner model foresaw full employment and low inflation through an active labour market policy, centralized and solidaristic wage bargaining as well as a

<sup>4</sup> F.G. Castles, *The Social Democratic Image of Society*, London and Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan, 1976.

restrictive fiscal policy<sup>5</sup>. Once approved by the social democratic party the model became state policy and delivered impressive results for as long as the onset of globalization made its application impossible to sustain. What is worth underlining here is that the Rehn-Meidner Model in effect went beyond the Keynesian consensus. In contrast to the Keynesian logic of a counter-cyclical economic policy with an expansionist tendency, the Model supported a counter-cyclical policy with a tendency to favour deflation. In other words, finance policy was a means to achieve primarily stability in inflation levels towards a low equilibrium and not achieve full employment in a context of economic depression, as was the case with the Keynesian system<sup>6</sup>.

A final point to note on the party-union link in **The Golden Age was the absence of a significant political alternative to mainstream social democratic parties that the unions could rely on.** *The culture of moderation and pragmatism*<sup>7</sup> was not only the result of Keynesianism, Fordism and the willingness of cooperation cultivated by employers and unions alike. It was also a necessary choice by many trade union elites who had to rely on social democracy in the absence of practical alternatives.

## The Social Democratic Decline

The trigger for the Keynesian demise was the economic crisis of the 1970s, which led to rising unemployment and inflation at a time of war in Vietnam and unrest in the Middle East. Yet it would be illusionary to claim that the beginning of social democratic decline was merely a question of economic underperformance, important as that was. In reality by the end of the 1970s, most of the structural factors that made the party-union link part of the successful progressive recipe had disappeared - and with them the social democratic moment. What is more, their disappearance was accompanied by a powerful and long-lasting ideological counter-strategy to the basic premises of the post-war settlement. The inevitable consequence was that social democrats and progressive trade unions found themselves on the defensive. Arguably, they have yet to recover.

Social partnership ended by the late 1970s-early 1980s and the reasons are various. To start with, Fordism became progressively weaker as a mode of production. "Just in time" production catering to a more fragmented and differentiated consumerist lifestyle became increasingly important for competitive firms.

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<sup>5</sup> R. Locke & K. Thelen, *Apples and Oranges Revisited: Contextualized Comparisons and the Study of Labor Politics*, [in:] *Politics and Society* 1995, 23(3): 337-67.

<sup>6</sup> L. Erixon, *A Swedish Economic Policy – The Rehn-Meidner Model's Theory, Application and Validity*, [in:] H. Milner & E. Wadensjö (eds.) *Gösta Rehn, the Swedish Model and Labour Market Policies. International and National Perspectives*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2001, pp.13-49.

<sup>7</sup> G. Moschonas, *In the name of social democracy*, London: Verso 2002, p.70



Flexible specialisation is the core theoretical explanation to which the rise of post-Fordism is connected. According to this approach, *the widespread application of numerically controlled, multipurpose machinery during the 1970s and 1980s led to a shift away from standardised mass production to what Wolfgang Streeck has called diversified quality production*<sup>8</sup>. Taylorist principles of work organisation reached the limits of their effectiveness. They were replaced by a mode of production emphasising the “responsible autonomy” of workers, who were given multifaceted tasks in the process of delivering products “just-in-time” and on the basis of close collaboration with their supervisors and engineers<sup>9</sup>. The clear-cut Fordist distinction between skilled and unskilled workers gave way to a less hierarchical pattern of product organisation and delivery that emphasised individual abilities as a core element of value added. In that context, John Matthews has defined post-Fordism as *[focusing] on the need for flexibility and a capacity for innovation in an economy geared to dynamic structural adjustment. It is distinguished from competing neo-Fordist perspectives in its insistence that flexibility and productivity are most efficiently based on the skilled input of workers taking increasing levels of responsibility for the design of their jobs their workplaces, their products and ultimately the management of their enterprises*.

The consequences of flexible specialization were not limited to the economy and entailed political implications as well. First, white-collar unions, previously small in number and politically less powerful than blue-collar unions, made a strong entry into the labour market. In due time they began dominating it, and their voice became ever more powerful.

White-collar unions were distinguished by two features. On the one hand, many of the white-collar unions organized highly skilled employees that were actively shaping new production techniques and whose affiliation to social democracy was much looser than for low- or medium-skilled workers. Rather than remain committed to employee-wide cooperation, they often chose to cooperate with employers instead to upgrade production towards the higher end of specialization and skills, thus making large and internationally competitive firms more efficient<sup>10</sup>. On the other hand, white-collar unions swelled their ranks with the increasing number of women that started entering the labour force after the war and whose entry accelerated as traditional family values eroded and identity politics became more pronounced. Their values and goals often overlapped with what traditional working class held dear; often, however, this was not the case and their relationship became more strained over time. A further line of division among salaried employees emerged.

8 T. Iversen, *Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralised Wage Bargaining: Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective*, [in:] *Comparative Politics* 1996, 28(4), p.406.

9 A. Lipietz, *Post-Fordism and Democracy*, [in:] A. Amin (ed.) *Post-Fordism. A Reader*, Oxford: Blackwells 1994, pp. 338-357.

10 P. Swenson, *Fair Shares: Unions, Pay and Politics in Sweden and West Germany*, London: Adamantine Press 1989.

Social partnership was thus being transformed from within. It could resist pressures for its dismantlement for as long as the Keynesian framework dominated economic practice, and for as long as employers remained committed to the nationally-minded post-war compromise. In due time both conditions ceased to exist placing social democracy in a very difficult position.

When Fordism gave way to differentiated production techniques, employers came to the conclusion that their derived benefits from practicing social partnership were declining fast. The fairly egalitarian wage practices used until that period, which had contributed to lowering post-war inequality became less and less necessary as highly skilled workers demanded higher compensation for their high-intensity labour. As intra-union divisions based on occupational and wage differences emerged the centralized, homogenous trade unions lost internal cohesion and political clout. Employers could thus take the opportunity to undermine their class rivals by opting out from the postwar consensus by calling for wage bargaining at local level and the dismantling of corporatist institutions<sup>11,12</sup>. Moreover, the salience of small- and medium-sized enterprises as a percentage of national wealth began to rise, and the centrality of large factories and plants was undermined. In fact, there is some data suggesting a correlation between employment share of large plant sizes and social democratic strength over time<sup>13</sup>.

But their ability to do so was not merely premised on the inability of the trade unions to present a united front and the concomitant ability of social democratic parties to solve the emerging policy dilemma. It also came about because the ideological winds of change that swept through the US in the 1970s moved over to Europe by the 1980s and dominated economic thinking for the next few decades. Despite successive crises of unregulated capitalism, it is these ideas that still dominate mainstream economic analysis today, not least in the EU.

Mark Blyth<sup>14</sup> has summarized the new economic ideas as follows: monetarism, supply-side economics, rational expectations and public choice theory. All of them were linked together by two fundamental assumptions that shaped the thinking of economists, politicians and consequently the public. First, that if asked to chose between unemployment and high inflation politicians ought to target inflation and let the employment rate “clear” at its “natural” rate. Secondly and connected to that, both inflation and unemployment should be traced to state intervention, which is *de facto harmful* to an economy at all times. The logical consequences of such assumptions, held deeply and promoted over the years with evangelical zeal,

11 K.O. Moeve & M.Wallerstein, *Social democratic labor market institutions: a retrospective analysis*, [in:] H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks & J.D. Stephens (eds.) *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 199, pp. 231-60.

12 D. Swank, *Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.

13 J. Pontusson, *Explaining the Decline of European Social Democracy: The role of structural economic change*, [in:] *World Politics* 1995, 47(4): 495-533.

14 M. Blyth, *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.





were destructive for social democracy and the party-union partnership.

First, this new economic thinking made labour market policy completely redundant. Not only did it remove a pillar of public policy previously considered indispensable; it also reduced the available room for progressives to intervene in the market and work in partnership with the trade unions to achieve full employment. The latter, it was now claimed, could remain as a theoretical (and increasingly unrealistic) aim of public policy if attempts to fulfil it did not mess up with the “real” goal: low inflation.

Secondly, new economic thinking meant that the issue of tax came to dominate political thinking. In the advanced welfare societies of Western Europe in particular, the immediate consequence of a radicalized generation of business calling for liberation from the tyranny of tax was to undermine the social democratic compromise’s broad coalition of the working- and middle class. That coalition had been based on an implicit contract that demanded high taxation levels in return for growth and welfare services. The swelling ranks of the middle class openly called for the end of the status quo ante and opted out for private provisions wherever possible. The trade unions and “old” social democracy were left back deriding the change in the game’s rules and seeking to appeal to peoples’ sense of solidarity and fairness. Such an appeal went increasingly unnoticed.

What is very important in the transformation caused by technological and economic change is the emergence of sharp divisions between employees. This is not to suggest that white-collar workers somehow all became middle class and abandoned social democracy and the unions. But it is to say that **collective action, which is premised on a degree of cohesion among the working people, became a lot more difficult since white-collar workers do not behave as blue-collar workers or perceive themselves to be part of that same group<sup>15</sup>. This is the main reason as to why the re-emergence of social democracy as a mass movement is premised on its ability to recreate a large societal coalition that will incorporate the mobile and cosmopolitan middle classes but will not be limited or dictated by it.**

## The EU Factor

It is within a context of a rapidly changing socio-economic reality that the EU factor became prominent, namely through the Single Market project of the 1980s and subsequent agreements promoting that objective in an enlarging Union. Until that period the process of integration was running parallel to the existence of protectionism and economic nationalism,

<sup>15</sup> C. Pierson, *Socialism after Communism: The New Market Socialism*, Cambridge: Polity Press 1995, p.16

which were the foundations for the development of national welfarism/Keynesianism<sup>16</sup>. In a divided Europe and with financial markets exerting minimal influence on national economic strategies and options, the idealism of the EEC's founders could co-exist with the welfare-oriented strategies promoted by social democrats and trade unions alike. After all, the trade liberalization schemes of the early EEC years could be seen as complementary, rather than contradictory, to member state objectives of growth and welfare.

The Single European Act and the institutional changes introduced to smoothen decision-making in a growing EEC meant that the logic of market integration could now be pushed forward on two fronts. Nationally, economic thinking became highly favourable to it and governments such as those of the Prime Minister Thatcher in the UK were determined to see deregulation and liberalization emerge at European level too to safeguard progress made on the domestic front. Supranationally, the European Commission saw in the Single Market project and market liberalization a golden opportunity to enhance its role in decision-making and gain some of the prestige and status that the "intergovernmentalist era" of the previous decades had denied to it. It was a match made in heaven for the liberals, but confronted social democracy with very uncomfortable questions regarding the limits of national sovereignty, the national welfare state and the postwar settlement that had been based, *inter alia*, on social partnership.

With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the criteria set for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a qualitatively different stage in the process of market liberalization was reached. From then on, social democratic parties and governments would be obliged to abide by Maastricht's monetarist logic and fulfil the objectives of EMU regardless of domestic priorities. Welfare restructuring, which essentially meant a downsizing of services and outsourcing to the private sector, became a *sine qua non* for the display of modernizing credentials. The strong, institutionally guaranteed supervisory power of the Commission and the Council forced every member state to abide by (or pretend to be abiding by, as was later revealed) strict monetary and economic targets. The Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 was the logical consequence of Maastricht and so was the need to implement a hands-off approach to competition policy. The broad lines of economic policy have not been changed ever since, despite the 2008 economic crisis and the current threat to the Eurozone's longevity.

It is true that in the course of time the coming to power of social democratic governments (see below) did introduce a "social" aspect to the monetarist logic of Maastricht. It is also true that the unions have occasionally been partners of reformist governments in bringing about welfare reform to meet the set targets and thus face the challenge of EU integration

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<sup>16</sup> McGowan, *Social democracy and the European Union: who is changing whom?*, [in:] L. Martell et al. (eds.) *Social Democracy: Global and National Perspectives*, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001, pp. 76-77



successfully<sup>17</sup>. However, **the return of social democracy in the 1990s failed to bring about substantial change, the odd bold initiative aside (the Employment Chapter in 1997 or the Lisbon Agenda of 2000). This led not only to a growing alienation between “modern” social democracy and the trade unions; it also led to growing Euroscepticism among manual labour and a rejection of the EU project as a whole.** The fact is that far-right parties have profited from growing alienation from the EU project, and the latter has suffered immense damage. To name but one example, the negative vote to the European Constitution in France was largely the result of working class rejection: 81 % of workers voted “no”<sup>18</sup>.

Various explanations for social democratic timidity can be put forward. The fact that market liberalization and its political aftermath are premised on the relatively straightforward process of “negative integration”, whereas social democratic interventionism necessarily requires more “positive integration”<sup>19</sup> is certainly among them. The strategic use of the EU by “modernizers” within the social democratic family to push for radical change by way of using the EU cover could be another<sup>20</sup>.

Yet there is an inescapable reality that seems to be the determining factor in putting social democrats and trade unions alike on the defensive. The institutional logic of the EU, geared towards consensus, working through a painstakingly slow process involving multiple actors and level, and distrustful of strong ideological arguments supposedly favouring efficiency and pragmatism instead renders the traditional tools of social democracy weak at best and unnecessary at worst. Furthermore, the existing redistributive and welfare-enhancing policy instruments of the EU remain skewed towards traditional objectives (agriculture remaining the single largest expenditure item of the Union’s budget) and stronger EU powers to address the needs of “Social Europe” stumble on national objections fuelled by reluctance to offer more authority to the widely discredited “Brussels bubble”. This, it would seem, is the web of interlinked explanations accounting for the frustration experienced by social democrats and trade unions that have entrusted their hopes for a new, progressive settlement at the supranational level.

### **Social Democracy’s Return: the Third Way Moment**

From the 1980s onwards social democracy found itself cornered between the demands of its traditional constituencies and the alleged imperatives of the neoliberal era. When the

17 K.M. Anderson & T. Meyer, *Social democracy, Unions, and Pension Politics in Germany and Sweden*, [in:] *Journal of Public Policy* 2003, 23(1): 23-54.

18 G. Moschonas, *Reformism in a conservative system: the European Union and social democratic identity*, [in:] J. Callaghan, N. Fishman, B. Jackson and M. McIvor (eds.) *In Search of Social Democracy: Responses to Crisis and Modernization*, Manchester: Manchester University Press 2009, p.189

19 F. Scharpf, *Negative and positive integration in the political economy of Europe’s welfare states*, [in:] G. Marks, F. Scharpf, P. Schmitter and W. Streeck (eds.) *Governance in the European Union*, London: Sage 1996, pp.15-39.

20 J. Moses, *Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: What’s Left to Leave?*, [in:] *Politics and Society* 1996, 22(2): 125-48.

Cold War ended and the ideological battles of the past subsided in significance, many social democrats bought into the euphoria of the alleged “end of history”<sup>21</sup> and shied away from questions concerning the movement’s mission at a time when the state-market balance was heavily tilting in favour of the latter. While there is little doubt that social democracy could no longer win elections if it was to just rely on heavily unionized manufacturing workers<sup>22</sup>, it was equally true that its political message was getting confused and its societal alliances rusty and dysfunctional.

Progress in EU economic integration made it electorally necessary to move to a more centrist terrain and seek to forge new societal coalitions in search for social democratic solutions. That was both legitimate and necessary, in harmony with social democracy’s reformist credentials. The Third Way project appeared to save the day in the 1990s, when it promised to go beyond false dichotomies and reinvigorate social democracy by modernizing its content whilst remaining faithful to its core principles<sup>23</sup>. However, the modernization agenda soon became synonymous with an attempt to distance “new” social democracy from its traditional constituents, including the trade unions, in the name of electability. This was true in the US, the original hub of Third Way thinking and triangulation techniques, but it soon spread to the UK and the rest of Europe. To be sure, the process was uneven and national legacies mattered in the way that “new” social democracy came about: to name but one example, the Swedish and British versions were very different with respect to the social democratic-trade unions’ link. Whilst in Sweden the link remained robust<sup>24</sup>, New Labour made it clear that the trade unions would be kept at arm’s length. They were, and that often led to their disappointment, despite the fact that Labour engaged with the unions in its drive for workplace modernization and restored some union recognition rights through the legal route<sup>25</sup>.

There is little doubt that many trade unionists have been quick to accuse social democrats of betrayal and political treason without examining their own failures first. There is also little doubt that at the end of the previous century and, even more so today, changes in the labour market have made trade unions defensive and often unwilling to accept that protectionism and a closed shop mentality will only harm their long-term interests in any given country. The example of Greece is instructive as to the fallacy of militant trade unionism. A country deep in economic recession has found itself trapped by the behaviour of a small, elite-led trade union-affiliated group who has been used to an unhealthy close relationship to government and political power. This small elite has been resisting any sort of public policy change; worse, it

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21 F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press 1992.

22 H. Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, p. 286

23 A. Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*, Cambridge: Polity Press 1994 and A. Giddens, *The Third Way: the Renewal of Social Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press 1998.

24 D. Tsarouhas, *Social Democracy in Sweden: the threat from a globalized world*, London and New York: IB Tauris 2008.

25 S. Ludlam, *New Labour and the Unions: the End of the Contentious Alliance?*, [in:] S. Ludlam and M.J. Smith (eds.) *New Labour in Government*, Basingstoke: Macmillan 2001, p. 124



has been triumphant in its opposition and has made its (successful) best to delay and obstruct even fundamental public policy reforms for a very long time, assisted by a complacent public and a supportive political class<sup>26</sup>. It is through the current crisis that its counter-productive action has been highlighted further.

Such extreme examples ought not to have been the guiding principle of the “new” social democratic approach to the trade unions. Yet, on more than one occasion, this is exactly what has happened. Radical modernizers have rushed to throw the baby out with the bathwater, falling victim to a siege mentality that identified trade unionism with backwardness across the board, and failing to appreciate the uses to which a reinvigorated partnership between the two sides could be put, at least in countries where trade unionism is more than a euphemism for the protection of vested interests. **The implicit (and occasionally explicit) assumption behind earlier modernisation attempts was that social democracy does not need the unions any longer, and that the progressive coalition could do just as well as in the past by relying on civil society organizations and citizen participation. The fallacy of this approach was brutally exposed when the crisis hit home in 2008-09, that is, when a political and economic alternative was required in the face of turbo-capitalism’s brutal failure. As social democracy had ceased being a movement rooted in the daily interactions with its erstwhile natural constituents, it failed to identify a set of progressive solutions that could drag the world economy out of the fiscal straightjacket it had been forced to wear.** Thus, *when the time came to stand up for an alternative political and economic project that would free productive forces from the asphyxiating constraints of the market, social democracy’s natural constituents either remained silent or, worse yet, turned their back to their former allies.*<sup>27</sup>

The problem thus runs deep and relates to the question of how social democratic values are understood and implemented by the party and the unions alike. There is a growing suspicion that, whilst the discourse used by social democrats and progressive trade unionists may be similar, what is actually meant by that language differs substantially. Moreover, this gap may actually be growing with time.

Why? First is the issue of EU enlargement to countries where party-union relationships are much looser than in Western Europe. Moreover, a number of west European countries too have fragmented and pluralist trade unions (France and Italy are good examples), which is a factor diminishing their cohesion and policy salience. Central and East European states (CEECs) do not share policy legacies related to a strong and fairly encompassing trade union movement. It is hardly a surprise that for CEECs such a question ranks lower in the priority lists

<sup>26</sup> K. Featherstone & D. Papadimitriou, *The Limits of Europeanization: Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece*, London: Palgrave 2008.

<sup>27</sup> D. Tsarouhas, *Social Democracy in Sweden: the threat from a globalized world*, London and New York: IB Tauris 2008, p. 154

of reinvigorating social democracy. At the same time, **the party-union link is a valid question even for countries with a different background and weak trade unions. That is because the party-union link is a facet of a much bigger problem relating to the lack of trust towards social democracy to deliver, this in itself resulting (inter alia) from its inability to express a mass constituency and contribute to the formation of a new collective.**

Increasing EU heterogeneity pits “labour against labour”, with some unions from the EU-15 acting against the alleged ‘wage dumping’ to which workers from new member states are contributing in the context of free labour movement across the Union. This issue is unlikely to go away in the future and as newcomers to the Union (Iceland excepted) are much poorer than the old EU-15. Here again one comes across a situation whereby social democratic modernizers sing the praise of the single market with little regard to its social consequences for local communities. At the other extreme, there is a real danger that defenders of the status quo would go as far as to discriminate against foreign workers in the name of maintaining high social standards at home. The episode a few years ago in the Swedish construction site involving a Latvian firm employing Latvian workers in the Swedish labour market is characteristic of the severity of the problem (for details on the Laval case Woolfson and Sommers 2006).

## **The Way Forward: Next Steps**

Social democratic parties across the EU are undergoing a period of reflection and renewal as they seek ways to reconnect with the electorate. This exercise is painful but necessary, and re-establishing a new, healthy relationship with the trade unions could be part of this exercise. By way of conclusion, this section will draw up a number of general principles and practical policy suggestions about how the party-union link could look like in the future. It goes without saying that this is an analytical, ideal-type exercise; as such it represents a template for action and not a conformity guide to adhere to. After all, different countries relate to the challenges raised in this piece differently and will surely follow different paths in seeking to confront them.

To start with, **social democratic parties can commit to supporting the principle of genuine social partnership and social dialogue at national and (more importantly) EU level.** This can go beyond rhetorical declarations; it could take the form of financial, administrative and technical support to trade unions and federations who seek to establish such dialogue structures with employers. Social dialogue and a genuine social partnership that values the input of labour in creating welfare in Europe is a precondition in restarting the process of connecting to citizens and breaking down the walls of indifference and apathy that citizens demonstrate vis a vis the political class. Social democrats have no time to waste in bringing



these walls down. Strengthening the processes of information and consultation in the workplace is a valuable exercise in that direction and reinforces the relevance of trade unions for working people. The success of such a strategy is of course linked to the ability of the unions themselves to overcome their divisions and establish a code of cooperation that transcends national and occupational barriers. It is a tall order, yet nothing less will allow them to regain much needed credibility and influence.

As important as social partnership and pan-European cooperation is, social democracy cannot only restrict itself to working through established institutional channels hoping that mainstream unions deliver the goods. **Social democrats should dare go beyond the social democratic type of trade unionism**, itself in crisis over the last few decades<sup>28</sup>. They should be ready to echo the demands of grassroots organizations and local-level trade unions active in their local communities and operating in a non-hierarchical, egalitarian fashion yet calling for progressive policy solutions. The spread of technology and the ability of citizens to organize beyond bureaucratized organizations means that social democracy needs to engage with collective and progressive movement of citizens *wherever that happens to be*. By reenergizing their local branches, social democrats and trade unions can work together on sets of concrete policy issues where consensus can be established, such as a living minimum wage in large urban centres. They would in this way be starting from a pragmatic point of policy convergence and a desire to introduce change and only then work out the modalities of their cooperation and the extent to which one side can be useful to another.

The party-union link has gone through turbulent times. Treating as a relic of the past or as the starting point for social democratic revival is equally simplistic. It is through the adoption of an approach that moves *suparantionally as well as locally* that social democrats and trade unions can make each other useful, and at the same time further the progressive causes of today.

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<sup>28</sup> M. Upchurch, G. Taylor & A. Mathers, *The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in Western Europe and the search for alternatives*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2009.

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John HALPIN

**The limits and possibilities  
of American progressivism:  
lessons for Europe**



## Key words

### Obama – Progressivism – Freedom – Rights – Common Good

## Summary

The election of President Obama in 2008 was widely anticipated to usher in a new progressive era in American politics. Although his administration has made signature achievements on health care and ending the war in Iraq, progressives have been unable to move significant economic reforms in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Three lessons emerge from the American experience. One, economic crisis does not lead to increased support for the left. In fact, populist resurgence in the U.S. context first occurred with the Tea Party attack on government from the right and has only recently shifted toward issues of economic inequality with the rise of the Occupy Wall Street movements. Two, the long term decline of public trust in government has become corrosive to progressive goals and ideas about the positive use of state power to achieve greater freedom and equality for all. Reform, transparency and adequate delivery of services will be essential to reestablishing public trust in government and progressive solutions. Third, the continued reliance on neoliberal policies has led to a political crisis for progressives. President Obama went out of his way to promote market friendly, pro-business policies but received little in terms of his policy and political agenda. The continued embrace of conservative orthodoxy on tax and budget matters over the past year restricted the President's ability to use the levers of government to restore aggregate demand, spur employment, and increase public investment in economic growth sectors. What progressives need is an independent outside movement that consistently presses populist messages from the left and challenges the dominance of supply-side, trickle down theories of governance. Above all, progressives need a sustained values narrative that builds on the great traditions of American liberalism—freedom, rights, national community, and the common good—and provides long term goals and aspirations that transcend the normal political process which many Americans view skeptically.

## Introduction

Progressive values and policies are notoriously difficult to promote in the United States. Despite periods of genuine change and advancement during the **Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society eras, the United States** continues to lag behind many OECD nations in terms of social equality, public investments, welfare protections, and cooperative labor markets.<sup>1</sup> The well documented differences between the European and American social models have been attributed to many factors including widespread individualism in American society, a political culture averse to collective principles and notions of social solidarity, a weak labor movement, and a byzantine structure of federal, state, and local governance.<sup>2</sup>

Progressives in the United States arguably face the most sophisticated and successful anti-statist political infrastructure of any western democracy. **Unlike many European nations, hatred of government and extreme libertarian values are not consigned to the fringes of the American political system.** Disdain for government, worship of the private sector, supply-side economics, and extreme individualism define the modern Republican Party – one of only two major political parties – and underlie the core value system of a well organized conservative movement and media ecosystem. Although past periods in American history have been dominated by progressive concerns for civil rights and economic opportunity (including the recent rise of the Occupy Wall Street movements against inequality and corporate greed), one of the most effective social movements in recent times is the Tea Party, an odd tapestry of anti-government reactionaries, conspiracy theorists, Christian conservatives, and anti-elitist populists that emerged in reaction to financial crisis and the election of President Barack Obama.

If you combine the rampant anti-statism of the right with the economic crisis and a constitutional structure designed to thwart coordinated action at the federal level, it quickly becomes apparent to outside observers how difficult it is to advance progressive ideals in the US. Although this convergence of forces may not be unique to American politics, it can be

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<sup>1</sup> For a good comparison of the US and European social models see: S.Hill, *Europe's Promise: Why the European Way is the Best Hope in an Insecure Age*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> S.Steinmo, *American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Culture or Institutions?*, [in:] *Dynamics of American Politics*, L.Dodd & Calvin Jillson (eds.), Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1994.



instructive to those seeking to advance progressive values in Europe and other nations given its extremity and success over the past 30 years.

## **From a New Progressive Era to the Rise of the Tea Party**

The 2008 US presidential election marked what many believed would be the start of a new era of progressive governance that would turn back the tide of Bush-era conservatism and complete the state-building process begun a century earlier with the actions of Theodore Roosevelt and later Franklin D. Roosevelt. Then candidate Barack Obama ran on a strongly progressive program that included a promise of universal health care coverage, a dramatic transformation to a low-carbon economy, and a historic investment in education alongside emergency measures involving substantial government spending and new regulation to deal with the economic and financial crises. Alongside these policy reforms, Obama promised to transform Washington and create a new form of politics. He called for an end to the bitter in-fighting and partisan nature of the day-to-day Congressional battles and asked Americans to join in a common effort to build a new economy and advance national priorities.

Obama won 53% of the popular vote in 2008 – the largest vote share received by any presidential candidate in 20 years. Building on their successes in 2006, Democrats also secured large majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the US Congress. These gains, of course, were erased in the House and reduced in the Senate after 2010 as a direct result of a resurgent conservative movement and failures on the part of Obama and his progressive allies as will be discussed below.

Ideologically, as a major study of public opinion by the Center for American Progress showed, **Americans began the Obama era favoring a more substantial role for government as a guardian against market failures, as a check on reckless business behavior, and as an important source of public investment in national needs from renewable energy and infrastructure to education and health care.**<sup>3</sup> Following the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and a lingering employment crisis that left nearly 25 million Americans either unemployed or underemployed, the public's faith in free market solutions and deregulation had waned significantly from its heyday in the Reagan and Bush presidencies.

Within the first few months of the Obama presidency in 2009, a raft of progressive legislation was passed to address the banking crisis and implement key economic stimulus spending to invest in new energy projects, infrastructure needs, education, and support for

<sup>3</sup> J.Halpin & K.Agne, *The State of American Political Ideology*, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, 2009.

working class families. In 2010, the Democrats passed major health care legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, securing a 100-year progressive battle for universal health coverage. Obama and the Democrats also passed the most significant regulatory changes to American finance since the days of the New Deal.

But the long term solidification of progressive governance was not to be. Almost immediately after Obama's inauguration and early legislative victories, the conservative right mounted a fierce, well coordinated counterattack against the progressive momentum of the Obama presidency. The Republican leadership in the US House and Senate embarked on a cynical but effective strategy of unified opposition to the president's agenda and numerous procedural hurdles like the endless threats of filibusters in the Senate and holds on the president's nominees for key governmental posts. The reactionary conservative movement, fueled by the demagoguery of Fox News, talk radio, and conservative leaders savaged the president's every move as crypto-totalitarianism or worse. Even the organized business community, which had been somewhat cooperative with Obama's administration on his major legislative priorities, moved into full revolt against his presidency over perceived lack of concern for business needs, new regulations, and the prospects of future tax increases.<sup>4</sup>

The pressure of this anti-statist counter movement was too much for the President and progressives to hold back. Suffering one of the largest electoral defeats on record, the Democrats in 2010 ceded control of the House of Representatives to the Republican Party after regaining the majority only in 2006. The Republican gain of 63 seats was the best post-World War II seat gain by either party in a midterm election, and only the third gain of more than 50 seats since that time. Exit-poll data from 2010 showed that independent voters, white working-class voters, seniors, and men broke heavily against the Democrats over the economy. Suffering from the poor economy, electoral burnout and apathy over the conservative resurgence in politics, turnout levels were also unusually low among the core progressive base of young and minority voters and unusually high among seniors, whites, and conservatives, thus contributing to a more skewed midterm electorate.<sup>5</sup>

By 2011, the Tea Party-dominated House Republican caucus completely controlled the national political agenda, even with President Obama holding major levers of executive power and the famous bully pulpit. Right wing Republicans first forced Obama and the Democrats to extend the Bush tax cuts for the most affluent Americans as a requirement for extending unemployment insurance and keeping taxes lower on middle income families. They then held

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4 See: M.Browne, J.Halpin & R.Teixeira, *Building a Progressive Center: Progressive Strategy and Demographic Change in America*, the Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, 2011.

5 See: R.Teixeira & J.Halpin, *Election Results Fueled by Jobs Crisis and Voter Apathy among Progressives*, the Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, November 4, 2010.



up normal budgeting processes and a routine extension of the debt limit – one that had been raised 87 times by prior Congresses since 1945 – to extract ideological concessions on federal spending and welfare provisions that could not have been passed under normal procedures. Obama most recently acquiesced to the howls of industry and the right – and undermined the scientists and leaders of his own Environmental Protection Agency – in shelving strict new controls on ozone pollution by the fossil fuel sector.

Today, as the nation continues to suffer from the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression, progressives have been stewing in frustration and anger as the nation's political elites have embarked on short sighted austerity measures and have ignored vitally important public actions to restore aggregate demand and increase employment. Out of this frustration and the activism of young people disenchanted with their future prospects has arisen a new movement against economic inequality and corporate corruption of politics – Occupy Wall Street and its local offshoots working under the theme of “We are the 99%.” The long term impact of this movement remains to be seen since at this point the movement's broad concerns have yet to coalesce into a concrete policy agenda and political strategy for breaking the two-party status quo in American politics.

**The US was supposed to be the bright spot in international progressive politics and in many ways still can be a model for global change. But clearly the political and ideological gains of 2006 and 2008 have yet to solidify.** The electoral volatility and ideological battles seen over the past five years suggest that the biggest issues in American politics – the role of government, the balance of public and market forces, taxation, the corporate-government nexus, and social welfare policies – remain contested.<sup>6</sup> Progressivism in the United States is wounded but the extent of the damage and its ability to feed off the rising animosity towards the structure of the modern economy remains to be seen.

### Lessons for International Progressives

So what might European progressives seeking to promote values of liberty, equality, and social justice learn from the US experience?

First, it is clear that **American progressives (as well as those in Europe) have not gained substantially from the dramatic failures of the financial sector and the conservative model of governance over the past decade.** There are many reasons for this development. Complicit in past efforts to deregulate finance, and lacking a coherent economic theory and course of

<sup>6</sup> For more analysis of the 2012 elections, see forthcoming paper, R.Teixeira & J.Halpin, *The Path to 270: Demographics vs. Economics in the 2012 Election*.

action for addressing the short and long term problems of job creation and growth, progressives in the US have not been well positioned to put forth a credible alternative to the status quo. Thus, the President and his allies have been reduced to defending insufficient federal stimulus and emergency spending as a stop-gap way to stem the bleeding rather than putting forth a clear explanation of America's economic problems and a sharp course of action for creating jobs, reducing economic inequality, and checking the power of business and finance. Without the countervailing force of a confident and convincing economic alternative from progressives, the right wing mantra of lower taxes and regulation has retained its power in American politics despite its manifest failure in practice.

Americans across the board are hurting economically and are looking to President Obama and his allies for reassurance that they know what to do, know how to do it and that they have the strength to stand up for their own beliefs and face down the extreme demands of the right on tax and budget issues. President Obama and progressives have begun to push back against this tide with a focus on a new jobs creation plan in the face of an obstructionist Congress, but they have yet to aggressively defend a vision and agenda of economic growth and equity that goes beyond austerity and shows working class voters they are on their side. Progressives need to forcefully protect their signature accomplishments like health care, Social Security and Medicare from conservative attacks and at the same time prove to Americans that they can manage and expand these programs prudently. Above all, **Obama and progressives need to produce tangible improvement in the overall economy – a tall order at this point in the election cycle – which is not likely to occur without a commitment to do so by any means necessary.**

It is also obvious to both American and European observers that the economic crisis did not lead to a concomitant rise in progressive populism. In fact, as Europeans know all too well, the onset of economic crises throughout history has frequently led to political reactions deeply hostile to progressive values: a fierce and seemingly uncontrollable right-wing populism that often runs its course until disaster strikes again.

Thus, the “new New Deal” that many progressives envisioned in 2009 was arguably built on a misreading of political history. Franklin Roosevelt came into office in 1933 after the worst of the Great Depression had hit and Americans were prepared for war-like measures, the famous “Hundred Days”, to restore stability and growth and pass new economic security measures. In contrast, Barack Obama came into office in 2009 before the peak of the Great Recession. Subsequently, his well intentioned economic experts predicted that the nearly \$800 billion stimulus plan would help to keep unemployment just below 8%.<sup>7</sup> Instead it rocketed to 10%

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<sup>7</sup> White House economic estimate: [http://otrans.3cdn.net/ee40602f9a7d8172b8\\_ozm6bt5oi.pdf](http://otrans.3cdn.net/ee40602f9a7d8172b8_ozm6bt5oi.pdf).





and has settled around 9% today. Measures to restore the banking sector did little to ease credit for distressed homeowners and consumers while the return of strong corporate profits did not lead businesses to hire more workers. At the end of the process, many Americans came to believe that the policies of the federal government exacerbated rather than alleviated economic problems. The nascent Tea Party successfully built on these sentiments in opposing the President's push for health care and additional stimulus measures to help cash-strapped states and the unemployed and the counter movement began in full force.

Second, and perhaps more damaging, **public distrust of government has reached a boiling point and is severely restricting progressive policy options going forward.** Public polling shows us that most Americans dislike the Wall Street miscreants who tanked the economy and blame them first and foremost for their own troubles. But a substantial number of Americans also blame the government for allowing these misdeeds to occur in the first place and then doing everything in its power to make the bankers whole while leaving working class Americans to suffer from high debt and poor employment prospects. If progressive government is supposed to provide for the common good and protect middle- and lower-income people from market failure, there has been little perceived evidence of it working in practice over the past two years.

**Americans overall do not hate their government. In fact, they strongly support numerous progressive policies and ideas during both normal and extraordinary times. But they are deeply disturbed by the government's inability to make serious progress on numerous fronts from the federal budget and economic management to education and health reforms.** In the current climate, conservatives have gained politically from their abstract assault on government despite abject failure of their tax and budget policies. In contrast, progressives have suffered from the negative overall climate while promoting and passing policies that have and will help millions of people get by and move ahead.

Many observers have remarked on the disjuncture between the public's positive agenda for government in many specific areas and its negative overall assessment of government's performance. Hadley Cantril's and Lloyd Free's well-known formulation is that the American public is "operationally liberal" but "ideologically conservative". This paradox would not matter much to advocates of active government if this operational liberalism could be easily channeled into support for worthy government programs. But it cannot. Poor overall views of government consistently drag down support for government programs even in areas where the public says it wants more action. This makes it difficult to allocate sufficient resources to get the job done in these areas, which only reinforces public doubts about government effectiveness, stiffens resistance to taxation and increases sensitivity to the level of government

debt. The first couple of years of the Obama administration have provided abundant evidence of this dynamic, where an underfunded stimulus, followed by a very sluggish recovery, led to a flowering of anti-government sentiment.<sup>8</sup>

For example, a May 2010 survey by the Center for American Progress asked Americans “when the government in Washington decides to solve a problem, how much confidence do you have that the problem actually will be solved?”<sup>9</sup> This question has been asked periodically by various news organizations over two decades, and the current results represent the lowest level of public confidence ever recorded. Just one-third (33%) of adults voice a lot or some confidence, 35% have “just a little confidence,” and another one-third (31%) have no confidence at all. The proportion saying “no confidence” has never before exceeded 23%. Simply put, **progressivism will not go far if Americans lack the confidence that their federal government can get the job done when it takes on a challenge.**

In conjunction with the overall distrust of government, progressives need to better understand the fluidity of ideological opinions among voters. Despite electoral setbacks for conservatives and potentially large proportions of Americans supporting progressive ideas about governance and society, the conservative worldview remains appealing to many Americans and creates important cleavages in the electorate.

Furthermore, CAP’s 2009 research showed that ideological labels such as “progressive”, “liberal” or “conservative” do not easily map onto predetermined patterns of thought and often mask a range of opinions across and within groups. For example, majorities of self-identified conservatives in our survey agreed with four out of five progressive perspectives about the proper role of government while majorities of self-identified progressives and liberals agreed with conservative economic positions on things like trade and Social Security.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, we found that self-identified progressives and liberals share many views and beliefs about government and the economy but hold somewhat differing beliefs on cultural and international concerns.

**Progressives need to accept that their ideas and values – typically unchanging and consistent among more elite activists and leaders – will always be in flux among diverse minded voters. Even the most liberal or progressive American fails to fit within a clear and consistent ideological framework on social and economic ideas and is open to conservative ideas about markets and government.** And although conservative voters tend to be more ideologically rigid and consistent, they are open to alternative ideas about how best to organize society and the economy.

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<sup>8</sup> See: J. Halpin & R.Teixeira, *How to Restore Confidence in Government*, published in a forum sponsored by *The Democratic Strategist*, A Journal of Public Opinion and Political Strategy.

<sup>9</sup> For more information on this survey: [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/07/what\\_americans\\_want.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/07/what_americans_want.html)

<sup>10</sup> J.Halpin & K.Agne, *The State of American Political Ideology*, 2009.

Third, it is increasingly clear that the continued reliance on neoliberal policy measures and support for austerity programs has led to a political crisis for progressives. President Obama has gone out of his way to promote centrist, market-friendly policies and to adopt a post-partisan posture of cooperation with his ideological adversaries and corporate foes. Yet none of his overtures have worked in terms of building support for a progressive approach to governance or rebuilding the economy. The continued embrace of conservative orthodoxy on tax and budget matters has only restricted the President's ability to use the levers of government to restore aggregate demand, spur employment, and increase public investment in economic growth sectors. At the same time, his posture towards conservatives – who want nothing more than to see him fail – has emboldened his opponents to extract even more from the President in terms of federal spending and tax policy. The President's focus on mythical deficit-obsessed independent voters over the past year weakened allegiance from his political supporters and his philosophical case for renewed government action, thus undermining the intellectual and political base of contemporary progressivism.

To the average American voter, progressive government under President Obama is simultaneously failing to solve the economic crisis and doing little to directly help them weather the storm. Fortunately, the President and his team seem to have recently concluded that their post-partisan posture was failing and have instead decided to focus on popular job creation and stimulus measures and labeling conservative obstruction as the destructive efforts of a "do-nothing Congress" unwilling to compromise on its tax agenda in order to help struggling Americans.

Compounding these problems, it is clear that progressives outside of government made a serious mistake in supporting the Obama administration so closely in 2009 instead of building a strong, independent ideological movement that could push both the President and political discourse in new directions. After the 1932 election, Franklin Roosevelt famously told labor leaders pressing their agenda, *"I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me do it."*<sup>11</sup> There was little of that outside push coming from movement progressives in 2009. Lacking the independent authority and credibility to offer alternative views on economics and government, progressives fell back into a defensive posture or retreated into politically inconsequential recriminations and criticisms rather than building real political forces for change.

Political values are created and promoted within institutional and social contexts. Unfortunately, the great progressive social movements and institutions of the past –

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.progressive.org/mag/nichols0109.html>

unions, universities, liberal churches, civil rights organizations, women's groups – that sustained, educated, mobilized, and persuaded people about progressive ideas are anemic these days.

Many of the most passionate newcomers in left politics today – including the Millennials who turned out in droves for Obama in 2008 – have little understanding about the tremendous influence of the great reformist tradition of the early populists and progressives, the Social Gospel movement, philosophical pragmatism, early civil rights activism, the great labor strikes of the twentieth century, or the New Left. Despite going to oft-derided “liberal” universities, many young progressives are unfamiliar with the theoretical advances of John Dewey, Herbert Croly, Walter Rauschenbusch, Bayard Rustin or even many of the great speeches of the Roosevelts.<sup>12</sup> Many have no background with Keynesian economic thought or the core theoretical arguments for progressive economics.

This complicates progressivism in a serious manner because people do not have a long term vision that they are promoting or a clear grounding in a set of ideas and activist traditions that can sustain their political work over decades let alone one election cycles. Instead of long-term movement building, progressives often focus on the non-stop, day-to-day battles of Congress and the media. These efforts are vital. But they also have the effect of elevating a nebulous sense of pragmatism – what's achievable today – above coherent rationales and arguments for action over the long term.

The rise of the Occupy Wall Street movement is a clear indication that outside progressive forces now recognize the importance of challenging conventional two-party wisdom and forcing issues of economic inequality, wage stagnation, home foreclosures, debt, and corporate corruption into public discourse. This movement has already achieved success in focusing on the privileges of the “1%” against the needs of the 99%. But the long term political implications remain uncertain in terms of whether these movements will channel their efforts into an organized attempt to gain greater influence within the Democratic Party, pursue a third-party, or continue to serve as a fiercely independent voice outside of traditional politics.

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<sup>12</sup> For more information on the history and theoretical background of American progressivism, see *The Progressive Tradition Series* published by the Center for American Progress: [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/progressive\\_traditions1.html/#aboutpt](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/progressive_traditions1.html/#aboutpt)



## Progressives Need a Sustained Values Narrative

Going into 2012, American progressives must find a way to both support and push President Obama if they are to stem the rising tide of conservatism and get the country back on course for the progressive changes so many supported in 2008. This will only happen if progressives successfully build and sustain a values narrative that simultaneously builds on the best traditions of American liberal politics and offers a more radical critique of the status quo and the inaction of the nation's political elites.

Successful political narratives in the American political tradition have usually been built on a common formula. They begin by outlining an ideal state of affairs or values, usually tied to American history or national identity but also to visions of a more utopian future. They then describe a current problem or set of problems that violate these norms. And finally, they put forth a relatively simple framework of solutions to help restore the balance or move to a better future.

There are three primary narrative traditions in the history of progressivism that have been successful in the US, each notably corresponding to a primary value in either the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution, the nation's founding documents.

First, and most successful, is the narrative of *freedom*. This is the tradition of Thomas Jefferson, John Dewey, and FDR's famous "four freedoms": freedom of speech and worship, freedom from want and fear (the value of liberty). Second is the narrative of rights. This is the tradition of Thomas Paine, the abolitionists and suffragists, the civil rights movement, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the women's and LGBT movements (the value of equality). Third is a narrative about *national community*, a tradition that started with Alexander Hamilton and continued with Abraham Lincoln, Herbert Croly and Teddy Roosevelt and focused on internal improvements, a strong central government and unified national purpose (the value of the common good and the general welfare). *Democracy*, *civic republicanism*, and *pragmatism* are also important traditions in American progressive politics alternatively stressing the importance of citizenship, participation, dialogue, communitarian values, and scientific reasoning.

These major traditions are not the only narratives but they have been the most successful in transforming the country in significant ways. These progressive narratives have been strongly shaped and challenged by more radical narrative traditions such as populism (the Grangers, the People's Party, William Jennings Bryan), *egalitarianism* (labor, socialists), *moralism* (the Social Gospel movement, left Catholicism and Judaism), *environmentalism* (ecology, sustainability), and *pacifism/anti-imperialism* (anti-war movements).

How have these narratives worked in practice? During the original Populist/Progressive era from 1890 to 1920 the narrative was simple: Government and society has been taken over by corporations and the forces of economic privilege that are undermining the freedom of farmers and workers and tearing apart the country along class lines. In order to restore the promise of America – that all people can turn their talents and ambitions into a meaningful and secure existence – we must rethink our relationship to government to better meet national needs, expand opportunity for workers and protect the most vulnerable. This overall narrative supported concrete steps to improve the well-being of workers and families through workplace safety regulations, food and drug protections, unemployment insurance, labor rights, and other social security measures.

Although the earliest progressives failed to adequately address issues of race and ethnicity, eventually they developed a concrete narrative on civil rights which argued that a nation founded upon liberty and equality for all and Christian humanitarianism cannot tolerate the legal and informal oppression of millions of its citizens based on their gender, race, ethnicity, and now sexual orientation. Therefore, we must remove all artificial barriers – legal, social and economic – that limit people from determining the course of their own lives.

Each of these narrative traditions worked well up to a point. The New Deal for example generated enormous support for individual opportunity and security measures but not for more cooperative forms of industrial organization or planning. Civil rights worked well over time on voting and other legal rights based on gender and race but later ran into trouble on class lines and notions of redistribution of wealth.

Each of these narratives confronted essentially the same conservative narrative of laissez-faire which posits that America was founded on the principles of individual liberty and property rights and that any interference in the private actions of people and corporations is a violation of the founding creed. This well established narrative underlies beliefs about a minimalist state that assists industry and operates on a principle of non-interference in private matters. Any attempt to intervene in the economy or society at large inevitably causes unintended consequences and reductions in overall wealth and liberty. The conservative narrative tradition leads directly to their agenda of supply-side tax cuts, privatization, deregulation and federalism.

Notably, the older, more Burkean tradition of conservatism focused on measured change and the protection of social and religious institutions is today virtually nonexistent outside of some opinion makers and survives primarily as a dogmatic form of social conservatism.

How has President Obama and contemporary progressivism developed in relation to these narrative traditions?



President Obama's core narrative, outlined in its most detailed form in his 2009 "New Foundations" speech at Georgetown University, has been a blend of national community and individual freedom.<sup>13</sup> Obama argued at the outset of his presidency that America is facing difficult times but has enormous resources and great people to draw on if we make the right choices. Rather than retreating from mounting threats to our competitive position in the global economy, or pursuing the conservative strategy of doing nothing for people, Obama argued that we need to fight to stay on top and expand opportunity. "America is not second best," as the President later stated.

For progressives, this overall framework signals a need for energetic national and international action to enhance the life opportunities of our people and position our economy for future success by:

- Repairing the broken financial order and replace it with more effective oversight and stability measures;
- Rebuilding American infrastructure – our roads, ports, transportation systems, broadband to position our industries for success; and
- Investing in education, science, technology and innovation to create and capture the high-wage jobs of the future.

Obama has at times put forth a second important narrative that attacks the key principles of conservative doctrine. As he stated during the spring fight over the direction of the U.S. budget:

*From our first days as a nation, we have put our faith in free markets and free enterprise as the engine of America's wealth and prosperity. More than citizens of any other country, we are rugged individualists, a self-reliant people with a healthy skepticism of too much government. But there has always been another thread running throughout our history – a belief that we are all connected; and that there are some things we can only do together, as a nation. ... Part of this American belief that we are all connected also expresses itself in a conviction that each one of us deserves some basic measure of security. We recognize that no matter how responsibly we live our lives, hard times or bad luck, a crippling illness or a layoff, may strike any one of us. 'There but for the grace of God go I,' we say to ourselves, and so we contribute to programs like Medicare and Social Security, which guarantee us health care and a measure of basic income after a lifetime of hard work; unemployment insurance, which protects us against unexpected job loss; and Medicaid, which provides care for millions of seniors in nursing homes, poor children, and those with disabilities. We are a better country because of these commitments. I'll go further – we would not be a great country without those commitments.<sup>14</sup>*

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-economy-georgetown-university>

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.npr.org/2011/04/13/135383045/president-obamas-speech-on-deficit-cutting>.

These are important narrative values that should be sustained and strengthened by the progressive movement, regardless of what Obama does or does not do wisely on the political front. At the same time, many progressives know that this approach alone does not meet the needs of the economy or the desires of many on the center left today. As argued earlier, progressives should commit serious time and resources in developing two sharper narratives that Obama cannot or probably will not deliver.

One is a populist critique of the status quo that is basically defensive: “Support the 99% of Americans who are suffering from misplaced economic priorities. Don’t balance the budget on the backs of workers and the poor. Make the wealthy and corporations pay their share first.” This is a core organizing theme, across many demands, of the Occupy movements. This is also the basis of many of the emerging progressive battles in Congress and in states like Wisconsin and Ohio against punitive austerity measures, attacks on union rights and the working poor, and the outsized influence of the Chamber of Commerce, Fox News, and other organs of movement conservatism.

The second progressive narrative is a moral and empirical critique of conservative economics that constantly reminds people how the new laissez-faire is not only a failure in practice – massive inequality, deficits, financial fraud, corporatism, environmental degradation – it is also a gross violation of American notions of fair play, individual opportunity, and Judeo-Christian values of cooperation and human dignity.

Throughout history, progressives have used multiple narratives to advance their goals and vision. The combination of Obama’s new argument for long term economic success and a fierce moral critique of crony capitalism and laissez-faire can together present a very compelling narrative for progressives in the face of a unified and increasingly extreme right wing vision.

## Conclusion

As European progressives face their own challenges advancing a new values debate, the American situation provides both cautions and hope. Europe and the United States face daunting economic challenges that appear unlikely to abate any time soon. Although the economic discussion in the US and Europe is almost entirely on the terms of the conservative right, this can be overcome if we take the proper steps to develop and sustain a credible framework on the economy and build the public and political coalition necessary to support this renewed vision.

Fortunately we are not without guidance. Progressives and social democrats have always stood for a politics of the common good, one that is built on a deep concern for the needs of the many above the privileges of the few and is grounded in a workable tradition





of democratic capitalism that provides working- and middle-class families with a central role in the economic and political decisions that affect their lives. Our countries and people need this pragmatic vision more than ever given the confusion and chaos of the global economy and the dominance of extreme laissez-faire on the right and authoritarian capitalism on the communist left.

**Progressives should show how a renewed commitment to a politics of the common good can help workers better balance the difficult challenges of work and life in modern society and increase participation in workplace decisions.** This model can provide a rationale to a skeptical public about why increased public investment in education, research and development, and the transformation of the economy toward more sustainable ends will help to create jobs and growth. It is a model better able to protect social welfare policies from elimination and to update these policies to more adequately reflect the diversity and mobility of the modern workforce. A politics of the common good within a system of democratic capitalism – as opposed to an attenuated politics of freedom for the few within a system of laissez-faire capitalism – is the only clear path for reducing the outsized role of finance in modern economies, checking the excessive influence of corporate power and the wealthy, and rebuilding the real economy through new industrial policies focused on energy transformation and high-level manufacturing.

To help develop and promote this vision of the common good, the lessons from the American experience are clear. Do not expect economic crisis and conservative failure to drive voters toward progressivism. Know the limits and possibilities of public opinion, national political cultures, and beliefs about government. Drop the old neoliberal playbook on policy and politics. Strengthen outside progressive movements to help shift public debate towards more favorable terrain. And ground all of these efforts in a sustained values narrative that shows people the real meaning and promise of freedom, equality, community, and social justice.

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# Core values of modern social democracy





Ania SKRZYPEK

**A comparative analysis of core values  
of PES member parties and the ideological  
evolution within PES.**



## Key words

### Social democracy – Renewal – Values – Policies – Discourse

## Summary

The paper “*Progressive values in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*” was elaborated within the Next Left Research Programme of FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies, which has been run for over two years with the support of Renner Institute, Austria. It is chaired by Dr. Alfred GUSENBAUER, former Chancellor of Austria.

This particular study was concluded as an outcome of a year-long research on what the progressive values in the 21<sup>st</sup> century are. It has been extensively discussed during subsequent meeting of the FEPS Next Left Focus Group<sup>1</sup>, to which distinguished Members the author remains indebted for their critical review and many constructive suggestions.

Consciously, the first chapter is dominated by methodology, through which the author defined the terms: *value, principle, paradigm*; and nonetheless examines the concept of system of values. These elaborations have interdisciplinary character which imposes references to political philosophy and ethics, sociology and social psychology, anthropology, law and none the less economy. A challenge that was evident to face in the research was the European context of the matter, within which the schools of thoughts and hence literature remain under-developed. Subsequent chapters examine the basis of common understanding of what the progressive values are nowadays. Therefore they contain a comparative analyse of the principles as proclaimed by the PES member parties, as also a quantitative analyse of the values referred within the PES manifestos since its establishment in 1992. The study is completed by a set of conclusions, which may also serve as a base for further research on the theme.

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<sup>1</sup> Taking place in: Brussels (February 2011), and in Vienna (May and September 2011).

The study aims to answer the principle question of how to define what the core values of European social democracy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century are. The paper abides by the boundaries of an academic empirical study. The author remains grateful to the respective international secretaries of the PES member parties for their support in identifying key documents and also their respective feedback on the initial conclusions. Furthermore the author wishes to express gratitude to the PES for having enabled the access to the PES archive documents.

Last but not least, the paper serves to provide food for thought. As such it is conceived out of an ambition to enrich the pan-European debate on the renewal of social democracy. Due to its scientific nature the paper strictly refrains from any direct recommendations, which could be read as suggestive and hence disturb an open political process that has been launched within the PES or within its member parties.





## 1. Introduction

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The theme of this study “*Progressive values in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*” imposes a need for a thorough methodological introduction.

Value is an extremely complex notion<sup>1</sup>. Diverse definitions of what this term precisely entails can be found in the different scientific disciplines; however an agreed-upon conception of basic values seems to be missing<sup>2</sup>. This makes it naturally difficult to find a systematic theory of values, which respective authors call a *theoretical limbo*<sup>3</sup>. The challenge seems even bigger, when it comes to explaining what qualifies to be called “a (core) value” once the reference point is a political party.

Furthermore, specifically in the framework of political sciences a sound definition of the term value is not enough. Especially, if one aims to relate it with a concrete political party and determine, which of the values are left and which are *right*. There are thinkers, who doubt that contemporary such a distinction is even possible to be made<sup>4</sup>. But if to assume that this would be the goal, one also needs to provide a definition of the *values system*.

The European context which this study refers to adds additional difficulty. Many authors tend to agree that *cultures define values in relatively different ways*<sup>5</sup>. This position is called a *contextualist approach*<sup>6</sup>. Following its reasoning, in order to proceed, one needs to assume 3 things. First of all, that there are pan-European political values<sup>7</sup>. Secondly, that there is a certain degree of an existing European identity of the studied subjects. Thirdly, it is necessary to balance between the national perspectives and the European framework. What makes all three very challenging is that there seems to be a vacuum in terms of a European school of

1 E.Wesley Hall, *What is value?*, The International Library of Philosophy, Routledge London 2000 (based on the original text published in 1952).

2 Sh.Schwartz, *Basic Human Values*, paper for the conference on the Quality and Comparability Measures for Constructs in Comparative Research: Methods and Applications; Bolzano, Italy in June 10-13, 2009.

3 D.Graeber, *Toward an anthropological theory of value: the false coin of our own dreams*, Palgrave New York 2001, pages 2 - 3

4 T.Judt, *Ill fares the Land*, Penguin London 2010, pages 2 - 3

5 D.Graeber, *Toward an anthropological theory of value: the false coin of our own dreams*, Palgrave New York 2001, page ix

6 D.Wiggins and J.McDowell, *Needs, values, Truth*, Blackwell 2000

7 E.Wesley Hall, *What is value?*, The International Library of Philosophy, Routledge London 2000 (based on the original text published in 1952).

thought as far as values are concerned. What this study evidently proves is that it is still mostly the American scholars, who are dominant in terms of research on the issue of values. Transposition of their conclusion into the European grounds is naturally only partially possible.

Therefore this Chapter will provide a definition of the terms value and value system, as also will seek to place them in the context of the *institutionalised* European social democracy<sup>8</sup>.

### 1.1. Search for a definition

There are several disciplines in which value is an important notion. There is a generally acknowledged absence of an agreed-upon conception of basic values, of the content and structure of relations among these values, and of reliable empirical methods to measure them<sup>9</sup>.

The literature provides different classifications. In the studies closer related to anthropology<sup>10</sup>, there are usually four main streams distinguished, in which value is defined in:

- a. Sociological sense
- b. Economic sense
- c. Linguistic sense
- d. Anthropologic sense

Accordingly to this classification, *value in sociological sense* would stand for all the concepts of what is ultimately good, correct or sought-after in human life<sup>11</sup>. In the *economic sense value* is defined as a scale of how much certain objects are desired. Part of the definition relates to relativism<sup>12</sup>, as the *economic value* can be described through how much others wish to possess the object and hence how much they are able to sacrifice (invest) in order to get it. *Linguistically value*<sup>13</sup> refers to the language, which then is considered as a system of pure values. Linguists prove it stating that it is composed of ideas as sounds. Finally, in *anthropology values* can be seen as the way in which actions become meaningful to the actor being incorporated in some larger, social totality. It is then not simply only what people want, but it refers to the *values*, as the ideas that people *ought to want*<sup>14</sup>.

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8 Political parties

9 Sh.Schwartz, *Basic Human Values, paper for the conference on the Quality and Comparability Measures for Constructs in Comparative Research: Methods and Applications; Bolzano, Italy in June 10-13, 2009.*

10 D.Graeber, *Toward an anthropological theory of value: the false coin of our own dreams, Palgrave New York 2001, pages 2 - 3*

11 For i.e. Max Webber values were in fact crucial for explaining social and personal organization and change.

12 *Relativists assert that one thing (e.g. moral values, beauty, knowledge, taste, or meaning) is relative to some particular framework or standpoint (e.g. the individual subject, a culture, an era, a language, or a conceptual scheme); Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/relativi/>*

13 P.Cobley, F. de Saussure, *Linguistic value [in:] The communication theory reader, [in:] ed. Routledge 1996, page 99*

14 C.Kluckhohn, *Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action (1951), after: Encyclopedia of Religion and Society, ed. W.J.Swatos Jr, Hartford Institute for Religion Research, <http://hrr.hartsem.edu/ency/Values.htm>*



For the purpose of this study, the search for an adequate definition will evolve in the two dimensions: sociological and anthropological one. *Economic sense* could deviate the attention from the political thought towards political marketing, requiring further quantitative analysis of the offer of at least major political parties operating on the EU level. Subsequently it would need to be followed with social psychology research, allowing building a model responding to a question of identity and electoral behavior. Despite that it would undoubtedly be an interesting research question it goes beyond the scope of this particular study.

As far as *linguistic meaning of values* is concerned, this could also constitute a fair base for further deliberations. The texts of the PES manifestos and of the selected documents of the PES member parties provide material to complete a study on rhetoric of contemporary social democracy. The complicated factor would be that the PES documents are adopted in two languages, which are not mother tongues for the majority of the PES member parties. The translation, or better the transposition of what the different notions mean would be crucial to look into mutual coherence between the member parties' interpretation and the pan-European one. Following that, it would require a separate process and a different methodology, and hence will be left out of this paper.

Hence, the importance layers in forming an adequate definition for the term value within the field of humanist sciences, narrowing it to the disciplines of: philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. The goal of this process is to create a category, according to which also it will be possible to complete a selection of paragraphs and quotations that are to be analyzed in the Chapters 2 and 3 of this paper. As such, it will serve also as an explanation which the criteria are for perceiving something as a value or not.

## 1.2. Utilitarian, axiological and ontological interpretations

In terms of philosophy, it is important to limit the search first of all to the political philosophy and political thought. Following Leo Strauss<sup>15</sup> these two terms require being distinguished. Political thought is the reflection on or the exposition of the political ideas<sup>16</sup>. Political philosophy can be then explained as an attempt to replace opinion about the nature of political things by the knowledge of political things<sup>17</sup>. Of course, *political things* are by their nature to be subjected

15 Leo Strauss (1899 – 1973) was a political philosopher. The years of his professional activity he spent mostly at the University of Chicago, giving lectures and completing research, which is reflected among the others, 15 published books. Though he began as neo-Kantian, his later works can be more related with the stream of phenomenology and authors such as Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Although his focus in the last years was also on the classical studies and research on how the teachings of Plato and Aristotle could be applied in the contemporary political theory.

16 L. Strauss, *What is political philosophy? And other studies*, The University of Chicago Press, 1988 (originally 1959).

17 C. Farrelly, *Contemporary Political Theory. A reader*, Sage Publications London 2004, page 12

to the opinions and emotions, be chosen or rejected, praised or blamed. Their essence is in fact to claim personal judgment, decision and obedience. Perhaps therefore the search for an adequate definition of what value, taking the serviceable character of this study, is should be more focused on the political thought than on political philosophy. This conclusion comes from Strauss's own realization that political philosopher is someone seeking an ultimate true, while a political thinker is in fact someone focusing on the policy aspects.

The functional precondition is again a relevant one. It explains, why this paper resists a temptation to refer to the classical political philosophy and subsequently does not have an ambition to appear a reader on *values* as explained by the greatest minds of all times. Their heritage is undoubtedly a very important one; however analysis of these would derive the main focus of this study and also would considerably expand its size. Therefore the objective chosen is the one of the *utilitarian values theory*. It entails evaluation criteria – it points out what to look for, to guide actions needed to achieve certain goals. Hence it allows also making conscious choices, being able to assess what rules and dispositions need to be put in place in light of their estimated consequences<sup>18</sup>.

The *utilitarian* aspect requires that the values appear to be real, tangible concepts with which people can identify. This is an explanation to why though we assume *values are the same*; in fact their understanding will vary depending on the historical, cultural and societal circumstances in which they were elaborated and defined. This is what makes the study on the respective PES member parties' core values relevant, while looking at the possibility of establishing a pan-European set of values (Chapter 2). On the other, it also explains why the values are dynamic notions – and hence why it is possible to see different emphasis and diverse interpretations of the same values in the context of the PES Manifestos (Chapter 3). Last, but not least, the *utilitarian criteria*, which requires placing the values in a certain context of reality, presupposes that if one was to agree on common European criteria – they would be the key to describing the vision for the future of Europe itself. This significantly binds the ideological renewal of social democracy with the hope for the renaissance of the idea of Europe.

Despite the clear focus on political thought, there are two philosophical disciplines that need to be taken into consideration. They are: axiology and ontology.

Axiology is a philosophical study of value. It may stand thus for the collective term for ethics and aethics, or for the foundation of these fields. For the purpose of this particular study, it is naturally the field of ethics (understood as moral philosophy) that seems most interesting to refer to. Metha-ethics is essential in providing a theoretical framework to the term value. Normative ethics deals with the practical means of determining a moral cause of action.

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<sup>18</sup> D.Knowles, *Political Philosophy. Fundamentals of Philosophy*, Routledge 2001, page 38



Applied ethics gives answers how moral outcomes can be achieved in specific situations. Moral psychology assesses how nature can develop and descriptive ethics is what values people actually choose to obey. Each of these could provide a very inspiring framework for further deliberations on identity, political culture etc., but they do also go beyond the boundaries of this study. For its purpose, a singular overarching definition is required. It can be concluded that in the light of ethics value stands for qualifying criteria of an action, which evaluated accordingly to its notion can be perceived as 'good' or bad'. Of course, the moral values are related to one's particular sensibility, experience and hence explanation<sup>19</sup>.

The axiological angle provides a theoretical framework to explain, why there should be a clear connection between the values and the code of conduct. Chapter 2 shows that there are various ways of ensuring such a connection. The strictest one is reflected in a method according to which the *core values* are a part of a respective party's constitution or statutes. The opposite of that it is a tradition of putting forward a declaration that is a totally independent document. The bridge between the ideals and the question of their implementation is an important issue – as their concretization on one side, as also the institutional and organizational implications of them are important for creating and enhancing members' identification. Furthermore, axiology also helps understanding validity of values within a concrete timeframe. Some of the parties adopt the fundamental programmes, as one could say, without expiration date – some other redraft and repeat them on the occasions of the subsequent elections. If the values are to be realized within a certain legislature period, its interpretation and implementation closely links with a challenge of legitimacy and credibility of the party.

The second of the disciplines, ontology is usually linked with metaphysics and examines the nature of *being, existence, and reality*. It helps to determine if certain categories are indeed fundamental and if they can be described as 'existing' ones. Practically, for the definition what the value is, the sense to apply is to consider if the reality as described through them can really exist. Hence from this point one could try to draw conclusions what is the margin of tolerance in assessing how far one has gone in abiding by the values and reaching the desired state of things. It remains especially vital as in the popular judgment politics appear very often to be lacking in values. And once politicians refer to the values they may appear as universal concepts, in which everyone believes in and they simply are brought into the debate as pre-packaged "feel good" concepts<sup>20</sup>.

The Ontological approach is present in a number of the member parties' texts that refer to values. This is what gives it a future-oriented character – values are the core pillars of a vision of a

19 J.McDowell, *Mind, value, reality. Moral reasons vs. mathematical ones.*, [in:] *Needs, Values, Truth*, ed. D.Wiggins and J.McDowell, Blackwell Cambridge 2000, page 1 and further

20 A.Swift, *Political philosophy. A Beginner's Guide for Students and Politicians*, Polity Cambridge 2006, page 1

*better world*, which they de *facto* predefine. In several cases, it is nevertheless underlined that the aim constantly changes – as the ambitions accelerate and hence the process towards realization of them in itself is already a goal. This thought, popular at the historical beginnings of the socialist movement, however, now is not always a mainstream one. This would lead to a reflection that social democracy nowadays should in fact rediscover how it comprehends the notion of process and accordingly try to give content to the notion of *progress*. Especially, that it is the adjective “progressive” that it contemporarily uses as synonym of democratic socialism, left etc.

An absolute ideal is hard to describe. It is even harder to *sell it* to the party members and eventual sympathizers. In the times when people disbelieve in politics and politicians, convincing them that they should entrust them with chasing a utopia is hard to be seen as a tangible task. Perhaps this is also why there are some parties who try to contrast their vision with that of their current opponents’ ideal. This is especially the case, if the values are described in the party electoral manifestos.

### 1.3. Using methodology of social sciences

There are several definitions of the term value within the social sciences. The broad selection can be downsized if to focus only on these, which most indirectly relate to the political sciences – namely ideologies, decision-making, participation etc.

Ralph L. Keeney<sup>21</sup> provides a simplistic, but easy to apply definition. According to it *values* are what *we care about*<sup>22</sup>. Therefore, he concludes that they *should be the driving force for our decision-making*. Keeney suggests that the values should in fact be also the reason why people spend time thinking and bothering to decide, as he claims that the *value-focused thinking* consists essentially of two activities: *deciding what you want and then figuring out how to get it*<sup>23</sup>. Keeney is positive that this kind of thinking is in fact a constraints-free one, as it is reflecting on ambitions and desires, which does not need to be self-centered, but may be about what one wants to do for others, for a group, for a society. This definition is best reflected in the scheme, that Keeney provides:

The following scheme enriches the previously enumerated characteristics of values (as understood on the grounds of political thought, axiology, ontology etc.) of three elements: strategic thinking, decision making process and communication. This is why it is valuable, when a party enumerating the values it chooses to make its core ones, also describes itself and what it in itself wants to be. Chapter 2 provides with examples on how this can be built,


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21 R.L. Keeney, research professor at Duke University [http://www.fuqua.duke.edu/faculty\\_research/faculty\\_directory/keeney/](http://www.fuqua.duke.edu/faculty_research/faculty_directory/keeney/)

22 R.L. Keeney, *Value focused Thinking. A path to creative Decision-making*, Harvard 1992, page 3

23 *Ibidem*, page 3





showing coherence between a struggle for a different reality and constant work on oneself to improve parallel as well. Especially in a socialist tradition the critical self-evaluation element plays an important role.

Additional aspect of the Keeney definition is the combination of the two definitions: *value thinking* and *free thinking*. He claims that designing alternatives is in fact *constraint-free-thinking*. Same time selecting among the alternatives is a *constrained thinking*<sup>24</sup>. This is particularly important conclusion for the consideration. The challenge is here, how detailed the description of a value and its content should be, to remain in its prior function of a guideline and not trap the party members (and representatives) in any sort of a dogma<sup>25</sup>. A number of parties within the socialist family address the question of the scope of doctrinal thinking and acting in their texts. Underlining its attachment to democracy, they naturally decline dogmatism and emphasize that their ideal is an *open (open minded)* organization. Where the line lays in between what is leftist therefore and what anymore isn't, is disputable – and hence often leads to fractions within the parties and frictions among them within a transnational family. The freedom, or as one could call it, a prerogative of interpretation is a great challenge once thinking especially also on the transposition of the eventually agreed values on the European level onto the national ones and implications of their respective implementations in the various socio-political contexts.

The terms *constrained* and *unconstrained ways* of thinking of values may in fact be leading to their different understanding. Same values may be defined in both ways, if for example

24 R.L.Keeney, *Value focused Thinking. A path to creative Decision-making*, Harvard 1992, page 7

25 After Karl Popper, authors repeat that an ideology is an all-closed encompassing system of thought, which determines political socialization and hence political culture. [in:] *Politics*, Stephen D. Tansey and Nigel Jackson, Routledge New York 2004, pages 70 and 125

process of implementing them is seen as constrained and the outcome in a constrained manner<sup>26</sup>. Generally, constrained vision means that one assumes that there are certain circumstances in which one operates, which limit him additionally to his own moral constrictions. The challenge here is therefore to make best out of possibilities, for oneself and for a society – as a person can be convinced through a system of moral incentives to sacrifice own interests for a greater good. Unconstrained vision assumes that an intention to benefit others is an essence of virtue. Working for and within a community is a road to happiness and it sees human nature as beneficially changeable and adaptable to social customs. Intention is central in unconstrained vision<sup>27</sup>.

Both visions also differ as far as mobilization of knowledge is concerned. Constrained vision implies that knowledge of one is inadequate for the decision making, especially in a complex reality nowadays. Therefore there are number of social arrangements that will facilitate enabling making choices and also be fairly represented. Unconstrained responds to the “age of reason” – as reason is the paramount in an experience of a cultivated mind. Unconstrained vision declines therefore ideas such as *collective wisdom*.

Though perhaps it may seem automatic, that progressives should apply unconstrained logics – however the issue is more complicated. First of all, there is never a possibility to have a 100% constrained or unconstrained vision. Researchers analyzing Marx claim that his vision was to begin a relatively constrained one (limitations here being foremost the material means) with an unconstrained elements, such as emancipation. Throughout the years it was noted it has evolved towards lesser constrained one<sup>28</sup>.

The degree of how constrained or unconstrained the visions are explains the differences in between different social democratic parties. Additionally, values can be both constrained and unconstrained as far as the process, while same time also both constrained and unconstrained as far as the outcome. Adopting more or less of one or another is a question of history, traditions and culture. This is precisely what leads into the tensions out of which the ideological debates are born, such as the one around the *Third Way* and *Neue Mitte*. To exemplify how that works, one can take the value of equality. Accordingly to the constrained vision *there must be equal treatment to all*, following the unconstrained one people have different capacities and hence *there must be equal opportunities*. The question also remains, if an expected result of that is *equality of outcomes*. Evolution of approaches, especially within the more and more individualized society, can clearly be seen in the Chapter 3.

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<sup>26</sup> Th. Sowell, *A conflict of visions. Ideological origins of Political Struggles*, New York, Basic Books 2007, p. 133

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 11-15 and 33-34.

<sup>28</sup> *em*, pp. 114 - 118





On the other hand, Clyde Kluckhohn<sup>29</sup> claimed that *a value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action*<sup>30</sup>. What is worth highlighting in this specific interpretation is the cognitive<sup>31</sup> element. This introduces a distinction between the values and so called subjective quantities, such as feelings, emotions, and needs. Nonetheless, it also allows to clearly telling apart values and preferences. Kluckhohn believed that identifying a value is a long-term process. He claimed that it can only become desirable for an individual, once it is *interiorized* and integrated into a personal system. Therefore actions undertaken can be only then explained as *value oriented*, namely carried out of an internal conviction.

This definition is especially worth considering in the context of political parties. Accordingly to that interpretation, the values would be precisely the backbone of any declaration or action taken. Hence they would constitute an indispensable factor ensuring integrity among the members and their actions. The challenge here is, however, the linkage between the declared values and the actual beliefs. Therefore not only the issue of adoption of the values is an interesting one, but also the process that led to that – its lengths, phases, how open it was and how much it had an impact on the entire organizations. There is a solid number of examples given in the Chapter 2, which proves that in order for a process to be called a true ideological renewal - long duration and openness are key to the success. None the less, its institutional impacts (as elaborated above) are important – namely a long, thorough process that ensures the primacy of the new values-document makes it significant and does not allow to imagine even that the effort could easily be repeated shortly after and the paper replaced by another one. These elements must be incorporated in the plans for a renewal, otherwise the above mentioned *interiorizing* will not take place and the document may not have any impact at all.

Kluckhohn's definition points out another important element of the characterization. The prescriptive nature of the values determines the limits to what a value entails. Hence the values may also be described by what they are opposed to. This notion is especially relevant for this research, particularly in the Chapters 2 and 3, and was also already touched upon in the section 1.2.

29 Clyde Kluckhohn (1905- 1960), was an American anthropologist and social theorist, best known for his long-term ethnographic work among the Navajo and his contributions to the development of theory of culture within American anthropology.

30 C.Kluckhohn, *Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action* (1951), after: *Encyclopedia of Religion and Society*, ed. W.J.Swatos Jr, Hartford Institute for Religion Research, <http://hrr.hartsem.edu/ency/Values.htm>

31 *Cognitive* refers to the process of thought. It can be used in several contexts. It allows viewing individual behavior linking it with processing information, making analyses and developing a concept, which then steers the individual minds, groups and hence may also the organizations. Gaining knowledge, recognizing new items and hence applying it, changes the preferences. Such process can be completed consciously or unconsciously.

## 1.4. Anthropological preconditions

Anthropological definitions bring another aspect, which is connected with the term *system of values*. This is an issue of a key importance in reading and understanding, or while designing a declaration of principles. As mentioned already before, comprehension of the respective values depends also on how they are related to the other values, as also how they are put in order. The hierarchy and configuration depend in case of individuals on the experiences and expectations<sup>32</sup>. The same rule would apply in the case of organizations, which may evaluate the same values differently depending on the history, political and social system, as also culture.

Most of the social democratic parties apply the logic, that the values (in the respective number they recognize) are inter-dependent and complementary. For many, all of them are equally important – however naturally there are also cases that the second, third etc. derive from the one they name as the first (and hence prior) one. This is elaborated upon especially in the Chapter 2, as also the fact that certain concepts become values for certain parties due to historical experiences and political circumstances<sup>33</sup>. To give an example, sovereignty is a core value for some of the parties – while it does not even appear in the documents of the others.

It is crucial to remember that understanding of different notions is predetermined by knowledge and experiences. This is why the same concepts recognized on the transnational level as the core values, may have totally different meaning for respective members of the member parties. Remembering this, one should however not simplify that there is one criteria according to which those differences can be spotted. On contrary, every party has multifaceted identification (as a party in a small or big state, from the “old 6” or “new 12”, as a post-communist or traditional socialist one, based on trade unions or unrelated to them, from multi or bi- party system, etc.). These make the movement diverse.

Diverse interpretations by the member parties are one challenge to overcome, while speaking about values from the transnational party perspective. The other is the question of how to reach to the respective parties’ members. Everyone has several competing identities. For example, as a member of the PES member party, they may in the same time be identifying themselves as: woman or man, old or young, trade unionist, migrant, social democrat, European... etc. The list in case of each person is long. It is never clear, which identity will appear dominant at which point and hence which set of values will be applied as the first basic one, setting limits to the respective person’s behaviour. It is proven that the

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32 C.Kluckhohn, *Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action* (1951), after: *Encyclopedia of Religion and Society*, ed. W.J.Swatos Jr, Hartford Institute for Religion Research, <http://hrr.hartsem.edu/ency/Values.htm>

33 M.Karwat, *Political Values as Ideas of Social Needs*, *International Political Science Review*, April 1982, <http://ips.sagepub.com/content/3/2/198.abstract>



role of the organizations and the political leaders is really crucial in mobilizing some of the identities before the others<sup>34</sup>. The question that Chapter 3 especially seeks an answer to therefore is the role of a declaration of values on the European level. It involves the queries on what role it should play, if and how it should be related to the national statements on values – and if it has eventually a potential to mobilize and make prevailing this part of personal identity, that would make activists on the local levels refer to themselves as the *European socialists*.

What is more, the question of the identity is a prominent one also because of other reasons. Though it is going beyond the scope of this particular study, it bridges with the issue of progressive response towards changing society. Some authors suggest that determining the question of identity will shape the 21<sup>st</sup> century politics as much as defining the category of class did back in 19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>35</sup>. Defining the values and accomplishing identification with them in a reality of political and social fragmentation constitutes in fact then the core of the challenge for social democracy. What makes it additionally difficult are the intense social processes connected with progressing individualism on one hand, and *intensified multiculturalism*. They may, in fact, be the main obstacles in establishing a value based politics – as it may appear that people balance their commitments in relations to their *common* values differently than traditionally expected. It makes the link between *universal* values and progressive ones significantly weaker. It is possible that certain virtues will need to be re-established both within the movement and among the citizen's body<sup>36</sup>. It should be seen as an opportunity, especially if through that the European contextualization of the values' understanding could be put in place. For progressives this is inseparable, as it is claimed that the future of the continental movement depends on how much it manages to Europeanize itself<sup>37</sup>.

Many authors underline that values should be considered in the context that that are formulated in. Abramson<sup>38</sup> and Inglehart<sup>39</sup> highlight that the understanding what values are have changed together with *cultural shift* from materialism (economic and physical security) towards post-materialist (a greater emphasis on freedom, self expression and quality of life.) The consequences of this shift are visible in the erosion of the previous social class identification and hence voting, which naturally also heavily influences what used to be the line of cleavage

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34 *Comparative politics. Interests, identities and institutions in a changing global order*, ed. Jeffrey Kopstein and Mark Lichbach, Cambridge University Press 2005, page 25

35 B.Haddock, *History of Political Thought. 1789 till present*, Polity Cambridge 2005, page 149

36 J.Morrow, *History of Western Political Thought. A thematic introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan 2005, page 371

37 A.Gusenbauer, *The progressive Europe we seek*, [in:] *Next Left – Towards a New Strategy*, E.Stetter, K.Duffek, A.Skrzypek (eds.), Brussels, FEPS 2011 (in print)

38 P.R. Abramson is a Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University

39 R.F. Inglehart is a political scientist from the University of Michigan. He is a director of the World Values Survey, which is (according to Wikipedia) a global network of social scientists who have carried out representative national surveys of over 80 societies on all 6 inhabited continents, containing 85% of the world's population. He is known for his work on the sociological theory of post-materialism.

between left and right. Together with an appearance of the new policy issues, rising level of education and awareness, more participation of media in a public life<sup>40</sup> there is a need for new answers<sup>41</sup>. Since the vast majority of the PES member parties' declarations were adopted in the last 15 years, both the new challenges (as for example the ethical approach to biotechnology) and the opportunities (such as new media) are touched upon in the respective texts and hence also elaborated upon in Chapter 2.

Furthermore, there is also a matter of credibility to be again touched upon. In the light of this thesis, even if people potentially agree on what values mean they may weight them differently. Today people often complain that the politicians left the traditional frameworks, moving beyond the traditional divisions between right and left. This is a consequence of adopting a certain *mix-and-match approach*.<sup>42</sup> The explanations of the departure from what used to be known as *traditional values* are explained in two ways. Either politicians say that this is a question of context and changing reality, to which they need to fit. Or that this was imposed by circumstances (i.e. coalition government), but after the elections they will get back to the core. Naturally this balancing on the line may cause cognitive dissonance and certain repulsive feelings both among the previous core electorate<sup>43</sup> and among the potential one they wanted to gain support of. This lack of consistency in applying ideology is a cause of confusion, which goes beyond pluralism of interpretation. It in fact undermines self-consciousness of the members<sup>44</sup>. The era of post-modernism additionally by itself is connected with both variety of choices, but also skepticism. Transparency, inclusiveness and openness of the process may be means to ensure appropriate legitimacy, as it was mentioned before and also is shown in Chapter 2. Same time *political responsibility* is started becoming a part of the declarations and is also there examined.

## 1.5. Values and system of values, principles, visions, paradigms

The sections 1.2 – 1.4 outline diverse and multifaceted definitions of the terms *value*, showing same time the bridge between this theoretical introduction and the empirical material that was analyzed in the subsequent two chapters of this paper.

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40 This remark shall also be seen in the context of the work of Samuel Huntington and his thesis on 3rd way of democratization.

41 P.R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, *Value Change in a Global Perspective*, University of Michigan Press 1996, page 3

42 A.Swift, *Political philosophy. Beginner's Guide for Students and politicians*, Polity 2006, pages 2 - 5

43 C.de Vries, *New Challenges for Social Democracy – Lessons from the Netherlands*, [in:] *Next Left – Towards a New Strategy*, E.Stetter, K.Duffek, A.Skrzypek (eds.), Brussels, FEPS 2011 (in print)

44 Self-consciousness is defined as capacity of human beings to conceive themselves in relation to other humans, to human structures and institutions, and to the non-human or natural environment, and to act in the light of these conceived relationship. After: David Gautier, *The social Contract as Ideology*, [in:] *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Petit, Blackwell Publishing Oxford 2006, page 56



Recapitulating, *core value* is an ideal that constitutes a pillar of a vision that a group (in this case political party) seeks to implement. Values are motivations and determinants of actions. Their understanding is presupposed by the socio-political context. Though their overall sense is eternal, their interpretation alters to make them understandable and identifiable with in the modern times<sup>45</sup>. *Core values* complement each other, coexisting as a *system of values*. The ways they derive from one another is distinctive for the group that upholds them. *Principles* originate from the *core values* and ensure the bridge between them and the code of conduct. They are the points of transposition of the ideals into (more) concrete policy guidelines.

Furthermore, *vision* is an idea of how things (the world) are and same time an indispensable projection of what things (the world) should be. The relation between values and vision is of a mutual influence. They are a sort of a map, an agenda for thoughts and actions. Therefore since goals accelerate within a political process, a *vision* also alters and hence *core values* must be updated in their interpretation. Finally, *vision* leaves very concrete features aside, being also described as “pre-analytic cognitive act”<sup>46</sup>. It may be characterized as *constrained and unconstrained*.

*Paradigm* is an intellectually developed entity, which includes scientific law, theory application and instrumentation together. *Paradigms* are inspired by *visions*. Generally, successful *vision of a society* is developed in parallel with a corresponding *paradigm*. The difference is that *vision* can survive and thrive on its own internal logic, while *paradigm* encompasses empirically provable theories and hypothesis<sup>47</sup>.

The terms as described above constitute the methodological basis for the paper.

## 2. Core values of the PES Member Parties

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### 2.1. Methodological choices

The anthropological theory of values indicated that the values are meaningful concepts once they are anchored in a certain larger social totality (Chapter 1.1). The later elaborations allowed a formulation of a conclusion that the reference point for citizens still remains to stay the national contexts rather than the overall, pan-European one. It is the national context that still predefines the way in which people perceive and interpret the notions coming from so

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<sup>45</sup> P.R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, *Value Change in a Global Perspective*, University of Michigan Press 1996, page 3

<sup>46</sup> Th. Sowell, *A conflict of visions. Ideological origins of Political Struggles*, New York, Basic Books 2007, p.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 230 - 243

called Europe. Therefore in order to answer in a full extend the question what *European progressive values* are, it seemed imperative to analyze what (if any) values the national actors – the member parties of the PES recognize, in what way they combine those in a rational system of values and then also how they may orientate their system of principles as far as the transnational political party is concerned.

The first methodological question was on what could serve as a material for such a study. As the title of the study “*Progressive Values in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*” implied that the focus should remain on the modern, contemporary documents – it was clear that the sources should encompass the documents that nowadays indicate what system of values a party in question recognizes and wishes to follow. This eliminated almost all the historical (founding) declarations, with an exception of two – namely Parti Socialiste Belge, for which the original “*Charter of Quadregnon*” from 1894 remains valid till today as the party’s declaration of principles; and of PASOK, of which core values are enumerated in the founding declaration of 1974.

The second question was if a unified pattern of texts that would encompass the core values existed among the PES member parties. If that was the case, one could speak about a certain European model. It was found not to be the case. As already mentioned before (Chapter 1.2), parties vary in the ways they proclaim, interpret and translate into actions their core values. Some of the parties chose to adopt *Declarations of Values* (or as it could be translated directly from German *Constitutional Programmes*), the others enumerate the values in the electoral manifestos. In several cases the values remain an ideological preamble only, in some other they are translated into less or more concrete principles or even deeply rooted in the statutes. The overall panorama of available documents presents itself in the following way:

Party	Declaration of Values	Political Programme	Electoral Manifesto	Constitution / Statutes
SPÖ	Grundsatzprogramm (1998)			
SP.a	Beginsverklaring (2010)			
PS Be	La Charte de Quadregnon (1894)			
BSP		About Bulgaria. Free citizens. Fair State. Cohesive societies. (2008)		
ČSSD		Střednědobý program (1998)		
Socialdemokraterne	Hånden på hjertet (2004, 2011)			

SDE		SDE Program (2003)		
SDP	Towards a world of social justice (1999)			
PS Fr	Déclaration de principes (2008)			
SPD	Grundsatzprogramm (2007)			
PASOK	Founding Declaration (1974)			
MSZP			Progress – security – democracy (2009)	
ILP				Constitution of the Labour Party (2009)
LSDSP		LSDSP short programme		
LSDP			The Local Communities' Policy Programme (2011)	
LSAP	Grundsatzprogramm (2002)			
MLP				Statute
PvdA	Beginselmanifest (2005)			
DNA			New solidarity. The Norwegian Labour Party's Platform (2005 – 2009)	
SLD			Jutro bez obaw. Program dla Polski. (2011)	
PS Pt	Declaração de principios (2002)			
PSD				Statutes
SD SI			Odgovornost za spremembe, Alternativni vladni program Socialnih demokratow (2008-2012)	
PSOE				Statutes
SAP		Party Programme of SAP (2001)		Constitution of SAP (2009)
LP UK				10 Constitutional Rules (amended 1995) (2002)

The table above shows that it is possible to classify the respective parties' documents that refer to the notion of values into four categories. The first one encompasses all the texts that are named as declarations (of values or principles), but also fundamental programmes. These fundamental programmes are different from the *regular programmes* (which constitute here category 2). They focus specifically on values and eventually include their transposition into policy principles – while the programmes placed in the second category refer more to concrete policy schemes and concrete contemporary political reality. Category 3 embraces the electoral manifestos, which some of the parties chose as a format to present the values they believe in and from that ideological base draw the strategy for the subsequent legislative period. Category 4, on the other hand, consists of the party's constitutions and statutes, in which values are anchored.

With a certain degree of generalization, one can say that Category 1 includes mostly the PES member parties from the central-western Europe (plus the two southern from Greece and Portugal, and two from the north – namely from Denmark and Finland). Category 2 and 3 is most frequently chosen as adequate for the parties from central-eastern and eastern-southern Europe (and additionally plus two northern – Norwegian and Swedish). The last, fourth category, suited the countries from so called Anglo-Saxon tradition, as also Swedish, Spanish and Romanian ones. An important disclaimer concerning this category is that the parties classified in the categories 1-3 naturally also refer to the values in their respective statutes – only that in their cases it is not the only (the core) document as far as their ideology is concerned. Finally, it is worth recalling in case of SAP that for this party both the party's programme and the party's constitution remain source of knowledge about this party's values.

This observation allows formulating a conclusion, that even within the European social democracy there are very different traditions as far as model of a document on values is concerned. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that in the majority of cases the documents that outline which values a party in question believes in are adopted with expiration date (of the end of legislative period). That would hint an overall believe in values' long term validity.

What is more, making a link with the Chapter 3, the PES has been clearly falling so far in the category 3 – as electoral manifestos remained its key documents since its establishment. Considering a future declaration on principles seems to indicate a shift towards Category 1 or 2.

From the table it is apparent that there are some PES member parties that are not included in this particular study. Those are: EDEK (Cyprus), MSZDP (Hungary), PS (Italy), DS (Italy), UP (Poland) and SMER (Slovakia). The reason for that is an issue of availability of the materials. Collecting all the data, ensuring translation and authorization of the translation has been in itself an occupation of several months. It is only the so called *Nordic* countries that (next to those of





whom English is native language) provide the core documents on their websites in English. In light of this point, author would like to once again thank all the colleagues from the respective PES member parties and colleagues from FEPS Team for their extraordinary help in identifying, finding and translating the documents – without which this study would not be possible.

Linguistic issues in a certain way predefined the research method. The initial ambition was evolving around the idea of completing a CMP (Comparative Manifesto Project) research. In the light of the material gathered on one hand, and within the time framework given, such an objective quickly turned to be unrealistic. This is why the methodology chosen for this chapter is a comparative qualitative study.

Another challenge was a question of applying the definitions from the Chapter 1. In case of the parties, who adopted a set of values and in preamble clearly stated, which values they recognize as the core ones, enlisting them was a fairly simple task. Though even in those cases there were dilemma appearing on how to make a distinction between values, virtues and convictions (as for example in case of the Fundamental Programme of the SPD). Certain parties enumerate as principles the same notions, that other refer to as values (to give an example one could compare the Declaration of Socialdemokraterne, for whom “equality” is a value; with the text of ČSSD, where it is referred to as a *principle*.) The most challenging however was to extract what the core values are from the documents that do not enlist them (as it was the case for example for PASOK). Subsequently it also meant a great demand for an academic discipline was necessary to return time after time to the Chapter 1 and especially 1.5 and strictly apply the definitions adopted for the sake of this research. They were the ultimate guidelines in the selection and sorting the collected data.

The rigorousness of research brought along another benefit, which was the ability to classify the material in a format of the tables. The first step included two rounds of reading the text in question. It was followed by the third reading, during which the values were extracted and place in the table’s left columns. The fourth reading was devoted to filling the right column with the bullet points, which allowed identifying the constructive elements of the respective values’ interpretations. After all the texts were classified, the materials was analyzed again and then organized in the subsections of Chapter 2 – allowing to review on how *shared the understanding of values among the parties really is*. Comparing and confronting them, allowed also to form partial remarks and pose questions that may appear useful to reflect upon in the future ideological debates.

The deliberations on what should be recognized at the core values led to new queries, which the focus of the paper become enlarged with. The first one related to what mission the party sees ahead of them. The second was connected with what they recognize as their

traditions and then what kind of organizations they wish to be. And the third one related to the issue of democracy, which clearly enough all the parties adopted as the political system they wish to continue working within and for. As those three questions were so closely linked with the values, the author considered that necessary to include them in the paper.

## 2.2. Origins of the declarations

There is a valid question on for how long the proclamations of values remain valid. In case of the documents of category 3 and 4, the longevity is determine either by the length of legislature or by the period between the respective party's congresses (which may alter the statute or also adopt the new one). In case of categories 1 and 2, the situation is more complicated. Replacing one declaration via the other is in most of the cases a long lasting process. It begins with a decision that there is a need for change, for renewal and it usually involves several rounds of consultations. The complexity of the process leading to establishment of any superior document, how inclusive it has been and how much attention it gained both internally and externally – these are the criteria that could also help potentially defining the relevance of a document.

Two (PvdA and SPD) out of the twenty six analyzed parties included a description on how the declaration was drafted, amended and adopted in the text itself. These two outlines give a sense of how historical each of those processes was.

The Fundamental Programme of SPD was approved by the party's Congress that was held in October 2007 in Hamburg. The document is a large one (78 pages) and is composed of 8 Chapters. The process that led to this programme's adoption took 8 years and had been launched at the SPD Congress in Berlin in 1999. Within the Programme, there is a reference to the motivation that guided the party while setting up the process: once SPD had taken over the government after many years in the opposition, it felt that a fundamental review of principles was simply necessary. It seems unusual, as regularly the renewal is being called at place *after the lost elections*. In this specific case, the task was therefore not to reinvent, but to revise accordingly to the new challenges that the values should give responses to. The ambitious goal was to set the standards for both the SPD and for the society, which could apply while making political choices in 21st century. In order to achieve that, SPD decided that the process should be an open one, involving all the members and becoming an initiative places in the heart of social debates.

PvdA, on the other hand, adopted its "Declaration of Principles" (of 9 pages) at its Congress in Delft on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2005. The work over it began in 2003, when the PvdA established



“Declaration of Principles’ Commission”<sup>48</sup>. The Commission presented the initial results on 1st May 2004. All the party members were entitled to comment and propose amendments, which were then a base for the text revision and its second version that was introduced in August 2009. Next, the party sections could comment on it, which changes were commonly worked by the Commission and the party board, who together presented the third draft in November 2004. The text was finally adopted in January 2005.

Looking at both the processes, it is clear that a process of drafting a declaration is an extremely demanding one. First of all, it needs a strong motivation to renew. It must be a relevant reason that not only the party elites, but above all the members and the citizens (potential sympathizers and supporters) can refer to. Secondly, the process requires legitimacy which depends on one hand on the strength of the mandate of the people in charge hold, on the other on credibility reconfirmed in the different stages of the process. Thirdly, there must be enough time to ensure that is a thorough one and that everyone gets a chance to contribute, which is the only way to ensure members’ identification and feeling of ownership. The efforts and the time that are consumed are additional elements that induce respect for the final outcome and discourage those, who would eventually wish to quickly reopen the process or would dare its outcome trying to replace it with another document without strong rooting.

Those two processes are the ones from the recent past, however it is worth mentioning that there are also parties who currently work over their profound renewals. These are: SPD, Labour Party UK and Swedish SAP. The detailed documents on the processes of the last two are disclosed and allow to make some additional remarks.

The process in the Labour Party is held under the motto *“Refounding Labour – a party for the new generation”*. In the foreword to the document, drafted by Peter Hain (Chair of the National Policy Forum), LP Leader Ed Miliband refers to the years of Labour in the government and the electoral loss of 2010 as an incentive for change. He outlines the objective of the process as to *repair, restore and reform* the party and make it fit for the new fights. The document is available via the Labour Party’s website and the invitation is extended to all to submit their comments on various themes enlisted in the paper (till 24th June 2012 - which makes it almost a year-long consultation). Among the others, there are 4 “Big questions” identified – namely: (1) An outward-looking party; (2) A voice for members; (3) Renewing our party; (4) Winning back power.

SAP officially adopted its guidelines for the party renewal process at the extraordinary Congress held in March 2011. The document is entitled *“A Sweden for tomorrow”* and includes also a number of criteria to review the party’s organization. It is underlined in the document that *SAP needs to be strengthened as an organization ad regain its full force as the broad progressive*

48 Composed of: Wouter Bos / Ruud Koole (Presidents), Mark Bovens, René Cuperus, Guusje ter Horst, Bertus Mulder, Monika Sie Dhian Ho and Coen Teulings.

party in Swedish politics on a firm footing as a popular movement. This requires becoming more open, the change of attitude of party and its representatives and finding new ways of showing interest and meeting people. It is re-emphasized that *the members are the party*.

Both the processes spin around the fundamental issues, which bridge between political vision and modernization process. Synergy of both is crucial, to reset the goals on one hand and to enable organization to be able to work towards them on the other. Close observation of both may undoubtedly provide with incentives for the pan-European debate.

### 2.3. Frameworks in which values are enlisted

The table on page 18 presents a variety of the formats that the respective parties chose to use in order to introduce their core values. To recapitulate, the overview provides four main categories, which include: declarations / fundamental programmes; programmes; electoral manifestos; and statutes / party constitutions. Drawing from this classification and from the introduction (here especially from the Keeney's scheme on page 10), it seems to be necessary to accelerate the research at this point and to examine also the respective structures of those documents.

The question about the framework – what the lengths of the documents are, how they are structured and if the values are accompanied with set of principles should allow to form hypothesis on how abstract the progressive values are as terms. Furthermore, the accompanying parts of the respective texts will indicate on where the parties strike the balance between the utilitarian, axiological and ontological interpretations. The data in the table below were put together to facilitate the examination process:

SPÖ	Grundsatzprogramm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Das Grundsatzprogramm”<sup>50</sup> originates from 1998</li> <li>• 33 pages</li> <li>• 4 chapters: (I) “New Challenges, New Solutions”, (II) The Principles of Social Democrats; (III) Political Perspectives, (IV) Democratic renewal as principle – self-understanding of SPÖ.</li> <li>• Chapter 2, which lists and provides and interpretation for the core values, is placed strategically between a mission statement (in which it is explained why and what for SPÖ exists) and explanations of political necessities and self-organization requirements that must be fulfilled in order to successfully accomplish the historical assignment.</li> </ul>
Sp.a	Beginsverklaring sp.a	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The text is supplemented with “We moeten weer vooruit. Goedgekeurd verkiezingsprogramma, 9 mei 2010”<sup>51</sup>.</li> <li>• 18 pages-long document</li> <li>• composed of 3 main chapters: (I) Equal chances for all; (II) Working on a better future; (III) An open, progressive movement.</li> </ul>
PS Be	“1893: La Charte de Quadregnon” <sup>52</sup> ,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• adopted by PS Congress on 25th and 26th March 1894</li> <li>• 2 pages long</li> <li>• Entails 2 sections: “Declaration of Principles” and “For the realization of these principles”.</li> </ul>



BPS	Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Title: "About Bulgaria. Free citizens. Fair State. Cohesive societies",</li> <li>adopted by the 47th Congress of BSP on 22nd and 23rd November 2008</li> <li>44 pages long</li> <li>5 Chapters: (I) Introduction; (II) Our strength in Transition; (III) The new global era; (IV) Necessary change – human development; (V) BSP – Progressive Winner of Project for Bulgaria.</li> </ul>
ČSSD	"Střednědobý program" <sup>53</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medium-term program</li> <li>Introduction and 7 chapters: (I) Who we are; (II) What we want; (III) To pave the way; (IV) What is our policy; (V) Foreign Policy; (VI) Information society – building a potential via public education, participation and solidarity; (VII) Conclusions</li> </ul>
SD DK	"Hånden på hjertet" <sup>54</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>adopted by the party's Congress in 2004</li> <li>11 pages (15 in a printed version with a foreword of Socialdemokraterne secretary general)</li> <li>12 Chapters are: (I) Conquering the land with new horizons; (II) Social democratic values; (III) Freedom; (IV) Equality ("Lighed"); (V) Solidarity; (VI) Democracy means government by the people; (VII) All have responsibilities; (VIII) The ethnical challenge; (IX) We believe in Denmark; (X) Part of Europe; (XI) Global Community; (XII) Afterword: It begins at home.</li> </ul>
SDE	Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>adopted by the party General Assembly in Tallinn on 19th May 2001 and amended on 10th May 2003.</li> <li>19 pages long</li> <li>an introduction and 8 chapters: (I) People, society, state; (II) Social Policies, Social Foundations; (III) Education, Culture and Science; (IV) Economy; (V) Regional Development; (VI) Sustainable development; (VII) Security; (VIII) Estonia and the world.</li> <li>no specific chapter that would be devoted to the issue of values</li> </ul>
SDP	Declaration of principles "Towards a world of social justice" <sup>55</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>adopted by the 38th Party Congress in Turku in 1999.</li> <li>The declaration is three pages long, and is composed of introduction and 3 chapters, each of which is broken into sub-sections: (0) Introduction (Our ideal of a just society; The rise of the labour movement; Social democracy means reforming; People must treat each other as equals); (I) Social democracy, the movement of freedom and equality (Our values stand firm in changing times; Freedom and equality create possibility to choose; Our goal, a society of solidarity; The environment belongs to all; All human beings worldwide are equal and worth); (III) Participation in the society (The economy must serve the entire society; Democratic control of the market; The global market must be supervised; The welfare society as a safeguard; The achievement of the balance between entitlements and responsibility; Work as an important factor of participation and integration; Increased significance of the trade unions in changing times; The rights rest on human dignity).</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Déclaration de principes <sup>56</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>adopted by the party on 14th June 2008.</li> <li>text is organized within 24 articles and encompasses 6 pages</li> <li>composed of an introduction and three chapters: (I) our fundamental goals; (II) our objectives for the 21st century; (III) our socialist party.</li> </ul>
SPD	Grundsatzprogramm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>adopted on 28th October 2007, at the party Congress held in Hamburg</li> <li>known as "Hamburger Programm".</li> <li>78 pages long.</li> <li>The document is composed of: introduction, 4 chapters and index of the key words. The chapters are following: (I) The times, that we live in; (II) Our fundamental values and principle convictions; (III) Our Goals, Our Policies; (IV) Our Way. The third chapter is additionally divided into 8 subsections: (1) A peaceful and just world; (2) Social and democratic Europe; (3) Civic society of solidarity and democratic State; (4) Equality of genders; (5) Sustainable progress and qualitative growth; (6) Decent work for all; (7) Supplying Welfare State; (8) Better education, children-friendly society, strong families.</li> </ul>

PASOK	Declaration of Principles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>from 3rd September 1974 (policy content has been updated by subsequent electoral manifestos and programmes)</li> <li>7 pages long</li> <li>It is not divided into any specific chapters, however sub-sections can be recognized. These are: introduction (exploring the US-led military intervention on Cyprus); “Courage and determination in building new Greece”; Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s mission to struggle for: National Independence, Popular Sovereignty, Social Liberation and Democratic Process (incl. “Ensure democratic process with direct and active participation of all citizens in political life” and “Cancellation of all international conventions and agreements that led Greece into economic, political and military dependence from monopoly groups in the West, particularly US imperialism”).</li> </ul>
MSZP	Manifesto “Progress – security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>dated from 1st December 2009</li> <li>17 pages long</li> <li>composed of introduction and 4 chapters with sub-sections: (I) Where are we? What have we achieved?; (II) On which side do we stand? (Our values and tools); (III) What are our tasks? Real issues, real answers; (IV) What do we aim at? New Left and the Programme for change</li> </ul>
ILP	Constitution of the Labour Party <sup>57</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>adopted in March 2009</li> <li>13 pages long.</li> <li>The Constitution is composed of 3 parts: (I) Principles and Objects of the Party; (II) Articles of the Constitution; (III) Standing Orders of the Labour Party Conference. Part I is additionally sub-divided into 3 sections: (1) Introduction, (2) What Labour stands for; (3) What Labour does.</li> </ul>
LSDSP	Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>14 pages</li> <li>preamble and 23 sections: (1) Economic policy, (2) State’s role in economy; (3) The state as entrepreneur, (4) State budget policy, (5) Taxation, (6) Investments, (7) Financial market reform, (8) Business environment, (9) Infrastructure, (10) Transport, (11) Economic development and environmental harmony, (12) Economic governance and institutional reform, (13) Regional development, (14) Agriculture, (15) Industry, (16) Social Policy, (17) Support for families and children, (18) Social care and insurance, (19) Pensions, (20) Health Care; (21) Home affairs, security and justice, (22) Environmental and Energy Policy; (23) Education and Research.</li> </ul>
LSDP	The Local Communities’ Policy Programme <sup>58</sup> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>From 2011</li> </ul>
LSAP	Grundsatzprogramm <sup>59</sup> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>adopted by an extraordinary Congress on 21st October 2002</li> <li>7 pages</li> <li>Preamble and 3 Chapters: (1) Our fundamental values (Freedom, Justice, Solidarity, and Security); (II) Acting on the bases of the socialist values (Primacy of the people; Equal quality of life for all; Coexistence of generations; the international framework); (III) Our understanding of politics</li> </ul>
MLP	Statutes	
PvdA	Beginselmanifest <sup>60</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adopted at the party’s Congress in Delft on 29th January 2005</li> <li>9 pages long</li> <li>composed of 3 main chapters, which then divide into sub-points: (I) Ideals; (II) Principles in modern times (2.1. Right to decent life; 2.2. Solidarity and togetherness; 2.3. Governing close to the people; 2.4. selective and sustainable growth; 2.5. Multifaceted democratic constitutional state; 2.6. Freedom as right; 2.7. Community as a choice); (III) Mission (3.1. The Netherlands and the World; 3.2. Chances and Securities; 3.3. Individuals and society; 3.4. Democracy and rule of law).</li> </ul>

DNA	“New solidarity. The Norwegian Labour Party’s Platform 2005 - 2009” <sup>49</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 70 pages</li> <li>• The entire document is composed of an introduction “A new majority – A New solidarity” and 5 chapters: (I) Our values: Freedom, solidarity and equal opportunity; (II) The information based society: Employment and education; (III) Quality of life: Culture, the environment and quality of life; (IV) The Welfare State: Assuming Care and Responsibility; (V) The globalised Community: Distribution and Management. Each of the chapters is divided into several sub-sections. The logic of the subsections is following: there is an introduction of an issue to begin with and then always in the bullet points what the Norwegian Party answer and action plan is.</li> </ul>
SLD	Tomorrow without fear. Programme for Poland <sup>50</sup> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2011</li> <li>• 217 pages</li> <li>• Introduction and 3 main chapters: (1) State; (2) Society; (3) Economy.</li> </ul>
PS Pt	Declaration of Principles <sup>51</sup> .	
PSD	Statutes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Articles 5, 7 and 8</li> </ul>
SD SL	Electoral manifesto “Responsibility for change” <sup>52</sup> .	
PSOE	Statutes <sup>53</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chapter 1</li> </ul>
SAP	Program and Constitution <sup>54</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is worth to add that accordingly to the document A Sweden for tomorrow, that was adopted by the SAP extraordinary congress in March 2011, SAP is currently in the process of rewriting its programme. For the purpose of revision a Programme Commission was established<sup>55</sup>.</li> </ul>
LP UK	The 10 Constitutional Rules of the Labour Party <sup>56</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The 10 Clauses encompass: (I) Name and Objects; (II) Party Structure and Affiliated Organisations; (III) The Party’s Financial Scheme; (IV) Aims and Values; (V) Party Programme; (VI) Labour Party Conference; (VII) Party Officers and Statutory Officers; (VIII) The National Executive Committee; (IX) The National Constitutional Committee; (X) Scope of Rules.</li> <li>• The Clause 4 has a specific history. It has belonged to the LP Constitution since 1918, as drafted by Sidney Webb. In 1995 its text was changed, marking the transition in between what was by then called “Old” and “New” Labour.</li> </ul>

49 SPÖ, Das Grundsatzprogramm, [www.spoe.at](http://www.spoe.at)

50 Both the documents were supplied by the International Secretariat of sp.a, for which help and support the author remains grateful.

51 1983: la Charte de Quadregnon; [www.ps.be](http://www.ps.be)

52 [www.cssd.cz/dokumenty](http://www.cssd.cz/dokumenty)

53 <http://s-dialog.dk>

54 <http://www.sosialidemokraatit.fi/en/node/2492>

55 <http://www.parti-socialiste.fr/le-ps/nos-valeurs>

56 <http://www.labour.ie/party/constitution> and <http://www.labour.ie/principles/>

57 Lietuvos Socialdemokratų Partijos 2011 metų rinkimų į vietas savivaldybes programos nuostatos.

58 Das LSAP-Grundsatzprogramm wurde angenommen vom außerordentlichen Kongress am 21. Oktober 2002 in Esch/Alzette. [www.lsap.lu](http://www.lsap.lu)

59 Beginselmanifest – Partij van de Arbeid; Vastgesteld door het congres van de Partij van de Arbeid, 29 januari 2005. [www.pvda.nl](http://www.pvda.nl)

60 New solidarity. The Norwegian Labour Party’s Platform 2005-2009. [www.arbeiderpartiet.no](http://www.arbeiderpartiet.no);

61 Jutro bez obaw. Program dla Polski, Sojuz Lewicy Demokratycznej. [www.sld.org.pl](http://www.sld.org.pl)

62 Declaração de princípios; [www.ps.pt/declaracao-de-principios](http://www.ps.pt/declaracao-de-principios)

63 Odgovornost za spremembe, Alternativni vladni program Socialnih demokratov 2008-2012, Ljubljana, 5.julij 2008. [www.socialnidemokrati.si](http://www.socialnidemokrati.si)

64 Estatutos, PSOE Congreso federal; 04, 05 y 06[07]08. PSOE la fuerza del cambio. [www.psoe.es](http://www.psoe.es)

65 The Constitution of the Swedish Social Democratic Party – Adopted at the ordinary party congress of 2009 and Party program of the Social Democratic Party, Adopted by the Party Congress in Västerås 6 November 2001. [www.socialdemokraterna.se](http://www.socialdemokraterna.se)

66 A Sweden for tomorrow. Adopted by the extraordinary party congress on 25th -27th March 2011. [www.socialdemokraterna.se](http://www.socialdemokraterna.se)

67 Labour counts. The 10 Constitutional Rules of the Labour Party (Clauses 1-10). [www.labourcounts.com/constitution.htm](http://www.labourcounts.com/constitution.htm)

In the light of this table it is obvious that the documents are very diverse. The length of the texts vary. Declarations are usually the shortest. The most brief of them is the one of the PS Belgium, which taking into account its historical character, may lead to a conclusion that throughout the years parties have started favoring lengthy documents. On one hand, it may be connected with a evolving style of adopting declarations, which nowadays thanks to the technical solutions allows reaching more members and hence enables posting more amendments. On the other, it may naturally be explained also by a growing complexity of politics. Some of the parties try to counterbalance the impression that they aim at providing answers to all the issues – for example LSAP writes that *we do not have the questions to all the answers*. In fact what seems to be evident is that a balance must be retrieved in between inspiring vision and the technical explanation.

The fundamental programmes are longer than the declaration, reaching in between 7 pages (LSAP) till 78 (SPD). These documents usually include an ideological preamble, enlist values and provide their definitions, as also indicate how these values are to be translated into principles, political choices and their own organizational arrangements. Though several of the texts provide fairly detailed descriptions, it is worth emphasizing that all the parties pledge same time openness and reject any form of dogma.

The translation of the values into actual policies seems to be regarded as a matter of credibility of the parties. And the importance of the notions of *trust, credibility* and legitimacy are frequently repeated in the different texts. As exemplification of that, the texts of MSZP, SDE, SAP. In some of the cases *political responsibility* becomes even elevated to the rank of a value and some of the parties additionally provide their understanding of what politics (a values-based politics) is about (such a definition can be found for example in the text of LSAP). Naturally, the most detailed ones are the electoral manifestos, which in fact are the detailed governing programmes. The longest one is the electoral manifesto of SLD (217 pages), however the shorter DNA one (70 pages) is by no mean less exhaustive. On contrary, it provides a very interesting structure in which descriptions of the challenges are followed by responses in bullet points, in which a clear reference to core values is made. The formats alike this one may be a proof how much the parties seek an effective response to an overall democratic crisis of nowadays, which manifests itself with disillusionment, distrust and detachment of citizens from politics. As some of the parties writes, the democratic sphere must be sustained – and the possibilities of social democracy heavily depend on it.

What also clearly differs from party to party is the context they chose to place their core values in, while going beyond philosophical reflection on their sense. Some parties begin with the reference to the people and society (mostly the case of Central and Western European





social democracy), the others to the constitutional state (which is especially the case for the parties from the Central and Eastern Europe, but also of the Nordic ones). Some parties begin from the point of internationalism, going subsequently through European, national and local levels (i.e. SPD, SPÖ, SAP), other refer to the European or global level towards the end (Labour Party), and some do not have any references at all. From this analysis one must draw a conclusion that there are discrepancies in the commitment of the parties to the ideas of Europe. This reflection shall perhaps be a motivation that once speaking of the progressive values on the European level, it is the vision of Europe that must simultaneously (if not first, as Chapter 1.5 would suggest) be agreed upon.

A salient reflection in the light of the elaborations on in which context the values are effectively anchored in, is an issue of how the parties envisage people – both as individuals, as also as society members. Assuming from the history of the movement, one could expect references to certain groups that the message is directed to – as it was the case of the workers' class. These expectations will be disappointed. The core values, the principles and the policies based on them are on overall ones, addressed to the people in general. The concept of workers and class struggle disappeared from the texts, with some few exceptions (such as Irish Labour Party). Same time, there are many references to notions such as *everyone is of the same value, every person is responsible for his life*. This may provide an explanation why the links between parties and core electorates are no longer there, or at least no longer that strong. Once parties have evolved to be "catch-all" ones, it is hard to expect that one certain group will specifically relate to them. In conjunction to that one could wonder, if on the national level there is a general image of an *ordinary citizen*, would there be a potential on the European level to address a specific group of potential sympathizers with an attractive vision of a flourishing European society?

The last point that is worth making here is that the framework in which values are placed predetermines if they are described as certain ideals or if they are outlined in an opposition to the values that social democrats associate with their political opponents. The tendency is that one the values are explained in an electoral manifesto, they are presented as the alternatives (i.e. MSZP, SLD; an exception is the fundamental programme of SPD, where is portrays itself as an alternative to conservatives and liberals). Once they are i.e. pillars of a party statute or a constitution, they are rather outlines as certain ideals that even perhaps could not be compared to anything else. Also contrasting one's beliefs with conviction of the certain other naturally gives visibility to this (and not the others) opponent. Majority of the parties chose to explain their values as pure notions and they don't weigh them against others. Perhaps this also reflects the trend that some parties articulate – namely to expose *positive character of the socialist policies* (see i.e. LSAP) or the belief that democracy is and will always remain a matter of pluralism and diversity (SPA, for example, states that *democracy presupposes multiparty system*.)

## 2.4. Historical heritage

For social democracy, its' tradition is an important construct of its identity. It is the past that determines the way progressives perceive reality and shape their dreams for the future. It was historical circumstances that led to emergence of the movement (clearly reflected i.e. in the declaration by PASOK) and it is history that social democracy feels obliged to make. It can be summarized that for the social democrats there is always tradition, mission and vision that come together. Majority of the parties express it, while referring to the historical circumstances in which they have been operating and their own evolutions in the party programmes. This is directly connected with the core philosophical base that the movement rose on – namely historical materialism. The brief list of the respective elements they expose can be found in the table below.

Sp.a is a party with long history, which gives a great emotional richness, belonging and engagement. It recognizes that the history however, may place the party too much inside of an establishment way of understanding role and place of the political parties nowadays. This danger can be avoided, if a party will rather opt for evolving towards becoming a movement of progressives, in which framework of cooperation between those, who seek an open, humane, sustainable and social society will be realized. This is, among others, a reason, why the party states that with the changing circumstances, also the programs of the parties (such as this one) may be gradually altered.

Sp.a	Sp.a is a party with long history, which gives a great emotional richness, belonging and engagement. It recognizes that the history however, may place the party too much inside of an establishment way of understanding role and place of the political parties nowadays. This danger can be avoided, if a party will rather opt for evolving towards becoming a movement of progressives, in which framework of cooperation between those, who seek an open, humane, sustainable and social society will be realized. This is, among others, a reason, why the party states that with the changing circumstances, also the programs of the parties (such as this one) may be gradually altered.
ČSSD	ČSSD describes itself as a historical party that has been struggling for: universal and equal suffrage; equality of all within the labour law; legal protection of minorities and elimination of discrimination against women.
SDP	SDP recalls its history as an emancipation movement, since the establishment of Finish Labour Party in 1899 and subsequently SDP in 1903. It underlines its historical mission to achieve social and economic emancipation of working people, being distinctive upon its establishment from both capitalism and communism. Nowadays the polarizing differences can be seen between SDP and ultraliberalism and conservatism.
PS FR	PS Fr emphasizes its historical traditions, which it associates with the spirit of humanism and philosophy of enlightenment. It adapts as its own the values of the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality and Brotherhood (de Fraternité). It claims the memory of 1848 (with the abolition of slavery by the Commune); heritage of the Republic, its democratic opening and struggle for secularism; great achievements of the Popular Front; Liberation; May 68 and May 81 and all the governments of the left since then. It also recalls the Dreyfus affair and the great commitment to abolishing death penalty, as also it acknowledges as its own universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.



SPD	Since its foundation, SPD has been emancipator movement for workers and the democratization movement, with an ambition to overcome oppressive and authoritarian systems. It has been devoted to the ideals of French Revolution and the Revolution of 1848. The history of struggle for democracy and the history of social democracy are inseparable, looking at its commitment to issues such as fight for women voting rights, opposition against dictatorship and Nazism, as also resistance against communists in DDR times. Social democracy has always been a part of workers' movement, and internationally and European oriented party and a democratic one. Since the fundaments of Godeberger Programme of 1959 it understands itself as a popular party, with its roots in Judaism and Christianity, humanism and enlightenment, Marxist social analysis and all the experiences of the workers' movement. It owes also impulses to women movements and other new social movements. SPD recognizes "Freedom, Equality and Brotherhood", which originate from the French Revolution, as the basis of the European democracy. Nowadays, the equal freedom would be translated into justice – which is why "Freedom, Justice and Solidarity" are the fundamental values of liberating, democratic socialism.
ILP	The Labour Party was founded in 1912 by a trade union movement with a goal to provide a means by which working people could bring about social and economic justice.
LSAP	It has over a century long history, in which it contributed to the establishment of democracy and supported justice within the society. It has been the core contributor to a social progress achieved. This tradition obliges as far as the future is concerned.
PvdA	As a movement, social democracy has a tradition that is anchored in 19th century and as such feels itself as a force that played historical role in emancipating workers and funding democratic systems.
DNA	DNA is proud of the past, but very conscious of the challenges – and hence far from satisfied.
SLD	SLD states that it builds its identity on the heritage of the history and ideological richness of polish social and progressive movements, which base themselves on: the enlightened rationalism, appreciation of the achievements of all the generations of the Polish left and its membership in the grand international socialist and social democratic family. SLD states that the left has earned its place in the Polish history through: is participation in the struggle for independence, fight against Hitler's invasion and working towards rebuilding Poland after the years of war and occupation.
PS PT	PS finds its roots in the 19th century social and political movement, that led the struggle for solidarity and justice. It also recognizes its own predecessors contribution into establishment and consolidation of democracy. The current PS was founded in 1973 <sup>68</sup> , as an organization of resistance against dictatorship and fascism.
PSD	PSD continues an over century tradition of Romanian social democracy. It stands strongly for democratic traditions in the spirit of the people and ideals of the Revolution of December 1989.
SAP	The party states that the working-class movement grew as a natural reaction to people's own rough experiences of poverty, humiliation and injustice. Democratic and socialist ideas gave a political structure to these experiences and created the organization that gave them social impact. As for the roots, SAP links the emergence of the core values with the radical debates of enlightenment and the criticism of both liberal and socialist thinkers of the 19th century. Specifically in Sweden, the labour movement grew also out of the tradition of self-government; which has been spread by early popular movements such as the temperance and Free Church movements. SAP adds that the ideology of the labour movement is a mean of analyzing development of society. The base here is the materialistic view of history, as related to Karl Marx and Frederich Engels. In its historical analyses the party puts itself on the side of reformism versus revolution. SAP considers communist and anarchistic lines as opposing and inconsistent with the ideal of democracy. The reformist line builds on the other hand on democratic participation and reforms, which should be pursued.

The first reflection is that the parties refer to themselves as *historical ones*. They claim this characteristic after over a century of struggle for a *better world* that would emerge based on the implementation of their core values. The emotional attachment to the past (as one could describe the articulation of *pride*) shows that they feel part of the certain set up (political stage, institutional system etc.). This is a source of strength, once understood as a tradition to rise from. On the other hand it may also be a sort of an entrapment, that quickly can be turned

68 On the bases of transformed Portuguese Socialist Action, that was established in 1964

to a pejorative characteristics of social democracy having grown into an *establishment* and hence losing its characteristics of a critical movement, which always stands in an opposition to what is unjust. In order to keep these balances the statements such as the ones by sp.a or DNA are very important communicates.

Furthermore, it seems that the parties refer mostly to their internal history (as singular parties), to the history of the movement overall or to major historical turning points (such as French Revolution, to which majority of the parties relate in the contexts of their core values origins). Some of the parties refer to a universal historical heritage (i.e. Parti Socialiste). The element that is missing in all the examined cases is a common European history and the social democratic achievements throughout the process of the European Union's unification. This is a remark that may also help explaining how this in fact is possible that the conservatives claim the historically prevailing role in uniting Europe. This element is decisive as far as European identity of social democracy is concerned.

There are discrepancies among the parties as far as referenced to philosophical base is concerned. There are parties, who refer to antiquity (i.e. SDP), to enlightenment (i.e. SAP) and enlightened rationalism (SLD), as also humanism (PS Fr, PSD, BSP, DNA). On the other hand, there are also the parties referring to Christianity (SPD, SDP), Free Church Movements (SAP) and to Judaism (SPD), while others make it a matter of principle to express their devotion to secularism (PS Fr.) or even secularism and anti-clericalism (LSAP). It seems from this table that a debate on religious heritage has been a sort of a grey area, which taking into account the societal debate in Europe on one hand, and political (such as around preamble to the Constitutional Treaty) on the other, one may assume that it remains a sort of a potential source of internal tensions. Potential, as SPÖ in their fundamental programme states, for example, that religion and socialism are not in an opposition – through which a Marxist maxima that *religion is opium for masses* is being rejected.

An interesting tendency also has appeared in the light of the documents from the parties of the Central and Eastern Europe, especially SLD and PSD. Those two parties seem to have dealt with the burden of their post-communist past and opened up to making links with these moments of the history, when they also played a significant role and which can be of an inspiration. Both refer to the over century long history of socialism and the achievements of the movements' member in the past, especially in the context of the struggle for freedom and democracy. In that sense the way they bring forward their historical contributions may be compared to the one applied by SPD, while speaking about i.e. the DDR era. SLD makes a very strong point in its document, *stating that it is only the voters who decide, how much it can allow itself*. It is a response of a new generation to what the previous one (of 1990s) was claiming, namely that *social democracy can allow itself less*



due to its communist past in the region. Both the declarations are a clear sign that the parties want to be seen as modern and European, as the ones which coped with the specter and are ready to move ahead.

## 2.5. Self-portrait of the parties

Equally important to the grand mission of the parties, is how they seek to implement those and hence what principles will guide their organizational work to enable them to fulfill their ambitions. In almost all the texts, the self-portraits of the parties can be found. The main threads of the descriptions present themselves in the following manner:

SPÖ	<p>SPÖ describes itself (Chapter 4 of the Fundamental Programme) as a political being acting in the interest of people. It is a party with clear principles that fights against political arbitrariness and populism.</p> <p>The sense of the core values is to direct members of the party in action, as they are the ones, whose doing must be an example. The party is open and will embrace all active and creative people, who wish to engage themselves for the cause. This one may not be understood as a concept of dogma.</p> <p>What is more, social democracy and religion are not in opposition. It is appreciated if a motive of love and devotion to another person is an inspiration for engaging oneself   social democracy. The principle, as also in case of all the groups, organizations and initiatives is partnership, respect and common understanding. The optimal goal is humane, peaceful, social and just world.</p>
BSP	<p>BSP describes itself as a party of democratic socialism, which strives for free, fair and cohesive society. It is entirely devoted to the issue of values that BSP wants to strive for, outlining what kind of party it wants to become in order to fulfil their implementation.</p>
SD DK	<p>Socialdemokraterne describes itself as a party whose mission is to implement democratic socialism. This means to liberate people, to give them a sense of security and provide each and every person with the chance to make decisions regarding his or her own life within the context of responsibility for her and himself, for the community, for nature and for generations to come.</p>
SDE	<p>SDE perceives itself as a party that strives for realization of the principles of humanism.</p>
SDP	<p>SDP describes itself as a modern, centre-left party, which aims to unite the potential of political system with hopes and optimism of [their] progressive ideals.</p>
SPD	<p>The party describes itself, as the oldest party in Germany, which has always been taking part in an international freedom movement.</p>
MSZP	<p>MSZP states that after consecutively having being entrusted by the voters to form a government, the party had found itself in the circumstances in which new challenges needed to be faced. Among them there was a lack of trust in politics and politicians, and in socialists above all. The idea behind the program was to go beyond the crisis management, looking into options for the years following the Great Depression.</p>
ILP	<p>The Labour Party describes itself as a democratic socialist party, which through its membership in the PES and SI is working for equality and empowerment of citizens, consumers and workers in a world increasingly dominated by big business, greed and selfishness. Labour Party emphasizes its belief in right of all citizens to participate fully in society and to develop their personal and social identity in an Ireland and Europe that is truly democratic, fair and inclusive. The commitment to the values (such as democracy and equality) frames the way the party operates, valuing the contribution of all: members, activists, supporters and voters. The operational way is through party members, who perform advocacy at their work places and communities, participate in organizations and trade unions, and work towards elections. The principles are to be obeyed on everyday bases, as also especially by the party's parliamentary and governmental activities.</p>
LSDSP	<p>LSDSP describes itself as the oldest Latvian party and a full member of Socialist International.</p>

LSAP	<p>LSAP describes itself as a party of reforms. As a big left wing popular party, it aims at uniting different philosophical and religious views, as also people of different origins in a struggle for common goals. The struggle of the party is not limited to the state borders, as also peace and prosperity aren't – hence it wishes to join forces with similarly thinking forces abroad. The party portrays itself also humbly: Political culture is a bridge between nowadays and tomorrow. (...) We do not assume that we have all the answers to all the problems, but we are sure that (as) socialists we can protect our country against conservative stagnation and liberal egoism. Together we can neutralize.</p> <p>LSAP considers itself as part of the European social democracy. Within this family, it unites itself with other parties originating from the workers movement in order to struggle against: dictatorships (both fascistic and communist) and hence for democracy; against clerical dominance; and against unlimited capitalism.</p>
MLP	<p>MLP describes itself (article 1) as a political organization that gathers progressively thinking people, who unite in the spirit of the fundamental values and with an ambition of realizing an inclusive society of full employment and social justice.</p>
PvdA	<p>Social democracy is a European and international movement, of which PvdA is a Dutch representative.</p>
DNA	<p>The Norwegian Labour Party sees itself as well rooted in values, an internationalist one and as the one that is socio-critical, which allow it to continue contributing to changing the society in important areas. Same time it wishes to preserve, protect and develop the freedoms and opportunities. Party admits that achieving objectives (...) demands will to govern.</p> <p>The party describes itself furthermore as an internationalist one. It strives towards a global society, based on active nations where citizens have democratic rights based on justice and the rule of democratic law, the right to work, and the chance to provide for themselves and their families. A society in which people have the right to organize in the labour unions and participate in democratic processes. Therefore an alliance is needed as together with sister parties and others who share goals, they are to work together to create international community based on peace and respect for human rights. The logic should be to apply international solutions to international problems.</p>
SLD	<p>SLD describes itself as a party of a modern, democratic and European left. SLD co-creates Polish democratic stage and both the SI and the PES.</p>
PS PT	<p>PS PT describes itself as a political organization of the Portuguese citizens and other citizens residing in Portugal. PS remains faithful to the reformist traditions of elaborating solutions jointly in a dialogue with the citizens.</p>
PSD	<p>PSD perceives itself as a legal entity, a political association that fulfills public mission as prescribed by the Constitution. It sees itself as a modern and progressive, pro-European leftist party, which is a member of the PES and SI. PSD aims at being an open one, who can reach out to all, who consider work and creativity as fundaments of existence and for personality formation.</p>
PSOE	<p>PSOE describes itself as a political organization of the class of working men and women, who struggle against all forms of exploitation.</p>
LP UK	<p>LP describes itself as democratic socialist party. It believes that by the strength of our common endeavour we achieve more than we achieve alone, so as to create for each of us the means to realize our true potential and for all of us community in which power, wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many not the few; where the rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe and where we live together freely, in spirit of solidarity, tolerance and respect.</p>

As one can conclude from the points quoted above, there is no party within the PES family that would describe itself as a revolutionary one. Several emphasize their commitment to the reformatory stream (such as SAP, LSAP, PS PT etc.) All have opted for a *democratic socialism*, which also reflects the commitment to democracy and elaborating solutions jointly in a society. Therefore there should also be met with adequate adjustments within the political jargon (here especially the European one). Very often it is being enumerated that this or another decision has been taken by *socialist and social democratic parties*. As the line of divergence within the PES family seem to have extinct on one side, and on the other there are



many more radical leftist challenging social democrats in several European member states – it seems to be a high time for a linguistic unification.

The parties see themselves as actors of political and legal system. There is a strong attachment to a democratic institutional order. Several parties mention their republican character. The strongest statement comes from SAP, who principally continues its struggle for eradicating monarchy in Sweden – unlike PvdA on the other hand, which accept that there is a Queen (or King) of the Netherlands, as long as it remains clear that their functions are purely representative ones.

Several parties include the notification on their attachment to respectively international (SI) and European (PES) organizations. Sometimes the notification is a formalized one and relates to the membership in these associations (i.e. ILP, LSDSP, SLD, PSD, PS Fr) and sometimes it appears rather as a general reference of being a part of those (SPD, LSAP, PvdA, LP UK). It is impossible to formulate a conclusion what factors it depends on if the parties decide to directly or indirectly relate to the international / European structures. Nevertheless it still remains a valid point of a debate, why the relation with the transnational level it is being mentioned only sporadically. On one hand it seems odd in the times of globalization, on the other it sadly does not seem to fully embrace the conclusions of the pre-last PES reform of 2001<sup>69</sup>.

On the other note, there are two features that the social democratic parties seem to be particularly attached to. The first one is the characteristic of openness, and the second one is *modernity*. The first attribute refers to how the parties wish to be seen as modern political beings. It is widely concluded that the party system is undergoing an evolution, through which the traditional ways of organizing a political party as a mass-one are being heavily challenged. *New opening*, which should attract individuals on one hand, and on the other enable new strategic alliances that social democracy need to reinvent itself as a movement. For some parties *reopening the party is a step in a struggle for an open society* and hence for preservation of democracy (i.e. MSZP, SD Slovenia). For some parties that would also mean making the party a popular one (LSAP).

*Modernity* is a quality through which it is evaluated if a party has an ability to readapt itself to modern times and hence also bring along with its governing progress and modernization for all (see i.e. MSZP). Being historical hence credible on one hand, and being *modern* hence able to operate in contemporary realities are in the light of the self-portraits actually two compatible features.

In most of the texts the self-portraits of the parties are included on the fringe of the explanation on what the core values are and how they are up to be interpreted. A significant exception is the document of PS Fr, which in fact in 50% (12 articles) is composed of the explanatory pledge of values and in 50% (12 articles) description of a the party itself – what it

<sup>69</sup> The PES Congress in Berlin in 2011 decided, among the others, that member parties will include reference to their PES membership in their statutes. The reform did not embrace any other documents, however it could be presumed to be a logical consequence that the statutory changes of such a nature are also reflected in the core documents.

is and what it aim at being. As this is a very original, unusual composition – it is also brought in details below.

PS Fr	Republican party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It organizes itself in service to engage citizens</li> <li>• It identifies itself with values of the Republic (Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood and Secularism)</li> <li>• It is for separation of powers</li> <li>• It is for independence and pluralism of media</li> <li>• Recognizes a nation not as an assembly of random communities, but a social contract of free citizens. Such a nation respects all the individual rights and observes all fulfilling their duties towards it.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Secular party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is for a separation of church and state</li> <li>• It is for secular public education</li> <li>• It supports freedom of belief</li> <li>• Secularism should be seen as a principle of tolerance, opposed to fundamentalism and sectarianism.</li> <li>• All the religions have to be equally respected and equally treated by law, and there should be no obstacles for their practices by individuals and collectives.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Reformist party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is ready to assume duties within elected bodies in order to bring a change for a society.</li> <li>• It wishes to change reality with society and for society, through law and (social) contract.</li> <li>• It carries a project of a radical social transformation.</li> <li>• It struggles against those social conditions that are the sources of injustice and inequality..</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Party of feminism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Struggles for emancipation of women</li> <li>• Is a protagonist of equality between men and women</li> <li>• Stands for parity and mixture within a society</li> <li>• Women's rights, which are the fundamental rights, must be respected, including the rights to decide about their own bodies.</li> <li>• It defends equality on the labour market, including right to equal pay.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Party of humanism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It opposes any kind of discrimination, no matter if this concerns origins or causes.</li> <li>• It condemns commoditization of human lives and bodies.</li> <li>• It condemns all the attacks on persons or their dignity because of their sexual orientation.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Party of decentralization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respect of the diversity of different regions lies in a core of values.</li> <li>• State plays a role of a regulator, who guarantees republican equality and equilibrium.</li> <li>• It is for vibrant, innovative democracy on the local level.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Party devoted to social justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It devotes itself to protection of liberties, both public and individual ones.</li> <li>• Justice is a value and an institution.</li> <li>• Justice is a guarantee that rights of each are reality.</li> <li>• Justice must be accessible, independent and same for all.</li> <li>• Justice means a mission to put sanctions, but also to ensure prevention and facilitation of rehabilitation and reintegration in a society.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Party that places education and culture among values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Culture and education are among the values.</li> <li>• Culture liberates.</li> <li>• Culture is a force against commoditization and standardization.</li> <li>• Culture contributes to constructing a world of diversity, dialogue, openness.</li> <li>• Education is a major condition of emancipation of all.</li> <li>• Education plays a role in democratization.</li> <li>• There should be equal access to education and training for all. .</li> </ul>





PS Fr	European party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PS Fr has been always, since the creation of the ECCS, a supporter of the EU.</li> <li>• It stands for political, democratic, social and ecologic Europe.</li> <li>• Europe must ensure peace on the continent and contribute to keeping the one in the world.</li> <li>• Europe must, among the others, ensure social progress.</li> <li>• As a member of PES, PS Fr pledges it will do all in its power to ensure that the PES strengthens and spread socialist message across the continent.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Internationalist party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It condemns all the oppressions and exploitations, as also all the contemporary form of slavery.</li> <li>• It stands for rights of children.</li> <li>• It supports rights to asylum.</li> <li>• It defends the role of the UN and other international institutions.</li> <li>• It hopes that SI will become a true worldwide progressive movement.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Popular party anchored in the world of labour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is anchored in the world of labour.</li> <li>• As it is open to a society, it will continue to express general interests of the French people.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Democratic party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It respects all of its members.</li> <li>• It organizes itself in a transparent, open way.</li> <li>• It recognizes diversification of responsibilities between members and elected bodies of all the level.</li> <li>• It insists on holding a permanent dialogue with civil society, especially trade unions, NGOs etc.</li> <li>• It defends political ethics in engaging members.</li> <li>• It bases itself on a voluntary participation of members, who however respect its decisions, texts and rules, which are commonly elaborated and adopted.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Party organizing a left alliance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It wishes to assemble all cultures on the left and is ready to overcome the divisions from the past, recalling all who share progressive values to join in forces together.</li> </ul>

Analyzing the detailed description above, one comes to three conclusions. The first one is that it may be important for a political party to anchor the values in a concrete operational guide for its organization. This transpositions the values from the level of ideal, laboratory prototypes into tangible directives – and hence facilitates it for respective members to get a better understanding of these. The second one is an observation that a grand vision may in fact require explanation of what kind of tools are to be used to realize it. Hence the process if its realization begins with putting the party into a shape in which it is to be capable to fulfill the mission. This imposes compatibility of the proposals in macro and micro scale, and obeys the logic that one must start a programme of change from oneself. Finally, this also shows a tendency that a vision for the future that parties put forward should also include a vision for what kind of party it wants to become.

## 2.6. Ideological Mission

Following the operational definitions, as outlined in Chapter 1.5, the relation between core values and vision is of a mutual influence. Vision remains an idea about how the world is and same time is a projection of what things should be about. This way of understanding, brings it very close to a term ideology, which is a term born within the debates during French

Revolution and which stands for a comprehensive, though abstract vision that offers a change in society. Ideology is a set of ideas and it necessarily includes actions that need to be taken in order to realize certain mission, which brings it close to principles. Ideologies predefine identification within a political spectrum.

Therefore it is the ideological base, from which a mission of social democracy is drawn. The following mission statements can be found, as accompanying principles:

SPÖ	<p>SPÖ's aim is to ensure an ongoing process of change that aims at new and better society. The way must be about involving people, as only where people are co-responsible for politics and the decision making processes, the full potential can be developed. A constant dialogue with the citizens is therefore indispensable, through which also legitimacy of the political parties – indispensable elements of democracy – is ensured. To goals are only then real and worth struggling for, if people can recognize their dreams and ambitions in them.</p> <p>Social democrats strive for a society, in which individuals can develop freely. The political work is therefore oriented on creating a society without privileges and dominance of one over the others; such a society is to be democratically organized and based on values of: Freedom, Equality, Justice and Solidarity.</p>
Sp.a	The main challenge, which is a matter of ensuring equal opportunities for all.
BSP	BSP strives for free, fair and cohesive society. The realization of them is to happen through development of an active welfare state, altering the European models to the Bulgarian conditions.
ČSSD	<p>ČSSD aims at developing a modern, open civil society based on freedom, justice, education, participation and solidarity. These create space for application of skills and productive life for everyone.</p> <p>It is committed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Principles of liberty, equality, solidarity, responsibility, democracy, sustainable development, socially and ecologically oriented market economy.</li> <li>• Support for principles of European Social Model, which includes respect for democracy and human rights, free trade unions, employee participation in corporate governance, social protection accordingly to the principles of solidarity and equal opportunities, namely welfare for all.</li> <li>• Advocacy for the concept of sustainable development (with environmental protection as a condition for economic prosperity and high quality of life)</li> <li>• Decentralization of public administration and government, to limit state's bureaucracy and enable active participation.</li> <li>• Fight against corruption.</li> <li>• Responsibility of state to ensure public education; social, cultural and other services; promotion of science and culture; with support of private enterprises in fields of industry, agriculture, transport, energy, telecommunication and consumers' protection.</li> <li>• Independent monitoring of conditions of democracy and promoting values of open civil society</li> <li>• Ensuring independence of media, who are a guarantee of democracy.</li> </ul>
SD DK	The party's commitment to the values is very strong, as they state that politics is about values. It is in fact a struggle between fundamental values and how we understand people and their needs. Values determine therefore the matters such as wealth production and redistribution; what opportunities are created for each and everyone. As Socialdemokraterne states It is not enough that the parties stand for certain values – it is crucial that they transposition these into concrete actions.
SDE	SDE's ultimate goal is to ensure a decent life for each and every one in a society, in which all share responsibility for ensuring its communitarian character. SDE is devoted to help Estonia become a successful and stable state in 21st century.
SDP	SDP as a social democratic party, it is assigned to its goal of the establishment of a society founded on freedom, equality and justice. Within such a society, everyone, according to one's capabilities, contributes to the advancement of one's own well being and furtherance of the common welfare.
PS FR	The PS sole mission, which the party has been faithful to in the past two centuries, is contestation of capitalism and struggle for a society of solidarity, in which people enjoy same liberties and same rights.



SPD	<p>The traditions of social democracy shall be translated into the new century. In the new age it will still mean a struggle for long lasting peace and preservation of natural environment; it will be about free, just and solidarity society; it will serve for ensuring equal treatment and self-determination of all people – independently of their origin and gender. The core of struggle still remains to emancipate people from fear, exploitation and poverty. The goals of social democracy are reflected in the introduction in a following manner: Peaceful and just world; Sustainable Progress, economic dynamism, social justice and ecological reasoning; Welfare State to combat poverty and offer equal opportunities; Strong civic and solidarity society. These are the criteria of assessment of the political reality, pre-determinants on of what constitutes a better order for a society, finally also a compass for action of social democrats.</p>
PASOK	<p>The prior mission of PASOK is to proceed with courage and determination in building new Greece. In order to achieve that, the movement [upon its creation] expresses hope to reflect aspirations, needs and hopes of ordinary Greeks. As such it should therefore belong to all (farmer, workers, artists, employers, employees, youth . . .), beyond the boundaries of classes. The movement was to act for creation of a free state, liberated from external control or influence on any sort of oligarchy.</p>
MSZP	<p>MSZP gives a long record of its achievements in the government and then describes its mission as to pursue one of the two alternatives. In opposition to the right wing, MSZP wants to ensure progress, preserve democracy, keep peace in a society. The task is in fact to curb extremism – and that can be achieved once a progressive alliance in the name of democracy will have been formed. It calls therefore for “re-opening of the Hungarian left”.</p>
ILP	<p>The ambition has been therefore to close the gap between what ought to be and what is. In contemporary society, its primary aims are still valid – as the class division continues to exist, and many citizens continue to experience, from childhood, major inequalities in wealth, health and life chances. ILP believes that tackling growing poverty and inequality throughout the world is the single greatest challenge now facing humanity. Its response to these is: Labour stands for democratic, workable global institutions to confront this challenge; and asserts that people in the developed world have a particular responsibility to accomplish the structural changes required to share the world’s resources more equitably.</p> <p>The Labour Party seeks to advance its values in the wider world while promoting Ireland’s independence and interests. Labour’s vision is of an Ireland contributing to the sustainable development of the earth, to solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, to the eradication of poverty and the protection of children’s rights, the strict observance of internationally accepted legal commitments and peace between States. Labour supports the development of a democratic and social European Union through which our vision both for Ireland and for the wider world can be achieved.</p> <p>Labour Party is to serve as a compass for the social transformation, which can be achieved through a political action that will lead to establishment of more equal, safe, caring, prosperous, fair society.</p>
LSDSP	<p>LSDSP’s mission is to create conditions in which Latvia can develop its full potential and using the opportunities coming from Latvian membership in the EU, become an open, modern country in the era of globalization.</p>
LSDP	<p>The mission of the party is a welfare state for all.</p>
LSAP	<p>The mission of LSAP is described as an obligation to the ideal of humane, democratic and just society, in which everyone is free from fear and poverty. The way to achieve its fulfillment is free of dogmas, paved through reforms and peaceful solutions to all conflicts. Already a process is a goal.</p> <p>The main reference point for LSAP is people. People are the rational core of nature and hence they can only live in accordance with nature. The individuals develop in a community. They are reasonable and ready to learn – however not impeccable – which is why democracy is possible and necessary. People must have within it a possibility and means to decide upon his / her own life. But in democracy everyone is held responsible for their actions. Women and Men must equally and in solidarity focus on common social life in dignity.</p> <p>The party wants a society in which all feel well and secured, in which circumstances they may develop their personally.</p>
MLP	<p>MLP underlines its commitment to Social Europe, as also to the peace, stability and cooperation in Mediterranean region.</p>

PvdA	<p>In the confrontation with everyday's reality, it is the principles that then show the direction. The main goal of the party is to ensure decent life for all, as only such conditions enable full participation of individuals in a society. Decent society is built on freedom, solidarity and responsibility of all.</p> <p>It is a movement that stands against violation of human rights, against inequalities in income and power, against poverty, against discrimination and against exploitation of natural environment. The document calls upon a "social democratic way", which needs following conditions to prove successful: strong economy, regulated vivid market, democratic responsibility, relevance of people, cultural development and ecological sustainability.</p>
DNA	<p>The document was written towards the elections, so its ambition consequently is to convince the voters to support the party and if elected, give a new course of the policies in Norway. There were five tasks that the party identified to fulfill if elected: creating jobs for all, to make Norway one of the foremost information-based countries in the world; to make the pension system more secure and more just; to improve social justice; to increase Norway's engagement in the international arena.</p> <p>The vision of the world that DNA wants to realize is that of a just world without poverty, at peace and ecological balance, where people are free and equal and can exercise influence over their lives. The reference point is a person and every human being is unique, irreplaceable and of equal value. Each and everyone of us shall be given the opportunity to realize his or her dreams of a good life. Social democracy is subsequently the direction to realize the vision above. DNA states that modern social democracy is based on social, democratic, humanistic and socio-critical values. It brings a vision of change that is brought through a social co-operation and solidarity is a precondition of succeeding.</p>
SLD	<p>The mission of the party, which originates from the Programme Constitution of 2007 and the resolution "What Poland we want" from 2008, states that the aim of SLD is to build: a solidarity civic society, strong and effective state and to ensure effective economy, which can satisfy the growing social needs.</p>
PS PT	<p>PS defends democracy and pursues democratic socialism as a way to solve national problems, as also same time respond to the challenges of contemporary world.</p> <p>The democratic socialism, that is the PS PT political cause, leads to a vision of a society that is freer, fairer and that enjoys harmonious development in peaceful conditions.</p>
PSD	<p>PSD sees its mission in promoting the 5 core values, as also in: struggle for democracy; actions to preserve national sovereignty, independence of the state, its unity and territorial integrity.</p>
SD SL	<p>The mission of SD SL is to ensure that Slovenia is a developed country in a world that is better and fairer. Slovenia must become therefore modern, open, unifies and knowledge-based society.</p>
PSOE	<p>PSOE aims at transforming society into a free and egalitarian one, in which people live in peace and in which PSOE struggling in solidarity will ensure progress for all.</p>
SAP	<p>The mission of social democracy is to build a society based on the ideals of social democracy and of the equal value of everyone. Free and equal people in a solidaristic society are the goal of democratic socialism.</p> <p>These values have been treasured and reshaped accordingly to the experiences of the previous generations, as also they will remain the driving force of today's and tomorrow's political efforts.</p>
LP UK	<p>The Labour Party's mission is described as to organize and maintain in the Parliament and in the country a political Labour Party. The party is to give effect, as far as may be predictable, to the principles from time to time approved by the party conference. Pursuing the objectives of the party should take place in cooperation with the trade unions, co-operative societies, voluntary organizations, consumer groups and other representative bodies.</p>

The ideological mission of social democracy is first and foremost to ensure change. The notion of change or its relative synonyms (such as development, establishment of a new..., transformation), they appear in almost all the documents. It indicates therefore two characteristics of social democracy. First, it shows that progressives are in an opposition to status quo. This relates to a critical evaluation of the reality and ambition to improve it substantially. The interesting question to pose here is therefore how to balance between the strong attachments to institutional traditions that make social democracy a part of



contemporary *political establishment* (as explained in 2.4) and the historical inspiration that laid fundamentals and remains core of the movements ideology – *namely remaining in an opposition to a system and all in it that is unfair, unjust*. In a larger context this particular question returns always during all the renewal debates, especially in the context of evaluation of the past left wing governmental policies.

Secondly, there is an emphasis on the concept of process. Framing it properly seems to be equally relevant as achieving the goals themselves. To give an example, LSAP states that *already a process is a goal*. Some of the parties describe the process of *bringing a change* therefore in details. The points that they mention as elementary vary however. Some insist on ensuring involvement of citizens as a precondition for the process to be a democratic and hence legitimate one (SPÖ, ČSSD, SDP, SPD). Detail analyses of how a principle of openness is being realized in party's processes of forming and implementing policies could in fact be also seen as measurements on how democratic they themselves are. It could also show they balance between strong leadership (that people require) and inclusive constant consultations around policies.

Within the mission statements, what appears is a vision of a different society that social democrats wish to establish. Explicitly or not, all the parties share a view that this *new society* should emerge as build on the core values. What is interesting in this positioning is that the contemporary enemy of social democracy seems to therefore be all that contradicts these values, rather than a specific class that it would embark on struggle against. There are of course exceptions to that rule: MSZP exposes its fight against extremism; and PASOK expressing its hostility towards oligarchy, PS contests capitalism. The two out of the three however emerge from the specific circumstances in which the documents were written – in case of MSZP the political electoral ones, and in case of PASOK the historical ones accompanying the party's establishment.

It is important to state that the ultimate mission is a *new society*. Its organization, policies and context (European and International one) seem to come as very relevant, but nevertheless still as secondary. There are several features that this *new society* should encompass: *better, free, equal / egalitarian; solidarity; fair and cohesive; safe; caring; prosperous; harmoniously developing; humane; in which all can lead decent life; peaceful; open; modern; civil; democratic*. These characteristics form certain objectives that have to be then ensured via adequate policies. The new society is a matter of realization of a vision deriving from the core values and emphasis clearly no longer stays related to the issue of social classes and struggle among them. It may come across, as no longer anchored in a framework of a specific social conflict, as a utopian one.

A *new society* will have to exist in a specific set up. The components of that, which reappear in the different texts relate to welfare state and welfare policies, as also democracy. Several

parties bridge the issue of new society with European and global issues within their mission (i.e. BSP, ČSSD, SPD, ILP, LSDSP, MLP, DNA, SAP). Though there are direct references to the European and global levels, there is in fact no clarity if and how the vision of a *new society* applies on those levels. This is perhaps a certain vacuum, which is not a question of solely placing it in the documents on those to transnational levels, but anchoring them stronger within the national one. Single Market and Globalization may be two reasons if one was to argue for it.

Referring to the *new society*, parties seem to share a concern that all in the societies should enjoy both rights and responsibilities. The interesting shift is from a discourse about *right and duties*, to *rights and responsibilities*, which could in a way be seen as an evolution from the debates on the left from 1990s and the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Though duties and responsibilities may sound similar, they in fact imply different things. *Duty* relates to an issue of owing something and in its Latin origins even more directly to a debt. Having a duty translates into a moral commitment that should result in an action, going beyond feeling or mere recognition. Duty does involve also sacrifice of immediate self-interests. Accordingly to Cicero, there were four different sources of duty: a result of being human; result of one's particular place in life (family, country, job etc.); result of one's character; and one's own moral expectations for oneself. There have been of course also many philosophers, who rejected a concept of sense of duty<sup>70</sup>.

Responsibility on the other hand, can be both collective and individual. *Collective responsibility* is a concept or a doctrine, according to which individuals are to be held responsible for other people's actions by tolerating, ignoring or harboring them, not necessarily actively participating in them themselves. *Individual responsibility* refers to personal moral obligations in certain situations. Disobeying those is qualified on the grounds of ethics. Society generally holds people responsible for their actions, however many believe that moral responsibility requires free will.

The question that arises is therefore what sort of motivation they expect people to be guided by, while contributing to the society. Should that be a sense of owing and personal moral expectations towards oneself (and hence duty), or shall that be an issue of ethically predefined obligation that relates to person's free will? Should the mutual contributions be imposed by execution of a social contract or should they be anticipated as coming due to the nature of the emancipated people? Analyzing the respective text it is impossible to deliver at this point one determining answer. To give examples of differences: SPÖ speaks about making people co-responsible for politics; ČSSD refers to *human reciprocity*; SD claims that it is

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<sup>70</sup> [www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org)



*citizenship that show itself with rights and duties*; SDE touches upon dualism of *personal freedom and social responsibility*; for SDP it is a matter of justice to uphold *balance between responsibilities and rights* as a basic condition to fulfill social contract; LSAP distinguishes in between duties and responsibilities; for PSOE i.e. *democracy is a matter of responsibility* (in case of internal one – is a matter of responsibility of the party’s members); PSD stands for *rights and duties of all*; SD Slovenia argues that everyone shares responsibility for common good; and SAP perceives rights and duties as a matter of *solidarity*, hence *responsibility* (more on that particular point can be found also in section 2.12). These few selected examples prove that parties perceive the notions of both duties and responsibilities in many diverse ways. It is possible that one of the keys to *new social contracts* lays in redefining these terms both in relation to a society, but also in relation to the parties and politicians. Popular agreement on how responsibilities / duties should be shared and what part of them it is up to the politicians to take and fulfill, could also facilitate establishing new popular evaluation criteria – and subsequently make politics more credible and more legitimate.

In the previous paragraphs, it was indicated that the *ideological mission* of social democracy assumes creating a new society in a certain policy framework. There are three parties that see their mission as multi-pillar strategy that encompasses: vision for a new society; democracy and role of state; economy and welfare. The elaborations of SDP, PvdA and LP UK constitute therefore specific interesting examples, worth quoting in this passage:

For SDP there are three core elements: *a fair society, a supportive state* and *a sustainable future*:

SDP	A fair society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Society without fairness is a society without meaning.</li> <li>• Success, opportunity and freedom must be open to all people.</li> <li>• Society must reward hard work and fair play.</li> <li>• Society must be against greed, promotion of status or by lucky chance.</li> <li>• The measure of people is their respect for others.</li> <li>• The measure of people is not their wealth, background or characteristics such as: race, sexuality, gender.</li> </ul>
SDP	A supportive state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State cannot decide how people should live their lives.</li> <li>• State must give people power to decide themselves</li> <li>• State cannot be an authority over a citizen, but a solid base below them – on which they can build their lives with the services and security they need to pursue their dreams.</li> </ul>
SDP	A sustainable future	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Problems of tomorrow cannot be ignored for benefits of today.</li> <li>• Environmental damage, reckless economic activity and a weakening of social case all pose threats to the future of a country and of the world.</li> <li>• An active state and international cooperation must be the tools with which we build sustainable future..</li> </ul>

PvdA believes that there are 7 principles for modern times, which directly show the transposition of the values into reality:

PvdA	Right to decent life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to opportunities, spread of power and income, as also investment in knowledge are essential to bring people into the situation, in which they can reach their own full potential.</li> <li>• The choices on the relation between freedom of one versus freedom of another, as also the relation between rights and duties is under a constant consideration.</li> <li>• The principle is that everyone has a right to decent life.</li> </ul>
PvdA	Solidarity and togetherness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Solidarity grew on the foundation of togetherness and shared destiny.</li> <li>• Increasing diversity puts solidarity under pressure. In order to counteract it, we need selective migration, development of shared view on past and future of our society, and eradication of deprivation and arrears.</li> </ul>
PvdA	Governing close to the people (subsidiarity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social democracy chooses again for local governance and local participation, so that the decisions are taken as closely as possible to the communities. This could mean re-identification of task divisions between the EU and the member states, as also within the member states.</li> </ul>
PvdA	Multifaceted democratic constitutional state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The democratic constitutional state with its parliamentary democracy with its classical division of power and its accent on fundamental rights remain at the center, but it has to have more multifaceted character with different variety of interactive and participative governance. It is a huge potential for a social change. PvdA is a factor of strategy that engages people through these means and organizes them to take responsibility, not only for their own future but also for their society as a whole.</li> </ul>
PvdA	Freedom as right	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom is not a merit, is a right. Everybody has to have chances and means to achieve something with their freedom.</li> <li>• People have also the right to security – and security of decent existence.</li> <li>• Freedom is about creating chances and redistribution of means, to create equal starting positions.</li> <li>• And for solidarity, it means creating decent existence for the people within and outside of the Netherlands.</li> <li>• PvdA strives for the imbedding and the limitations of market mechanisms to ensure that the public sphere is not dominated by commerce and in which sphere essential services are accessible for everybody</li> </ul>
PvdA	Selective and sustainable growth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unrestrained economic activity puts pressure on quality of existence; if commerce leads to cultural unification; if markets are blind for nature, environmental and animal welfare; if the burdens of our economic growth are passed on to the developing countries and future generations.</li> </ul>
PvdA	Community as a choice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social democracy promotes that people organize themselves to liberate themselves this way, not to bend towards conformism.</li> <li>• PvdA pleads for a relaxed society, in which men and women have choices for work, care, learning and volunteering.</li> <li>• PvdA defends a libertarian moral in which there is space for differences in visions on lives, living styles and cultures imbedded in the fundamental rights</li> </ul>

LP, on the other hand, enumerates 4 principles on basis of which it seeks the trust of the people to govern:

LP	Dynamic Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Serving the public interest, in which the enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition are joined with the forces of partnership and co-operation to produce the wealth the nation needs and the opportunity for all to work and prosper with a thriving private sector and high-quality public services where those undertaking essential to the common good are either owned by the public or accountable to them.</li> </ul>
LP	Just Society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which judges its strengths by the condition of the weak as much as the strong, provides security against fear, and justice at work; which nurtures families, promotes equality of opportunity, and delivers people from the tyranny of poverty, prejudice and abuse of power.</li> </ul>





LP	Open Democracy	
LP	Healthy environment	• Which we protect, enhance and hold in trust for future generations.

## 2.7. Sense of values

One of the issues underlined in the methodological part 1.2 was the *utilitarian aspect* of core values. From it, a question on *why core values* are needed and how they can be used derives. The sections above referred to the core values as a basis on which a vision is built, as also the mission is designed and accordingly to which the parties are organized. It did not however explore yet the issue on sense of values in themselves, which assessment will be enabled by the table below.

The list requires two additional methodological comments. First of all, different formats in which the parties indicate what their core values are, is related to yet another issue – namely that not all the parties enumerate the core values. Some of the parties present a list – they do not provide a structured text of their respective interpretations. The author's decision was to include in this paper all the values that the respective parties directly named as *core values*, but also encompass all those which parties referred to in i.e. introduction to the documents. If the values were named and interpreted, the author did not seek further explanatory points. In case they were not, the interpretation was found usually in the rest of the respective text, even though in those cases no structured elucidation was possible to be retrieved.

Secondly, author applied rigid discipline in following the definitions formulated in section 1.5. Nevertheless, there were several cases of exceptions that needed to be made. They occurred when respective parties introduced certain concept as values, while in the light of the definitions they could rather be classified as principles or in fact even a framework. Also, there have been cases in which certain parties remained in contradiction with one another, as far as the list of core values is concerned. At this point of the research, the author choses to give primacy to empirical methods in order to provide first and foremost an adequate picture.

Enumerated Core Values		Details	Explanation /remarks
SPÖ	4	Freedom Equality Justice Solidarity	All the four values are equally important. The reason for this approach is that only their complementary implementation may provide all the people with life in peace and freedom. From this sentence, peace appears also relatively more as a matter of life circumstances than a value or a principle. Life choices (decisions) of each and everyone have to reflect responsibility towards oneself, towards other people and towards the society, and none the less towards the future generations.
Sp.a	Values are not listed		Next to values there are also three other concepts that remain in the core of the ideological focus: work and well-being; dignity and democracy.
PS Be	Values are not listed		
BSP	5	Liberty Democracy Equality Social Justice Solidarity	
ČSSD	5	Freedom Justice Education Participation Solidarity	A modern and open society based on these is a space for application of skills and productive life for everyone.
SD DK	3	Liberty Equality Solidarity	These values derive all of the understanding that each individual is unique and irreplaceable.
SDE	3	Freedom Justice Solidarity	
SDP	3	Freedom Equality Solidarity	SDP's core values are named in the different sections of the document as values of socialism; lasting values; humane values. These are rooted deeply into democratic Europe, as they are of the legacy of the humane philosophy bequeathed by Antiquity, of Christian ethics and of the progress ideology of Enlightenment. They give strength for the movement to pursue the reform of a society, to link continuity and change, tradition and future.
PS Fr	10	Emancipation Justice Equality Solidarity Sustainable development Progress Democracy Labour Peace Internationalism	PS Fr emphasizes its historical traditions, which it associates with the spirit of humanism and philosophy of enlightenment. It adapts as its own the values of the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality and Brotherhood (de Fraternité). It claims the memory of 1848 (with the abolition of slavery by the Commune); heritage of the Republic, its democratic opening and struggle for secularism;



SPD	3	Freedom Justice Solidarity	<p>Social democracy, historically speaking has always been about fighting for justice, next to legal and material conditions, and next to equality of rights and equal participation and life opportunities. Conservatives and Liberals have a different understanding. For social democrats the values constitute unity, they are equally important and equally valuable; they support, complete and limit each other.</p> <p>Since the fundamentals of Godebsberger Programme of 1959 it understands itself as a popular party, with its roots in Judaism and Christianity, humanism and enlightenment, Marxist social analysis and all the experiences of the workers' movement. It owes also impulses to women movements and other new social movements. SPD recognizes "Freedom, Equality and Brotherhood", which originate from the French Revolution, as the basis of the European democracy.</p>
PASOK	Values are not listed		
MSZP	Values are not listed		<p>MSZP believes that the above mentioned reopening must be based on common understanding of values by the party and eventual partners. They must involve answers on new means of combating discrimination, unfair privileges, humiliation, stigmatization and vulnerability of people. Reopening of the party should strengthen it in a fight for an open society.</p>
ILP	4	Freedom Equality Community Democracy	<p>Labour Party believes that the role of principles is to serve as a compass for the social transformation, which can be achieved through a political action that will lead to establishment of more equal, safe, caring, prosperous, fair society.</p>
LSDSP	Values are not listed		
LSDP	Values are not listed		
LSAP	4	Freedom Justice Solidarity Security	<p>The role of the Grundsatzprogramm is to give a clear orientation and to re-emphasise that LSAP seeks work, welfare and quality of life for all.</p> <p>LSAP wants a society in which all feel well and secured, in which circumstances they may develop their personally. The society without privileges, which obeys democratic principles is the one that should be, accordingly to the LSAP, be build on the base of 4 core values: freedom, justice, solidarity and security. Those four are complementary and interconnected, as only their compatible implementation can ensure for everyone a life of self-fulfillment. These four are modern and valid.</p> <p>The document ends with the interpretation on what LSAP understands to be politics. The text reads: Politics is not to be imagined without dialogue, confrontation of opinions and convincing others. We will therefore continue to listen to our co-citizens, seek together with them answers and try to convince them to us. LSAP wants active democracy, with the right of citizens to access information and share opinions, as also to take part in the decision-making processes (beyond elections only). In the elaborations they touch upon trustworthiness and reliability of socialist policies, as also the positive character of them.</p>
MLP	Values are not listed		

PvdA	5	Freedom Democracy Fairness Sustainability Solidarity	
DNA	3	Freedom Equal Opportunities New Solidarity	
SLD	3	Freedom Equality Brotherhood	The Left is a guardian of 3 core values: freedom, equality and brotherhood. These three are, in its understanding the core of a democratic state.
PS PT	3	Freedom/Liberty Equality Solidarity	In the Declaration Ideologically the party identifies itself with the humanist traditions.
PSD	5 (principles)	Liberty Social Justice Equity Equality Solidarity	
SD SL	4	Equality Freedom Fairness Solidarity	The role of values is that they should be seen as cornerstones of a new agreement (new Deal for Slovenia).
PSOE	3	Freedom Equality Solidarity	
SAP	3	Liberty Equality Solidarity	The values are naturally inter-related. Freedom and equality are a matter both of individual rights as well as of collective solutions (...) The human being is a creature who develops and grows in co-operation with other people and much of what is important to the welfare of the individual can only be created together with others.)
LP UK	3	Freedom Solidarity Equality	10 Constitutional Rules (amended 1995) (2002)

From within the researched parties, the majority (20 out of 27) provides a list of their *core values*. The author chose to use the terminology of *core values*, however the adjectives used in the introductory texts may vary: *basic, principle, fundamental*. While *core* perhaps puts more emphasis on the notion of “in the centre”, *fundamental* would indicate more towards an idea that they are basis for anything else. In either way it is not a semantic issue of a great relevance.

The number of values enlisted varies. There are 10 parties, which recognize 3 values respectively. 4 others put forward 4 values and subsequent 4 pledges as many as 5 values. One party (PS Fr) proclaims 10. Freedom (or liberty), equality and solidarity (or brotherhood) – three values deriving from French Revolution – remain the central part of all the lists.



A majority of the parties underlines that the *core values* are interlinked, equally important and altogether constitute a *system of values*. The way they are interrelated and used while explaining of reality and proposing alternatives for the future – this is what makes them different to any other system, and hence allows showing divergence among different ideologies. This is to what for example the preamble of SPD Grundsatzprogramm refers to – though generally parties refrain from formulating such comparisons themselves in the fundamental programmes, programmes and statutes. This naturally is different, when a document in question is an electoral manifesto.

There are five different reasons that parties use to legitimize a need to recognize and struggle for the implementation of core values. First of all, there are historical reasons. The core values are what preserves identity of a movement and what enables it to bridge between its respectable past and hopeful future (i.e. SDP, PS FR). Secondly, it is a matter of parties' own guidelines in functioning and in decision making (i.e. PS Fr, PS PT). As such, they serve therefore as a compass for an organization and for individuals. Both the first and the second reason are about coherence and strength of a party itself. Thirdly, core values should be a base on which society is built and in reference to which people make their choices (i.e. SPÖ, SAP). Fourthly, they should serve as a core of welfare state (i.e. sp.a). Fifthly, they should be a base on which democracy and democratic state is constructed (i.e. SPD, SLD). The last three reasons appear as an obligation for the core values to be translated into an ideological mission.

Concluding, there are 5 categories of reasons for which parties decide on having core values. They clearly need to be shared within the party, if the process of drafting and adopting any document including values is to be a legitimate and meaningful. Critics may say that especially nowadays, in the era of 24h media cycle, simple cynicism may deny core values the important role which, at least in declarative statements, they play. Nevertheless those arguments are combatable, once the sense of having and upholding to the core values, both for external and internal purposes of a party, is adequately exposed.

## 2.8. Freedom, liberty and emancipation

Within the previous section, it was duly explained that the interpretation of singular values depends heavily on the way they are connected with the other ones, with which altogether they create a distinctive values system. It is shared by the majority of the parties explicitly that the values are equal in their ranks and derive from one another. Nevertheless in the list of values, one may observe a tendency that this is a concept of *freedom* that most frequently is placed on the top of the list. It is shown in the column 2 in the table below, in which a number in brackets point toward which position value of freedom holds in the respective texts.

There are potential linguistic differences that this study would not be able to explore further due to limitations mentioned already in the previous chapters. They are connected with an observation that in gathered material it happens that the terms: freedom, emancipation and liberty are being used in parallel in the respective parties' texts (with exception of PS Be, in which manifesto both freedom and emancipation constitute two different core values). This could suggest that either they are synonyms or either that usage of some indicates a potential ideological evolution. To be able to come any closer to one of the two hypotheses, it is useful to search the literal meaning of the three terms<sup>71</sup>.

Dictionary-wise, freedom is explained through three concepts: free will, political freedom and economic freedom. Free will is an apparent ability to make choices free from certain kinds of constraints. The limitations can be referred to as described by metaphysical determinism (namely that everything is an outcomes of certain preconditions and that all that takes place is predefined by circumstances), as opposed to metaphysical libertarianism (which disregards the conditions and emphasize that a person or a group always has a free will). The dichotomy in between both relates obviously to why the progressives reject libertarianism (which discussion is returning to the debate's tables frequently recently). Second of the pillars, political freedom (also known as political autonomy) is one of the fundamental features of democracy. Ensuring political freedom means enabling, establishing conditions, in which persons are free from oppression or coercion and in which there are no immobilizing conditions for groups or individuals. This is also why capacities and possibilities to act, human rights and civil liberties are the related notions. Finally, economic freedom is a divided concept. It can be related to the market (standing for free market and free property) or to welfare (through which individuals and groups are ensured and ability to be able to choose freely).

Liberty is a right that identifies the condition in which human beings are able to govern themselves, to behave according to their own free will and to take responsibility for their actions. Naturally, in philosophy there are different concepts of liberty – as there is a variety of ways that a relationship between individuals and society can be defined in many ways. Liberty, on two opposing sides, can refer to a social contract or existence in a pure state of nature. It is assumed that freedom and rights are the components of liberty. In certain classifications, liberty is divided into two sorts – positive (which stands for a personal possibilities to exercise one's wills without discrimination) and negative (which touches upon freedom as a space in which no one external interferes).

Finally, emancipation is a broad term that describes efforts of a disenfranchised group or individuals to political rights and equality. In Marxist interpretation, political emancipation was as attempt towards equal status of individual citizens in relation to the state, which would

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71 [www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org)



ensure equality before the law, regardless of religion, property or other private characteristic of individual people.

Contrasting all three, one can conclude that these three terms are very close, but they are yet not exactly synonyms in the light of their dictionary explanation. The question is therefore if they are used by the respective parties as in the same sense or indicate primacy of one of the definition's characteristics. At this point it must nevertheless remain unresolved. For the sake of conclusive comparison, they will be treated as of similar notions and they will further be looked into on the bases of the table included below.

SPÖ	Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Of each and every one should be understood as a right to socially responsible self-determination.</li> <li>• Freedom of individuals determines freedom of all in a society</li> <li>• Freedom is not only the question of freedom from dictatorship and authoritarian systems</li> <li>• Freedom is a matter of material and social preconditions</li> <li>• Different dependencies can be eliminated through education, access to information and material security</li> <li>• Freedom translates into a capacity of making choices (capacity to be choosing / electing)</li> <li>• Only in those conditions (as enumerated in the point above) can there be a life led in freedom and security</li> </ul>
sp.a	Freedom (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Socialists want to organize society in a way that every individual obtains maximum of chances to make choices. This equals to equal freedom for all.</li> </ul>
PS Be	Liberty and well-being (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The right to manage capital (means of production) has to belong to all – individuals and groups – who should ensure that all human beings can enjoy as big as possible liberty and well being.</li> <li>• Usage of means of productions should be free and free of charge.</li> </ul>
PS Be	Emancipation (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Socialists need to pursue simultaneously economic, moral and political emancipation of proletariat.</li> </ul>
BSP	Liberty /Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Universal value</li> <li>• "Equal freedoms" are essence of justice.</li> <li>• It means an ability of an individual to determine their life. It is a matter of a freedom to choose.</li> <li>• "Equal liberties" must be not only a slogan, but must mean guarantees of economical, social and formal conditions enabling one to be free to make decisions.</li> <li>• Freedom for individuals is inseparable from their personal responsibilities and responsibilities towards others.</li> </ul>
ČSSD	Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Anti-freedom and anti-pluralistic behaviours must be punished.</li> <li>• Representative democracy is an instrument to protect people from domination of the elites.</li> <li>• Freedom of associations is a core of a pluralistic society.</li> <li>• Freedom of information and freedom of media .</li> <li>• Freedom (protection) from fear of poverty, crisis, capital and unemployment.</li> <li>• Freedom of private enterprise. .</li> </ul>

SD DK	Liberty / Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emphasizes human right to be and to express his diversity.</li> <li>• People should have freedom to create a life based on their own dreams and abilities.</li> <li>• Freedom is true if it is there for everyone. This is why we need to fight against inequality, injustice and social impoverishment.</li> <li>• Freedom is about being able to make own choices.</li> <li>• Everyone should be free to choose basic things such as education, jobs, housing – and this will only be true if there are basic opportunities for all.</li> <li>• Struggle for freedom must never become a struggle for selfishness. It must be understood in a framework of a community. The welfare state is about opportunities to pursue dreams as individuals, and responsibilities towards the community.</li> <li>• Freedom is a basic right.</li> <li>• The political rights as: voting, free speech, freedom of press, freedom of belief, freedom of associations, freedom of strike. These must be defended through rule of law based on fundamental human rights.</li> <li>• Freedom is about life chances, as they are offered by a community. Community is a liberator.</li> </ul>
SDE	Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is a matter of enabling everyone to freely develop</li> <li>• Life incorporates two principles: principle of personal freedom and principle of social responsibility.</li> <li>• An ideal is a society of free people, who all live in dignity and who bear responsibility for themselves, the society they live in and for the future generations.</li> <li>• Recognizing that it is a human right to be able to choose freely, SDE insists on the fact that every choice is a moral one and humanism determines its scope.</li> <li>• People must respect each other's freedoms, accepting each other's beliefs and aspirations.</li> <li>• Freedom of press, access to information and ability to use public freedoms are essential for legal order.</li> </ul>
SDP	Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Responsible freedom" is together with solidarity and "community awareness" a cornerstone of a development of a society.</li> <li>• People are entitled to live freely regardless of their personal characteristics, social and economic origins.</li> <li>• Freedom belongs to the individuals, as long as it does not harm other people, environment or society.</li> <li>• Freedom goes beyond achievement of material equality or formal granting of liberty.</li> <li>• In practice, a possibility to choose is a right, in both material and moral contexts.</li> <li>• Struggle to live in freedom and dignity is conducted all over the world.</li> <li>• "Responsible freedom" means that people are ready to altogether move and live in a mutual respect in a multicultural society.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Emancipation (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complete emancipation of every person is a goal of a socialist action.</li> </ul>
SPD	Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Free and equal in value and rights" is a common explanation of human rights.</li> <li>• Every person must be able to self-determine their life in a society, in which also everyone else may realize this self-determination.</li> <li>• Every person shall be able to freely develop oneself, without endangering other's freedom and being.</li> <li>• Means a possibility to self-determine one's life.</li> <li>• Everyone is created for and entitled to freedom. If he or she can use it, it is being decided in a society.</li> <li>• One has to be free from shameful dependencies, from poverty and fear.</li> <li>• Everyone must have opportunities to develop one's talents.</li> <li>• Everyone must be enabled to act responsibly within a society and in politics.</li> <li>• Only those, who are socially secured, can use their freedom fully.</li> <li>• Freedom of individuals ends, once it would mean harm to freedom of others.</li> <li>• Who imposes restriction on others can never be free himself.</li> </ul>





PASOK	Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of organization to achieve collective goals under the Constitution, inviolability of individual rights must be guaranteed.</li> <li>• Trade unions must be freed from dependence from financial oligarchy.</li> <li>• Education removes barriers and creates a society of free-thinking, socially responsible citizens.</li> </ul>
PASOK	Social Emancipation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social Emancipation and social transformation are the cornerstone of the socialist movement.</li> <li>• The dramatic income inequalities between regions and social strata must be combated.</li> <li>• The exploitation of man by man must be stopped.</li> <li>• Social emancipation of working people is connected with socialization of financial system as a whole and of the main production units in particular.</li> </ul>
ILP	Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom is a fundamental human right.</li> <li>• No society is free unless men and women who make up this society are free.</li> <li>• Freedom involves not only freedom of individuals to pursue personal goals and to seek to fulfill their potential, but also freedom from external oppression. Poverty, homelessness, unemployment and ignorance are the enemies of freedom.</li> <li>• Labour Party extends the same freedom to all members of society and opposes the victimization of individuals on the basis of class, colour, creed, religion, sex, sexual orientation, race or ethnic origin.</li> <li>• All people should have opportunities for enjoyment of and participation in cultural life and this should be fostered and supported by state. Labour Party is committed to the preservation and promotion of the Irish language as our historic and thriving national language</li> </ul>
LSDSP	Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom requires that people themselves decide on what kind and scope of health care provision there should be.</li> </ul>
LSDP	Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom means freedom of expression and opportunity to foster one's creativity herewith.</li> </ul>
LSAP	Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Without freedom, there is no human dignity.</li> <li>• Everyone should be entitled to freedom understood as socially responsible self-determination.</li> <li>• Everyone must be entitled to make choices that are adequate to their system of beliefs.</li> <li>• Freedom means definite refusal of any authoritarian systems or concepts.</li> <li>• Ensuring freedom means ensuring for all: education and information, material security, as also personal and economic development possibilities.</li> <li>• State must be a secular and tolerant one, as this is the measurement of the individual freedoms.</li> <li>• Church and state must be separated.</li> <li>• Only through effective actions can a State guarantee for all: knowledge share, justice, protection of minorities and security.</li> <li>• Freedom touches upon tolerance. Respect for the others and for being different is a basic condition to ensure life in freedom for all.</li> <li>• Democratic society requires that citizens are equal and encouraged, and that they are aware of their duties and responsibilities – hence that they are actively taking part in the democratic decision making processes.</li> <li>• There is no freedom without social responsibility.</li> </ul>

PvdA	Freedom as right	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom is not a merit, is a right. Everybody has to have chances and means to achieve something with their freedom.</li> <li>• People have also the right to security – and security of decent existence.</li> <li>• Freedom is about creating chances and redistribution of means, to create equal starting positions.</li> <li>• And for solidarity, it means creating decent existence for the people within and outside of the Netherlands.</li> <li>• PvdA strives for the imbedding and the limitations of market mechanisms to ensure that the public sphere is not dominated by commerce and in which essential services are accessible by everybody.</li> </ul>
DNA	Freedom for all people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People want to be free – and only if everyone is, freedom is truly fulfilled.</li> <li>• Freedom means rights that apply to all: to vote, of expression and protection under law.</li> <li>• Freedom allows individuals to choose freely and independently from others.</li> <li>• Freedom premises security and opportunities to achieve the aims and ambitions one sets for oneself.</li> <li>• Freedom is emancipation from bondage of injustice, social divides and negative social inheritance.</li> <li>• Community is there to provide greater freedoms than any individual could achieve alone.</li> <li>• Freedom of one must not deprive others from freedom. Freedom is about ensuring that other in a society also enjoy equal freedoms.</li> <li>• Freedom is about opportunities and responsibilities. Rights must be balanced by duties and obligations – towards other people and towards society.</li> <li>• Freedom demands tolerance towards differences. Minorities therefore have a right towards special protection; however their choices and acts may not result in others' losing their freedoms.</li> </ul>
SLD	Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is more than just a freedom of movement across the EU.</li> <li>• It is a matter of an ability to make life choices that are free from economic constraints.</li> <li>• Free country is a country in which nobody must finish education on the basic level only, because he or she cannot afford further steps.</li> <li>• Freedom means not to have to resign to set up the family because of worries on how to sustain one economically.</li> <li>• Free country is a country in which employers do not feel as slaves, but the relations between employees and employers are regulated by the labour law; where there are decent working conditions and incomes; where people are not afraid to present request for holidays, medical leave or admit joining trade unions.</li> <li>• Freedom is an authentic freedom of consciousness and believes, which includes free choice if to send or not to send children to religion classes.</li> <li>• Freedom means a free choice as far as deciding to have or not to have children is concerned – which above all is a freedom of women to decide how many children and when she wants to have.</li> <li>• Freedom is a freedom of expressions, thoughts, access to information, Internet – all those free from governmental censorship.</li> <li>• Freedom is a right to privacy, free from invigilation by secret services.</li> <li>• A state that is free is very cautious when it considers imprisoning its citizens.</li> </ul>
PS PT	Freedom / Liberty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For PS PT is a cornerstone of the fight for more cohesive, fraternal and just society.</li> <li>• Freedom means ability to live in pluralistic society, where one can freely express ideas and opinions.</li> <li>• Freedom means denouncing fascism, colonialism, totalitarianism, colonialism.</li> <li>• Freedom predefines the fight against exploitation and oppression</li> <li>• Civic freedoms and human rights are indivisible and universal.</li> </ul>



PSD	Liberty (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Free development of human personality</li> <li>• Pluralism</li> <li>• Private property is the basic for market economy and an enterprise is a free expression of creativity of citizens. The arrangements between what is public and what is private must be guaranteed by state.</li> <li>• Promotion of education, research, science, culture, church and its traditions is the key to progress and Romanian and universal spirituality. It is a matter also of protection of rights and freedom.</li> <li>• Protection of rights and freedoms as far as respect for cultural identity; as also linguistic, religious and ethnic traditions is concerned.</li> <li>• Means condemnation of extremism, racism, chauvinism; ethnic separatism etc.</li> </ul>
SD SL	Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom is a precondition for all to be able to develop their full potential.</li> <li>• Judiciary must be free and independent.</li> <li>• Freedom of expression must be guaranteed, as also freedom of consciousness and freedom of belief.</li> </ul>
PSOE	Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom from exploitation</li> <li>• Principle of free society</li> </ul>
PSOE	Freedom (in relation to the party itself)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There must be respect for freedom of conscious and freedom of expression of every member. The internal debates must be concluded in absolute freedom.</li> </ul>
SAP	Freedom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Everybody must be free to develop as an individual, to govern their own lives and to influence their own society.</li> <li>• Freedom involves both freedom from external compulsion and oppression, hunger, ignorance and fear of the future, as well as the freedom to participate and to decide on questions together with others, to develop as an individual to live in a secure community and the freedom to live ones own life and to choose a future of ones own.</li> <li>• Civil rights and privileges, universal and equal right to vote, freedom of thought and religion, freedom of speech and freedom of association are necessary, basic conditions for liberty. They alone are not sufficient though. Economic and social differences create different conditions for citizens to use these freedoms and for real opportunities for people to control their lives. Real freedom of participation and development presupposes that people are freed from economic, social or cultural disadvantage, and from dependence on separate economic power groups beyond the control of democracy.</li> <li>• Freedom is a matter of both individual rights and privileges and of the social structures that give individual real opportunities to grow and develop and to participate in the work of the community on equal terms with everybody else.</li> </ul>
LP UK	Freedom (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is about living together freely in a spirit of tolerance and respect</li> </ul>

There are two classifications that can be proposed to organize results of the comparison concluded on the basis of the table. Firstly, there are three main points of reference, accordingly to which *freedom* is being defined in the respective parties' texts: as an abstract philosophical concept; in relation to an individual and in relation to a society. Secondly, as the dictionary definition indicated, there are two spheres in which freedom is being considered: political and socio-economic one. Both the classifications need further exploration, which will expose the main common and main diverse points among the ways parties define freedom.

As an abstract philosophical concept, *freedom* is being named as a universal value (i.e. BSP); right and eventually human right (i.e. SPÖ, SD DK, SPD, PvdA, PS PT); question of enabling all to develop freely (i.e. SDE, DNA); a goal of socialist action and a cornerstone of socialist

movement (i.e. PS Fr, PASOK). Adjectives that accompany *freedom* within those texts are: responsible, socially responsible, equal. This reflects logic of the rights and responsibilities, as explained in the section 2.6. Indeed, it is a matter of justice that all enjoy “equal freedoms” (i.e. sp.a, BSP, SPD etc.), but benefiting personally from them means also accepting social responsibility they bring along and are inseparable from (i.e. SPÖ, BSP, SDP, LSAP). This is a solid link that shapes the relations between an individual and a society.

In relation to individuals, *freedom* is first and foremost an issue of *self-determination* (i.e. SPÖ, SDE, BSP, SD SK, SPD, LSAP, SAP). Following the metaphysical determinism, in order to be able to choose freely, there must be certain conditions ensured. The political and socio-economic one will be further elaborated below; however at this point it seems to be worthy to draw attention to two features that social democracy assumes is at place while speaking about individual self-determination. The first one is that all the individuals are willing to choose and pursue certain ambitions and develop talents (i.e. SD DK, SPD, ILP) that would lead them to *self-fulfillment* (i.e. DNA). Second one is that there is education that prepares them to realize their dreams and to make the choices. The ethical assessment will additionally derive from humanism (i.e. SDE). Herewith social democracy appears to be positive about human nature.

Another important notion that some of the programmes bring along are the issues of *respect (tolerance)* and *dignity*. Social democrats emphasize that people are and will remain different (i.e. SD DK, LSAP, PSD, SAP, LP UK). As long as their choices do not harm others (i.e. SDP, DNA, PSOE), any decision they take (i.e. accordingly to their system of believes) should remain respected. The notions of respect in a context of individual, personalized rights are still a relatively new feature of the social democratic programmes – though it is already relatively well spread. It is possible to assume that this thread will be further develop, also in order to reply to growing individualization of the European societies. Additionally the combination between *responsible freedom, respect and social responsibility* surely creates a solid base on which social democracy can explain its vision for the future of more and more diverse (multicultural) society. In some of the text it also serves as an explanation on why the minorities are to be protected.

Society plays a crucial role in contextualizing the concept of freedom in the progressive ideology. Guarantee of freedoms for individuals and their range predetermine how free the society in itself is (i.e. SPÖ, SDE). Said in another way, society will never be free – unless all the men and women within it are (i.e. ILP). Same time it is a society (or a community) that is in fact the liberator (see i.e. SPD, SD SK, DNA). Community can provide greater freedoms, than individuals may achieve alone (i.e. DNA, SAP). The goal remains therefore a free, cohesive and fraternal society (i.e. PS PT) of completely emancipated people (PS FR) to which a path leads through

certain arrangements that enable emancipation (and here undoubtedly state and its policies play a crucial role).

In the context of this first classification it is possible to make two over-reaching conclusions. The first of them is that social democracy follows rather the logic of metaphysical determinism, assuming that certain conditions must be ensured in order for individuals and for societies to enjoy freedom. The exception in this rationale is a conviction that independently of them, all the individuals possess dreams and are ready to choose ethically ways of their realization. The second is related to the specific understanding of liberties. In the spirit of social contract, progressives promote the view that individual freedom and social responsibility are interconnected. There is a difference in how much parties emphasize on the fringe of that diverse character of contemporary societies and how much it links with individualized matters such as respect.

The second of the two proposed classifications, breaks the constituting elements of *freedom* into two categories: *political* and *socio-economic*. Within the first one, freedom is defined by some parties as an opposition to: dictatorship and authoritarian systems (i.e. SPÖ), from fascism (i.e. PS PT), colonialism (i.e. PS PT), totalitarianism (i.e. PS PT) domination of elites (i.e. ČSSD), *freedom* from external oppression (i.e. ILP), extremism (i.e. PSD), racism (i.e. PSD), chauvinism (i.e. PSD), ethnic separatism (i.e. PSD). Generally one can say that the parties from the countries that in their modern history suffered from either occupation or oppression of a non-democratic system are likely to still insist on defining *freedom* in opposition to those. Renouncing all these as contradictory to *freedom* makes also the link between this particular value and democratic system really apparent.

There are certain constructive elements of *freedom* interpreted through a political category. *Freedom* translates into: pluralism; active and passive electoral rights; freedom of association; freedom of participation, freedom of belief and consciousness; freedom of expression; freedom of strike; freedom of media; free judiciary. Though different parties make respectively less or more detailed lists of the components of *political freedom*, there are relatively not many discrepancies in the content of the lists. Some, that appear, can easily be explained by a contemporary political context – such as in case of i.e. SLD the reference to “right of privacy and freedom from invigilation by secret services” is rooted in the practices of their political opponents (while in government). Where the line of divergence could eventually be found is on the issue of principles that derive from the interpretation of *freedom of consciousness and belief*. Some parties draw from it a demand for secularism and separation of the state and church (i.e. LSAP, SLD), others emphasize the aspect of mutual respect of churches and peaceful coexistence (i.e. SAP). Theoretically the sense remains similar; however the conclusions in fact frame two different messages. One should however underline that this particular issue gains more importance for the parties originating from states, where church has played a vital role in its modern history.

Another specific item that appears in several documents is *freedom of expression* understood as an issue of protection and preservation of the national heritage, culture and language. It will further be referred to in the section 2.20.

The differences can also be observed among the parties on which pillar: political or socio-economic one plays a bigger role while defining freedom. It may seem that the tendency to focus primarily (however not exclusively) on political freedoms is more of a trend among the parties from Central and Eastern Europe (with addition of PS PT). The explanation of that may be derives from on one hand still recent experiences from the non-democratic regimes from before 1989, as also on the other hand still present struggles and fragility of the democratic settlements. This perhaps would indicate that those parties would be perhaps more attached to the notion of liberty, while the others to the cause of freedom.

Historically speaking, freedom in (socio-) economic understanding originates from a demand that usage of means of productions should be *free and free of change* (which understanding can still be retrieved in the PS Be document). In the spirit of determinism, social democratic parties share an assessment that material and social preconditions predefine freedom. Ensuring freedom therefore translates into freeing people from: poverty, hunger, shameful dependencies, fear etc. It means ensuring material security and creating chances through redistribution system. This logic links *freedom* directly with the concepts of decent work and decent life, issues of well-being and altogether question of welfare state.

Socio-economic emancipation and political liberation should, as many (though not all) parties state, progress simultaneously. This conclusion represents a shift from a traditional historical socialist view according to which the material conditions will ensure subsequent political freedom. This is what may be a point of reflection in the renewal. Striking an adequate balance between individual freedoms and social responsibilities on one hand and between political and socio-economical interpretations of freedoms on the other can be the key to providing answers to what a modern vision of both democracy and welfare state should encompass. Not less, the question of *freedom from fear* otherwise also described in the documents as *security*, could also facilitate finding an answer on how to gain credibility for an alternative (a change) in times of general insecurity, fears and pessimism.

## 2.9. Equality

The concept of *equality* is placed by a significant number of the national parties as the second among the core values. Even though contemporary discourse more and more indicates that it is *equality* that is to be the leading progressive value in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As in



case of *freedom*, also *equality* is being interpreted in various ways and with reference to several social concepts. Generalizing, the term could be brought to: *the same and for all*. This pure sense is reflected in the legal interpretation, according to which *equality before law* signifies that all are equal and hence poses the same rights, with no discrimination and no privilege allowed. It is connected with the term *equality of perception*, according to which people should be seen (and hence treated) as equally worth.

On the fringe of that it is also worth exploring the term *universalism*. It refers to a concept that applies to all persons and / or all the things for all times and in all situations. Its precise definitions vary, however the interesting angle for this study is that *universalism* explained on the grounds of philosophy is connected with the Age of Enlightenment (to which several parties related, as shown in the section 2.4) and idea of a social contract in which *universal rights* stood for self-evident, unalienable, natural rights. Finally, ethics would describe *universalism* as opposite to *relativism*.

Within political thought, the explanation appears to be however more diverse. Accordingly to the logic of constrained vision, *equality* translates into equal treatment to all. Contradictory to that, in the spirit of unconstrained vision everyone is different. Noticing that induces therefore affirmative action, which aims at ensuring the most adequate support for all, accordingly to individual's specific needs. Even though (as mentioned in the section 1.3), any vision is always a mixture between both unconstrained and constrained, this theoretical explanation of divergence between them may also help understanding discrepancies in between the parties.

Unconstrained vision of *equality* is therefore closely related to the concept of *equal opportunities*. They are the specific chances, which are available to all and ensured in a way that individual is capable of making own choices that lead to his or her self-development. *Equal opportunities* are often placed in context of *justice* (or *fairness*) as they per definition require an adequate assessment process to be put in place in order to both define the conditions and way of eliminating obstacles that could prevent individuals from full usage of opportunities. Another term that is closely related to it is *equality of process* which demands in its logic equal treatment and adjustments throughout the process.

*Equal opportunities* remain related to the notion of *equal outcomes*. This is a concept based on expectation that everyone should be able to find themselves in the same position (as far as wealth, knowledge etc.) is concerned. This is what the redistribution mechanisms are based on. There is surely a dispute if *equal opportunities* are not sufficient and the notion of *equality of outcome* should not be dropped. These hypotheses have already been met with strong

opposition. In fact it is more and more the case that philosophers (such as i.e. Paul Krugman<sup>72</sup>) advocate that the *opportunity* and *outcome* are and shall be closely linked.

An interesting thread in the debate on equality was brought in by Amartya Sen<sup>73</sup>, who proposed a term of *equality of autonomy*. In short, this idea is a pledge that an ability and means to choose a life course should be as equally as possible spread across a society. In its sense, it puts emphasis on the question of *empowerment* rather than on simplistic understanding of *equal chances*. It assumes that there is always a complex situation one finds oneself, having also different abilities and hence different possibilities as far as benefiting from the same opportunities. The impact of such thinking would lead to development of case-based solutions and hence would place it in the field of unconstrained thinking.

Within the texts quoted below, there are two more concepts that are introduced by the parties. First of them is *equity*. As an idea, it explains the relational satisfaction in terms of perception of fair and unfair distribution of resources. *Equity* may be a term used for comparing contributions and outcomes, and in that way be related to an issue of justice. It was broadly elaborated by John Stacey Adams in 1963, who researched the issue as a behavioral psychologist in the context of workplace. His findings led to conclusions that as individuals seek to maximize their outcomes, it is in fact a group (a collective) that can induce more equitable behaviours by making them more profitable. A system of rewards and punishments serves this purpose.

Finally, *egalitarianism* is a trend that favors equality, placing emphasis on the fact that the concept of *equality* contains *equity of quality*. It means that everyone must be treated the same, regardless of race, origin etc, as also all human beings are equal and worth same. Within a political doctrine, *egalitarianism* imposes that all should be treated *in the same way* – namely have equal political, economic and social rights. Philosophy adds to that a component of *removing economic inequalities and decentralization of power*. In that sense, *egalitarianism* is closer to constrained thinking.

These different terms are being used in the various contexts by the national social democratic parties. The overview of the mainstreaming notions presents itself in the following way:

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<sup>72</sup> Paul Krugman, born in 1953, is an American economist, professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics and an op-ed columnist at "The New York Times". In 2008 Krugman won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science for his contributions to "new trade theory" and "new economic geography".

<sup>73</sup> Amartya Sen, born in 1933, is an Indian Economist, who was awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to welfare economics and social choice theory, and for his commitment to seeking solutions to the world's poverty. A.Sen is currently a Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard University. "New Statesman" listed him in their 2010 edition of "World's 50 Most Influential People Who Matter".





SPÖ	Equality (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Every person in their exceptionality and as individual is equally important and deserves equal treatment</li> <li>• People in their diversity are equal as far as rights and dignity are concerned.</li> <li>• This is why all should have equal opportunities, regardless of their gender, background, income, physical and intellectual abilities, sexual orientation, ethnical origins, principles and religious beliefs, individual life style.</li> <li>• Right to work and education mean equal opportunities.</li> <li>• People should have equal political and social human rights.</li> <li>• People, who are less fortunate, have right to a special support</li> </ul>
Sp.a	Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The goal of social democracy is a society, in which everyone receives equal chances to realize his self-fulfillment.</li> <li>• Equality is a unique feature of social democracy. No other movement makes a point of it.</li> <li>• Equal chances are not the same as equal rights. Equal rights for people, whose situations are unequal, would mean prolongation of inequality.</li> <li>• Equal chances mean more than just equal 'starting opportunities'. Any discrimination at any stage of one's life should be fought against.</li> <li>• Social democrats must fight against discrimination in any form (origin, belief, gender, disposition, sexual orientation, handicap or skin colour.)</li> <li>• Equal opportunities result from efforts of an individual, as also are fruits of cooperation of people within a community. The chances start by an individual, but should benefit society too.</li> <li>• Public services will be measured on if they can offer equal access for all.</li> <li>• Equal rights come together with equal duties. But in order to be able to speak about obligations, one has to ensure that rights are truly guaranteed.</li> <li>• Equality means fewer discrepancies in incomes.</li> <li>• Equality concerns also culture. In our society no culture can be privileged over another. Every believer and every culture has same rights, which are defined by social values and norms (...).</li> <li>• Equality means equal chances (access to) in high quality education.</li> <li>• Diversity is triumph and a chance. (...) In a diverse society there is no place for fundamentalism.</li> <li>• Equality between men and women is an achievement.</li> <li>• Everyone is different, but nobody is worth less.</li> <li>• Everybody should have a right to a high quality health care system.</li> <li>• Everyone has a right to affordable and quality place to live.</li> </ul>
BSP	Equality (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Universal value.</li> <li>• No discrimination;</li> <li>• Gender equality means equality of opportunities for a decent life. It is a goal in overcoming social polarization and discrimination predetermined by gender.</li> <li>• Equality means also that poor and disadvantaged are entitled to social protection.</li> </ul>
ČSSD	Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is a centennial struggle of social democrats to eradicate system of privileges.</li> <li>• Each individual should have equal rights and opportunities.</li> <li>• Welfare state should provide citizens with equal opportunities, improving their situation as far as economy, employment, social and consumer rights are concerned.</li> <li>• Equality of opportunities should be realized at all the life stages of an individual's life, independently from their economic status, disabilities etc.</li> <li>• Equality is a reason to protect citizens against poverty.</li> <li>• We reject egalitarianism and equity of income differences. Income reflects diversity of contributions to wealth creation. Nevertheless the discrepancies must not enable one to usurp a position and dominate others.</li> <li>• The principles of equality between men and women must apply.</li> <li>• There must be equality between diverse ethnic and ideological communities in a multicultural society.</li> </ul>

SD DK	Equality (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Means that every person is equally important, as each person is unique and irreplaceable.</li> <li>• Equality is a precondition of freedom.</li> <li>• We want a society, where everyone has equal opportunities.</li> <li>• People are different. They have different talents and qualifications.</li> <li>• Equality is about neutralizing negative impact of worse social origins of some. Nobody should live a life characterized by loneliness, addictions or lack of social networks.</li> <li>• We need equal opportunities. This is why we need to fight inequalities in access to medical care, education, employment.</li> <li>• Inclusive society means full employment.</li> <li>• Diversity is a driving force in a society. We must respect and appreciate it.</li> <li>• Discrimination is unacceptable.</li> <li>• Denmark as a land of “equality and opportunity” requires that there is a bridge built between Danes and other ethnic groups. The way is a targeted integration with clear rights and responsibilities for all.</li> <li>• Respect for minorities does not mean an automatic agreement with all they pledge. We must fight perceptions that limit women’s opportunities.</li> <li>• Children’s upbringing may not be hindered by an authoritarian parenting pattern.</li> <li>• We oppose discrimination against disabled, in general and in particular on the labour market.</li> <li>• We are against age-based discrimination.</li> </ul>
SDE	Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Women and men should have equal opportunities on the labour market and be equally empowered to participate in the decision making processes (both on the policy in general as also on management in particular levels.)</li> </ul>
SDP	Equality (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Men and women are entitled to equal opportunities to well being, security; participation in decision making at home, work and society.</li> <li>• People must be equal before law.</li> <li>• Society must be stable and safe in order to allow people and communities, men and women in all equality to form projects for the future.</li> <li>• Inequalities must be suppressed.</li> <li>• Everybody has a responsibility to gather information and participate in a society, and this is how actual equality and commitment grows.</li> <li>• All people are entitled to equal possibilities to gain and possess, create and evaluate, master information and knowledge. This is a prerequisite of democracy and of a development of a society.</li> <li>• Freedom is about life chances, as they are offered by a community. Community is a liberator.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Equality (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Equality is in the centre of the ideal.</li> <li>• Equality and freedom are inseparable.</li> <li>• Permanent redistribution of means and wealth is necessary to guarantee equality of rights and enable each to live their lives accordingly to their wishes.</li> </ul>
PASOK	Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There must be economic and social equality of genders.</li> </ul>
ILP	Equality (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implies reorganizing society with a specific objective of creating a more equal distribution of wealth and power, and not just opportunities for individuals to become powerful or wealthy.</li> <li>• Labour Party is committed to recognizing and valuing diverse identities and experiences.</li> </ul>
LSDSP	Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People have the same legal rights</li> <li>• People have to enjoy the same right to access quality education, employment, healthcare, housing, social assistance, culture and recreation, as also to the global and local-scale information and technology.</li> <li>• Everyone should enjoy the right to be advised and receive benefits of the social security.</li> <li>• State must fight discrimination against elderly, improving their pension situation and granting them the same tax rights as the people professionally active enjoy</li> </ul>



LSDP	Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is about reducing differences between rich and poor.</li> <li>• Translates into access to education for all and universal childcare.</li> </ul>
MLP	Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusive society</li> <li>• Full employment (right to work for all)</li> <li>• Every individual should have same opportunities</li> </ul>
DNA	Equal opportunities for all	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Every human being is unique. Diversity has a special value. Same time, everyone has the same value as a person – therefore deserves the same opportunities to develop oneself, to use talents and skills, to reach self-fulfillment. This is regardless of gender, social background, religion, sexual orientation and ethnic origins.</li> <li>• Equal opportunities are preconditions of freedom.</li> <li>• Individuals have rights as members of a society. Social arrangements (education, health care and social benefits) must be universal. It has contributed to making Norway a country with a minimum differentiation and a high level of personal freedom.</li> <li>• Welfare state is not just for those who fell between tracks. There are welfare arenas common for all and this in itself is a great value that everyone is included and that people find that they receive something in return for the payments they make to public goods. Goal is to continue building universal solutions and to make them of a high quality, which makes it attractive for all.</li> <li>• Equal opportunity entails that all citizens know that they have the same right to personal development regardless of social background.</li> <li>• Potential is about encouraging the individual to take the initiative to use themselves in ways that benefit those individuals and the society. If people cannot use their abilities and talents, and they become poorer, it is the society that becomes loser.</li> <li>• There are different starting points for all – but the origins should not determine destinations. There are many reasons of discrimination and the mission of social democracy is to fight against all its forms. There must be extra support for victims of it.</li> <li>• Norwegian society has always been multi-cultural. The population is more and more diverse – which is a positive development. All the groups and individuals must have same rights, but also same responsibilities.</li> </ul>
SLD	Equality (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As a value seems to be negatively associated in the 3rd Polish Republic. It is being replied by many with cynicism, that in the previous regime it was claimed that all had same stomachs.</li> <li>• Equality is the way to the welfare of societies – the lesser gap there is between the richest and the poorest, the lesser amount of social problems there is. This theory appears to be correct in all the spheres: from infant mortality, through illiteracy to criminality.</li> <li>• European Union demands implementing equality, though i.e. Lisbon Strategy, especially in education and labour.</li> <li>• Equality means a ban of discrimination because of any reason and in any area.</li> <li>• There can be no equality if: women are discriminated on the labour market, in the pension system and via the anti-abortion law; when secular people and those of other than catholic confessions are discriminated in education; when sexual minorities are discriminated in family law; when everyone who cannot afford assistance – is discriminated in a court room.</li> <li>• Equality contradicts unjust privileges – those obtained via financial success, professional career or being born in a wealthy family.</li> <li>• Positive discrimination can be a tool to ensure equality – of which expression a parity rule on the electoral lists is.</li> <li>• All can be achieved if there is a balance between state and market. State must be a regulator. Markets must serve people – people mustn't serve markets.</li> </ul>

PS PT	Equality (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Equality motivates to struggle against injustice and discrimination</li> <li>• The inequalities and discrimination based on origin, gender, sexual orientation, racial origin, wealth, religion of belief, genetic predisposition or any other reason must be combated.</li> <li>• Equal rights and opportunities are the matters of fairness and social justice.</li> <li>• Inequality of rights and privileges are illegitimate.</li> <li>• Equal rights and opportunities are the matter of the principle of equity.</li> <li>• Policies promoting employment for all, welfare and social protection are key for democratic state.</li> <li>• Equal opportunities and social justice must be embodied in policies of: education, health, social security, culture and science.</li> </ul>
PSD	Equity (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social equity expresses itself in equal opportunities for all the citizens</li> <li>• Progressive tax is a system of fair redistribution of income in a society.</li> </ul>
PSD	Equality (4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seeing people as of equal value is a reconfirmation of identification with values of humanism.</li> <li>• Employment must be available for those disadvantaged</li> <li>• Means recognition of the role of women in family and society. Equality between men and women everywhere, including political world, must be promoted.</li> <li>• All the people must have equal rights, opportunities and obligations. Culture, lifelong learning and health care must be equally accessible for all.</li> <li>• Minorities must be protected.</li> <li>• Social policy must be progressive and secular, to embrace all.</li> </ul>
SD SL		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Everyone must be able to benefit from the same opportunities and possibilities, but same time must hold onto equal duties. Everyone is responsible for personal and common good.</li> <li>• There must be equal access to all the high quality public services to all.</li> </ul>
PSOE	Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Principle of egalitarian society</li> <li>• Progress must be shared by all</li> </ul>
SAP	Equality (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Equality is presupposed by freedom of people. Equality is the condition of freedom.</li> <li>• Equality presupposes a fair distribution of resources that are essential for the freedom of people: economic strength, education, and access to culture.</li> <li>• Equality is the expression of the idea of everybody's equal value, dignity and rights.</li> <li>• Equality means that all people despite different preconditions are given the same opportunities to build their own lives and to influence their society.</li> <li>• Equality presupposes right to choose and to develop differently, without differences leading to social ranking and to social divisions in power and influence over everyday life and in society.</li> <li>• Equality does not mean that everybody must act and live in the same way. On contrary the demand for equality is a demand for plurality: people must be free to make their choices and develop their own identity, without being limited by the ideas and without running risk of finding themselves socially disadvantaged because of their choices.</li> </ul>
LP UK	Equality (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Of rights are duties.</li> <li>• Power, wealth and opportunity in hands of many</li> </ul>

Several parties recognize *equality* as a unique feature of social democracy (sp.a), centre of the ideal social democracy seeks (PS Fr) and the sense of the centennial struggle of social democrats against privileges and discrimination (ČSSD). It is related to the heritage, as it reflects identification with the principles of humanism (PSD), as it is an expression of a belief that everyone is of an equal value (sp.a, SD DK, SAP). For some it is a matter of a *European Standard* (SLD). Even though within the renewal debates it is being discussed if equality



should become the prior value, such an approach is not reflected in any of the respective parties' positions at this point. *Equality* is being seen rather in the context of other values, being frequently describes as precondition of *freedom* (which is especially strongly reflected among the Nordic parties, i.e. SD DK, DNA, SAP) and inseparable from it (PS FR).

For some parties equality is connected with *equity*. Examples of that are PS PT or PSD, that enumerates among its core values both equality and equity. In the text of other parties, the word *equity* is not explicatively used, however they do relate to either equality of rights and duties (sp.a, SDP, PSD, SD SL, LP UK). There are also the parties who restrict themselves to speak about *equal opportunities* and *equal rights* only, seeing guaranteeing of them as already a translation of *justice* (ČSSD, SD DK, DNA, PS PT). These observations can be compared with the ones made in section 2.6, where the issues of responsibility, duty and obligation were elaborated upon. The conclusion to draw is that the notion of reciprocity is placed by the member parties in the framework of different core values (freedom, equality, solidarity, justice etc.) – which could be explained by the context of an emphasis parties chose to take (political or socio-economic scope). The differences, if to speak about the duties and when, remain however still relatively substantial among the parties in the light of analyzed texts.

*Equality* is described by the parties as a goal and /or as a mean. The very aim (which relates to the ideological mission, described in section 2.6) is an *equal society*, in which individuals enjoy equal rights and opportunities (i.e. sp.a, SDP). In that sense *equality* is rather an outcome of the social democratic actions. The critical approach to this ideal is raised by i.e. ČSSD, that raises an objection to *egalitarianism and equity of income differences*. (Similar concern is shared by SPD under the theme "justice", please see section 2.10), The differences in income are perceived by that party as a matter of justice in relation to different efforts being made by different individuals. Also DNA touches upon the issue, however from a different angle. DNA states that all must benefit [from welfare state], and not just *those who fell between the track*. It seems that the issue of relation between *equality* as an *outcome* and *equality* as opportunities could become an interesting point for a further debate, especially in the light of the theories quoted in the introduction to this section.

As far as the process is concerned, there are two ways of perceiving equal opportunities that are reflected in the parties' respective documents. The first of the three includes parties, which focus on seeing *equal opportunities* as a matter of *equal treatment*. It is not exclusive that those parties do not see a need for a special support for those less fortunate or to fight against discrimination. It is rather a question on where they put emphasis. Their logic is hence more connected with constrained thinking. Examples of such parties are SPÖ, MLP, PS PT, PSOE. The second category embraces those parties, which give an emphasis to the context.

They believe, as sp.a., that equal chances are not the same as equal rights – once people start from different points which predetermine in what extent they can use the opportunities. ČSSD, SD DK, DNA, SAP are the examples of parties, who perceive it that way. They would place themselves rather therefore on the side of unconstrained thinking. One could here try to draw a conclusion that one of the ways is closer to the southern parties, while another to the Nordic ones – but the texts themselves do not provide enough of information to be academically entitled to make such a conclusion here.

Some parties express their open criticism to the notion of *equal opportunities*. Sp.a introduces an interesting distinction between *opportunities* and *chances*, in the light of which opportunities mean less than chances, as chances imply not only enabling a possibility, but also enabling individual to use it – through a fight against discrimination. The parties vary in terms of how explicit they are about the affirmative action, specific measures for groups or individuals. Some parties unambiguously point out that equal opportunities must be offered at all stages of life (i.e. ČSSD).

*Equality* may be defined in relation to a society, in relation to a group and in relation to an individual. Starting from the last one, several parties recognize *diversity* of individuals (i.e. SPÖ, sp.a, SD SK, DNA etc.) It is being advocated that diversity is a societal strength and hence shall be met with respect, that would on one side drive a fight against discrimination, on the other would enable all to me members of community and society (SD SK writes explicatively that nobody should be left alone). The second relation mostly touches upon the multiculturalism and coexistence of the different ethnic groups (however in some cases also the issue of religions, churches, political believes even). The answer proposed to that is *equality* realized through: *no privileges for one culture above another* (i.e. sp.a), fight against discrimination i.e. PS PT), targeted integration (i.e. SD DK), ensuring *equal rights and duties* (i.e. DNA). The third relation is between *equality* and a society. It is a joint effort of individuals and society that ensures opportunities (through i.e. welfare state) and from which deal enabling progress both society and individuals benefit (i.e. sp.a, ILP, DNA).

Last but not least, an important concept that plays a role in the social democratic texts is an issue of *gender equality*. This very particular kind of *equality* is enumerated more frequently than any other. It is a consequence of the century struggle of women movements for universal suffrage, which are in a large scale connected with social democratic parties. There are differences in between the parties on how they express their commitment to this struggle. For certain parties it falls under the category of actions that aim at combating all forms of discrimination (i.e. SPÖ, DNA, PS PT). Certain parties refer to the issue as the one of *gender equality* (i.e. BSP, DNA, PS PT), others as *equality of men and women* (i.e. sp.a, ČSSD, SDE, SDP), and yet others advocate more for *women rights* (i.e. SD SK, SLD, PSD). This dichotomy is an



interesting one, as it shows approaches to the same objective of equality and also may be an explanation on why there are different associations with the terms: *suffrage*, *feminism*; within the social democratic movement.

## 2.10. Justice

*Justice* is placed in 14 out of all the 26 analyzed texts. Among the parties, which enlist values in a certain order, it is placed between second and fourth position. Defining this notion seems particularly difficult, due to its complexity and strong rooting in cultural context<sup>74</sup> (which will make it exceptionally hard to understand on a pan-European level).

Dictionary-wise, justice is described as a concept of *moral rightness* based on: ethics, rationalism, natural law, religion, fairness and equity. John Rawls<sup>75</sup> described it as first virtue of social institutions, associating it with fairness<sup>76</sup>. The difference between this modern understanding and the more traditional one is that historically often justice was related to an issue of faith or “Divine Providence”, and hence being rooted in the history, mythology and religion. This makes this term’s interpretation even nowadays still very dependent from the cultural context in which it is being used.

The parties use both the terms of *justice* and *social justice*. Social justice is in fact an idea of creating a society that is based on equality and solidarity, that understands and values human rights and that recognizes dignity of every human being.

For the purpose of this particular paper, it is interesting to add here also the explanation on what *distributive justice* is. It is a term that stands for a proper allocation of wealth, power, reward, respect etc. among different people. As such seems to be directly related to the issue of redistribution and is much stronger than notions such as charity, mercy or compassion. According to certain thinkers it is the basis of a social contract; however some others (John Stuart Mill, to give an example) believe that justice is not the fundamental value and rather derive from other standards. There are three principle questions connected with *justice*, namely:

1. What is to be distributed?;
2. Between whom?;
3. What is the proper distribution?.

Answers to those questions differ and their set makes it distinctive for one or another ideology.

74 O.Cramme and P.Diamond (eds.), *Social Justice in the Global Age*, Cambridge Polity Press 2009, pp. 3 - 21

75 John Rawls, 1921 – 2002, an American philosopher, who is known above all from his work *A Theory of Justice*.

76 J.Rawls, *Teoria sprawiedliwości*, PWN Warszawa 2009, p. 9

Following responses could be found in the respective parties' texts:

SPÖ	Justice (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Justice should apply in all societal dimensions.</li> <li>Justice should mean just (fair) distribution of chances and goods, especially as far as labour market and education, as also incomes and capacities are concerned.</li> <li>Justice is about equal participation of all in a society.</li> <li>Justice means remaining on the side of those weaker.</li> <li>Aim of justice is to reach a society of people, who are freer and more equal.</li> <li>Justice means eradication of class-differences.</li> </ul>
Sp.a	Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Everybody should have a right to a good, fair pension</li> </ul>
BSP	Social Justice (4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Universal value.</li> <li>It is a responsibility to fight for justice, which means protection of labour, poor and unemployed.</li> <li>Justice means that everyone is equal in their dignity.</li> <li>It is expressed in recognition of individual contributions to a general advancement of a society, from which progress everyone should be able to benefit from. (also understood as: fairness)</li> </ul>
SD SK	Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(Equality) Socialists wants more just world. As the gap between rich and poor is becoming wider, there must be a state (or EU) level action to ensure more equitable distribution of wealth.</li> </ul>
SDE	Justice (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The goal is to build Estonia as an economically successful society, which in the same time is also compassionate and just</li> <li>Everybody must be aware of their rights and should be guaranteed their protection. This awareness is basis for democracy.</li> <li>Is about increasing opportunities, so that everyone be an active member if a society.</li> </ul>
SDP	Justice (4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is generated by the balance between rights and responsibility.</li> <li>Universal justice should be the prevailing world value.</li> <li>Welfare state intervenes against injustice.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Justice (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Struggle against injustices has been a fundament on which the socialist revolution has been built upon.</li> <li>Fundamental rights for all must be defended.</li> </ul>
SPD	Justice (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishes each and everyone as equal.</li> <li>It means equal freedom and equal life opportunities for all, independently of their origin or gender.</li> <li>Justice means equal access for all to: education, labour, social security, culture, democracy, public goods.</li> <li>Unequal distribution of incomes, wealth and power is against equal freedom and hence unjust.</li> <li>Social democracy is needed to ensure equal life opportunities.</li> <li>Equal opportunities do not mean egalitarianism – on contrary. They offer a space for developing individual predispositions and skills. People are and remain different.</li> <li>Natural inequalities and social origins may however not be determinant for one's destiny.</li> <li>Justice is about being against any form of privilege and discrimination on the basis of origin, position, skin colour, gender, sexual orientation or religion.</li> <li>Performance (efforts) must be appreciated. Justice is about distribution of incomes and opportunities.</li> <li>Ownership obliges: who earns more, has to contribute more to the wealth of the entire society.</li> </ul>
LSDSP	Social Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Means that every member of the society can live their life in dignity.</li> </ul>
LSDP	Social Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Means there is no place for poverty, unemployment, social inequality, human rights' violations.</li> <li>Creating jobs is about reducing necessity for emigration.</li> <li>Is a matter of quality and affordable health care.</li> </ul>



LSAP	Justice (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All the people are equal in rights and value.</li> <li>• There must be equality of opportunities, access to which does not depend on gender, origin, income, philosophy, individual approach.</li> <li>• Equality does not mean negation of differences, but giving a space for individual predispositions and abilities.</li> <li>• Equality means respect for diversity as far as personalities and cultures are concerned.</li> <li>• People, who are weaker and in precarious situations have a right to be especially supported.</li> <li>• Political and social human rights, as also equal distribution of incomes and material valuables belongs to the notion of equal opportunities.</li> <li>• An obvious basic right for socialists is the right of all to education, culture and work.</li> <li>• Justice means overcoming social discrepancies among people and setting up a society of free and equal people.</li> </ul>
MLP	Social Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress is for all and it is measured by progress achieved by the weakest members of the society.</li> <li>• Strong economy supporting welfare state should bring along social justice.</li> </ul>
PSD	Social Justice (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social justice and solidarity are prerequisites of progress.</li> <li>• State has a social role to ensure balance in a society</li> <li>• Well paid jobs are a matter of social justice, but also of creating opportunities and multiplying national welfare.</li> </ul>

Among the parties listed above, there are two (SPD and LSAP), who opted for naming explicitly *justice*, but not mentioning *equality* among the enumerated core values. For them this is *justice* that establishes all the people as *equal*, ensuring *equal opportunities*; and guides the struggle against *inequalities and emancipation*. Hence perhaps justice could be seen as broader concept, which in a better way reflects also the complementary character of the relation between equality and *freedom*.

Overall, the majority of the parties link issue of *justice* with a value of *equality*. It is according to them *justice* that establishes all as equal, as of the same value (i.e. SPÖ, BSP, LSDSP, LSAP). What is perhaps a small difference to the definitions on *equality* in relation to an individual (as analyzed in section 2.9), is a focus on *dignity* – to life in which all should have rights. This notion appears commonly in the context of remarks about the diversity in a society and differences among individuals, and can prove a tendency of social democrats to speak more on the social justice.

Relating to the first question of the introduction, namely *What is being distributed?*, one can find three notions: welfare, political rights, progress. Within the first category, parties advocate for a *fair* distribution of chances, services and material goods (SPÖ, SPD, LSDP, LSAP). Within the second, they touch upon the issue of participation and representation, as also demand eradication of a divided (class-based) society (i.e. SPÖ, SPD). The third one follows the logic that a progress is an outcome of an effort of all and hence everyone should be able to share its benefits. Characteristically for social democracy, there are two particular demands. On one side, *justice* requires standing on the side of weaker and imposes that they are

especially supported. On the other, those who have succeeded and in a consequence earn more must make even a greater effort and contribute more.

This last two points bridge directly to the second question, namely *between whom* there is a distribution. In the light of the earlier quoted debate on *rights and responsibilities*, one can at this point make an assessment the answer may only seem a simple one (justice is about fair (re)distribution among all, especially among those who are in need). The ongoing debates on renewal of social democracy and the pressure that welfare state finds itself under, they show a growing demand on explanation how to balance a demand for an explanation of expectations between the extraordinary support for those requiring it and enabling their contributions to an overall progress on the other. This and the answer to the third question *what is the proper distribution?*, they still remain unresolved themes since the ideological debates in 1990s.

Finally, *justice* in the understanding of many social democrats refers also to an issue of labour. In that context, it links with: equal opportunities at the labour market (i.e. SPÖ, SPD), fighting unemployment (i.e. BSP, LSDP). The difference in between two approaches is perhaps also a contextual one and depends on if the priority is to fight unemployment or struggle for full employment. For some it is a matter of *justice* that all have the same right to work and hence to get a (well-paid) job (i.e. LSDP, LSAP, PSD). This particular interpretation may come as a significant reference point for all the current post-crisis debates. It will be further be elaborated in the section 2.14.

### 2.11. Fairness

John Rawls advocated that justice can in fact be seen as fairness. In his “Theory of justice” he wrote that *justice* (specifically *distributive justice*) is a form of *fairness*.

To better sense the distinction, the synonyms of *fair* would include: just, equitable, impartial, unbiased, objective, and dispassionate. These adjectives emphasize neutrality in judgment.

There are two parties that used the notion of *fairness* in their texts: LSDSP (which parallel also speaks about social justice) and SD SL. The first of them relates *fairness* with fiscal policy and medical care; the second with competitiveness.

LSDSP	Fairness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Social Democrats are in favour of fair, efficient and socially responsible fiscal policy.</li><li>• Fairness means that both employers and employees equally cover medical expenses.</li></ul>
SD SL	Fairness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• SD SL believes in a fair competition, which is essential to a dynamic evolution.</li></ul>



## 2.12. Solidarity

*Solidarity* is the notion that throughout the course of the years replaces within the post-French Revolution trio the notion of *brotherhood*. Hence also its third place among the core values, if enumerated by the social democratic parties.

The term *solidarity* originates from sociology (and used mostly in the field of social sciences) and refers to the degree and type of social integration, shown by a society or a group towards the others. It can be described as unity that produces or is based on community of interests. Understanding of that value and extend to which it is being recognized by a society, usually depends heavily on the cultural and historical context.

It appears in the texts in the following way:

SPÖ	Solidarity (4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Solidarity means attention to others.</li> <li>• Solidarity means readiness to undertake common action for realization of the social democratic principles.</li> <li>• Solidarity means responsibility for a community. This translates into an obligation to support others and fulfill societal tasks in the spirit of core principles.</li> <li>• Solidarity is the fundament of a social cohesion.</li> <li>• Solidarity is a practical instrument in advancing towards more just life circumstances.</li> <li>• International solidarity encompasses all the people.</li> </ul>
Sp.a	Solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Equal chances influence solidarity between generations.</li> <li>• Equal chances have impact on solidarity between “North and South”</li> <li>• Solidarity means responsibility for ensuring that sustainability will be a mainstreaming story of the 21st century.</li> <li>• Social democracy pledges for solidarity and redistribution to ensure a better future for all.</li> <li>• Positive discrimination of countries that are weaker in a global system should lead to a coherent development.</li> <li>• Handicapped people need to be able to live their lives in respect, dignity, solidarity and enjoy same chances.</li> </ul>
PS B	Solidarity (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transformations from capitalism to collectivism should take place following a moral order, in which sentiments of altruism and solidarity will be developed.</li> <li>• All the socialists from all the countries must become solidar with one another, as emancipation of workers is not a national, but international matter.</li> </ul>
BSP	Solidarity (5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Universal value.</li> <li>• Global challenges require global solidarity, new internationalism.</li> <li>• Means recognition of mutual interdependence.</li> <li>• It signifies willingness of people to stand for each other and assist one another in need.</li> <li>• Solidarity as a term refers to both: single community, social group and society as a whole.</li> <li>• This is a value that bears potential for change.</li> <li>• It is a historical one for the labour movement.</li> </ul>

ČSSD	Solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Principle of solidarity shall be respected, not only the market principle of performance.</li> <li>• Individual achievements are to the benefit of all.</li> <li>• Each will be in a situation, in which a person requires help. He/she shall receive that, but same time commit to work further for a common benefit.</li> <li>• Solidarity is about demonstrating responsibility for other citizens.</li> <li>• Solidarity is an expression of human reciprocity.</li> <li>• Solidarity with young people means ensuring their access to education and good starting chances.</li> <li>• Solidarity with families means ensuring quality housing and conditions for childcare.</li> <li>• Solidarity with poor requires public services.</li> <li>• Solidarity means creating new jobs enabling people to reach their self-fulfillment.</li> <li>• Solidarity with disabled and sick means fighting against commoditization of health care.</li> <li>• Solidarity with pensioners. Old age must be respected.</li> <li>• Solidarity unities humanity to rationality in all the spheres.</li> </ul>
SD DK	Solidarity (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is a way to make freedom and equality true for all.</li> <li>• No individual can succeed alone – we all need a community, which can help, when required.</li> <li>• Solidarity is the willingness for unity and expression of sense of responsibility towards others. Solidarity is not only about a community help to individuals, but a duty of each and everyone to show solidarity to a society.</li> <li>• Is a requirement to put the interests of a community above the solely personal ones.</li> <li>• It is a historical value that in 130 years has proven to be a right one. Nowadays however the conditions changed – thus it must be reinterpreted for a modern society.</li> <li>• Solidarity expressed in helping a smaller group enables a society as a whole to remain free of major social divisions and conflicts.</li> <li>• Access to basic welfare services cannot be predetermined by an economic situation of an individual.</li> <li>• Solidarity between generations is imperative in a modern society.</li> <li>• Solidarity with the future generations is a matter of sustainable development (in its economic, social and environmental sense). It is a question of shared responsibility.</li> <li>• Denmark is a part of an integrated world. International solidarity means on one side helping people in cases of hunger, poverty, wars, natural disasters etc., on the other setting up an immigration and asylum policy that reflects humanism and solidarity.</li> </ul>
SDE	Solidarity (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDE is a party of social responsibility. It translates to a motto of caring about people and their faith, as they are the only measurements of progress and success.</li> <li>• Translates into an intergenerational solidarity and respect.</li> </ul>
SDP	Solidarity (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Balance between equality and freedom is struck, when the community assumes its responsibility for its members and when they themselves take responsibility for one another and for community as a whole.</li> <li>• Because of solidarity people respect mutually each other's rights.</li> <li>• Because of solidarity people do not exploit each other.</li> <li>• Solidarity translates into protection of environment (as solidarity in between generations, as also with other in ensuring well-being).</li> <li>• International solidarity means standing against oppression, helping those in poverty and hunger. It is also about peace-making.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Solidarity (4)	
SPD	Solidarity (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Means mutual attachment, togetherness and reciprocal help.</li> <li>• It is readiness of people to stand for one another and help each other.</li> <li>• It is in between the strong and weak, in between generations, and among the people.</li> <li>• Solidarity empowers for change, which is an experience of the workers' movement.</li> <li>• Solidarity is the force that holds our society together, in a spontaneous and individual readiness to help each other.</li> <li>• Welfare state, with its rules and organization, is a politically validated and organized solidarity.</li> </ul>



MSZP	Social Security Justice Solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Being of the side of workers.</li> <li>• Standing for the rights and safety of all, while fighting privileges and dominance of some.</li> <li>• Working in solidarity for an inclusive society, fighting unemployment, poverty, discrimination.</li> </ul>
LSDSP	Solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is opposing the long-time cultivated individualism</li> <li>• European welfare state illustrates a successful human development based on mutual respect and responsibilities of all the members of a society.</li> <li>• Solidarity means that people actively involve themselves contributing to the health care funds.</li> </ul>
LSAP	Solidarity (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Without solidarity there is no human society worth living in.</li> <li>• History of the movement teaches solidarity among the oppressed workers. Solidarity made social changes possible.</li> <li>• Solidarity is the base of cohesion of a society and a working instrument of implementation of the vision of more just and more human living and working conditions.</li> <li>• Solidarity is the weapon of the weaker in their struggle for their rights.</li> <li>• Solidarity imposes a view that people need each other. Whoever enters poverty must be able to rely on solidarity of the society. Solidarity means also however taking some responsibility for the others.</li> <li>• Solidarity can express itself in many forms. It can have a form of state organized one; however it may also be part of the private individual initiatives – which are the manifestations of the individualization that progresses in our societies.</li> <li>• Solidarity recognizes no borders. All the people are entitled to life opportunities and to living in dignity – this determines the responsibilities of the industrial states versus the developing ones.</li> <li>• Solidarity encompasses all the generations. The future ones are entitled to opportunities – which are what needs to be kept on mind by the current generations, while they make their choices.</li> </ul>
MLP	Solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protection of environment, culture and national heritage is a key to quality life and an expression of solidarity and respect with the future generations.</li> </ul>
PvdA	Solidarity and togetherness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Solidarity grown on the foundation of togetherness and shared destiny.</li> <li>• Increasing diversity puts solidarity under pressure. In order to counteract it, we need selective migration, development of shared view on past and future of our society, and the eradication of deprivation and arrears.</li> </ul>
DNA	A new solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nobody can manage on their own. Solidarity is a will to pull together and express care, concern and sense of responsibility towards the others.</li> <li>• Solidarity must encompass current and future generations.</li> <li>• Solidarity is a traditional value that contributed to improvement of living and working conditions of many.</li> <li>• Society based on solidarity cares for those that need help to get by. It creates inclusive community.</li> <li>• In a modern society, a comprehensive public responsibility for providing and financing common tasks is an expression of solidarity. This is the sense of public financing welfare benefits and a progressive taxation system that ensures redistribution of wealth.</li> <li>• Social developments challenge solidarity – which needs to be constantly restored.</li> <li>• Human relationships are not to be viewed from the perspective of markets. Cooperation is a more important motor for development than competition.</li> <li>• Intergenerational solidarity is necessary. It is especially crucial in the times of ageing society.</li> <li>• Intergenerational solidarity means also care for environment.</li> </ul>

SLD	Brotherhood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brotherhood should be understood as building a society, which does not leave anyone alone, especially in need; in which citizens receive help – not in a form of humiliating charity, but because of the social contract.</li> <li>• Brotherhood is a system of governance, in which all the decisions are taken with a view of the interest of all.</li> <li>• Brotherhood is a social capital – a mutual trust and community-based thinking.</li> </ul>
PS PT	Solidarity (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State shall promote cooperation and solidarity; shall be responsible for setting the rules for the market and for setting the spheres of private and public initiatives.</li> <li>• Provision of social services is core to upholding social cohesion. Quality of those is a responsibility of the state.</li> <li>• Solidarity promotes social integration.</li> <li>• Practice of solidarity is a fight against exclusion, poverty and injustice and must not be confused with charity, paternalistic protectionism or favours.</li> <li>• Solidarity is a translation of treating all people equally and in dignity, as citizens.</li> </ul>
PSD	Solidarity (5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social security must be developed in a spirit of solidarity</li> </ul>
SD SL	Solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tolerance for others guarantees peaceful coexistence.</li> <li>• Solidarity should give new impetus to economic development and strengthen social safety and welfare of people.</li> <li>• Health care system must be based on universality and solidarity.</li> <li>• International solidarity translates into environmental protection.</li> </ul>
PSOE	Solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defines the spirit of the struggle</li> </ul>
SAP	Solidarity (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Solidarity is the unity that originates from the insight that we are mutually dependent on each other, and that the best society is the one that is built on co-operation, on mutual consideration and on respect. It is in co-operation that people develop as individuals, emotionally and intellectually.</li> <li>• Everybody must have the same right and opportunity to influence solutions; everybody must have same obligation to be responsible for them. Solidarity requires everybody to make a contribution.</li> <li>• Solidarity means that we as citizens give each other the right to secure livelihood when ill, injured at work, old or unemployed, the right to education, health and care, to participation in cultural life and to the respect for everybody's value as an individual and as a social citizen.</li> <li>• Solidarity does not exclude striving for individual development and success; it excludes the egoism that enables people to exploit other people to their advantage.</li> <li>• Solidarity provides support for the struggle for justice for those acting from disadvantaged positions.</li> <li>• Regardless of a person's strength, solidarity is a precondition of security and community in the surrounding society for everybody. Security and community can only be born out of trust, never out of battle and competition.</li> </ul>
LP UK	Solidarity (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Together we achieve more than alone</li> </ul>

Social democracy recognizes *solidarity* as its traditional, historical core (universal) value (i.e. BSP, SD SK, LSAP, DNA.) It originates from *solidarity among the workers* (i.e. PS BE, LSAP). It was also *solidarity made social changes possible* (quote from LSAP, but see also i.e. BSP, SPD, DNA). *Solidarity* is an expression of a belief that jointly people can achieve more (i.e. LP UK, DNA), it has grown on the foundation of togetherness and shared destiny (i.e. PvdA). Solidarity predefines the rules on the bases of which a cohesive and inclusive society is built (i.e. PS PT, SAP) and indicates the way on which values of *freedom* and *equality* can be



realized (i.e. SD DK, SDP). *Solidarity* means readiness to take responsibility for a community (i.e. SPÖ, SD SK) and for the other citizens (i.e. ČSSD, SPD, SD DK, DNA). Therefore it is an issue of mutual respect (SDP), readiness to care and help one another (i.e. SPÖ, SPD, SLD) and therefore translates to an issue of *social responsibility* (i.e. ČSSD, SDE, DNA, SAP). Specifically, for the members of the movement it translates into realization of social democratic principles (i.e. SPÖ, sp.a, PS BE, PSOE). In the light of those sentences, there are two features that require underlining: *solidarity* according to social democrats is an issue of defining relations among one another (both individuals, as also between individuals and society). It proves why community is needed for all to be able to progress (i.e. SD DK). As such it is an answer to egoism (see i.e. LSDSP, SAP). It appeals to a sense of responsibility, and hence encourages to action.

There are few components characteristic for the way social democracy comprehends *solidarity*. They can be divided into two categories: those, which refer to solidarity with whom; and those, which encompass state and transnational arrangement.

Within the first category, *solidarity* can be: among people, with certain individuals and with certain groups. *Solidarity* among people refers to the circumstances, in which they share certain identity. This has been traditionally the case of workers (i.e. PS Be, MSZP). What is interesting to state here is that in none of the text a notion of *comradeship* has been found. Another example of *solidarity* among people is *solidarity among generations*. It is currently frequently underlined and pledged for in number of the respective parties' texts (i.e. sp.a, ČSSD, SD DK, SPD, LSAP, DNA). It mirrors the fact that social democrats wish to use *intergenerational solidarity* as a value, on bases of which one can give a convincing answer to on one side demographic challenges, on the other choices that affect future (example of which is environment that in several programmes i.e. SDP, DNA and MLP, is linked to *intergenerational solidarity*; as also the connection with *sustainable development*). Drawing a conclusion here, it could be said that *solidarity* is a way for the parties to speak about overcoming societal problems in order to ensure a better future for all.

*Solidarity* with certain individuals and with certain groups usually is an expression of awareness about certain societal problems and divisions. Therefore *solidarity* is with all those, who need support (i.e. DNA) and in particular with certain groups (please see as an example the list provided by ČSSD or sp.a). *Solidarity* becomes in that sense a set of ideas how to overcome the divisions and steer towards more cohesive society. There seem to be however the situations, which require difficult choices in positioning. Example of that seems to be migration and complexity of the PvdA's stand point may reflect that.

Within the second category, *solidarity* refers to state and transnational arrangements.

State (directly or indirectly) is expected to ensure that the *solidarity* is perceived as *practical instrument in advancing towards more just life circumstances* (i.e. SPÖ). Therefore *solidarity* guides the principles on the bases of which: labour market, education, public services should be organized. Interconnecting *solidarity* and the basic sense of (welfare) state, which link is present in majority of the documents, allows concluding that social democracy believes that: the state is there first and foremost to serve the society and its members.

Solidarity that refers to the *transnational arrangements* appears in the texts as *international solidarity* (*internationalism* will be analyzed in the section 2.20). The historical understanding of international solidarity can be traced through the words of the PS BE declaration, which explains that *emancipation of workers is not a national, but international matter*. Currently the logic may have changed and *international solidarity* is more of an ideological response to the circumstances of globalization and growing interdependence of both states and societies (see i.e. BSP). *International solidarity* encompassed all the people (i.e. SPÖ, LSAP) and may be reflected in policy principles and in institutional demands. In terms of the policy principles, they derive from *solidarity with people*, who suffer from hunger, poverty, oppression, wars, natural disasters (i.e. SD DK, SDP). In terms of intuitional demands it can be shaped as solidarity between the more and less developed countries (i.e. sp.a, LSAP). The aim of *international solidarity* remains to ensure peace, stability and sustainable development for all.

### 2.13. Work and labour

In the recent debates about the renewal of social democracy, it has been argued that *work* may be the values in itself. In the context of some of the respective parties' text such a hypothesis may perhaps appear defensible.

sp.a	Work and well-being	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social democrats want well-being and decent work for everyone.</li> <li>• Work is one of the possibilities to fulfill one's goals in a society. Work must ensure income and dignified life.</li> <li>• Everyone has a right to an adequate job.</li> </ul>
BSP	Work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is a fundamental right.</li> <li>• Is a basic value.</li> <li>• It is the main factor determining self-fulfilment of individuals in a society.</li> </ul>
SDP	Welfare / work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The welfare society is a community of liberties, duties and equal opportunities where balance between rights and responsibility is reached.</li> <li>• Everyone has a right to decent, congenial and substantial employment. Work creates wealth of a society and offers a chance for personal development – it enhances therefore human and social capital.</li> <li>• Trade unions should play a crucial role in ensuring representativeness and justice of solutions (such as collective agreements).</li> </ul>



PS FR	Labour (8)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Work is a fundamental right.</li> <li>• Work is an individual way to socialize, to get recognition and to emancipate oneself.</li> <li>• Labour market must be accessible to all, allowing each and every one to lead a life in dignity.</li> <li>• Quality of employment is a fundamental objective which reflects realization of the principles of justice.</li> </ul>
PASOK	Work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All the citizens, men and women, have a right to work.</li> </ul>
DNA	Work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is a force behind production of goods and services.</li> <li>• Is the source of creativity and developments, personal development and social interactions.</li> <li>• Work is a key to wealth creation. This applies to both public and private sectors, domestic market activities and export market activities, the service industry and the manufacture of goods, and both paid and unpaid voluntary work. The deciding factor is that the work meets a need in the community.</li> </ul>

For methodological reasons it was adopted (section 1.5) that *value* is an ideal that constitutes pillar of a vision of a respective party, being same time this party motivation and determining its actions.

Within the points gathered from the respective texts, there are several that could help envisaging *labour* as a value in itself. This is especially the case, when the reference is made to decent work that enables emancipation, life in dignity for individuals and progress for a society (i.e. sp.a, PS FR, BSP). Same time however, others would rather counter argue that everyone should have a right to work (which derives from equality) and hence more than a value, it is a principle in designing adequate policies (i.e. PASOK, SDP).

Attitude towards work, the way it is approached and performed is connected with work ethos, which may also depend heavily on the cultural context. In the light of gathered materials, as also observing the state of development of the European debate, it is surely not possible to determine at this stage if there are prevailing argument to acknowledge *labour* as a pan-European progressive value.

## 2.14. Welfare and well-being

Even though majority of the parties refer *welfare* indicating the framework on interactions between the state and society, there are few parties that are inclined to enumerate *welfare* or *well-being* as a value. It could be argued that as it describes something ideal and dear, and hence indeed mobilizing for action.

The term of *welfare* is connected for social democrats with a concept of state, which plays an active role, promoting and protecting both social and economic well-being. This concept derives from the core values of *equality* and *solidarity*, and especially from the angles of *equal opportunities*, *equity and redistribution*, *public responsibility for ensuring decent life for all*. In Wikipedia, the term is also defined as *provision of wellbeing and social support without stigma of charity*.

*Well-being* therefore is a concept that evaluates standard of life. It can embrace number of indicators, among them degree of freedom people enjoy, respect for human rights, but also i.e. happiness. Even though the last one is relatively hard to measure it reappears more and more frequently in a contemporary political discourse. It may be indicative of changing focus and exposing especially the element of well-being in the concept of welfare nowadays.

Certain elements of the conceptual framework of the term *welfare* have already been quoted in 2.13, nevertheless as the several parties refer to them explicitly while enumerating values (and principles), in order to obey adopted methodology, they had to be also quoted and analyzed separately:

SD DK	Welfare state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (Freedom) The market creates numerous benefits for people, but will not guarantee a free choice for them. There must be therefore a social regulation of market. Real opportunities should not be hindered by economic inabilities.</li> <li>• (Equality) Free and equal access to education, medical care and other forms of welfare benefits is what makes Denmark more just and harmonious society.</li> <li>• (Equality) We must organize society and welfare in a way that this provides a solution for a diverse society.</li> <li>• (Solidarity) Our prosperity is based on each having an access to services, because of each and everyone being a citizen in a society. Hence this reflects the relation of mutual responsibilities between a society and an individual.</li> <li>• (Solidarity) Welfare model depends on putting willingness to jointly finance that above resentment towards high taxation. Progressive taxation ensures economic redistribution.</li> </ul>
SDE	Well-being	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is a right of every human; it is achieved by creating circumstances of peace, solidarity, cooperation, fair competition and embracing it in a social contract.</li> </ul>
PASOK	Welfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The goal is to ensure work and housing for all Greeks.</li> <li>• People must be enabled to participate actively in planning of social, economic and cultural progress of the country.</li> <li>• There must be equal access to medical, hospital and pharmaceutical care.</li> <li>• Mothers, children, elderly must be protected</li> <li>• Education must be accessible to all.</li> </ul>
LSDSP	Welfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wealth is a result of working together.</li> <li>• All Latvian residents should have an opportunity to get a decent job, which can provide decent life. The job should correspond to the person's talents and skills.</li> <li>• An objective remains to be full employment and high social security.</li> <li>• Welfare is one of the foundations of adequately paid employment.</li> </ul>
DNA	Wealth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is important to share it in a fair manner.</li> </ul>

Though the table includes only a few parties, one could see a certain tendency that a majority of them originates from the North of Europe, from countries of welfare state.

Another observation that derives from studying data in this and in the previous chapter is that *welfare system* is perhaps not as much a value on its own, but rather an arrangement within a social contract that enables to build a *welfare society*. Its building pillar, *well-being*, is however described by some as a right of every person (see SDE). It can be created as a result of a common effort (i.e. SDE, SDP, LSDSP) and once established will be a society that thanks to application of



values in practice (such as equality and solidarity) overcome difficulties (such as tensions of a diverse society). The concept is easily translatable into concrete policy guidelines, which derive from the values, namely: public services or progressive taxation as a mean to ensure them.

Concluding, as this is more an issue of an overall goal, perhaps welfare system and the society it helps creating are therefore rather connected with the mission of the movement – which could allow further elaboration on the basis of this and 2.6 sections. Additionally, a need to revise the concepts of *well-being* and hence welfare within a changing society, seem to be reemerging as a vital theme to debate.

### 2.15. Democracy

Social democracy indicates in its name its attachment to the democratic form of government. For four among the studied parties (BSP, SDP, PS FR, ILP) democracy is a value – namely not only a political system, but in fact an aspiration, an ideal to seek. As far as the other ones are concerned, the definitions may vary, as far as emphasis on certain descriptive elements is concerned. This reflects that also on the ground of political sciences there are different ways of describing it.

SPÖ	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Democratic principles must apply to all the spheres of society.</li> <li>• The process of democratization is a constant one and there is never an end to it.</li> <li>• Democracy is the only acceptable form of human and societal organization of a life in a community, but it remains always fragile and must be continuously developed.</li> <li>• Parliamentary system is the core pillar of democracy and must be the setting on all the levels of public life. The representative democracy is realized if there are general, equal, free elections with a right to cast an undisclosed vote. Through elections citizens are co-responsible for political choices.</li> <li>• The civil society, through NGOs and initiatives, plays an important role in building awareness and political will within societies.</li> <li>• Democratic principles must apply in the world of labour.</li> <li>• Democracy means rule of majority with protection of minorities. Rights of individuals must be protected. Dialogue must be the bridge between different opinions and groups.</li> <li>• Austrian Identity is historically predetermined to be a multicultural and multiethnic one.</li> <li>• Citizens of foreign origins must be integrated in political life, as also in labour, welfare, education and social policies.</li> <li>• Democratization must encompass the EU. The reforms are needed to ensure that indeed it is people, who are sovereigns of the EU.</li> <li>• There must be a global struggle to ensure democracy for all and everywhere, eliminating lack of peace, discrimination, all forms of terror, death penalty and tortures.</li> <li>• Human rights encompass right to asylum in case of political, religious, racist or any other form of persecution.</li> </ul>
Sp.a	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International politics has to be led by democratically legitimized international organizations.</li> <li>• Europe is not democratic enough.</li> <li>• Sp.a is fighting for equal chances for all to participate in society and in politics.</li> <li>• Politics needs to be democratized, so that a better and larger representativeness is guaranteed.</li> </ul>

BSP	Democracy (5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Universal value</li> </ul>
ČSSD	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a respect for rule of law and order established by Czech Constitution.</li> <li>• The fundamental rights and freedoms of an individual are inviolable.</li> <li>• The separation of powers is the objective.</li> <li>• Sole source of legitimacy is political pluralism and principle of sovereignty of the people.</li> <li>• Will of majority applies.</li> <li>• State policy must be ideologically and religiously neutral.</li> <li>• Protection of weaker is a democratic state's characteristics.</li> </ul>
SD DK	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Democracy is a fundamental idea, which reflects application of the value of equality (everyone is equal, hence should have the same decision powers).</li> <li>• Democracy is a universal right, which cannot be overridden by any argument.</li> <li>• Social democracy stands for spread of democratic rights to all people of all countries in all parts of societies. This is the essence of universal suffrage.</li> <li>• Democracy is synonymous with rights and duties of all the citizens. They need to take active role.</li> <li>• Socialdemokraterne cherish rule of law.</li> <li>• Politicians and any elected structure should always be accountable to people.</li> <li>• Foundation of (Danish) democracy is: free elections, majority rule, minority protection, respect for human rights. Right to assemble, right to participate in a political work and in professional organizations is essential to maintain development of political traditions.</li> <li>• There must be a consistent policy against all those, who try to abuse democratic system via criminal and racist acts.</li> <li>• Everyone must be eligible to receive information and give opinions. Educational system must be constructed in a way that people learn how to seek information and critically analyze them. There must be a pluralism of media, who are in service to a public.</li> <li>• Political parties play a central role in the (Danish) democratic form of government.</li> <li>• Democracy means that individuals can influence economy.</li> <li>• To achieve a further progress in democratizing the world, there must be a modern and legitimized international institutional system (UN). People must be able to influence decisions of the international organizations (WB, ECB, , IMF);</li> <li>• EU has to serve to bring peace, stability, justice and democracy.</li> </ul>
SDE	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDE stands for democracy and human rights.</li> <li>• SDE is a part of a democratic system.</li> <li>• Political parties bear responsibility to engage and mobilize voters.</li> <li>• The parties must be open and all the documents of theirs must be disclosed to the citizens.</li> <li>• There must be a balance of powers in between institutions.</li> <li>• People must be equally represented.</li> <li>• Public offices must be held by people who understand their service in spirit of moral and law standards.</li> <li>• Corruption must be eliminated.</li> <li>• Civil society (NGOs etc.) plays an important role in democracy.</li> </ul>
SDP	Democracy (6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participation is a right.</li> <li>• Task of political movements are to raise awareness while providing information and encourage participation.</li> <li>• Civil dialogue is an important tool of engagement.</li> <li>• Modern democracy operates on many levels. Procedures must therefore comply on all of them: from local to international.</li> <li>• The use of economic resources must be subordinated to a democratic control. Global markets must also be supervised.</li> </ul>



PS Fr	Democracy (7)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is a goal and a mean.</li> <li>• It embodies a value and reflects a universal struggle.</li> <li>• It predefines the nature of a socialist action.</li> <li>• It means that people decide on their lives, their society and the future of the world.</li> <li>• Socialism is a concept that embraces citizenship practices.</li> <li>• Altogether: political, social, representative and participative democracy, they enable deliberation and collective decision.</li> </ul>
SPD	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Globalization makes the acting possibilities of single states smaller, while in the same time the new challenges are appearing (connected with climate change, social integration of millions of people and demographic changes).</li> <li>• People do doubt in the potential of politicians and politics to bring a needed change. Reversing this trend of distrust and re-establishing a belief among the people that they in a spirit of solidarity can themselves participate in decisions is one of the most important tasks of social democracy.</li> <li>• Democracy is in a “crisis of confidence”. The traditional parties are shrinking and their role is decreasing. Nevertheless the parties should still remain (as traditionally they have been) the irreplaceable element of democratic system, advocating for the interests and representing the citizens.</li> <li>• Parties should be internally democratic, with clear structures, apparent profiles, transparency of decisions, coming across as responsible and trustworthy.</li> <li>• People must be seen as equally important. Democracy is possible as they all are rational, ready to learn and entail much potential in themselves.</li> <li>• Democracy is needed as people are fallible.</li> <li>• Everyone carries responsibilities for their lives. Democracy is the only political order that justifies this self-determination and self-responsibility of people within the political framework. It is people and civic rights that on the other hand determine the institutional set-ups in the spirit of people’s cooperation in a society.</li> </ul>
PASOK	Democracy Party Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Depends on active participation of citizens in all decisions that concern them</li> <li>• Fully guaranteed democratic process – from bottom up to the leadership – with absolute equality of all the members must be guaranteed.</li> <li>• Power emanates from the people, is expression of people and must serve people.</li> <li>• Basic rights of citizens are human rights as outlined in the UN Charter.</li> <li>• PASOK stands for decentralization and strengthening local government.</li> </ul>
MSZP	Democracy Cooperation Collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As a democratic party, MSZP wants to insist on a peace and stability within a society.</li> <li>• Values of democracy and republic require protection.</li> <li>• No restrictions on democracy, stigmatizing, violence or hate can be tolerated.</li> <li>• There should be democratic parties alliance against right wing extremism.</li> <li>• There needs to be peace with neighbouring countries and society, which is a criteria for Hungary itself to remain and open, modern and proud country.</li> </ul>

ILP	Democracy (4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In democracy all people can participate in decision-making on equal bases wherever their interests are affected.</li> <li>• Democracy requires access to information and analyses through media that is under diverse ownership and underpinned by effective freedom of information legislation.</li> <li>• ILP rejects the use of force, intimidation and violence as means of achieving political aims in a democratic society.</li> <li>• ILP rejects all forms of corruption in political and public life.</li> <li>• ILP stands for a dynamic, positive role for the State working through responsive and accountable public institutions on local, national and international levels.</li> <li>• In expressing the democratically determined public good, the State can be enabling, civilizing and bonding force.</li> <li>• The State is central to the creation and distribution of wealth through the investment, development and management of the country's assets and resources.</li> <li>• State is responsible for the provision of effective, high quality and accountable public services, regulation of markets for public good and a fair taxation system.</li> <li>• Role of state is to ensure that all men, women and children enjoy basic human rights, including the right to home, to an adequate standard of living, to proper levels of health care and education and to employment. Such rights should not depend on income, power or privilege.</li> <li>• ILP favours an efficient and competitive public sector.</li> </ul>
MLP	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Democracy is a precondition for progress.</li> </ul>
PvdA	Multifaceted democratic constitutional state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The democratic constitutional state with its parliamentary democracy with the classical division of power and its accent on fundamental rights remain at the center, but it has to have a more multifaceted character with different variety of interactive and participative governance. It is a huge potential for social change. PvdA is a factor in a strategy that engages people through these means and organizes them to take responsibility, not only for their own future but also for the society as a whole.</li> </ul>
PvdA	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A decent existence is only possible in a democratic constitutional state.</li> <li>• Security is subjected to democracy and the citizens are protected against arbitrariness of the power. This is a fundamental point in consideration of protection of privacy and reduction of it in favor of the protection of all the citizens.</li> <li>• Decisions have to be taken on the lowest possible level ensuring participation of citizens.</li> <li>• Representative democracy: political power needs public control and accountability. More and more political power is being conducted without direct interference or influence from the representative democracy. Representative democracy has to be leading instead.</li> <li>• Multifaceted democracy: more often people are in the position to organize and manifest themselves. Some citizens have more possibilities than others and in order to prevent that the richest and the best organized get more influence, the principle one person-one vote has to remain the fundament of each form of political exercise of power.</li> <li>• New forms of governance, participation and consultation have to be stimulated.</li> </ul>



DNA	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The aim is to develop democracy and influence for individual in all strata segments of society and working life.</li> <li>• It draws from the value of freedom – to be able to decide on one’s situation and course of development.</li> <li>• Important premises are: right to vote, free elections, majority government, the protection of minorities and respect for human rights.</li> <li>• Democracy means rights and obligations for all. Citizens have a right to participate and duty to contribute.</li> <li>• Active democratic participation is pre-conditioned by access to knowledge, insight skills that promote individual’s orientation with regard to values, knowledge of decision making processes and social conditions. It is the task of a community at large to contribute to that, so that all citizens have the opportunity to acquire such knowledge. Education system must support citizens in seeking information and help them maintain critical attitude.</li> <li>• Population must always be able to hold elected politicians responsible.</li> </ul>
PS PT	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pluralist democracy is the only political system in which the Socialists are recognized – socialism is inseparable from democracy purpose.</li> <li>• Democracy is not about means – it is an end in itself</li> <li>• None of the values can be realized without democracy.</li> <li>• Defending democracy means never to hesitate in confronting the enemies of democracy. You fight against totalitarianism, which violates fundamental human rights and against the populism that attacks the foundations of the rule of law.</li> <li>• Democracy must continuously be recreated, in order to be continuously strengthened. Democracy itself also proves to be dynamic.</li> <li>• Democracy has to be applied as principle in all the spheres, also in economy and social affairs.</li> <li>• Political power must be independent from the economic one.</li> </ul>
PSOE	Party Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defines the format of participation and the scope of responsibility of the party members</li> </ul>

SAP	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It must never be limited by economic interests (market). It is democracy that states the terms for economy.</li> <li>• Democracy must be practiced in many ways and on many levels. The scope of democracy can be determined by democracy itself only.</li> <li>• Social democracy strive so that people are the citizens that influence developments at large and at community levels.</li> <li>• Every person must be able to influence the direction and redistribution of production, the organization and the conditions of working life.</li> <li>• Democracy must characterize society as a whole and people's mutual relations.</li> <li>• Democracy is about eliminating divisions into lower and higher orders, without class differences, sexual segregation or ethical divisions, a society without prejudices and discrimination, a society where everybody is needed and has a place, where everybody has the same right and same value, where all children can grow up to become free and independent adults, where everybody can run their own affairs, and in equal and solidaristic co-operation work for the social solutions that serve community best.</li> <li>• Democracy is a process for making decisions on common, civil concerns.</li> <li>• Democracy presupposes a multi party system and general elections.</li> <li>• The administration of society must build on public access and insight, and on clear fair rules.</li> <li>• Social Democracy also works for the abolition of the principle of hereditary succession in the monarchy and seeks to replace it with a republic where people directly or indirectly elect the head of state.</li> <li>• Democracy presupposes active citizens. The popular movements, old and new, and adult education – with the force for change that arises when people meet to share ideas and act together – must play a decisive role in the building of society.</li> <li>• The media play important role in free speech and free information. The non-commercial media for the spread of knowledge, adult education and cultural breadth strengthen democracy.</li> <li>• The power of democracy to take action must constantly be safeguarded against groups that have power because of their economic strength as well as against groups that think they have greater right than others to influence politics because of their specialist knowledge or specialist competence.</li> <li>• Internationalism implies a new challenge to democratic participation – as many political decisions are being taken on a different level.</li> </ul>
LP UK	Open Democracy (aim)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In which government is held to account by the people, decisions are taken as far as practicable by the communities they affect and where fundamental rights are guaranteed.</li> </ul>

In the light of the above quoted documents, *democracy* can be described as an ideal, but also as a process that leads to achieving it. These two categories are not contradictory, but complementary – as a process of democratization is and will remain a constant one (i.e. SPÖ, PS Fr, DNA, PS PT, SAP). It is through *democracy* that the frameworks of *democracy* are being decided and it is a common responsibility to protect and develop it. Hence *democracy* is a fundamental concept, without implementing each realization of other core values is not possible (i.e. ČSSD, SD SK, PS FR, DNA, PS PT), however on that it is worth noticing that parties highlight different from among the core values for which *democracy* is indispensable. Decent existence is only possible in *democratic constitutional state* (PvdA). *Democracy* is also a precondition for progress (see MLP). Next to being a frame, it also can be seen as a universal right (i.e. SD SK). Finally, *democracy* is the only political system in which socialism and its values are recognized; hence they are both in fact inseparable (i.e. PS FR, PS PT) and it is democracy that predefines the nature of the socialist actions (PS FR).





*Democracy* must apply to all the spheres of society (i.e. SPÖ, PS PT), it must characterize society as a whole (i.e. SAP). While exploring the details of the definitions given by the parties, it is possible to observe that the term *democracy* is being described either in relation to an institutional setting or to the actors, who play a role in democratic system. As well, as positively, it may also be defined as an opposition to: totalitarianism (PS PT); any restrictions on democracy (MSZP), extremism (MSZP), usage of force and violence in attempt to achieve political goals (ILP), corruption (SDE, ILP), and any power abuse (SD SK), arbitrariness (PvdA), racism (SD SK). It is noticeable that while naming the contradictions to democracy, parties are heavily influenced by the experiences from the recent respective histories of their countries.

Explaining the meaning of *democracy* in the context of institutional setting, all the parties more or less explicitly link it with the *respect for the rule of law*. There is a tendency that can be observed, which is that this focus is more exposed in the documents of the parties from the Central and Eastern Europe. They more frequently and more unequivocally refer to it, as also to the democratic constitutional order they are part of. (see i.e. BSP, ČSSD, SDE, SLD). To recapitulate, it is not a question of a divergence (as all the parties clearly share this principle), but rather an issue of political and historical circumstances those particular parties operate in (which is on one side still fresh memory of pre-1989 times; and on the other still fragile democracy, troubled with political turmoil after every election).

In the context of institutional setting, parties believe in representative democracy that subordinates political power under public scrutiny, accountability and control (i.e. ČSSD, SD DK, ILP, PvdA, SAP, LP UK). Some parties (i.e. SDE) emphasize additionally that duties of public office should be executed accordingly to high moral standards. For a number of parties *political ethics* is directly related to the question of ensuring trust in politics as such, and in political parties and politicians in particular.

The decisions in democracy are taken accordingly to the rule of majority (i.e. ČSSD, SD DK, DNA) with protection of minorities (i.e. SPÖ, SD DK, DNA). There are certain preconditions that must be ensured for democracy to be realized. The lists of those preconditions given by the parties usually correspond with one another. The enumerations are given especially by the two Nordic parties (SD DK and DNA) and they encompass: right to vote (DNA, but also SPÖ), free elections (SD DK, DNA), respect for human rights (SD DK, DNA), right to assemble (SD DK), right to participate in a political work (SD DK), right to participate in work of professional organizations (SD DK). SPÖ same time supplies with a detailed description of electoral rules, demanding that they are general, free, equal and that everyone should be entitled to cast an undisclosed vote. What could inspire further research is in fact how exactly those preconditions, which here are rooted clearly in a national state's circumstances, could be transposition onto the European or International level.

Several parties provide further characteristics of a democratic system. It is a consensus that a basic framework is a constitutional state. Vast majority of the parties favours a republic (for an unambiguous declaration on that please see i.e. SAP; PvdA on the other hand reconciliates with an idea of constitutional monarchy in which royals play only representative role. For more on the subject, please consult section 2.5). Parties advocate that a parliamentary system is a core pillar of democracy (see i.e. SPÖ, PvdA), in which there must be a balance of power in between institutions (i.e. SDE, PvdA).

Descriptions of institutional system are part of a discussion on what kind of state social democracy seeks to build. The most detailed description is given in the constitution of ILP, for which party, just to remind, *democracy* remains one of the core values. ILP believes in a positive role of state, which should be responsive, active and dynamic. State is in fact in charge of creation of wealth, hence for ensuring responsible management and fair, effective distribution of the resources. This links with a demand to organize, supervise and constantly improve public sector and its services. Furthermore, it is expected that *democracy* will encompass all the levels of governance (i.e. SDP, ILP). This may connect with a demand for decentralization and strengthening local government (i.e. PASOK).

The demand that *democracy* must be obeyed on all the levels (local, regional, national, European, international) is repeated by several parties. Transposition of power onto European and international levels is a natural cause of globalization, in which process interdependencies in between the states are growing and power of single states is decreasing. The transnational level are the ones, on which a response to new challenges, such as climate and demographic changes. (i.e. SPD). There are two methods that parties used to describe these two levels of democracy – either how they should be constructed or what purpose they should serve. In the first of the two, parties touch upon democratic legitimization of the international institutions (i.e. sp.a, SD DK, SAP). Among the prerogatives they indicate that they should exercise the legitimate, democratic control over the capital (i.e. SDP), as it is democracy that should state terms for (global) economy (see i.e. SAP). In the same pillars, the demands for democratization of Europe fall into (i.e. sp.a, SD DK). The second of the methods describe the aims that come along with the global struggle for *democracy* among them: ensuring human rights for all (i.e. PASOK), peace, eliminating of terror, death penalty, tortures (i.e. SPÖ). An observation that can be made is that parties tend to be more detailed and concrete in explaining the term *democracy* in the context of the national state, than in the light of European or institutional arrangements. It seems also that the entire institutional debate of the EU, which dominated the first years of the new century, is not substantially reflected in the respective parties' programmes.

Next to the institutional context, parties also interpret *democracy* in relation to the actors that play significant roles in this system. This is commonly derived from the logic that



*democracy* is a matter of rights and duties (responsibilities) of those, who create, sustain and develop it through their own action within it. There are four categories of actors that can be extracted as the ones; parties refer to in their respective texts: individual citizens, NGOs, media and political parties.

Even though the representative democracy makes some in charge of leadership and decision making process, it is still citizens that through election share responsibility for the political choices (see i.e. SPÖ, SD DK). Participation is their right (i.e. SDP), but also reflects a responsibility for the way matters are decided (i.e. SPD, PASOK). Some parties underline that it is citizens' duty (i.e. DNA). It varies among the parties on how much attention they pay to the "duty" dimension of citizenship. Active participation links with the belief that was already described in the section above, that the decentralization and empowerment of local levels is an effective way of involving citizens. This must however be interconnected with the transposition of *democracy* onto higher levels in the spirit of a concept that PvdA named *multifaceted* democracy. Finally, though generally parties do not explore the questions around rights and duties of citizens of foreign origin, a contradictory example of that is SPÖ, who demands that they are integrated in political life, as also in labour and social policies.

Additionally, *education* plays a crucial role in emancipating, enabling and encouraging citizens to take part in democratic processes. It directly relates to the principles of equal opportunities for all. It is especially three Nordic parties (SD DK, DNA, SAP), who put an extraordinary emphasis on this matter. Access to knowledge, insight skills and cognitive competences predefines abilities of people to participate in politics (DNA). Therefore, educational system must equip people with skills to be able to search for and critically analyze different pieces of information (SD DK, DNA). Civic education must take place among all the groups and on all the stages of one's life (SAP). This way of understanding one of the roles of education and the interdependency between education and democracy, provokes two additional questions. The first one is the challenge of internal party education, which has been a tradition of socialist movement and perhaps could enjoy review. The second one is a challenge on how to ensure that *education* can play a distinctive role in a process of democratization of the European Union. Since education still remains a national issue – the europeanisation of (civic) education seem still eventually requiring further thoughts.

As far as the second classification – namely the one concerning the actors who play a crucial role in democracy, in the respective texts of the parties, one can find reference to three groups: NGOs, media and political parties.

Social democratic parties recognize a profound meaning of the civil society and its organizations (i.e. see SDE). Their role is about, among others: awareness raising (i.e. SPÖ),

building political will within the society (i.e. SPÖ). Civil dialogue is an important tool of engagement (i.e. SDP). Hardly any reference can be found in those respective sections to the trade unions, despite the fact that some of them touch upon the issue of democracy in the world of labour (i.e. SPÖ) and that democracy means that individuals can influence economy (i.e. SD DK, SAP). There is no further indication on any eventual alliance between civil society and political parties; however they share responsibility for fulfillment of certain tasks.

Media are in service to public (SD DK) and hence charge of providing people with relevant information. This is a basic requirement of *democracy*. Pluralism of media (SD DK), that reflects freedom of speech and free information (SAP), is a guarantee that an objective choice can be made by citizens. Therefore it is also relevant that they are not monopolized and remain under diverse ownership (ILP). SAP underlines in their text that it is the public (*non-commercial*) *media* that are responsible for spread of knowledge and education.

Last but not least, several political parties also describe role of political parties in *democracy*, which presupposes multi party system (i.e. SAP). Political movements are also responsible for awareness rising and for encouraging participation (SDP), but also for mobilizing voters (SDE). Politicians and any elected structure should always be accountable to people (SD DK, DNA). Nowadays there is a lack of trust in politics and politicians and social democracy especially has a mission to reverse that trend (i.e. SDP). These several points will be exceptionally interesting to analyze in relation to transnational political party system, such as the one in the EU.

## 2.16. Humanism

*Humanism* is frequently defined as an approach, usually in studies (especially social sciences) and / or philosophy. It focuses on *human values* and concerns, affirming in general human nature. Certain definitions distinguish between secular and religious humanisms (the first emphasizing the role of reason and ethics as basis of morality and decision making, the second referring to religious beliefs and rituals as defining ones). Modern humanists (such as Corliss Lamont<sup>77</sup>) argue that humanity must seek for truth through reason and best observable proofs. They stipulate that the decisions on right and wrong should be based on individual and common goods<sup>78</sup>. Contemporary humanism also embraces *qualified optimism* about people, believing that human nature is not impure or perfect, however people can live up to the ideals if they are helped by others and by the society. It is being observed that *humanism* evolves towards inclusiveness and sensibility towards others (both human, but also planet etc.)

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<sup>77</sup> Corliss Lamont, 1902 – 1995, American socialist philosopher, professor at Columbia and Harvard Universities, as also New School for Social Research. Lamont served as chairman of National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

<sup>78</sup> [www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org)



In this light *humanism* would rather appear as a way of thinking, than a value in itself. For several parties *humanism* is being named as their *heritage* in which also their contemporary beliefs are anchored in (see section 2.4; i.e. PS FR, PSD, BSP, DNA). Nevertheless some do refer to it as their core value – and the texts of BSP, ČSSD and SDP are examples of it. It is worth underlining that among them SDP refers to it explicitly as the 5th among the core values they recognize.

BSP	Humanism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is an expression of a desire to revitalize the meaningful value of all the people.</li> <li>• It signifies a hope for humanization process in the new global information age.</li> <li>• It is most valuable landmark of modern social democracy.</li> </ul>
ČSSD	Humanism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a need for radical humanization of work and life.</li> <li>• Humanism is the bases of the rule of law, which guarantees a development and social transformation.</li> </ul>
SDP	Humanism (5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It refers to a popular movement for human dignity, human rights, sense of responsibility of individual; civil rights; cultural rights; social and work related rights.</li> <li>• The possibility of personal development along with the access to culture, they form an essential part of human rights.</li> </ul>

*Humanism* brings attention to individuals. It presupposes the understanding that everyone is of the same great value. Therefore also all are entitled to same human rights, to life in dignity and to self-determination. Emphasis on the human nature is suggested to be a necessity in order to ensure adequate place of humanity in the modern, progressing world.

As it has been pointed out, contemporary *humanism* embraces two notions that can be of a great importance for social democracy in the 21st century. The first of them, being an attention to reason, can be easily linked with the policies that progressives advocate for on the bases of their core values, such as i.e. education. Seen from that angle, education is not only a question of empowerment of individuals, but a way of creating a common, societal ethics – and as such gives also strong bridge to the role progressives expect education to play in the context of modern democracy. The second one is optimism. This is a characteristic that is difficult to embrace by the progressive movement, which has in its DNA historical criticism and in its mission struggle against all the injustice. It is being noted recently that social democracy is less and less related to the conception of hope (campaign of President Obama being an exception here), rather being seen as those, whose policies one should refer to in case of trouble (poverty, unemployment etc.) It is being replied that it is difficult to bring along optimism, once fighting for preservation of the social system in the era of crisis. Perhaps a solution to that could be indeed a *humanist* belief in people.

## 2.17. Secularism

*Secularism* refers to separation between state (governmental institutions) and religion (religious churches and dignitaries). This means that there is no religion recognized as a state one; and that the religious convictions of all the officials of government, legislative and judiciary remain their private matters. Same time, in a number of definitions *secularism* puts emphasis that everyone should enjoy freedom of beliefs and worship. As such then *secularism* could be linked with two values that social democrats recognize as their core ones: freedom and equality (in a sense of equality of all the people regardless of their philosophical convictions). In understanding of some, *secularism* may also appear linked to anti-clericalism, which stands for a historical movement that opposes religious institutional power and influence (real or alleged) in all aspects of public and political life.

*Secularism* has been mentioned already, as it appears in the respective parties' texts both regarding the heritage (see the section 2.5), self portrait of the parties (see section 2.6) and also in the subsequent sections. It has been elaborated there already on what discrepancies can be spotted among the parties on this respective issue. To the list of the parties, who position themselves on the issue, also PASOK should be added:

PASOK	Secularism	The state and church must remain separated.
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Furthermore, certain differences can be seen regarding parties who relate to *secularism*. LSAP and PS Fr refer to *secularism* as the principle; however it is effectively only PASOK that name *secularism* as a value. The explanation embodies the image of the overall rules of a democratic state, referring to separation of it from the state. For LSAP *secularism* is directly connected with anti-clericalism.

Due to the European history, positions on religion, religious freedoms and place of church in public life are associated (though not related explicatively) with Christian church (Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant). Nevertheless, this debate is not yet related to the question of Islam – even though it plays such an important role in all the contemporary debate on migration and changing societies.

## 2.18. Community

*Community* is a term that most would associate with a group of interacting people, who possibly live in a close proximity and are to share common values. There are many definitions (deriving from sociology, psychology, anthropology and social philosophy), which bridge



with concepts such as: social networks, social capital, and sense of community.

Despite that in the light of these definitions it is rather a certain idea than a fundamental value, *community* is being named as the third core value in the Constitution of the Irish Labour Party. It is a very unique position.

ILP	Community (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community solidarity, a common sense of belonging and a willingness to work for the common good in the local and wider community, is essential to creating a good quality of life for all.</li> <li>• The (natural) environment is central to a true sense of community, locally and globally. All human interactions with the environment must be sustainable so that we can meet the needs of today without compromising the rights of future generations.</li> <li>• The spirit of Community places Labour on the side of the oppressed, not only in Ireland, but also in all countries of the world and particular in the Third World.</li> </ul>
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Since the ILP does not enumerate solidarity as a core value, but instead refers to community one could ask if that signifies a potential direction of ideological evolution. The definition that the party provides is encompassing level of individuals, their immediate surroundings, but also the global one. Through a notion of sense of community it indicates the framework in which relations between a human and the world around should be built, and hence provides an interesting explanation on social democratic position on issues such as: individualization, globalization and global interdependence.

## 2.19. Respect and dignity

The terms *respect* and *dignity* are being more and more frequently mentioned within the texts of the national parties. They appear in a form of adjective; however they also are being referred to separately.

The first of them, *respect*, stands for a positive feeling (towards a person or entity) and for a specific action (a conduct that represents this esteem). It can derive from ethics or can be also an expression of regard towards certain valued qualities. The second, *dignity*, can be used in a context of moral, ethical and naturally political discussions. It is an acknowledgement that all poses same, innate right to *respect* and ethical treatment. The term derives from teachings of Enlightenment.

There are two parties, who refer to those two terms as to core values: sp.a and ČSSD. As chapter 3 will show, these notions also appeared in the recent Manifesto of the PES. It can be another sign of a shift in attention from a dominant thinking from the angle of community / collective towards a new mainstreaming conceptualization, that begins from an individual in a society.

ČSSD	Respect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All rights are in public interest. They put an obligation to respect other citizens.</li> <li>• Respect is bases for any cooperation</li> </ul>
sp.a	Dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Everyone’s life should be led in dignity.</li> </ul>

## 2.20. Security

*Security* stands for protection against danger, which can be understood in many different contexts. It is being recognized only by LSAP as one of the party’s 4 core values, which defines it in a following way:

LSAP	Security (4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People have an elementary need for security, which needs to be ensured. Security is a practical outcome of an implemented solidarity and the fundament of the social life in a community.</li> <li>• For individuals security means security of their existence in a sense of social insurance. It implies also ensuring public services, health care, environmental protection and safety from risks connected with new technologies.</li> <li>• Scientific research must remain in service of the people and as such must obey moral and ethical boundaries. This is especially applicable in sensitive areas of new bio-technologies.</li> <li>• Every person has a right of security of themselves and their property, as also to their personal data and private sphere protection.</li> <li>• There must be security for each against violence and crime.</li> </ul>
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There are two observations that should be made at this point. First of all, 21st century has so far become a century of insecurity. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, the subsequent phases and dimensions of global crisis induce an overwhelming feeling of fear among the European and world populations. Reference to security and making it a core value may be a way to answer to those. Secondly, the LSAP interpretations show implications of *security* as a value mirrored in policy principles that shall be obeyed regarding new challenges – such as evolution, new technologies, bio technology etc. This is an inspiring example of a how meaning of certain concepts gets modified, while being placed in a modern reality. As such it constitutes a positive argument for a need of constant renewal and constant readjustments.

## 2.21. Peace and Internationalism

In the section 2.12, there has been an extensive elaboration on the question of *international solidarity*. It was summarized that its aim was, among others, establishment of *peace, stability and sustainable development*. Concluding from that, peace in fact would appear rather as a certain world order rather than a core value. It would follow then the dry dictionary interpretation, in the light of which peace is a state of harmony characterized by lack of a violent conflict (war).





Regardless of this, there is a need to recognize that the tendency to see peace as one of the core values exist within social democracy. It may be strengthened especially on the European grounds, where it is believed that the EU is in fact a community built upon common values of which *peace* is the one. Three of the parties, among the group whose texts were analyzed, refer to *peace* as a value – explaining it as a certain ideal and enumerating conditions that must be fulfilled towards establishing and preserving it.

BSP	Peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is more than absence of war.</li> <li>• Is the precondition and guarantee for a decent and fairer life, as also a determinant of sustainability of the mission of progress.</li> </ul>
PASOK	Peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An ambition is world peace and brotherhood of people.</li> <li>• Denuclearization of Mediterranean and Balkan area and neutralizing this zone in the military sense remains an ambition.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Peace (9)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Struggle for peace, collective security and common development reflects the internationalist thought of socialism.</li> </ul>

PS Fr in its elaborations refers additionally to *internationalism*. This can be understood as a principle for a complex, multifaceted, global action, that based on cooperation among actors is to lead to a world of peace, balance, human rights, social justice and democracy. For PS Fr it also is the key to solving issues such as migration, which makes party place migration in itself rather as a global scale matter than an exclusively a domestic one. This is important to point out, as there is no one definite way of approaching this issue and in the future it may become a point of further divergence among the parties.

PS Fr	Internationalism (10)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Internationalism means struggle for human rights and social justice; for world of balance, fairness and assurance.</li> <li>• There is a need to democratize the international institutions.</li> <li>• To make France an open country, there is a need to combat all the discriminations against migrants and protect their fundamental rights.</li> </ul>
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## 2.22. Sustainable development

*Sustainable development* as a term owes much of its popularity to the work of so called Brundtland Commission<sup>79</sup>. Accordingly to the definition that was adopted in this Commission's report *sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the*

79 Brundtland Commission, formally World Commission on Environment and Development was convened in 1983 by a resolution 36/161 of the UN. It was established to address growing concern "about the accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural resources as the consequences of that deterioration for economic and social development." Its Chair, Gro Harlem Brundtland, born 1939, is a Norwegian social democratic politician, who served as Prime Minister of Norway in 1981, 1986-89 and 1990-1996.

present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two concepts: (1) the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and (2) the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.

One could therefore link *sustainable development* as a principle deriving from solidarity: international on one hand, and intergenerational on the other. Certain parties estimate its importance however higher, recognizing in it not only a principle but a core value. These are 5: BSP, ČSSD, SDE, PS Fr and LSDSP.

ČSSD	Sustainable development (principle)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Natural, social and cultural environment must be protected.</li> <li>• (Cultural) Heritage of ancestors must be preserved.</li> </ul>
SDE	Sustainable Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDE is a party of sustainable development.</li> </ul>
PS Fr	Sustainable development (5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allows responding to the needs of society nowadays and in the future.</li> <li>• Preservation and improvement of the environment reflects general and particular interests.</li> </ul>
LSDSP	Sustainable development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One of the conditions for global sustainable development is economic development that is harmonious with the environment.</li> </ul>

In comparison to the UN definition, social democrats add three contexts in which *sustainable development* should be additionally considered. The first one is a matter of individual and collective rights and interests. The second one is the link between humanism and culture and the issue of environment. Finally, the third one is a matter of responsibility – which foremost derives from intergenerational solidarity.

## 2.23. Patriotism, Sovereignty and Culture

Social democracy emphasizes its internationalist character. This is perhaps why it is very rare that it inspires associations between it and the notions such as patriotism, sovereignty, national identity and national culture. These four more often are attributed to the right wing.

This generalization may not be legitimized, neither from the perspective of the actual definitions, nor from what can be read and what is echoed in the respective parties' statements.

Starting from the definitions, *patriotism* signifies devotion to one's country and compatriots. *Sovereignty* of a state gives that state a supreme, independent authority over its territory. As such, it links with *self-determination*, which is a principle of international law accordingly to which nations have a right to decide in sovereignty about their political status. Finally, *culture*



has several definitions – but in this particular context would mean set of shared attitudes, values, goal and practices that characterize a group or an institution.

These are related to in the different parties’ texts: SPÖ, BSP, sp.a, ČSSD, SD DK, SDE, PS Fr, PASOK, MSZP, ILP, MLP, PS PT, PSD. They may be associated with different particular issues. To exemplify that in the context of culture a bit more, for example language’s preservation is of a crucial importance to ILP and MLP; national identity is very relevant for SPÖ and SDE. Sp.a, SDP and PS FR agree that this culture sets the limit to standards. PSD underlines the magnitude of national interest, integrity and sovereignty.

The list above proves again, that it is historical and political context in which values are being determined by the respective parties. The attachment to *patriotism* and *sovereignty*, to the features of *culture* such as language, is commonly especially strong among people from the countries, which suffered from occupation, oppressive regimes and from foreign rule. These experiences are relatively fresh for the states from Southern Europe, and very vivid for the Central and Eastern Member States.

There are two parties, for which patriotism is a value – BSP and MSZP:

BSP	Patriotism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This is a determinant to be a responsible national party.</li> <li>• It composes of: Bulgarian folk traditions, virtues of patriotism; hard work; openness to the world; integrity; devotion to family; friendship, hospitality; charity and mutual aid.</li> </ul>
MSZP	Patriotism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MSZP is a party of the nation, which should remain open and must never exclude anyone.</li> <li>• There must be a fight against expropriation of nation.</li> <li>• With pride of Hungarian achievements and heritage, MSZP underlines its belief in diversity and pluralistic society.</li> <li>• Nation is not primarily a question of ethnic origins, but an issue of common destiny, common traditions, culture, language, commitment to common future. Hungarians living outside of the state borders’ are part of this community.</li> <li>• Solidarity strengthens the nation, as also the peaceful co-existence of the respective diverse faiths, ethnic and social groups</li> </ul>

Sovereignty (popular and national) is named as a value by PASOK:

PASOK	National Independence Popular sovereignty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is inseparably bound with popular sovereignty and democracy</li> <li>• National independence is a prerequisite for realization of popular sovereignty.</li> <li>• Popular sovereignty is a prerequisite for the realization of social liberation, which subsequently is a prerequisite for realization of political democracy.</li> <li>• Territorial integrity of Greece must be ensured.</li> </ul>
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Finally, national culture is a value for SDE:

SDE	Culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National identity, heritage, language and culture are very important. Protecting them should not be however understood as xenophobia or unequal treatment towards citizens of different national origins.</li> </ul>
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Even though, as it was shown above, the notions of *patriotism, sovereignty and national culture* seem very important to the number of parties – they are overshadowed in communication by other matters. This is happening despite the fact, that in some countries (here especially in the North of Europe) firm support for one’s state can also be translated into notions such as welfare state and hence made directly link with social democratic agenda. Finally, those matters are also never recognized within the European debates, as they could eventually be seen as contradictory to the spirit of internationalism and also as conflicts-inducing one.

Realizing those, one could say that there is a certain vacuum that exists in between the national parties’ programmes and the European level in that dimension. This void should perhaps be filled in with some new concepts, also opening the door for eventual European identity and European patriotism building. This may be the turning point for proposals from the renewal debates, such as *cosmopolitan social democracy*.

### 2.24. Progress

For two parties (PS Fr and MSZP) progress constitutes a value as well. It is worth examining the idea carefully, especially that in modern times social democrats frequently refer to themselves as progressives. It can serve on one hand showing a difference from conservatives, on the other also indicating the modernization of the movement and its openness.

PS Fr and MSZP characterize progress in a following way:

PS Fr	Progress (6)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress is a fundamental value for socialists as it remains a synonym of improvement of life conditions.</li> <li>• Intellectual achievements, results of research, technological innovations and cultural heritage should be available to all.</li> <li>• Progress should be to the benefit of the people. As it determines future of humanity, it should obey principle of precaution, which enables to realize collective choices via democratic surveillance and subordination of the risks acceptance (which remains inseparable from research). Democratic control would ensure legitimate use of innovations.</li> <li>• Socio-economic progress must ensure improvement of living and working conditions of all.</li> </ul>
MSZP	Progress / modernisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reject to look inward, to embark on false historical nostalgia.</li> <li>• Progress is achieved thanks to the cooperation of people</li> <li>• Purpose of modernization is country's prosperity from which all can benefit, being able to readapt to changing conditions.</li> </ul>

PS Fr underlines that it is a fundamental value, as it is a sign of improvement of all the life conditions. The precondition, that achieving *progress* requires cooperation among people and that its benefit should be shared among the people qualifies it as a societal concept. From that perspective eventual evolution from the labeling *social democratic* into *progressive* may



be also seen as an indication that social democracy is ready to embark on a new mission, aim of which is no longer redistribution of the means of production but rather of shares of civilization's evolution.

*Progress* is also frequently related to *openness*, which parties aim at seeing as their self-characteristic (see section 2.5). In that sense *progressivism* could also mean emphasis on inclusiveness of the movement, which i.e. PS PT explains as a following ambition:

PS PT	Openness	• To be open to diversity, initiative, innovation and progress.
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### 3. Ideological evolution of the PES

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The aim of the research concluded within this Chapter is to show the main threads of the ideological evolution of the Party of European Socialists (PES) since its establishment in 1992 till its last electoral Manifesto in 2009. The question that is to be answered is double folded here. First of all, what the European progressive school of thought has been about until nowadays and hence how that can eventually serve as basis in the renewal process that was launched by the PES at its Congress in Prague in 2009. Secondly, in the light of the findings of Chapter 2 it is to point the questions and issues that have remained unsolved or unrelated between the national and European level. Hence it will expose the matters, which that in the course of a pan-European debate can lead to new answers and subsequently become a solid step towards Europeanization of social democracy.

As indicated, the post-2009 discussions on a need for a profound renewal of social democracy have largely evolved around the systematical ideological restitution. There can be three explanations of such an approach.

First of all, commenting upon the electoral strategy in 2009, analysts pointed out the weakness of the PES as a transnational political party, which had not presented a so called "top candidate"<sup>80</sup>. It was widely argued that a political figure, who potentially could have become a President of the European Commission, would have given a face to the PES Manifesto. As such he or she would have embodied an opposition to the EPP candidate, Jose Manuel Barroso. Appointment of a so called top candidate became an emergency in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, which assumes that the President of the Commission will originate from the political family of the largest group in the European Parliament. If indeed all the major political parties

80 E.Sundström, *The Next Left: Thoughts on the European Elections 2009*, [in:] *Next Left. Renewing Social Democracy, Contributions to a European-wide debate*; (eds.) E.Stetter, K.Duffek, A.Skrzypek. FEPS 2009, pages 125 - 130

were to nominate such a person to lead their campaigns European-wide, it could have a great impact on personification and hence politization of the European Union<sup>81</sup>. Elections based on actual rivalry on pan-European scale would require greater coherence and unity among the member parties, promoting this particular candidate and the unique message all across the continent. This would in a natural way observe realization of the cleavage theory of the democratic parties on the EU level<sup>82</sup> and also could induce further europeanisation of the respective national parties, as they were to unite forces for sake of successful campaign<sup>83</sup>. There are hypothesis according to which europeanisation of social democracy on the old continent is the only way forward, which is why the review of all the policies is equally, if not even more important than the revision of the electoral strategy<sup>84</sup>.

Secondly, it has been widely criticized that the European Union is a political stage on which decisions are taken on the basis of a compromise. The multifaceted, bureaucratic character of European policies makes it additionally difficult for a potential voter to retrace differences between what i.e. conservatives and progressives are proposing as far as the vision for the future of Europe is concerned. Hence what the European elections remain so called "second rank" vote<sup>85</sup>, which are commonly used by the European electorate to express their opinions concerning national parties and the performance of the government of their respective countries. A profound ideological renewal of transnational political parties, which would begin with putting in place a new vision, could be a chance to change this state of affairs. Circumstances, in which people all across the continent, can actually distinguish European left and European right, identifying with a position of one of these could generate both interest in European affairs, as also mobilization for the elections. Therefore also the renewal of policies is a matter of a historical importance. As such, it must begin with re-instituting the core values in their modern interpretation as a sort of a moral compass to guide subsequently principles for action and policies.

Thirdly, in relation to re-politicisation of Europe and europeanisation of the national parties, a process in the result of which a new reference point was to be established should not be underestimated. Across Europe, there is a relatively common trend of decline of the traditional member-based parties. Several academics link it, among others, with a shrinking

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81 A.Skrzypek, "Models of (s)electing a top candidate", FEPS 2010 [http://www.feps-europe.eu/fileadmin/downloads/next-left/1007\\_FEPS\\_AS\\_Candidate.pdf](http://www.feps-europe.eu/fileadmin/downloads/next-left/1007_FEPS_AS_Candidate.pdf)

82 S.Hix, A.G.Noury and G.Roland, *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*, Cambridge University Press 2007, pages 63 - 65

83 See: *The Europeanization of national political parties. Power and organizational adaptation*; (ed.) T.Poguntke, N.Aylott, E.Carter, R.Ladrech, K.R.Luther; *Routledge Advances in European Politics*, New York 2008

84 These hypothesis are based on an assumption, that as the social democratic policies such as labour and social ones can no longer be dealt by a states alone – due to single market and transposition of the prerogatives of the welfare state onto the European level, the point of reference for social democracy should be above all the EU level and its policies. Hence Europeanisation of the national political parties is an urgent necessity.

85 See: R.Corbett, F.Jacobs and M.Shackleton, *The European Parliament*, John Harper Publishing London 2005, p. 29



scope of actual possibilities of party members to have an impact through their activism<sup>86</sup>. It is perhaps too simplistic to say that enabling them to act in a new, European dimension would reverse the trend of the decline. Nevertheless one could risk a hypothesis that enabling an identification of the national party members with a certain set of values on the European level, could inspire them to act accordingly and promote them on the national and local level. For activating that identification it is crucial to provide them with a coherent set in a shape of a declaration of principles.

These three arguments fully legitimize the process that PES has undertaken, following the decision taken at its Congress and Council, respectively in Prague in 2009 and in Warsaw in 2010. The process was labeled with the branding of a vision of “Our Progressive Societies” and observed several meetings of both party officials, as also consultations through its Advisory Board Meetings.

However, the ambition is naturally to look into the future, it is self-evident that a new progressive vision for Europe will be strong and credible only if it is well anchored in the traditions that have united socialists since the beginnings of their cooperation on the European level. Therefore this particular chapter is devoted to analyses of what ideological base has been created throughout the past 20 years of existence of the Party of European Socialists.

### 3.1. Introduction

Until the elections of 2009 it has been the European Elections Manifestos that have constituted the supreme political documents of the PES. This thesis can be supported by several arguments. First of all, until 2009 there had been no other document that would overpass them in rank. There has also been no provision in the statute envisaging such an evolution. Secondly, Manifesto being a “set of key statements of party positions” allowed as the only one see the ideological complexity of the PES in the sense considered by R.L.Keeney’s scheme (as explained in section 1.3). Thirdly, it is precisely Manifesto that has constituted an important symbol of unity of all the social democratic parties from across Europe.

This third point requires perhaps further elaboration. The Manifestos have often been met with a criticism as far as if they meet the criteria of *utilitarianism* (see section 1.2). This denigration often leads to overlooking that it is a powerful message that all the social democratic parties from all over the continent are capable to come together and agree on a common direction. The tendency is to overlook that this has not always been the case – if one

<sup>86</sup> U.Jun, O.Niedermayer, E.Wiesendahl, *Zukunft der Mitgliedepartei*, Verlag Barbara Budrich Warschau 2009, pp. 20 - 21

remembers that in 1979 the CSPEC (predecessor of the PES) did not manage to get parties to agree on one Manifest. Also till the 1990s the Manifestos were in fact weakened by the footnotes of the respective parties, in which they placed the disclaimer about one or another section<sup>87</sup>. What is more it is the Manifesto that enlists the policy issues that the party wants to take care of in the upcoming legislative period. These compared with the respective Manifestos of the EPP and ELDR give an impression on what realistically will be debated, as also where the main lines of ideological disputes lay<sup>88</sup>.

It is a different approach and signifies different expectations towards the role of Manifestos that what one would assume in relation to the national parties. That originates from a conclusion that the European transnational party system is profoundly different from the national one. The common aspiration to see them as alike has led to the situation in which Manifestos have often been met with severe criticism that they have been a sort of "laboratory documents", which neither have been a point of reference for the respective member parties, nor have they been potentially sellable as campaign addresses. The stereotype that the texts of Manifestos are developed by the parties' elites during some closed meetings has been given as a reason why parties' members do not feel ownership of them. This criticism was tackled significantly by the strategy adopted in 2007, which made the process more open, inclusive and based on multifaceted consultation. Next to that however, another important aspect should be brought in the Manifestos defense. The European Elections are commonly named as the second rank national elections, in which parties run on the bases of their responses to the national issues. That is and will continue being the case, once no real European public sphere is constituted.

The conclusion of the previous paragraphs is that the Manifestos are therefore, as assumed, the key documents in light of which the ideological evolution of the PES can be analyzed. The fact that they are adopted regularly since 1984 allows studying policy changes over time<sup>89</sup>.

The methodological choice was to show the evolution only from the moment of establishment of the PES and disregard herewith the previous Manifestos adopted by the CSPEC in 1984 and 1989. There are two reasons. The first one is a historical context, which is that the map of Europe have changed significantly in 1989 and that has a great impact on what is being emphasized by the European social democrats while elaborating on values such as peace, solidarity or democracy. Comparison of the elements of that change would constitute

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87 A.A.Skrzypek, *Partia Europejskich Socjalistów 1957 – 2009. Geneza – organizacja – możliwości*, Warszawa Aspra 2009

88 A.A.Skrzypek, *Studium oferty programowej konserwatystów, liberalów i socjalistów przygotowanej z myślą o kampanii wyborczej do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2009*, [in:] *Przegląd Europejski 1 (18) 2009*, Uniwersytet Warszawski Elipsa 2009

89 M.Laver, *Position and salience in policies*, [in:] *Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors*, ed. Michael Laver, Routledge New York 2001, p. 77



undoubtedly a great research question, but definitely overpass the capacity and focus of that study. Secondly, 1992 has brought to life the European Union. This is a new political set up, parallel to which a transnational party system has been formalized. This is the arrangement in which parties operate nowadays and hence remains the same reference point.

There was one more document analysed within the study, which is not a Manifesto per se but supplies with a number of relevant points that influence the findings. This is *The Den Haag Declaration*, which was adopted at the first (establishment) Congress of the PES in November 1992. As it encompasses all the thoughts that laid fundamentals for re-emergence of social democracy in the newly established Union, it is naturally a great starting point for all the elaborations.

Though the study has been worked on throughout the year 2011, it consciously does not refer to the two ideological renewal processes: from 1999<sup>90</sup> and from 2009-2011. There are two reasons for this methodological choice. First of all, the threads in the renewal debates represent pluralism of social democratic movement. As long as they are not officially adopted documents they cannot be considered equally relevant to official positions. Secondly, the aim of this study is to uphold an academic character (as stated clearly in the introduction), to which direct comments on the ongoing process could be disturbing.

As the objective remains to link the analyses of the European social democratic thought with the outcomes of the comparative study of the positions of the respective national parties (as completed in Chapter 2), the structure of this Chapter has been readjusted to the composition of the previous one. It is attuned, accordingly to what notions appeared in fact in a significant way in the PES documents.

Even though the initial intention was to show the ideological evolution using quantitative methods (especially CMP – Comparative Manifesto Project), it has been in the course of the research dropped and replaced by qualitative methods. It is true that several elements would enable usage of CMP<sup>91</sup>, however pursuing this direction would make it fairly impossible to bridge the findings of the Chapters 2 and 3. As also historical and anthropological context (see section 1.4) have been changing significantly, the PES has grown and evolved bringing new members and new understandings along, it would have not been possible to classify any of

90 The references to the 1999 process can be found among the documents of the PES Congress 1999. "The Values and Commitments of European Social Democracy in the 21st Century" was in fact a title of one of the opening debates during the PES Congress "The new Europe" in Milan, Italy on 1st and 2nd March 1999. Among the speakers there were: Raimon Obiols (PSOE / Vice-President of PES; Thorbjörn Jagland (Leader of DNA), Heinz Fischer (SPÖ / Vice-President of PES), Achille Occhetto (Italy, VP of PES), Akis Tsohatzopoulos (PASOK, VP of PES), Philippe Busquin (Leader of Belgian PS). In his opening remarks, R.Obiols recalled the old Brandt's question: "what are the characteristics of social democracy?" and then replied "To take new initiatives, from new starting points." Responding to him, T.Jaglad said that in his view "there was no natural convergence of thinking between social democrats in the member countries of the EU. If there was, we would have seen greater attempts to unify the left. It is people, who converged, ideology remains the same".

91 Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945 – 1998, ed. Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Eric Tanenbaum, Oxford University Press 2001, page 215 and further

the values as notions of the same content at each point of time. Hence the study could not be accurate. This is why the author decided on using qualitative comparative methods.

As in the previous Chapter, the text includes a number of tables. Their function is to allow presenting larger pieces of texts, within which passages values are either directly quoted or emerge from a context. This method allows showing relevance of the particular values in subsequent years. Though it was not a prior task of this research, they also illustrate the development in the art of writing Manifestos (i.e. how abstract or details they were, what their constructions were etc.)

### 3.2. Formats of the documents

In the previous chapter, much attention has been devoted to the issue what format that the respective PES member parties chose for expressing their values (see section 2.2). The question remains valid for the PES, which until 2011 has never adopted a singular Declaration of Principles or Fundamental Programme.

As it was explained extensively in the introduction (see section 3.1), the methodological choice was to analyze therefore the respective PES Manifestos. They are, beyond any doubt, the supreme ideological documents of the PES, which by its nature give guidelines to all the policy areas that the party occupies itself with during respective legislative periods of the European Parliament. Next to being an important symbol of unity among the social democratic parties across the continent, they are also oriented to show the cleavage between the visions that exists among the main transnational political families as far as the present and future of the European Union are concerned. Finally, their drafting and adopting process is the most inclusive one, involving different stages of consultations among different bodies (statutory and ad-hoc established ones). They induce organizational effort, which a European campaign (or attempt to coordinate national campaigns from the European level) is. As such they perhaps so far are the most potential ones, as far as creating a sort of a European social democratic identity (if one was to return to the Keeney's scheme from the section 1.3). The analyses of the subsequent Manifestos were enriched by a study of the founding (so called "The Hague") Declaration of the PES. It was added in a hope, that it could enable understanding what vision for Europe and hence what mission for the European party in it was agreed upon.

Altogether the number of the "fundamental" documents reached therefore a number of 5. The overview of the basic pieces of information about them (title, composition, length) is illustrated by the following table.



1992<sup>93</sup> "The Den Haag Declaration – "Europe, Our Common Future"" as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992.

5 points / 5 pages

1. European socialists and social-democrats are fully committed to the process of European integration
2. The First Congress of the PES marks an important step in the evolution of European socialism and social-democracy.
  3. European socialists and social-democrats want to improve Europe.
    - 3.1 A common strategy for employment in the 1990s
    - 3.2 Economic and social cohesion
    - 3.3 Social Europe
    - 3.4 An Environmental Europe
    - 3.5 A Democratic Europe
    - 3.6 A Tolerant Europe
    - 3.7 A People's Europe
    - 3.8 Adequate funding of the Union
    - 3.9 Common Foreign and Security Policy
    - 3.10 Community Enlargement
4. We have welcomed the Treaty of the European Union.
5. Socialists and social-democrats want to make Europe more open.

1994<sup>94</sup> Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994

9 Chapters / 17 pages

0. Preface (by W.Claes, President of the PES)
1. Europe at the Crossroads – A Challenge for Democratic Socialists
2. Creating jobs, safeguarding social progress and encouraging cohesion
3. Equality for men and women
4. Protecting environment and the consumer
5. Creating peace and security through co-operation
6. Fighting racism – regulating immigration together
7. Fighting organised crime
8. Working for democracy
9. Everyone is talking about Europe – only we can make progress

<p>1999<sup>95</sup></p>	<p>“The New Europe” PES Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections          “21 Commitments for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”          4 Chapters / 21 points / 22 pages          Europe of jobs and growth          1. Putting jobs first          2. Working for growth          3. Promoting a Social Europe          4. Making the Euro a Success          5. Completing the Single Market          6. Promoting Education, Skills and Technology          Europe that puts citizens first          7. Promoting citizens’ rights          8. Supporting youth in the 21st century          9. Creating Equality Between Women and Men          10. Combating Racism and Managing Migration          11. Ensuring a Healthy Environment          12. Developing Strength Through Cultural Diversity          13. Strengthening Security and Fighting Crime          14. Bringing the European Union Closer to The People          A Strong Europe          15. Meeting the Challenge of Globalisation          16. Uniting Europe          17. Acting Together for Peace and Security in the World          18. Promoting Solidarity with other Nations          A Democratic Union That Works Better          19. Reforming the European Union Policies          20. Reforming the European Union’s Budget          21. Reforming the European Union’s Institutions</p>
<p>2004<sup>96</sup></p>	<p>“Growing Stronger Together. 5 commitments for the next five years.” Manifesto of the “PES for the June 2004 European Parliament elections          5 Chapters / 7 pages          1. Boost Europe’s growth, fight poverty and create more and better jobs          2. Bring the European Union closer to its citizens          3. Manage migration and pursue social integration          4. Build a more secure, sustainable, peaceful and just world          5. Promote Europe as an area of democracy and equality</p>
<p>2009<sup>97</sup></p>	<p>“People First: A New Direction for Europe.”          6 Chapters / 46 pages          1. Relaunching the economy and preventing new financial crisis          - Reforming the financial markets to serve the real economy, jobs and growth          - A European Strategy for smart green growth and jobs          - Ensuring workers and businesses benefit from economic transformation          2. New Social Europe – giving people a fairer deal          - Ensuring a fairer deal for people          - Protecting citizen’s rights          3. Transforming Europe into the leading global force against climate change          - Successfully leading international negotiations for a global climate change deal          - Leading by example – a more ambitious climate and energy policy for the EU          4. Championing gender equality in Europe          - Making gender equality a reality for all          5. Developing an effective European migration policy          - Managing migration effectively          6. Enhancing Europe’s role as a partner for peace, security and development          - Promoting peace and security          - Promoting partnership          - Eradicating poverty          Make your vote count in Europe in June 2009</p>



On the bases of this overview, a few observations can be made. First of all, throughout the years there seem to be a tendency to lengthen the documents. Exception to that is the document adopted in 2004, which however can easily be explained by the political circumstances that accompanied this particular process and the congress itself<sup>97</sup>. The founding declaration was effectively a 5 points / 5 pages long declaration, once the 2009 Manifesto reached the considerable size of 6 Chapters on 46 pages. There are three possible explanations. The first one is that the growing European Union and progressing unification of it enlarged the number of issues that a transnational party must hold a stand on. The second is that increasing need for cooperation among the parties (especially once they controlled majority of the European governments) required a higher degree of coordination in a larger number of issues. This tendency remained, despite the electoral defeats across the continents. Thirdly, and finally, it reflects the overall (national and European) shift in the ways policies are presented.

This change is clearly noticeable alteration from visionary politics (of grand ideas) to politics of facts and figures. This is comprehensible if one considers that IT era and popularization of internet on one side, and the 24 media on the other, enable people to have a broader access to information. That observation is frequently translated into a conclusion that gaining credibility requires providing not an idea, but a full-fledged plan with supplementary statistical evidences. This is the reasoning behind the complicated, detailed electoral manifestos in general – and most likely also in case of the PES.

The professionalization of politics is an additional challenge to that. It is especially so, once the European politics is concerned. Europe has been accused for years of being too bureaucratic and too distant from the people, while in fact the domestic politicians involved on the different EU levels play a role in not translating it into their countries' citizens' ordinary lives. Europe became complexity not only because it embraced more issues, but also because it was given such an image. The way the Manifestos of all the European transnational parties developed, mirrors the trend.

Last, but not least it still plays a role, that even though the Manifestos are technically the agendas for the European 5 years legislative terms, they still need to embrace the ongoing matters from the national levels. This emerges clearly parallel to the progress that transnational

92 *The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.*

93 *Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.*

94 *Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4*

95 *Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.*

96 *PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, [www.pes.org](http://www.pes.org)*

97 *The Congress 2004 was the first one in the history of the PES, which observed a competition between two candidates to the position of the PES President – namely Giuliano Amato and Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. The parties grouped in sort of two opposing camps and the Manifesto drafting process was in this sense overshadowed.*

parties made in gaining their space in a political landscape of Europe. Nowadays they are allowed to campaign before the European elections. However naturally, if they are to do so, they need to do it through the member parties. These fight the European elections still as the second rate ones, and their struggle is still based mostly on their standpoints on the domestic matters – which voters can easier grasp. This interdependence – between the newly gained rights of the europarties and the stagnation as far as transposition of the European matters onto the national level is concerned – may induce a behavior in which parties will want to put as many of their relevant domestic issues inside of the European manifesto as possible. It can be explained, as this may be the way of gaining a firmer ownership over the Manifesto and having it easier translatable to the national campaign (in a way of “Look, the European party of ours, is for our issue”). This may of course lead to further expansion of the Manifestos in size and number of details.

All the Manifestos have a sort of preamble. Two of them (1994 and 2009) begin with opening addresses by the respective PES Presidents and one uses the photo to present the two authors of the draft (1999). In none of the documents an ideological introduction can be found. In some of the texts the values are enumerated, but in none of the documents an explanation as far as they more exact interpretation can be found.

The conclusion that can be made at this initial point is a double folded one. First of all, the detailed character of the Manifestos made them appear rather as strategic documents (with a tendency to become a work plan) than as a reflection of a grand, ideological vision. They respond more to the criteria of “being concrete” (secondary element in the Keeney’s scheme). There are reasons to believe that it will evolve further in the direction of complexity. Secondly, the symbolic nature of the Manifestos requires reaching a compromise among all the member parties – including their respective proposals and finding a way around the controversies. The diversity of the proposals can be easily explained on the bases of the divergence among the parties, as shown in Chapter 2. The certain margin of ambiguity required to reach a compromise naturally affects the question on how thorough an interpretation of singular values in the European context may be.

The conclusions concerning the tradition in which the PES supreme documents were drafted and adopted so far leads to an observation that there is a hidden challenge in providing any ideological declaration at this point. It is that it would require a complete shift in ways the member parties think about Europe – from the governing to the visionary one. The question remains, in the light of all the doubts on the future of party politics (both on the national and European levels), if such a process of ideologisation of politics would not appear as a sentimental attempt to preserve the still prevailing understanding on representative democracy and power to be able to make a choice.



### 3.3. Historical heritage

In comparison to the national parties, PES puts by far much less emphasis on the question of socialist tradition and the movements' historical heritage, to say the least. There are no references to the beginnings of the movement, as also no attachments to the great European momentums and/or philosophies (please consult the section 2.4). Instead the following approach can be observed:

1992 <sup>99</sup>	European socialists and social democrats are fully committed to the process of European integration. Socialists and social democrats have played an important role, as the biggest political family in Europe, building a strong Community.
1994 <sup>100</sup>	Fifty years ago the survivors of the two terrible world wars placed their hope in Europe. Their aim: no more war. The path they followed led to the European Community, in which people who had been enemies for generations were reconciled, and nations that had overcome dictatorship were admitted. Today, Europe is again at the crossroads and we must prove ourselves once again. The fall of the Berlin Wall was the beginning of an era of fundamental change. Each of our countries is individually too small to tackle alone the problems this creates; only together can we solve them. That is why socialist know that our vision for Europe depends on European Union. By working together we can [achieve goals].
1999 <sup>101</sup>	No reference. The Manifesto is oriented towards the future. "This manifesto of the Party of European Socialists sets our 21 commitments for the new beginning for the European Union in the 21st century. These commitments reflect our shared values as socialists and social democrats."
2004 <sup>102</sup>	No reference in the Preamble. References in the text, i.e.: "Social democrats drew up the first EU action plan for economic and social reform, adopted in its Lisbon Strategy four years ago and developed in Gothenburg, to make the EU most dynamic knowledge based economy in the world (...)" "During the negotiations of the Convention on the Future of Europe, European Socialists played a key role in shaping the draft Constitution and ensured that it included key values and rights. When finalised and ratified, the European Constitution must make the EU institutions more transparent, accountable and relevant to citizens."
2009 <sup>103</sup>	It is now 30 years since the first direct elections to the European Parliament, which has a key role in realising our vision of a European Union which puts people first. The Party of European Socialists is your voice, promoting your interests and championing your causes. (...) Progressive left and centre-left parties in government at regional or national level are already making a difference to people's lives. Where the left is in power, we can see real evidence of what socialists and social democrats can achieve. For the past five years, the conservatives have had a majority in Europe – in most EU Member States and the EU institutions. What have they done with it? (...) They follow the market. We follow our convictions.

There are a couple of observations that should be made at this point. First of all, the "Hague" Declaration includes an important statement that the socialists are a pro-European movement. Nowadays that may sound more as an obvious truth; however that has not

98 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

99 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

100 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

101 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

102 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, www.pes.org

always been the case in the past. Several parties were skeptical towards the European integration (seeing that as an economically, not politically driven process). The clear shift can be seen precisely in the 1990s, and the Declaration mirrors it. Subsequently, the Manifesto in 1994 shows strengthening of this argument – going even as far as linking the future of social democracy with the future of the EU. This argument however has not been carried through the subsequent three Manifestos. Interestingly enough, the contemporary debates on the renewal seem to observe a return to this precise point. It may prove therefore an invitation to sort of *second wave of europeanisation of social democracy*, if the argument was to prevail.

As stated at the beginning of this section, there is no attempt to bridge between the groundbreaking moments of the European history and the role that social democrats may have played in it. The Hague Declaration serves only a relatively vague statement that it was an *important one*. The Manifestos of 1994 and 1999 are focused on the vision for the future. This is logic, taking into account that in 1990s socialists still were gaining power and emerging as the majoritarian force in Europe. This is at least as far as the intergovernmental pillar was concerned (in the result of the 1999 elections socialists for the first time had to give primacy to the conservatives, who emerged from them as a bigger EP Group). The approach changes in 2004. This is the Manifesto in which socialists call upon two recent accomplishments in the European politics – Lisbon Strategy and substantial role in the EU Convention on the Future of Europe<sup>103</sup>. The search for legitimacy anchored in the past successes seems to be corresponding to the wave of decline and electoral defeats of the national parties. 2009 Manifesto in a certain way continues the trend, aiming at exposing the damage of the previous 5 years of conservative rule in Europe.

The observation that should be made at this point shapes to be a following one. On one side, national parties in majority of cases refer to their own and to their respective state's past. In their own views, they emerge as a natural consequence of certain intellectual and social processes. The historical reference provides also basis for them to show their claim for credibility as well established parties, who served their countries and their people in the past. Within the national parties' programme documents, the issue of their respective contributions to Europe and its history is however absent (please see section 2.4). On the other hand, there is also no deeper reflection on its own past on the European level. The Manifesto 2004 constitutes an exception, but still there seem to be no one shared understanding of what European social democracy has done within the past over 60 years of integration. This of course is a weak spot, which conservatives use. Taking into account the relevance of the past

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<sup>103</sup> This should be read in a context of the Manifesto and the times it was written in, not from the perspective of today's evaluation of both.





for social democrats in constructing their identity (regardless now if past records and being part of so called establishment can effectively win votes), this may be an issue to look into. Especially if the tendency of comparing the records and politisation of the campaign through that was to be proceeding – as the Manifesto of 2009 shows and as the ongoing processes could indicate.

### 3.4. Self-portrait of the PES

The ambiguous relation to its own past, as to the political organization on the European level, enhances the relevance of the question how PES sees itself and its mission. In the light of the findings of Chapter 2, majority of the member parties found describing its assignments as equally important to outlining a grand political vision. The logic behind was that the way they perceived themselves was an indication on how they want to reach fulfillment of their pledges (beginning the implementation from themselves). Additionally, it gave fringe information on how they assess the contemporary democratic system, the party political system and their own role as a factor in democracy building and preserving processes.

In case of the PES, self-defining seems to be a more complicated task. It is understandable, taking into account the circumstances. In these europarties are relatively new invention (celebrating 20 years since its establishment next year only). Since 1992, there is a sound debate among both academics and among the members, if they are true parties (or still parties confederations of a specific format) and what implications one or another standpoint should have (as far as transnational candidates lists, direct or personal membership, campaigns etc.) The issue is not solved and this perhaps also is reflected in the table below:

- 1992<sup>105</sup>
- European socialists and social democrats are fully committed to the process of European integration.
  - Socialists and social-democrats have played an important role, as the biggest political family in Europe.
  - The first Congress of the PES marks an important step in the evolution of European socialism and social democracy. As the Maastricht Treaty indicates, European parties are a vital force in representing and fulfilling the aspirations of the people on Europe. The PES will also stimulate the participation of the public in European politics.
  - In view of the rapid historical changes (...) the PES will be a driving force for the development of new strategies adapted to the problems with which people are confronted.
  - The socialist (...) parties of the EC are developing new and more effective forms of cooperation so that they can play a worthwhile role in meeting the challenges facing the Community.
  - The decision to establish PES and introduction of majority voting in its statutes are expressions of a serious commitment to move together through important phase of European integration. Common convictions are more necessary than ever. Stronger political coordination, the joint platform for the 1994 European elections and other activities will ensure that the new PES will be at the centre of the struggle to build a better Europe.
  - PES welcomed founding of ECOSY.

1994 <sup>106</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The PES, which regroups both countries from the EU and from the EFTA countries, and associate and observer parties, is working towards it [fulfilment of a mission]. In close collaboration with the Group of the PES in the EP, it is constructing the Europe we want. [introduction by W.Claes]</li> <li>• We, as followers of Socialist, Social Democratic and Labour movements, would like Europe to be closer to its citizens (...) We want to listen to the people. [intro]</li> <li>• We will be united under the banner of the PES. [intro]</li> <li>• As socialists, we accept the challenge of the new Europe. And for the first time we are fighting elections as the PES.</li> <li>• (...) socialists have been the advocates of a new democratic Europe, taking important initiatives. (an enumeration of achievements follows, including doubling of structural funds; standards of employment protection; higher environmental standards; ensuring higher resources for research and technology).</li> <li>• We all have different traditions and our own responsibilities in our countries. But we share a vision. Together we must make Europe grow.</li> <li>• Every vote counts towards ensuring a powerful presence of the Party of European Socialists in the European Parliament.</li> <li>• Everyone is talking about Europe, but only we, as socialists, can make a progress.</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>107</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As social democrats we believe in equal opportunity for all and a fair deal for those who need protection in the society (...) As internationalists we believe that we make each of our countries stronger by strengthening our partnership in the EU. We are proud of our national cultures and identities (...)</li> <li>• For socialists and social democrats a modern economy can only be developed in close cooperation with social partners.</li> <li>• Throughout the lifetime of the new European Parliament we will work to ensure that the EU fulfils its commitments and responds to the major challenges ahead.</li> <li>• Parties of the Left and Centre-Left are in government in most of the Member States. The citizens of Europe need a common strategy shared between the new EP, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and Member States. With a strong representation in the EP, the PES can build that partnership and provide the direction that Europe needs</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>108</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A vote for Social Democrat candidates is a vote for a European Union that combines social justice within the countries and solidarity between the countries. It is a vote for a strong, social EU (...)</li> <li>• Social democrats of every country are strongly in favour of a successful and united European Union (...) We also recognise that in many policy areas national or local authorities are in better position to act.</li> <li>• The PES offers a programme for a progressive EU (...) We pledge ourselves to work throughout the EU to ensure that all citizens, in both existing and the new Member States, benefit from enlargement.</li> <li>• We give voters 5 key commitments.</li> </ul>
2009 <sup>109</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The PES is committed to creating a fairer, safer society, tackling the challenges we all face by putting people first.</li> <li>• [In the context of the EP] The PES is your voice, promoting your interests and championing your causes.</li> <li>• Progressive left and centre-left parties in government at regional and national level are already making a difference to people's lives. Where the left is in power, we can see real evidence of what socialists and social democrats can achieve.</li> <li>• Our comprehensive progressive reform agenda to transform European cooperation (based on values) can deliver the change which the people of Europe so desperately need.</li> <li>• We socialists, social democrats and democratic progressives, share common values and common vision. We will work together for a fairer, safer and greener Europe. Together we are a force for change.</li> </ul>

To begin with, the analyses of the subsequent Manifestos allow saying that the European movement seems to be increasingly ready to recognize its pluralism. In 1992, PES referred to itself as “socialists and social democrats”. In 1994, the term “labour” was added and in 2009

104 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

105 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

106 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

107 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

108 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, www.pes.org



“democratic progressives”. As suggested in the section 2.5, at this very point all the PES member parties renounced revolution and opted for *democratic socialism*. Hence the question remains, if sustaining the distinction between “socialists” and “social democrats” on the European level is a matter of faithful translation of different parties’ names into common categories. Especially that on the other hand the PES name is translated to both “Party of European Socialists” (i.e. English) and “Party of European Social Democrats” (i.e. in German) and the parties are free to choose the adequate translation. If it was, however the actual point of internal differences that could indicate that the raising debate on *cosmopolitan social democracy* could be well argued for.

There are three levels on which PES indicates, how it sees itself: within the EU institutional context; towards its members (parties) and towards the voters.

As far as the institutional context is concerned, in 1994 PES insisted on the importance of its cooperation with the Socialist Group in the European Parliament. In 1999, it underlined how relevant it is for an ability to fulfill its plans, that it is being a majority in both international and intergovernmental pillars. Starting from 2004, it began emphasizing that the EU level is a supplementary one to the local and regional, including slowly the issue of transposition and complementarity of policies on all the levels. This shift is explainable by the three phases social democracy has been in in the last twenty years: 1) strong representation in the EP, low on the national levels; 2) strong within both EP and among the governments; 3) weak in the EP and weak on the national level, relatively still fair on the local and regional. It does not mean that the statements in the Manifestos result from a pragmatic calculation. It simply rather relates to previous conclusion, that in Europe one can rather speak about socialist strategy than socialist vision – which creates a situation, in which focus may depend on possibilities at hand. The fact remains, that in none of the quoted Manifestos, PES described in a more detailed manner the model of the party democracy and its place in it.

As far as the member parties are concerned, PES sees itself since the beginning as the joint platform, an instrument for a closer cooperation (coordination) and an area of policies development. This does not change too substantially from Manifesto to Manifesto. What can perhaps be said is that indifferent to the national parties (see section 2.5), it does not explain too much the sense of the mutual relations, especially as far as rights and duties of one another towards one another are concerned.

Finally, concerning the voters the approach of PES has evolved. Upon its establishment, 1992, it expressed the conviction that its role is to represent people and to stimulate their participation in European politics. The public is somewhat a *third person*, with whom the gap needs to be bridged. In 1994 and 1999, the focus is rather than on the voter on the PES presence

in the institutions. Years 2000, mark a shift beyond the initial ambition. In 2009, the Party sees itself a voice of the citizens. People are the ones, who “come first”. The focus is on the meaning of their votes. It can be described as a return from a sort of “power politics” of the 1990s to “citizens’ politics” in 2000s. This clear shift may be of course read as a response to a democratic crisis. But if it was so, it may constitute an indication that party is preparing to a new metamorphosis, new “opening” (as some parties expressed as their own ambitions). It is hard to assess how much of an impact it could have in strengthening participatory democracy in Europe.

To summarize, the PES states that it feels responsible for Europe, that it is ready to develop it and consolidate efforts to work on its future. There is however no answer given yet, what significance it as a PES wishes to have in it within a certain, pre-defined European party political system. This leaves many queries still unanswered and PES, as its opponents, finding it out and claiming its place mostly by doing.

### 3.5. European ideological mission

In the section 2.6, ideological missions of the respective parties were analyzed. In the light of the methodology adopted for this research, the term ideology applied to describe *a certain set of ideas, a comprehensive vision of a change that is required*. In other words, this is a certain *raison d'être* of a political party. As a question on *what the party seeks* applies naturally also to the PES. Having concluded previously, what challenges lay in the aspects of the PES relation to its heritage and its self-portrait, it is a logical consequence to focus this part of analyses in the issue of its mission. The table below gathers the necessary paragraphs:

1992<sup>10</sup>

- The European Community is an instrument for promoting peace, prosperity, welfare and social justice as well as for building cooperation, whether locally, regionally, nationally, or internationally. It is an anchor of stability in Europe.
- European socialists and social-democrats want to improve Europe. Their agenda for the 1990s encompasses 10 points.
- The Single Market increases opportunities and Monetary Union will help stability, but they will not by themselves bring about overall and balanced growth, capable of reducing unemployment and generating the necessary wealth to improve living standards and competitiveness throughout the Community. Policies are needed to develop and combine the objectives set out in the Treaty of Maastricht – and to bring about the regeneration of our economies that is so urgently needed.
- Real European Union means economic, environmental and social balance between and within member states. (...) We want to promote better coordination of the joint objectives of social and economic development as well as more effective solidarity to prevent a two-speed Europe.
- Social Europe: The TEU lays the groundwork upon which socialists and social democrats wish to build social dimension (of the EU). They want to focus social policy on job creation, working conditions, positive action, industrial democracy and social cohesion.
- An Environmental Europe: we call upon the Community to further develop its environmental policies.
- Socialists and social democrats are committed to a Democratic Europe.
- As European Community is becoming a space for free movement we must ensure the convergence of immigration policies and conditions for the exercise of the right of asylum.
- National citizenship is to be complemented by a European citizenship, which is an evolutionary concept.

- European identity will be enhanced by adopting and strengthening common foreign policies. (...) Europe carries responsibility for creating and maintaining stable and more equitable relations with both East and the South. (...) Europe must ensure the coherence of its activities in the context of its external relations (...) The rest of the world expects an active role of Europe in international affairs promoting human rights and helping in development.
- The Community must contribute to the progress of democratisation and economic development of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Mediterranean Basin. We consider it necessary to offer a clear vision to these countries with regard to their relations with the European community.
- European Union will ensure that Member States solve problems together and not at the expense of one another, essential, for example, is the fight against unemployment.
- Socialists want to make Europe more open. For the people of Europe the relationship between national and European levels sometimes creates uncertainties. Therefore the main function of European politics is to establish clear links between European and national policies. European policies must better reflect the interests of the citizens living in the different countries.

1994<sup>111</sup>

- (Preface, W.Claes) The European Parliament elections in June 1994 will take place in a new Europe. The era of confrontation between the great powers will be a thing of the past. (...) [After the Autumn of 1989] Europe has finally thrown off its shame and will now be able to devote itself to its full and entire construction.
- Today, Europe is again at its crossroads and we must prove ourselves again. The fall of the Berlin Wall was the beginning of an era of fundamental change. Each of our countries is individually too small to tackle alone the problems it creates; only together we can solve them. This is why socialists know that our vision depends on European Union.
- Peace and neighbourliness, democracy and human rights; social justice and ecological renewal; solidarity and responsibility; employment and social welfare; this is what our Europe should look like. [here "our" is in the opposition to the "conservative" Europe, which "places faith in the dogma of the market place, undermining social achievements"]
- The 1994 European elections are about choosing path. This is why we need a strong European Union more than ever before. We need EU that proves itself as a successful community of peace, committed to the principles of democracy and traditions of social progress while harnessing the power of the world's biggest internal market. There is still a long way to go to achieve this.
- This is [socialist] course for Europe we want to pursue: create jobs, safeguard social progress and encourage cohesion; work for equality for women and men; protect environment and the consumer; create peace; fight racism and xenophobia; combat organised crime; work for more democracy.
- Our aim is to create as soon as possible a society in which everyone will have a job or an occupation. We can achieve this only through a co-ordinated European strategy.
- (...) the Union can today follow the path of environmentally sustainable growth and full employment and hold its own in world-wide competition. (...) We must develop Europe's strengths in the world-wide competition: millions of motivated and well-trained workers; the world's biggest single market; great research potential; stable democracies; social services; relatively high environmental standards; an incomparable cultural diversity.
- We need a European agreement on employment and future investment; a common initiative from member states – if possible with the world's other major industrialised nations – to create jobs.
- We want economic stability. This is why we want a single currency which all member states can join. (...) We consider economic convergence a necessary condition for the success of the economic and monetary union.
- We want to develop prosperity in every part of the Union and distribute it more fairly. Solidarity between the stronger and weaker is the cornerstone of the European Union. This is why the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund set up the Treaty on European Union are important investments in Europe's joint future. (...) The better individual member states are doing, the better everyone is doing.
- By investing in the reconstruction of Eastern Europe we also invest in our own future (...) To rebuild the east we need development in the west.
- The ability of the EU to contribute to an economic upturn throughout Europe depends on its performance in competition with the world's most powerful industrial nations. A joint industrial and research policy is particularly important to achieve it. We have fallen behind in the field of high technology.
- We want to build a real partnership with the poorest countries, to contribute to their economic and social development. Above all, we must facilitate their access to the European Union's markets. (...) The European Union must take the action against unfair trade practices (...) the European Union must also ensure, through international treaties, that human rights are respected in world's economy. The principle of free trade must not be used to undermine social standards in Europe.
- We want to believe that the European Union is the correct way to maintain and develop further social progress which characterises our countries today.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [EC helps to set standards for equality of men and women] (...) it is now particularly important that the EU takes the lead to ensure equal opportunities</li> <li>• We share a common responsibility for Europe's seas, lakes, rivers, coasts, forests, water, soil and air. Therefore we need a joint European environmental policy because pollution knows no frontiers. (...) As socialists, we want an EU that harnesses its economic power to the ecological renewal of our industrial society. (...) We demand a legally enforceable EU Environment Charter and the implementation of the commitments made at the Rio Summit.</li> <li>• In order to improve quality of life, European co-operation is also necessary in the field of public health, particularly regarding research aimed at combating cancer and AIDS.</li> <li>• The EU cannot exist as an island of wealth in a sea of poverty. This is why we must spend more on development and less on arms, to be less protectionist and do more to promote fairer world economic order.</li> <li>• Once a common foreign and security policy is in place, the question of one seat for the EU in the Security Council can be addressed.</li> <li>• Peace in Europe is the first and foremost responsibility of Europe itself. Close cooperation is more important for peace than military strength. (...) Together we can create a European peace-keeping force, which will be made available to the CSCE and United Nations.</li> <li>• We want EFTA states to join the EU (...) We want to open up the European option for the reforming states of central and eastern Europe.</li> <li>• We want to develop cooperation with all our European neighbours and through Mediterranean Region.</li> <li>• Europe's future does not lie in a centralised super-state. Only a democratic Europe is a strong Europe. (...) We want to apply strictly the principle of subsidiarity.</li> <li>• Together we must make Europe grow.</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>12</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As internationalists we believe that we make each of our countries stronger by strengthening our partnership in the European Union. (...)</li> <li>• The EU must belong to the people and must be driven by their priorities – on jobs, security and the environment. (...) We want closer Union, but we also want reform to make the European Union more open, democratic and efficient.</li> <li>• (...) we will work to ensure that the EU fulfils its commitments and responds to major challenges ahead. (...) Europe will need to respond effectively to the continuing challenge of globalisation.</li> <li>• We believe that by working together we can build a better Europe. We want a European Union that both respects the identity of each of our countries and promotes a closer union between our peoples. Our vision of Europe is an area of freedom, stability, prosperity and justice. Together we can create a European Union that will play its full part on the world stage.</li> <li>• The manifesto (...) maps out a Europe for 21st century: a Europe of jobs and growth; a Europe that puts citizens first; a strong Europe; a Europe that works better. We ask the voters of Europe to give it their support and to open up the way to a Europe ready for the new millennium.</li> <li>• Our ambition for the future of Europe goes beyond the implementation of the Single Market. We must promote economic and social cohesion, and ensure that all citizens have a fair share of the fruits of common prosperity.</li> <li>• Europe must enable its people to secure a better future and give priority to the issues that matter most to them.</li> <li>• Europe must be able to secure its common interests and promote its values of democracy, solidarity, justice and freedom on the global stage.</li> <li>• Europe must be able to adapt to meet new challenges. It must adopt the policies and carry the institutional reforms needed to create an enlarged and inclusive Union that is more democratic and efficient.</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>13</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A vote for Social Democrat candidates is a vote for a European Union that combines social justice within countries and solidarity between the countries. It is a vote for a strong, social EU that provides economic success and security for its people: a Union that is able to tackle the major challenges of unemployment, social justice, international terrorism and the global environment.</li> <li>• Social democrats of every country are in favour of a successful and united European Union that is an area of peace and cooperation based on partnership and the rule of law. We also recognise that in many areas national or local authorities are in a better position to act.</li> <li>• The PES offers a programme for a progressive European Union that puts the concerns of people first. We pledge ourselves to work throughout the EU to ensure that all citizens, in both existing and new member states, benefit from EU enlargement.</li> <li>• We must preserve, strengthen and modernise the European Social Model which combines economic growth and adequate levels of social protection.</li> <li>• Our vision of the European Union is a community based on the principles of the social market economy and mutual cooperation for the benefit of all.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We want a strong EU that has a clear voice in international forums, pressing for a just, stable and peaceful world in accordance with international law and in the framework of the UN.</li> <li>• We will push for a progressive globalisation, which not only increases trade with developing countries, but also promotes democracy, human rights and environmental protection in these countries. The EU must play its part in ensuring good corporate governance and social responsibility of business wherever it trades.</li> <li>• Our vision is of a EU based on democracy, equality, respect for human rights, diversity and the rule of law. For this reason, we support the Charter of Fundamental Rights and its inclusion in the Constitution. We should also promote these values beyond the borders of the EU.</li> <li>• Europe is growing. Together we can make it stronger and better.</li> </ul>
2009 <sup>114</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is a choice between our vision of a progressive Europe in which citizens, Member States and institutions work together to address the issues of greatest concern to the people of Europe.</li> <li>• The EU is the vital link in the era of globalisation. It puts our countries in a stronger position to solve global problems that have an impact locally. We need more active cooperation in Europe to tackle our common challenges and improve people's lives. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, subject to ratification by all EU Member States, would make Europe better able to tackle common challenges democratically, transparently and effectively.</li> <li>• We can relaunch Europe's economy and create a fairer and safer society for all in a New Social Europe.</li> <li>• Our comprehensive progressive agenda to transform European cooperation – based on our values of equality, democracy, human dignity, solidarity, freedom and justice – can deliver the change which people of Europe so desperately need. (... ) We will work together for a fairer, safer and greener Europe.</li> <li>• A new progressive reform agenda is essential to build a New Social Europe, giving people a fairer deal.</li> </ul>

The Hague Declaration reflects the pro-European approach of the PES and its member parties. When in the 1990s the declaration of pro-Europeanism was made, it described an approach that characterized a person positive towards the unification and integration processes. Since then the term have become more complex, with the introduction of the notions of “euro-enthusiasm” and “euro-skepticism” (which frequently still is being confused with the anti-Europeanism). This terminological evolution is not echoed in any of the subsequent documents. The common denominator of pro-Europeanism is accepted – and the shades of it remain an unexposed evidence of the European organization's pluralism.

The visions for Europe are relatively complex, however from the lengthy descriptions; one may extract certain prevailing notions. In 1992, socialists aimed to *improve (our) Europe*; in 1994 the circumstances were *new Europe (after the Berlin Wall fall)* in which socialists needed to prove themselves; in 1999 it was a better Europe socialists aimed at; in 2004 a *progressive Europe* and finally in 2009, a *new Social Europe*. Though they are rhetorically different, they all echo the same standpoint. This is to improve, upholding what is already known and what serves. From that perspective the proposals may not seem as too revolutionary – but this should not necessarily be immediately taken as criticism. It mirrors the mere fact that achieving

109 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

110 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

111 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

112 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

113 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, www.pes.org

any change within the EU circumstances requires a long term process, several negotiations round and number of compromises across the party political stage. Even though some of the proposals within the Manifestos may be bolder than others, its main tone reflects consciousness of the operational boundaries. Nevertheless, this safeguarding, cautious approach can be in fact the most disturbing in answering the question – how different is the Europe that socialists propose to any other Europe? Can we really be talking about a European socialist doctrine?

The European Union is described in several different ways in the light of the subsequent texts. The common element that characterizes socialist understanding of it, it is that Europe is /should be a being that is based on values. In 1992 they are: *peace, prosperity, welfare, social justice*; in 1994: *peace, neighborliness, democracy and human rights; social justice and ecological renewal; solidarity and responsibility; employment and social welfare*; in 1999 it is *democracy, solidarity, justice and freedom at global stage*; in 2004 *social justice, solidarity between the countries, security and employment*; and finally in 2009: *equality, democracy, human dignity, solidarity, freedom, justice, fairness, safety*. Each time, there is an alteration of the enumerated values. They are all recognized as (or the ones that should be) shared on the European level. There are two issues that may inspire further debates. The first one is how they are to be interpreted and combined in one, comprehensive set. The other, if they are to be seen as pan-European, where the difference lays between how they are advocated for by socialists and by conservatives.

The sense of united Europe is to promote those values enlisted above and ensure that they are the guiding principles of its policies. The European Union is to provide solutions on the matters that the single member states no longer can. In 1992 it is a matter of ensuring cooperation in place of a competition, for which reasons socialists advocate coordination of policies. 1994 expresses a fear that countries no longer are able to cope with certain matters alone and 1999 Manifesto speaks about need for partnership that would strengthen the Member States (in the spirit of internationalism – which is used as argument for having a Union only in this Manifesto). Through 2004 and 2009 the necessity derives from emergence of globalization and the processes connected with it. It remains unsolvable if therefore pro-Europeanism interpreted as support for further integration on the EU level and hence cooperation of the respective parties, would therefore be emerging from a necessity or would in fact be more of a matter of a strong ideological conviction. This question relates to deliberations on how much political families shaped the European development and how much this development shaped them.

As mentioned above, the mission of social democrats, is then to *reform (improve)* Europe. Though the scope of ambitions in respective policy areas changes, accordingly to progress made in these, there are two overall elements that construct the framework of the mission. The first one is that the PES agenda is always a double folded one – composed of internal and





external policies. The second one is that PES always has been arguing that the external policies may never be reduced to a common market, but a social dimension must be an integral part. This is also the reasoning behind strong support for European democratization.

### 3.6. Freedom

The core values are frequently just briefly enlisted in the PES Manifestos. The way to discover, what role they effectively play is to gather the quotations of the texts in which they are mentioned, as also extract those parts of the text that may be complementary and facilitate finding their respective interpretations. Additionally, as it was shown in the section 3.5, even if the values are enumerated – they are hardly ever placed in a certain, unified order. This is why the order applied in the Chapter 3 is simply a consequent follow up of the one used in Chapter 2. In this way it also facilitates comparisons between the conclusions as far as both European and national levels are concerned.

*Freedom* was the value that many parties placed as the first one, opening any list of core values (see section 2.8). In the concerning Chapter, it was analyzed together with the notions of emancipation and liberty. In case of the PES Manifestos the material does not legitimize such a distinction. The table below illustrates in which paragraphs and which context freedom was used within the subsequent PES Manifestos:

1992 <sup>115</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [Context: A Tolerant Europe]: Only a Tolerant Europe with its cultural diversity can be an asset rather than a threat. (...) As the European Community is becoming a space for free movement we must ensure the convergence of immigration policies and conditions for the exercise of the right to asylum.</li> <li>• This European citizenship is an evolutionary concept that should entail: freedom of movement, residence and establishment; right of the European citizens to vote in their place of residence in local and European elections; creation of a European legal area; the development of rights embodied in the European Social Charter; the introduction of a charter of citizens to a high level of environmental protection; and the promotion of a charter of the rights and responsibilities of European Citizens.</li> </ul>
1994 <sup>116</sup>	
1999 <sup>117</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the Manifesto for 1999 European Elections<sup>118</sup> there is a set of 21 commitments for a new beginning for the European Union in the 21st century. Already in the introduction there is a direct reference to the values "These commitment reflect our shared values as socialists and social democrats. Democracy, freedom and human rights. Solidarity, social justice and equal opportunity. Common civic rights and responsibilities.</li> <li>• Our vision of Europe is an area of freedom, stability, prosperity and justice.</li> <li>• A stronger civil society must be the foundation of a more democratic European Union which guarantees civil liberties. We attach special importance o the rights of people with disabilities. In order to develop a stronger European Identity we propose that the fundamental civic, economic, social and cultural rights (...) should set a European charter of rights. (...) We commit ourselves through this Charter to strengthening citizen's rights and building a Europe, which is an area of freedom, security, justice and equal rights</li> <li>• We commit ourselves to preserving distinct cultures, to promoting understanding between them and to ensuring that all cultures can express themselves freely.</li> <li>• Europe must be able to secure its common interests and promote its values of democracy, solidarity, justice and freedom on the global stage.</li> </ul>

2004 <sup>119</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the European Union we propose policies to improve people's quality of life, focusing on equal rights for men and women, rights for employees and consumers, freedom of movement, safety of food, quality of the environment and access to transport.</li> <li>• We oppose all forms of discrimination, including any based on race, religion, belief, gender, disability, age or sexual orientation.</li> <li>• We oppose media concentration and monopoly control of economic and political power.</li> </ul>
2009 <sup>120</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our comprehensive progressive reform agenda to transform European cooperation – based on our values of equality, democracy, human dignity, solidarity, freedom and justice (...)</li> </ul>

From the table above, it is easy to draw a conclusion that the value of *freedom* does not seem to match the high importance that was given to it within the national manifestos. Such a supposition may however be a too simplistic one. The matter is complicated and the answer depends on expectations, if values described on the European level should be limited to the European dimension only (so provide a specific, European supplementary to the national ones) or be a conglomeration of all that already has been listed in the respective national statements.

There are four main ways in which *freedom* is explained. The first one attaches it to the *free movement of people*. It is present in all the Manifestos (except 1994). It mirrors a conviction that European Union is not only a market of free movement of goods, but above all the Community of its people. This is why their freedom to transfer their lives and work to different places is symbolically such an important one. In Manifesto of 2009 it is highlighted that this particular sort of freedom provides workers with more *freedoms and opportunities*.

Secondly, there is *freedom of expression*. In 1992, as also 1999 this is being explained in two ways. First of all, it is affirmation that there must be acceptance (in early years it was named as tolerance) for diversity in a society and hence no discrimination can take place. This understanding appears in all the texts. In years 2004 and 2009, freedom of expression embraces also the questions of freedom of media. This seems however more a reflection on anxieties around some worrying signals from the level of the national states, rather than a pan-European question.

Thirdly, *freedom* is being associated with the *civil liberties*. In 1999, they have been explained in the context of a more democratic Union, civil society and European citizenship. They seem to however gain mostly the attention in 1999, and then slightly decline in the relevance.

114 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

115 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

116 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

117 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives.

118 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

119 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, [www.pes.org](http://www.pes.org)



Lastly, *freedom from terrorism* seems to be an issue that steadily also grew European attention since the 9/11. In the course of programmatic developments, other notions are being attached to that – such as freedom from crime, extremism etc. It is too early to say if that would eventually evolve towards more general emphasis on security (as a positive concept opposed to freedom “from”) or not.

### 3.7. Equality

*Equality* seems to be elevated in the lights of the manifestoes slightly beyond freedom. A quantitative proof of that is the comparison of the table from the previous section with the one below:

1992 <sup>121</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The concept of a two-speed Europe undermining the solidarity between the member states is (...) unacceptable.</li> <li>• We maintain the ideal of Europe that brings economic and social prosperity for all.</li> <li>• In the single market, and within the Economic and Monetary Union, the member states and their citizens should have equal opportunities. Every aspect of Community policy must take full account of the position of women in society. The community must harness the talent and contribution of women, or the Community as a whole will be weakened.</li> </ul>
1994 <sup>122</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The course for Europe we want to pursue: (...) work for equality for men and women.</li> <li>• Measures are also needed urgently to tackle unemployment among women and young people, create an educational system better adapted to modern society and ensure wider mutual recognition of training and qualifications within the EU.</li> <li>• (Structural funds) help the groups which are particularly disadvantaged to find a place in the labour market, for example through retraining or youth training.</li> <li>• To prevent unfair competition in the internal market we are working to establish high minimum social standards within the EU, a guaranteed minimum wage and a progressive improvement in working conditions: this concerns (...) equality for women.</li> <li>• We need efficient and unbureaucratic states able to face up to their social obligations and guarantee to all the citizens free access to public services.</li> <li>• [an entire Chapter] We want to achieve equality for women and men in the economy, in society and politics. Women's emancipation throughout the EU is restricted by the traditional division of labour between sexes, disadvantages in the labour market, discrimination in pay and in social security and, not least, by inadequate representation in all spheres of public life. The current economic crisis has a particularly harsh effect on women. Achievements made in the past – with the EC's help – are under threat. This is why it is now particularly important that the EU takes the lead to ensure: equal opportunities in the labour market; equal treatment in social security systems; equal pay for work of equal value; equal opportunities for women and men to combine a career with family life – particularly through measures to provide adequate childcare facilities; equal opportunities to participate in politics.</li> <li>• [Fighting racism – regulating immigration together] We want to build a European society which ensures equal opportunities for all regardless of their sex, race, religion or beliefs.</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>123</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• These (21) commitments reflect our shared values as socialists and social democrats. Democracy, freedom and human rights. Solidarity, social justice and equal opportunity. Common civic rights and responsibilities.</li> <li>• We know that economies are stronger when societies are just. The poverty of some diminishes the lives of all who live in a divided society. And the exclusion of any from access to education, employment or the skills and technology of the modern age weakens the economy to which they can not contribute. This is why we say “yes” to market economy, but “no” to a market society.</li> <li>• We believe that each individual has more opportunity and more security if their community invests in modern services of high standards in education, health, transport and welfare. (...) We know that our society will only flourish if we eliminate discrimination in all its forms, allowing everyone do develop their talents and to love without fear of prejudice.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We commit ourselves to modernising and strengthening the European social model, promoting dialogue between the social partners and tackling social exclusion.</li> <li>• We attach special importance to the rights of people with disabilities.</li> <li>• We commit ourselves through this Charter [European Charter of Rights] to strengthening citizens' rights and building a Europe which is an area of freedom, security, justice and equal rights.</li> <li>• Young people are the future of Europe and Europe is their future. (...) We commit ourselves to improving opportunities for young women and men in a Europe that secures the well-being of future generations.</li> <li>• As social democrats we believe in equal opportunity for all and a fair deal for those who need the protection of society</li> <li>• We want to build a European society, which ensures EQUAL rights and opportunities for all regardless of their sex, race, religion or beliefs.</li> <li>• A stronger civil society must be the foundation of a more democratic European Union which guarantees civil liberties. We attach special importance to the rights of people with disabilities. In order to develop a stronger European Identity we propose that the fundamental civic, economic, social and cultural rights (...) should set a European charter of rights. (...) We commit ourselves through this Charter to strengthening citizen's rights and building a Europe, which is an area of freedom, security, justice and equal rights</li> <li>• The principle of equality of opportunity between women and men is fundamental to democracy. It must be applied in all aspects of society and form an integral part of social and economic policy. (...) We commit ourselves to ensuring equal opportunities for women and men across the European Union and promoting that principle in all the policies of the Union.</li> <li>• A healthy society and democracy can only be based on mutual respect for the equal rights of all its' people. The EU and its Member States must take the lead in tackling racism by cooperating more closely together. (...) We commit ourselves to fight all forms of discrimination, tackle prejudice and to defeat racism and xenophobia, and to work for successful integration through action at the European and national level.</li> <li>• [Enlargement] All applicants must be subject to the same objective political and economic criteria.</li> <li>• The European Union must also help to ensure that the benefits of globalisation are equitably shared and allow fairer access to its market for trade from poorer countries.</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>124</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We pledge ourselves to work throughout the European Union to ensure that all citizens, in both the existing and the new Member States, benefit from EU enlargement.</li> <li>• We demand action to meet the social and employment objectives of the Lisbon strategy with particular emphasis on reaching 70% overall employment rate and 60% rate for women participation in the workforce by 2010.</li> <li>• To ensure that prosperity is shared, we must strengthen social partnership. (...) Our vision of the EU is a community based on the principles of the social market economy and mutual cooperation for the benefit of all.</li> <li>• We have already fought and secured European laws to promote gender equality between women and men at work. However, there remain inequalities of income and opportunity. Progress is still needed to ensure that equality laws are respected in practice and that there is sufficient support for working parents.</li> <li>• We aim to increase the participation rate of women and remove barriers that prevent women from taking up jobs; introduce measures to help women and men to achieve a better balance between working life and family commitments.</li> <li>• "(...) we propose to improve people's quality of life, focusing on equal rights for women and men, rights of employees and consumers, freedom of movement, safety of food, quality of environment and access to transport. (...) We will work for greater European cooperation to make society free and safe for everyone.</li> <li>• We aim to (...) improve access to information technology and aim to provide broadband internet access for all citizens by 2012.</li> <li>• [Chapter: Manage migration and pursue social integration] We aim to fight racism and xenophobia across the EU.</li> <li>• [Chapter: Promote Europe as an area of democracy and equality] Our vision is of a European Union based on democracy, equality, respect for human rights, diversity and the rule of law. For this reason, we support the Charter of Fundamental Rights and its inclusion in the Constitution. We should also promote these values beyond the borders of the EU.</li> <li>• For social democrats, equality is one of the most important values: democracy is not possible without equality. We oppose all forms of discrimination.</li> <li>• We aim to promote equality and fight all forms of discrimination; Reinforce alliances against extreme right wing forces and challenge other parties (...) to sign the EU Charter for a Non-Racist-Society.</li> </ul>
2009 <sup>125</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our comprehensive progressive reform agenda to transform European cooperation – based on our values of equality, democracy, human dignity, solidarity, freedom and justice (...)</li> <li>• All Europe's citizens should have decent, quality work that enables them to enjoy decent life.</li> <li>• We must act to help those who have been hit hardest get back on their feet. [hit by the crisis]</li> <li>• Legal migrants must have the same rights and duties as other workers.</li> <li>• It is imperative that our citizens – of all ages – have the opportunity to develop their skills, find new and better jobs as well as being able to work and study abroad.</li> <li>• We will work towards full and equal access to life long learning with special attention paid to 'second-chance' education and training for those who have not completed their formal education.</li> </ul>



- Mobility (such as Erasmus) should be a rule not an exception. Every young European should have the chance to enjoy it.
- Existing inequalities and new global challenges are placing new pressures on people and creating a risk of permanent social divides within our societies (. . .) We can tackle these inequalities by focusing European cooperation on improving the lives of people in Europe. We must promote better policies to protect most vulnerable people during the economic recession and beyond.
- The EU is based on human rights, non-discrimination and respect for all. We view diversity in its many forms – cultural, linguistic and religious – as one of Europe's greatest assets.
- We propose setting EU targets for providing care for the elderly, modelled on those already in place for childcare, in light of our ageing population and the need to reach the goals of full employment and gender equality.
- We are committed to ensuring that EU legislation respects citizens' rights (. . .) We will strengthen anti-discrimination legislation to ensure equal treatment on grounds of gender, race, disability, age, sexual orientation and religion or belief. We propose to ensure equal treatment for all EU citizens, without discrimination.
- We will continue to fight gender stereotypes and believe that strengthening women's rights and opportunities will bring significant economic, social and democratic benefits for all Europe's citizens. [Proposals include: European Women's Charter to improve rights and opportunities; improved parental leave; campaign for equal representation in all decision making bodies at the EU level; support for balancing professional and private life through childcare; fight to close gender pay gap; support for women entrepreneurship, scientists and researchers; promote sexual and reproductive rights; European efforts to eradicate human trafficking and sexual exploitation through closer judicial and police cooperation; encourage and support the EU and its member states in their efforts to stop domestic and gender-specific violence]
- We propose to establish a European Charter for the Integration of Migrants, based on equal rights and responsibilities and mutual respect, which should be coordinated closely with policies governing the admission of migrants. We want an integration policy that establishes an on-going process to achieve inclusive citizenship and representation, as well as rights and duties for all citizens.

The approach of the European socialists to the issue of equality has been undergoing major changes through the last two decades. Since the beginning, the mainstreaming interpretation has been falling rather under unconstrained than under constrained thinking, which can be reflected in the dominant position of the notion of equal opportunities (for more theory please see sections 1.3 and 2.9). Nevertheless the balance was not always the same one. In the texts of 1992, 1994 and 2004, there is a special attention paid to the specific groups that need to be empowered through opportunities (women, youth, elderly, and migrants). Exception (though not a categorical one) from that rule is 1999, when the emphasis lays on "all", "everybody; and in a way 2009 which constitutes a balanced mixture of both approaches. One could assume that the special character of 1999's interpretation is connected with the debate around Third Way that was at this point at its peak as far as the European social democracy is concerned.

Equality in the European socialists' understanding can be translated into two blocks of guidelines. The first one concerns different groups of people, and the second states (member states and different than EU countries).

Within the first category, PES has been extremely devoted to the issue of *equality between men and women*, which then evolved towards the term *gender equality*. The

120 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

121 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

122 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

123 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

124 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, [www.pes.org](http://www.pes.org)

commitment to this value got recognition in all the Manifestos, with a prominent role especially in 1994, 2004 and 2009. The certain shift that accompanies the terminology is that at the beginnings the focus was to enable women (to enter labour market etc), nowadays it is more on combating existing inequalities (though one has to here also add that the scope and complexity of the demands also substantially increased). It reflects in many ways the overall European change that has taken place within the modern societies.

Among other groups, who get a special recognition are: youth, elderly and migrants. Especially towards the last of those groups, frequently struggle for *equality* is defined as synonym with *fight against discrimination* (and racism and xenophobia).

Within the second category, in which equality is interpreted, there has also been a clearly visible development. In the Declaration 1992 and in the Manifesto 1994, the focus is on the member states, so that they coexist in partnership and avoid unfair competition. *Equality* is therefore recognized as a fundament of the European cooperation, which is also reiterated in 2009. In 1999 there is additional mentioning of the equal approach towards applicant countries and towards the poorer ones (especially as far as trade is concerned).

### 3.8. Justice

Within the introduction to the section 2.10, it was shown that *justice* is among those values, which are particularly related in their complexity to the anthropological context and hence very difficult to be defined within pan-European circumstances. This can also serve as one of the explanations, why there is affectively only a little bit more than just mentioning to be found within the Manifestos, which observation the table below illustrates:

1992 <sup>26</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The EC is an instrument for promoting (...) social justice.</li> </ul>
1994 <sup>27</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (...) Social justice and ecological renewal (...) is what our Europe should look like.</li> <li>• Thanks to us the structural funds have been doubles, bringing greater justice between richer and poorer regions of the Union.</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>28</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [Introduction] These (21) commitments reflect our shared values as socialists and social democrats. Democracy, freedom and human rights. Solidarity, social justice and equal opportunity. Common civic rights and responsibilities.</li> <li>• Our vision of Europe is an area of freedom, stability, prosperity and justice.</li> <li>• A stronger civil society must be the foundation of a more democratic European Union which guarantees civil liberties. We attach special importance o the rights of people with disabilities. In order to develop a stronger European Identity we propose that the fundamental civic, economic, social and cultural rights (...) should set a European charter of rights. (...) We commit ourselves through this Charter to strengthening citizen's rights and building a Europe, which is an area of freedom, security, justice and equal rights.</li> <li>• Europe must be able to secure its common interests and promote its values of democracy, solidarity, justice and freedom on the global stage.</li> </ul>



2004 <sup>129</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A vote for Social Democrat candidates is a vote for a European Union that combines social justice within countries and solidarity between the countries. It is a vote for a strong, social EU that provides economic success and security for all its' people: a Union that is able to tackle the major challenges of unemployment, social justice, international terrorism and global environment.</li> <li>• We give voters five key commitments for the EP's next five year term: (. . .) Build a more secure, sustainable, peaceful and just world.</li> </ul>
2009 <sup>130</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our comprehensive progressive reform agenda to transform European cooperation – based on our values of equality, democracy, human dignity, solidarity, freedom and justice – can deliver the change which the people of Europe so desperately need.</li> </ul>

Most commonly *justice* is being used within the Manifestos in the meaning of *social justice*, which would indicate its prior sense be related to the social dimension of the EU. For socialists it remains one of the values they wish to see Europe grow upon, hence most logically expand its social provisions (see 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009). This is complemented by a pledge on international politics. Accordingly, socialists want to struggle for a just world (especially 1999, 2004, 2009) – which indicates an ambition to ensure a better sort of mechanisms that would enable fairer settlement and hence distribution.

As both *justice* and *social justice* are usually enumerated among the other values and the available material on that is relatively a small one, it seems impossible to fully compare these findings with the conclusions of the section 2.10.

### 3.9. Fairness

*Fairness* was not mentioned in the Hague Declaration, however the later Manifestos seem to have picked it up and place in relatively prominent way (especially 2009). This may be seen as a fingerprint of the last two decade of a renewal debate and echo of the proposals from the Third Way stream from the 1990s.

Nevertheless, in the spirit of the work of John Rawls (as interpreted in the section 2.11) it may seem that *fairness* appears on the European level as more than just supplementary to *justice*. The table below can help examining in what extend they may be in fact seen as synonyms:

125 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

126 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

127 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

128 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

129 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, [www.pes.org](http://www.pes.org)

1992 <sup>131</sup>	
1994 <sup>132</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The principle of free trade must not be used to undermine social standards in Europe. We must protect our economy from unfair trading and we must try to combat social and environmental dumping.</li> <li>• The EU cannot exist as an island of wealth in a sea of poverty. This is why we must spend more on development and less on arms, to be less protectionist and do more to promote fairer world order.</li> <li>• Trade relations with other industrial nations must be fair and based on the principle of reciprocal concessions by all the partners. The EU must take action against unfair treaty practices. And, of course, the EU must also ensure, through international treaties, that human rights, environmental protection and social rights are respected in the world economy.</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>133</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We must promote economic and social cohesion, and ensure that all citizens have a fair share of the fruits of common prosperity.</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>134</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We are committed to working towards a more efficient and effective use of the EU budget. Finances should be raised in a fair way between EU countries and citizens on the principle of solidarity between richer and poorer regions.</li> </ul>
2009 <sup>135</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Party of European Socialists is committed to creating a fairer, safer society, tackling the challenges we all face by putting people first.</li> <li>• We believe democracy and citizen's rights in the European Union are crucial to ensure a fairer deal for people. Citizenship should be inclusive, based on rights and responsibilities, as part of a shared future on our continent.</li> <li>• Migration is one of the key challenges facing Member States of the European Union. Europe's progressives are committed to addressing the issue on the basis of our values of fairness, democracy, human rights and solidarity.</li> <li>• The EU must support the multilateral trading system, to the benefit of developing countries in the WTO Doha Development Round, and to ensure a fairer domestic distribution of the benefits of trade opening, as well as guaranteeing better social and environmental standards</li> </ul>

In the majority of the quotations, *fairness* refers to the international matters. Mainly the domain it is being attached to is international trade (see 1994, 2009), linking also with questions of redistribution on a global level. The other context, in which it is being used are in relation to (international) *order*, *share of prosperity* (1999, 2004) and *deal* (for the people). In the later one, it bridges with the issue of rights and responsibilities of citizens (2009) and the way the issue of migration should be approached (2009).

Even though the two notions *justice* and *fairness* are not being used in exactly same context, their meanings seem to be very close to one another. The observation that could be made is that on the national level it is *justice* that was more frequently used, and in the European context it was rather *fairness* – however the discrepancies are indeed so small, that this is rather a point of interest than a substantial remark.

130 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

131 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

132 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

133 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

134 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, [www.pes.org](http://www.pes.org)





### 3.10. Solidarity

Previously, solidarity has been described as a value that refers to the degree and type of social integration and of which understanding depends on cultural and historical contexts (please see section 2.12). In the light of comparison of the respective statements by the national parties, a typology proposed to divide the interpretations into two categories. The first one embraced all the reference to *solidarity* with whom, and the second grouped all the notions that connected with the state issue or transnational arrangements. It seems that on the basis of the texts included in the table below, it is possible to apply corresponding model of classification:

1992 <sup>136</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We maintain the ideal of a democratic Europe (...) a Europe where solidarity between and within the nations, as well as between generations is a guiding principle.</li> <li>• We are convinced that we have to develop this Europe together: the concept of a two-speed Europe undermining the solidarity between member states is thus unacceptable.</li> <li>• Solidarity in Europe is of fundamental importance. Real European Union means economic, environmental and social balance between and within member states. (...) We want to promote better coordination of the joint objectives of economic and social development as well as more effective solidarity to prevent two-speed Europe.</li> <li>• [Environmental Europe] Socialists and social democrats emphasize the need for solidarity between generations.</li> </ul>
1994 <sup>137</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (...) solidarity and responsibility (...) that is what our Europe should look like.</li> <li>• Many people see today's EU as too bureaucratic and undemocratic; lacking equality and solidarity (...) We want to change this.</li> <li>• Solidarity between the stronger and weaker is the cornerstone of the European Union.</li> <li>• This is not just a dictate of solidarity, but good economic sense. The better individual member states are doing, the better everyone is doing.</li> <li>• Solidarity between generations will ensure the elderly participate fully in society.</li> <li>• Socialists have always believed in creating peace by co-operation. (...) Our most important task in the search for peace is, therefore, to find a balance between north and south, west and east, and rich and poor countries. (...) we must spend more on development and less on arms (...) improving the situation of poorer regions of the world is demanded as an act of SOLIDARITY (...) reform and strengthen UN (...); further human rights and democracy throughout the world; Peace in Europe is first and foremost the responsibility of Europe itself. Close cooperation is more important for peace than military strength. But without security from military threat there can be no peace (...) work towards disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>138</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• These (21) commitments reflect our shared values as socialists and social democrats. Democracy, freedom and human rights. Solidarity, social justice and equal opportunity. Common civic rights and responsibilities.</li> <li>• [Promoting a social Europe] Solidarity is one of our fundamental principles, including solidarity between generations</li> <li>• [A Strong Europe] Europe must be able to secure its common interests and promote its values of democracy, solidarity, justice and freedom on the global stage.</li> <li>• [Promoting solidarity with other nations] Europe has a responsibility to cooperate with developing countries. (...) The EU must also help to ensure that the benefits of globalisation are equitably shared and allow fairer access to its market for trade from poorer countries. The European Union should ensure consistency between its solidarity with developing countries and its other external policies.</li> <li>• [Reforming the EU's policies] The EU also needs reformed structural funds which can address the reality of regional and social inequalities in the new enlarged EU. These funds must be effectively targeted towards job creation, promoting solidarity and improving social and economic cohesion.</li> </ul>

2004 <sup>139</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A vote for Social Democrat candidates is a vote for a European Union that combines social justice within countries and solidarity between the countries. It is a vote for a strong, social EU that provides economic success and security for all its people</li> <li>• We are committed to working towards a more efficient and effective use of the EU budget. Finances should be raised in a fair way between EU countries and citizens on the principle of solidarity between richer and poorer regions.</li> </ul>
2009 <sup>140</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Our comprehensive progressive reform agenda to transform European cooperation – based on our values of equality, democracy, human dignity, solidarity, freedom and justice – can deliver the change which the people of Europe so desperately need.</li> <li>• We believe in a social market economy that enables everyone in society to make the most of the opportunities globalization offers. We believe in solidarity between generations, not right-wing individualism.</li> <li>• We can promote solidarity and cohesion, cornerstones of the European project from which we all gain. Free movement of labour should provide all workers with more freedoms and opportunities ( . . )</li> <li>• Because it is a budget of solidarity (European budget), it should serve to improve living standards and foster social cohesion and growth throughout Europe as well as supporting convergence of the least developed EU regions, not least in the new Member States.</li> <li>• Migration is one of the key challenges facing Member States of the European Union. Europe's progressives are committed to addressing the issue on the basis of our values of fairness, democracy, human rights and solidarity.</li> <li>• We must work together for peace and partnership, and to eradicate poverty, in solidarity with people across the world.</li> <li>• A new European progressive reform agenda is essential to enhance the EU's role as a partner for peace, security and development, for the sake of our own future development and security as well as solidarity with other countries and peoples.</li> </ul>

*Solidarity* is being described as the core value of socialists and the one that is of particular relevance to existence and strengthening of the European Union. In the light of the texts quoted above, the classification model used in section 2.12 should be altered by adding one extra category. Then it would consist of: *solidarity with whom; solidarity among member states; and finally international solidarity.*

Within the first category, it is clear that the most exposed one is the pledge to cultivate *solidarity among generations*. It is mentioned in every Manifesto (except 2004). It is a guidance from which other policies are being drawn – i.e. environmental one (1992), social (1994, 1999) and social (1999). The environmental aspect is worth highlighting, as *solidarity between generations* appeared already in that particular sense in the Hague Declaration, so long before the others started using that as a moral legitimization of actions taken i.e. against climate change. On the other hand, it should also not remain overlooked that in the latest Manifesto of 2009, *solidarity between generations* is named to be an alternative to a process of individualization. Taking into account the major shifts in demography, this notion carries a major potential.

135 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

136 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

137 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

138 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

139 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, www.pes.org



As far as *solidarity among member states* is concerned, it is being seen as a core sense of European Union. Depending on the years, it provided adequate socialist answers to the threats: in 1992 and 1994 to a danger of a two-speed Europe and crisis-related corrosion on the Union; in 1999 and 2004 it was a guideline on how to proceed to strengthen the EU in the enlargement times, helping all to reach same level of prosperity; same logic – but much more economy, finances and labour oriented – applied in year 2009. What is interesting, in 1994 it was underlined that *solidarity* is in fact also a matter of pragmatism, as its application benefits all. It is worth reiterating on how crucial it still remains, especially in the days of a vast economic crisis that Europe is going through contemporarily.

Finally, *solidarity* has always been the value that socialists tend to associate with international level. In that sense, it appears of course in the Manifestos as a notion that guides primarily the European ideological mission (see 3.5) and complementary to *justice* and *fairness* (see 3.8 and 3.9). *International solidarity* means that EU must assume its global responsibility, working to ensure peace and cooperation (1994, 1999, 2009), which is especially crucial in the globalization era (1999).

### 3.11. Work and welfare

It was considered in the sections 2.13 and 2.14 if work (labour) and welfare (and well-being) could be considered as core values of social democracy. This deliberation emerged as an echo of the contemporary renewal debates. It remained inconclusive. Nevertheless, it still remained a query for the examination of the pan-European documents. Especially, that in times of austerity it is frequently repeated that one of the *values* that crisis takes away is the value of the *European Social Model*. As terms, *work* and *welfare* cross-cut each other in the PES Manifestos, the quotations concerning them were organized within a single table below:

- |                     |  |
|---------------------|--|
| 1992 <sup>141</sup> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The European Community is an instrument for promoting (...) welfare.</li> <li>• The Single Market increases the opportunities and Monetary Union will help stability, but they will not themselves bring about overall and balanced growth, capable of reducing unemployment and generating the necessary wealth to improve living standards and competitiveness throughout the Community. (...) the fight against unemployment implies, amongst other things, the need for a concerted and coordinated boost to growth and the adoption of industrial policy measures at Community level.</li> <li>• Our task is to identify the rate of growth without which monetary convergence will be a purely deflationary mechanism and social Europe will become a means of compensation rather than a matter of rights, responsibilities, and full opportunities.</li> <li>• Without social dimension the single market will be fatally flawed. (...) [Socialists] want to focus social policy on job creation, working conditions, positive action, industrial democracy and social cohesion.</li> </ul> |
|---------------------|--|

1994 <sup>142</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By working together we can (...) fight mass unemployment and guarantee social progress; (...) face economic challenge from both America and Asia, ensuring that the European model of social democracy and the welfare state survive.</li> <li>• (...) Employment and social welfare – this is what our Europe should look like.</li> <li>• We need an EU that [is] (...) committed to the principles of democracy and traditions of social progress while harnessing the power of the world's biggest market.</li> <li>• This is the course for Europe we want to pursue: create jobs, safeguard social progress and encourage cohesion; (...)</li> <li>• Today millions of people throughout Europe are out of work, bringing greater poverty and threatening social peace. We must create jobs now, distribute income more fairly and guarantee social progress. (...) We want to concentrate all our efforts on a massive reduction in unemployment. Our aim is to create as soon as possible a society in which everyone will have a job or occupation. We can achieve it only through a co-ordinated European strategy.</li> <li>• We must develop Europe's strengths in world-wide competition: millions of motivated and well trained workers; the world's biggest single market; great research potential; stable democracies; social services; relatively high environmental standards; an incomparable cultural diversity.</li> <li>• We need a European agreement on employment and future investment. (...) We need o also create and maintain more jobs by reorganising work and safeguarding competitiveness with measures agreed between the social partners. These include a substantial cut in working time to ensure better division of available work.</li> <li>• [Funds] help groups which are particularly disadvantaged to find a place in the labour market, for example through retraining or youth training. (...) This is not just a dictate of solidarity, but good economic sense.</li> <li>• We believe that the EU is the correct way to maintain and develop further the social progress which characterises our countries today.</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>143</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The EU must belong to the people and must be driven by their priorities – on jobs, security and the environment.</li> <li>• [1: Putting Jobs First] Employment must be at the top of the European agenda. Social democrats will continue to lead the way with new ideas to create jobs, to help into jobs those without work and to provide training without the right skills. Europe cannot accept the economic and human waste, nor the social divisions caused by structural unemployment. The development of a European pact for employment is a priority. There are many positive ways to promote employment, including training, tax reform, the modernisation of welfare systems, the promotion of new enterprises and support for the non-market sector. This may include agreed reductions in working time negotiated between the social partners. We commit ourselves to promote opportunities for employment for all those who are without work, especially through programmes to help the young and long-term unemployed.</li> <li>• We commit ourselves to closer economic co-ordination aimed at ensuring sustainable growth and high levels of employment.</li> <li>• We commit ourselves to modernising and strengthening the European social model, promoting dialogue between social partners and tackling social exclusion.</li> <li>• We commit ourselves to completing the Single Market, ensuring that Europe's businesses have free and equal access across Europe's markets and boosting employment through increased trade.</li> <li>• We believe that each individual has more opportunity and more security if their community invests in modern services of high standards in education, health, transport and welfare.</li> <li>• We commit ourselves to promote opportunities for employment for all those, who are without work.</li> <li>• We commit ourselves to improving opportunities for young women and men in a Europe that secures the well-being of future generations.</li> <li>• Our biggest investment must be in our greatest asset, our people and their skills. (...) We commit ourselves to promoting a Europe of knowledge based on life-long learning, to train workforce in the most modern skills and European research programmes that open up and develop the technologies of the future.</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>144</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A vote for Social Democrat candidates is a vote for a (...) strong, social EU that provides economic success and security for its people: a Union that is able to tackle the major challenges of unemployment, social justice, international terrorism and the global environment.</li> <li>• We demand action to meet the social and employment objectives of the Lisbon strategy.</li> <li>• It is essential that the EU and its Member States give more priority to social standards, in particular the objectives of more and better jobs, full employment and social inclusion as well as environmental protection and sustainable development. We must preserve, strengthen and modernise the European Social Model which combines economic growth and adequate levels of protection. To ensure prosperity is shared, we must strengthen social partnership. (...) Our vision of the European Union is a community based on the principles of the social market economy and mutual cooperation for the benefit of all.</li> <li>• Progress is still needed to ensure that equality laws (in employment) are respected in practice and that there is a sufficient support for working parents.</li> <li>• The historic EU enlargement of May 2004, welcoming 10 new countries, will provide a better standard and quality of life for citizens in the new Member States, stimulate trade and increase jobs across the whole of the EU.</li> <li>• We are in favour of reforming the stability and growth pact to promote higher growth and employment. Stability should be pursued as a vital condition for growth, not as alternative to growth.</li> </ul>



- 2009<sup>145</sup>
- Working together in Europe we are stronger because: we share the biggest economy in the world – and can therefore create more and better jobs and reduce poverty by trading with each other on the basis of common standards; (...) we can promote solidarity and cohesion, cornerstones of the European project from which we will all gain. Free movement of labour should provide all workers with more freedoms and opportunities, benefiting the economies of the countries where these workers are based, while avoiding brain drain from less prosperous regions. But it should never lead to reduced social standards or wage cuts designed to give one Member State a competitive advantage over others at the expense of workers.
  - The EU is the biggest economic and labour market in the world. By working together, we will be in a stronger position to relaunch the economy through our smart green growth and jobs plan. Trade unions and employers have an important role to play in contributing to the realisation of smart growth across Europe.
  - Limits are also needed on top executive pay and bonuses, notably so that earnings reflect losses as well as profits. [about financial markets].
  - We propose a European strategy for smart green growth and jobs which will create 10 million new jobs by 2020 – with two million in the renewable energies sector alone – and help make Europe a world leader in innovation, new green technologies and products. This would build upon the EU's existing Lisbon Strategy to make Europe into the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.
  - We propose a European Pact for the Future of Employment. All European programmes should be examined to see how employability and employment opportunities can be safeguarded and improved. EU-funded investment projects should be swiftly implemented. Advantage should be taken of the possibilities offered by the European Social Fund for integrating the unemployed into the labour market and for training workers. In a global economy, investments in education are fundamental for growth and creating better-paid and better-quality jobs. We propose to fund Skills Programme through the current EU budget, to train workers across Europe for, amongst other things, the 'green' jobs of the future, such as renewable energy sector. We will also work towards full and equal access to life long learning. (...)
  - The EU's Internal Market should be completed – and the red tape facing business reduced – to generate more European trade and jobs, based on high environmental and social standards.
  - The ECB must encourage growth and employment while maintaining price stability.
  - We support businesses to anticipate changes caused by climate change and technological shifts – thereby safeguarding existing and creating new jobs – while helping workers retrain if they lose their jobs because of these changes. (...) We will support job creation by ensuring that businesses have access to credit to invest and grow, for example through European Investment Bank.
  - Citizenship should be inclusive, based on rights and responsibilities, as part of a shared future on our continent. We want everyone living and working in Europe to participate in deciding their future.
  - Existing inequalities and new global challenges are placing new pressures on people and creating a risk of permanent social divides in a society. (...) We can tackle these inequalities by focusing European cooperation on improving the lives of people in Europe. We must promote better policies to protect the most vulnerable people during the economic recession and beyond. (...)
  - We propose to include a social progress clause in every piece of European legislation (...)
  - We propose to establish a European framework for public services, guaranteeing universal and equal access for citizens, quality, local autonomy and transparency in public services, maintaining their integrity as defined at national level, so that European competition and business rules do not run counter to citizens' rights.
  - We propose a European pact on wages, guaranteeing equal pay for equal work and setting out the need for decent minimum wages in all EU Member States (...).
  - We will address the problems related to brain drain created by the migration of highly-qualified professionals and skilled workers within Europe and from the thirds countries into Europe.
  - We will act to prevent exploitation of workers and strengthen their rights in collective bargaining (...)
  - We propose to strengthen workers' rights to information and consultation. Employee participation at European and global level is a key issue for the future – a vital element of a more social Europe and a precondition for decent work.
  - We propose setting EU targets for providing care for elderly.

140 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

141 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

142 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

143 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

144 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, [www.pes.org](http://www.pes.org)

Since its foundation, PES has been placing work as a top priority issue. In 1992, the focus remained on fighting unemployment, as also ensuring good working conditions and a well-functioning industrial democracy. This agenda has been evolving, as also have been the labour market and the expectations of workers and employees. In the 1990s the prevailing logic was to create jobs – as everyone should uphold a job or an occupation. It indicated a vision of a society that social democrats wished to build on the European level, in which all are embraced by the labour market. It was sustainable growth that was supposed to be the answer on how to achieve that. In the new century, approached seem to have altered. Social democrats still spoke about jobs, but since 2004 clearly about “more and better jobs” and rather about jobs creation in numbers, than of a vision of a fully-employed society. Despite the fact the agenda has become a very detailed one, it seems that it became a question of a strategy that a matter of explanation why people need to work, what is the societal function of it, how the personal life cycle should in fact look like. This vision seems to be missing, especially in the context of all the challenges and pressures that the European labour market is facing. Finally, in the context of how *work* is being described, it can be concluded that at least in the light of the European debate it does not constitute a core value.

As far as *welfare* is concerned, the assessment on its interpretation in the light of the Manifestos is fairly similar to the one on work. In the initial texts *welfare* is considered a backbone of the Union on one hand, and on the other a goal of the implementation of the European policies (1992, 1994). Since the mid-1990s the challenge that arises from the crisis is obviously the challenge of preservation and strengthening of the European Social Model, which is reflected in almost identical sentences in the Manifestos of 1999 and 2004. A Universalist approach was chosen in defining a goal, which was a provision for all and each and every one. In 2009 the pledges were enriched by a notion of *green* (technologies, jobs etc.) – adding environmental standards to the list of components of the European Social Model. From the deliberations it seems that though *European welfare* is a core pillar of the vision of a (new) Social Europe – it still is not yet at this stage explained in the documents of the PES in a way that it could be considered as a core value.

Perhaps one last observation in this paragraph that needs to be made is that there are certain elements that become in certain periods of time the construct of the socialist vision of i.e. European Social Model. An example of that is a notion of social progress that was a mainstreaming category in 1994, redefining objectives, provision and addressees of any social (investment) policies. It reappeared again only 15 years later, in the Manifesto 2009. As such it provides an interesting hypothesis that the ideological development of social democracy on the European level is perhaps not so much of a straight line, but rather a sort of a spin – which makes completes a circle upon a major external crisis and collapse.



### 3.12. Democracy

Contemporary social democracy, on both national and European levels, is attached to *democratic* system of governance (see section 2.15). As it was shown before, it remains an ideal to seek and the parties repeat its pledge to tirelessly work towards further *democratization*.

The European context poses an extraordinary challenge to this mission. First of all, because EU is continuously accused of being “not democratic enough”, bureaucratic and distant from its citizens. Secondly, because of its complicated institutional construction, several elements that the member parties pointed out to be necessary circumstances for democracy to exist – remain very difficult to be truly transposition and translated. An example of that is the issue of civic education, which is complex to organize within the national circumstances, and practically impossible to achieve from the EU level. This is also because education still remains largely a competence of the member states, because the campaigns organized have still a limited impact due to the lack of public sphere and finally also, because the concept of the European citizenship as such still remains ambiguous. There could be more examples enumerated. Last but not least, there may be additional doubts - if Europe is indeed not *democratic enough*, it may appear questionable how it can in fact can promote itself (or be an instrument in promoting) *democracy*.

For socialists *democracy* is principally both goal and the way. Some parties treat it as a value, some see it as the best possible institutional set up. In all the cases their particular image of the ideal naturally depends on the political tradition of the country they operate in. This is in fact a double-folded challenge for a europarty not only to reach agreements in this dimensions on principles, but also to place it in a well-thought through vision of the European-level democracy. This ambition has been reflected in subsequent manifestos, which relevant paragraphs are quoted below:

1992<sup>146</sup>

- We maintain the ideal of a democratic Europe that is both open to its citizens and to the world (...)
- As the Maastricht Treaty indicates, European parties are a vital force in representing and fulfilling the aspirations of the people of Europe. The PES will also stimulate the participation of the public in European politics.
- The decision to establish a European party and the introduction of majority voting in its statutes are expressions of a serious commitment to move together through this important phase of European integration. Common actions are more necessary than ever. Stronger political coordination, the joint platform for the 1994 elections and other activities will ensure that the new PES will be at the centre of the struggle to build a better Europe.
- They (socialists and social democrats) want to focus social policy on job creation, working conditions, positive action, industrial democracy and social cohesion. (...) The most vulnerable in society must not be made to suffer in order to pay the price for the economic failures of the recent past.
- Socialists and social democrats are committed to a democratic Europe. The Treaty on European Union shows the way in which we wish to move forward. Where decisions in the Council are taken by majority, the European Parliament should have the right of co-decision. Where consensus is necessary, national parliaments should be fully involved. The next Intergovernmental Conference called to revise the treaties should be used to apply further this principle.



- National citizenship is to be complemented by a European citizenship. This European citizenship is an evolutionary concept that should entail: freedom of movement, residence and establishment; the right of European citizens to vote in their place of residence in local and European elections; the creation of European legal area; the development of rights embodied in the European Social Charter; the introduction of a charter of rights of citizens to a high level of environmental protection; and the promotion of a charter of the rights and responsibilities of European Citizens. We will work towards the implementation of this programme.
- Socialists and social democrats want to make Europe more open. For the people of Europe the relationship between national and European levels sometimes creates uncertainties. Therefore a main function of European politics is to establish clear links between European and national policies. European policies must reflect better the interests of the citizens living in different nations. This will foster the spirit of cooperation. We therefore reaffirm the necessity of ensuring openness in Community decisions; of guaranteeing better information for and participation of citizens; and of clarifying the principle of subsidiarity that implies that decisions are taken on the level at which they are most effective, democratic and close to the citizen. As such the application of the principle of subsidiarity should not be used as pretext to block progress especially in environmental and social policies. PES will initiate a public campaign in Europe to enhance participation of citizens, to put the concept of subsidiarity into practice and to promote discussion of policy choices for the 1994 elections.

1994<sup>147</sup>

- (...) democracy and human rights (...) that is what our Europe should look like.
- We need an EU that proves itself as a successful community of peace, committed to the principles of democracy and traditions of social progress while harnessing the power of the world's biggest internal market. There is still a long way to go to achieve that. Many people see today's EU as too bureaucratic and undemocratic (...)
- The Maastricht Treaty on European Union is a step in the right direction. It gives the European Parliament more influence and makes the European elections more important.
- (...) This is the course for Europe we want to pursue: (...) work for democracy.
- To make the economy more democratic, we believe in European work councils, consultation of workers in multinational businesses and European sectoral collective agreement.
- Europe's future does not lie in a centralised super-state. Only a democratic Europe is a strong Europe
- Openness fosters confidence and acts as a defence against abuse of political power.
- The Treaty on European Union strengthens the European Parliament. But this is not enough. We want to use the Treaty revision foreseen for 1996 to make EU more democratic and efficient.
- Full democratic and informed participation of Europe's citizens, national identity and the diversity of regions must become the hallmarks of the European Union.
- We want the European Parliament to have a right of initiative, and for co-decision between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers and majority voting in the Council to be a rule.
- National parliaments should exercise democratic control over member states' European policy.
- We support involvement of local and regional authorities in the EU decision making process. The new Committee of the Regions has a contribution to make to this.
- We want to apply strictly the principle of subsidiarity. In future this must mean as many decentralised, national and regional decisions as possible, but with European regulation and legislation necessary. This principle, however, must not be used to block progress in European environmental or social policy.
- A democratic Europe must grow from the base upwards. We must: (-) expand partnership between local authorities; (-) promote further regional co-operation both within and outside the EU; (-) strengthen and expand successful EU youth exchange programmes, in order to increase mutual understanding amongst Europeans; (-) build an educational system that brings people closer together and promotes the study of more foreign languages. Only in this way can the cultural wealth of our continents be enjoyed by the greatest possible number of people.
- A stable democracy requires credible politics. Political parties are essential to modern democracies. Political parties are basic instruments to participation in democratic life for citizens. Improvement in their functioning is fundamental in order to promote public confidence and participation in political life. Power must come from the people and not from the parties and we therefore believe in greater direct participation by the public.
- Corruption, embezzlement and illegal party financing damage trust in the political system and thus democracy itself. Such practices go against all our principles. We therefore support strict rules to prevent misuse of power and demand that party finances be open, clear and subject to public control.
- The EC must be more than just a giant market. We want to turn into a real community, dedicated to the great European traditions of parliamentary democracy, human rights and the welfare state.



- 1999<sup>148</sup>
- These (21) commitments reflect our shared values as socialists and social democrats. Democracy, freedom and human rights. Solidarity, social justice and equal opportunity. Common civic rights and responsibilities.
  - [A Europe that puts citizens first] [Promoting citizen's rights] The EU has extended the rights of its citizens complementing the rights of national citizenship. A stronger civil society must be the foundation of a more democratic European Union which guarantees civil liberties.
  - We attach special importance to the rights of people with disabilities.
  - In order to develop a stronger European identity we propose that the fundamental civic, economic, social and cultural rights which have been won by citizens throughout the European Union, including access to public services, should be set out in a European Charter of rights. In carrying forward this work the EU and the EP in particular should initiate a wide-ranging consultation with citizens groups, the social partners and other non-governmental organisations.
  - [Bringing the European Union Closer to the People] We want a decentralised Europe that encourages regional initiative and local democracy. We must preserve the identity and independence of Member States in those matters that can be better resolved at the national, regional or local level. We must also build a closer union that can deal effectively with those issues that make us interdependent and require a European response. Information and decision making must be open and accessible for the citizens. We commit ourselves to bring decisions in Europe as close to the people as possible and respect the principle of subsidiarity by ensuring integration whenever necessary and decentralisation whenever possible.
  - [Reforming the EU's Institutions] The EU needs democratic and efficient institutions if it is to deliver effective policies which accommodate the larger Union of the next century. In particular the EU must agree on the reform left over from Amsterdam Summit – on the size of the Commission, the weighting the votes and the application of QMV. The EP must take full use of its increased powers of legislation and scrutiny to build a closer partnership with national parliaments. The European Commission needs to be better organised and more accountable. The European Council should set the strategic agenda for the European Union. The Council of Ministers must be better coordinated and its procedures must be made more transparent and efficient, including the increased use of QMV where desirable.
  - We commit ourselves before enlargement to reform the institutions of the EU to make them open, efficient and democratic.
  - Europe must be able to secure its common interests and promote its values of democracy, solidarity, justice and freedom on the global stage.
- 2004<sup>149</sup>
- The EU must ensure that citizens benefit from its actions and that they are involved in its decisions. At the same time, in line with subsidiarity principle, the EU should not act when national or regional bodies are better placed to do so.
  - During the negotiations of the Convention on the Future of Europe, European Socialists played a key role in shaping the draft Constitution and ensured that it included key values and rights (. . .) The European Constitution must make the EU institutions more transparent, accountable and relevant to citizens. It must enable their decisions to be more democratic and efficient.
  - Our vision is of a European Union based on democracy, equality, respect for human rights, diversity and the rule of law. For this reason, we support the Charter of Fundamental Rights and its inclusion in the Constitution. We should also promote these values beyond the borders of the EU.
  - We support a strengthened role for the European Parliament as the directly elected voice of the European people.
  - Democracy is not possible without equality. We oppose all forms of discrimination.
  - Fraud and corruption undermine democracy and we will root them out whenever they are found.
  - We oppose media concentration and monopoly control of economic and political power.
  - We will continue to press for further reform of the EU institutions. We will fight for openness and transparency, with sound financial management, open competition and value for money in the European Commission.
  - We aim at: (. . .) Reinforce alliance against extreme right-wing forces.

- 2009<sup>150</sup>
- Our comprehensive progressive reform agenda to transform European cooperation – based on our values of equality, democracy, human dignity, solidarity, freedom and justice – can deliver the change which people of Europe so desperately need.
  - The threats to democracy and citizens' rights have not gone away. Terrorism, crime and extremism cross European borders. We have to step up European action to prevent these developments from threatening lives and freedoms of citizens within our borders, without compromising fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression or protection of personal data.
  - We propose to work with all our global partners towards reform of global financial architecture in order to prevent the recurrence of a financial crisis and make the power of financial institutions subject to democratic scrutiny.
  - We believe democracy and citizens' rights in the EU are crucial to ensure fairer deal for people. Citizenship should be inclusive, based on rights and responsibilities, as part of a shared future continent. We want everyone living and working in Europe to participate in deciding their future. We believe in empowering future generations, and in doing what we can to encourage political and societal engagement. (...) We believe in active democratic consultation and participation.
  - We propose to establish a European framework for public services guaranteeing universal and equal access for citizens (...) so that European competition and business do not run counter to citizens' rights.
  - We propose to strengthen workers' rights to information and consultation. (...) the rights of European Works Councils must be extended.
  - We will ensure that democracy, transparency and accountability are cornerstones of all the reforms of the European institutions. For example, we propose to strengthen transparency by obliging all lobbyists and lobby agencies to register themselves, their clients and their activities (...)
  - We are committed to ensuring that EU legislation respects citizens' rights as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
  - We advocate giving regions and local authorities a greater role in European affairs, reflecting their growing role in implementing European policies and promoting discussion of the European questions at the sub-national level.

As in case of the national parties statements, also in the context of the PES Manifestos, it can be observed that also at the European level *democracy* is being described in relation to the actors, who play a role in its creation and through a proposal on an institutional set up that would suit its realization.

Within the first category there are two groups of statements – those, which concern citizens and those that describe the role of the parties. Europe should be open to the citizens (1992, 1994, 1999) and should encourage their informed participation (1994). The socialists' demand for presence of the citizens grows from ensuring that the EU decision making process is a transparent one to a demand that all can participate in it (2009). Even though it is not as strongly present, as it was in case of the national parties manifestos, there is also a strong signal in the last years (2009) that rights of citizens mean also their responsibilities. This is, as stated, not as categorical as in the national parties' views (see section 2.15; in many of which the citizens were made co-responsible for democracy and democratization), but nevertheless indicates direction of developments.

145 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

146 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

147 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

148 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

149 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, www.pes.org



In its manifestos, PES introduced a notion of *European citizenship*. It was at beginning assumed to be an *evolutionary concept* (1992), which is easy to explain – as when the idea was formulated, the Masstricht Treaty in fact had just entered into force and there were as many hopes, as also question marks on the future of the newly established Political Union. Experience of the European Parliament, which started as a consultative assembly and have been since its foundations gaining new powers so to say “in making”, could induce a belief that the same would be the case for citizenship. To begin with, European citizenship has been seen as complementary to the national one (1992, 1999). It was to entail different rights (social, political, cultural, economic etc.) and create a potential for building European identity (1999). The issue of identity (national and European) and bridging that with a concept of respect of diversity has been faded in the new century – reflecting the tendencies of disaffiliation of the society from the world of politics. Perhaps this is one of the threads that could be picked up in the renewal debate as well, adding points that in 1992 – 1999 were not to be thought of, such as European citizenship (in the light of i.e. power of Initiative), European partisanship (in the angle of the development and strengthening the European political party system) and interactions between European parties and European civil society (touched upon in 1999 and 2009).

This links to the question how PES sees the role of the parties, which elaborations should be seen as supplementary ones to the section 3.4. Upon the establishment of the PES in 1992, it considered itself as a vital actor in a representative democracy (so linking between the Union and “people”) and a instrument of coordination of policies on the European level. The first of the roles in planned to fulfill by organizing a pre-electoral campaign, and the second while uniting parties in the name of one common manifesto. In this regards, the ambitions could be read as giving a platform to meet and consult, formulate main directions and inform the public about it. It was relatively distant from an ambition of every day substantial policy making. This has been evolving – in 1994 the approach was taken that *political parties are essential to modern democracies*. Even though there was no deliberation on what that would mean in the European context, it still was an important statement – especially that in fact it was the last one of that kind. The later Manifestos (1999, 2004, 2009) did not include any references to the political parties, even though they did offer much space to elaboration on institutional framework.

In terms of institutions, it is clear that their reform drew attention especially in 1994 and 1999 – which is connected with the Intergovernmental Conference, Amsterdam Treaty and finally run-up to Nice. The proposals mostly evolve around the rights of the European Parliament, its relations with Council and Council of Ministers, as also around the decision making mechanisms. In years 2004 and 2009 the institutional question seems to have less prominent place – mirroring perhaps the conviction that instructional reform has advanced as far as it could (given circumstances, among them also the fiasco of the referenda in France and the Netherlands).

In general, it can be said that though many details were given about the particular institutions, a vision of a democratic Europe is still relatively an ambiguous one. There are additionally many elements that indicate certain potential debate's threads – such as relations between local and regional levels (mentioned in 1992, 1994, 1999), relations between European level and global governance (mentioned in 2009), as also the question on subsidiarity (that was consequently mentioned in years 1992 – 2004).

### 3.13. Tolerance, respect and dignity

Within The Hague Declaration *tolerance* was named as the key value of the socialists' movement. In the way it was encompassed in this initial document, it was to characterize approach of Europe towards its people, ensure that cultural diversity is preserved and minorities are embraced with special protective measures. On the other hand, tolerance was also the value from which the principle derived to stand against racism and extreme nationalism.

Within the subsequent years *tolerance* seem to have disappeared as a notion that became associated with somewhat passive approach (from a core value in 1992, in 2004 it was "only" a once used characteristics). Its place was partially taken by concepts of respect and *dignity*, which also seem to have referred more to individuals from all social groups than to certain groups. This can be observed while analyzing the data gathered in the table below:

1992 <sup>51</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tolerance is a key value for our movement. We are committed to fighting racism and extreme nationalism that endanger the stability of whole societies and put minorities at risk. Only in a tolerant Europe will its cultural diversity be an asset rather than a threat. We call on all other democratic forces to join us in this struggle. As the European Community is becoming a space for free movement we must ensure the convergence of immigration policies and conditions to exercise the right of asylum.</li> </ul>
1994 <sup>52</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This is the course for Europe we want to pursue: (-) fight racism and xenophobia.</li> <li>• [Fighting racism – regulating immigration together] Immigration and the social fears of many people are increasingly being misused for extreme right-wing activities. We say that racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism must never be given another chance. The EU must contribute to this with its own campaign. Extreme right-wing and racist activities must be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>53</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discrimination in any form has no place in a modern society that we want to build. A healthy society and democracy can only be based on mutual respect for equal rights of all its people. The EU and its Member States must take lead in tackling racism by cooperating more closely together. Developing a society based on tolerance requires a European strategy to prevent illegal migration, to tackle at source the pressures of poverty and persecution which provoke migration, and to ensure respect for the rights of legal migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.</li> <li>• We commit ourselves to fight all forms of discrimination, to tackle prejudice and defeat racism and xenophobia.</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>54</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We vehemently oppose racism and xenophobia whenever it is found</li> <li>• For social democrats, equality is one of the most important values: democracy is not possible without equality. We oppose all forms of discrimination.</li> </ul>

- 2009<sup>155</sup>
- The EU is based on human rights, non-discrimination and respect for all. We view diversity in its many forms – cultural, linguistic, religious – as one of the Europe's greatest assets.
  - All Europe's citizens should have decent, quality work that enables them to enjoy decent life.
  - We demand needs-based social welfare benefits (...) to guarantee a life in dignity.
  - We will continue to fight gender stereotypes and believe that strengthening women's rights and opportunities will bring significant economic, social and democratic benefits for all Europe's citizens.
  - Europe's progressives are committed to addressing this issue [migration] on the basis of our values of fairness, democracy, human rights and solidarity.
  - [on migration] the answer is not ghettos or xenophobia, but real reforms to ensure integration, fight illegal migration (...)

The principle to stand against racism and extreme nationalism (1992), continued to be regarded as an extremely relevant one. In subsequent years, also xenophobia and anti-Semitism were added to the list of what socialists declared their readiness to struggle against (1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009). With the years passing, however, the tendency grew to embrace all these under a motto to "fight against any discrimination". Two reasons can be named, why there has been such a strong attachment to this particular struggle. First of all, discrimination is the opposite to the values of equality and solidarity, upon which socialists wanted to base their vision. Secondly, it is also disruptive to the way they wish society to develop. Discrimination would lead to segregation and would disturb cohesion, hence totally undermine any chances of Social Europe to be ever put in place. Therefore the struggle against had in fact both ideological and strategic meanings, which mutually strengthen each other. This is an interesting observation in the light of contemporary struggle against growing forces of right wing extreme and populism, which fight is more and more developing to be a tactical one about potential electorate rather than a political one about different visions.

The way socialists envisage to fight against right wing extremism is through law (1994, 1999, and 2009). The attachment to its rule is also the reason why in a majority of the quoted documents there is a promise to combat *illegal* immigration. In the Manifesto 2009, the issue of migration is social integration is for the first time strongly related to the socio-economic issues. Perhaps it is echoing the debate that immigration is the only chance for Europe to gain capacity to remain economically sustainable in the light of i.e. ageing society. This is also perhaps why *tolerance*, which more clearly referred to cultural issue, was replaced by *fairness*. This remains an indication on what debate there can be in Europe – a right wing

150 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

151 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

152 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

153 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

154 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, [www.pes.org](http://www.pes.org)

version driven by a debate around religious or cultural differences, or a left wing one – departing from economy and social policies for a new society. This distinction is an ideological one.

### 3.14. Security and safety

Accordingly to the findings of section 2.19, *security* was recognized as a core value by one of the PES member parties (LSAP). It was understood as a protection against danger, which last notion can naturally be defined in several different ways – depending from the context. Security may have been therefore a protection against wrongdoings (crime etc.) or against potential threats (i.e. challenges that may occur in the course of technological evolution).

In the context of united Europe, *security*, *stability* and *safety* remain extremely meaningful concepts – as the sense of the European Integration was in fact to build an area of peace, stability and prosperity. This also explains why they have been given as prominent role in the PES Manifestos, as it may be seen in the light of the table below. Naturally, the biggest section comes from the Manifesto 2004 (especially when one compares the proportions of the texts with the lengths of the original documents) – which is understandable, as this was the first Manifesto after 9/11 in fact.

1992 <sup>156</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A conjunction of stagnation in some member states and recession in others threatens jobs and living standards (. . .) A common approach is needed in order to avoid social disruption and economic distortions on the road to Monetary Union.</li> <li>• European identity will be enhanced by adopting and strengthening common foreign policies. Peace and security are high on our agenda. Europe carries responsibility for creating and maintaining stable and more equitable relations with both the East and the South. (. . .) The rest of the world expects an active role of Europe in international affairs in promoting human rights and helping development.</li> <li>• [Community Enlargement] We hope that the Community can strengthen and widen its scope of cooperation with all neighbouring states to the East and South, particularly through association agreements, establishing common standards for safeguarding the environment and health, as well as through a greater widening of European programmes; since its stability and security in Europe depend on political, economic and social progress in these countries.</li> </ul>
1994 <sup>158</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Today millions of people throughout Europe are out of work, bringing a greater poverty and threatening social peace.</li> <li>• And to prevent unfair competition in the internal market we are working to establish high minimum social standards within the EU (. . .) health and safety in the workplace (. . .)</li> <li>• Socialists have always believed in creating peace by co-operation. (. . .) Our most important task in the search for peace is, therefore, to find a balance between north and south, west and east, and rich and poor countries. (. . .) Close cooperation is more important for peace than military strength. But without security from military threat there can be no peace (. . .) work towards disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation</li> </ul>

1999 <sup>158</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We believe that each individual has more opportunity and more security if their community invests in modern services of high standards in education, health, transport and welfare.</li> <li>• Our vision of Europe is an area of freedom, stability, prosperity and justice.</li> <li>• We commit ourselves to ensuring that the single currency achieves a smooth introduction and provides growth, employment and stability.</li> <li>• [Strengthening Security and Fighting Crime] Security against crime is an issue of common concern for all European citizens. Improving the security of our communities must be a top priority for the governments of Europe. Cross-border crime, such as money laundering and trafficking in drugs and human beings, has a direct impact on people's lives. The countries of the European Union have a responsibility to work together to tackle organised crime, to improve the security of our external borders and to ensure success of the new police intelligence agency, Europol.</li> <li>• [Acting Together for Peace and Security in the World] We commit ourselves to building close and strong cooperation in foreign policy and to enhancing Europe's capacity and means to prevent conflicts and to respond security crises.</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>159</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A vote for Social Democrat candidates is a vote for a European Union that combines social justice within countries and solidarity between the countries. It is a vote for a strong, social EU that provides economic success and security for all its people.</li> <li>• We are in favour of reforming SGP to promote higher growth and employment. Stability should be pursued as a vital condition for growth, not as an alternative to growth.</li> <li>• We propose policies to improve people's quality of life, focusing on (...) safety of food.</li> <li>• Fighting cross-border crime requires a common approach at the European level. For this reason we will work for a greater European cooperation to make society free and safe for everyone. The new threat of international terrorism has proved its brutal cruelty on European soil. It threatens the fundamental European values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. We, as Europeans, must unite against any intimidation of this sort. No country is immune and therefore need truly effective cooperation between European police and security agencies to tackle and reduce this threat.</li> <li>• We want strong European Union that has a clear voice in international forums, pressing for a just, stable and peaceful world in accordance with international law and in the framework of the United Nations.</li> <li>• We need to reform UN to enhance its role in ensuring global peace and common security and make it more representative.</li> <li>• We are committed to strengthening stability in South East Europe and to encouraging the European orientation of the countries from former Yugoslavia.</li> </ul>
2009 <sup>160</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Party of European Socialists is committed to creating a fairer, safer society, tackling the challenges we all face by putting people first. (...) We will work together for a fairer, safer and greener Europe. Together we are a force for change.</li> <li>• The EU must also act outside its borders to promote peace and development. This will increase our security, while benefiting people in poorer countries. (...)</li> <li>• No matter who we are or where we were born, people in Europe share the same basic values about the kind of society we want to live in: a safer Europe, with high living standards, decent and stable work, and a safe and clear environment.</li> <li>• By improving consumers' rights and protection, we can help to build a safer and fairer Europe for our citizens.</li> <li>• A new European progressive reform agenda is essential to enhance the EU's role as a partner for peace, security and development, for the sake of our won future developments and security as well as solidarity with other countries and people.</li> </ul>

155 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

156 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

157 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

158 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

159 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, www.pes.org

There are two dimensions of *security* that European socialists have been referring to: internal and external one. In terms of internal, it most commonly addresses either social issues (employment, welfare, education) or legal one (criminality). In the social field, *security* is needed to that society can prosper in peace and the social disruptions are avoided (see i.e. 1992, 1994). The notion of preserving *social peace* seems to be a very important one throughout the 1990s. In 2000s safety takes more the place of security. It brings along a correlation between safety and change (see i.e. 2009) and touches upon the core of the difficulty of the socialists' message: how to convince people to necessity for progress and change, while they are so skeptic about the future and see it only as a process of decline (as they are in the new century according to all the major polls and statistics). To begin with, socialists claimed that stability and security depended on progress (see 1992), but this instinctive association seems to have been relatively weakened. Especially, it is the case as far as the European context is concerned. It is also hard to notice what was the influence of changing circumstances on these concepts, as perhaps with an exception of 2004 (reference to food security), bridging with new threats of modern times seems to be missing.

External context brings along the questions of the European's responsibility towards the rest of the world (both closer and distant regions), but that seems to be cross-cutting with the elaborations on *peace and internationalism*, which are dully explained in the section below.

### 3.15. Peace and internationalism

The spirit of European *internationalism* has partially been captured already within the section that was devoted to the issue of *solidarity* (see section 3.10). Nevertheless, the picture sketched there remains incomplete. The material analyzed there allows to explain *international solidarity* as a matter of global responsibility of Europe, which is a justified generalization, however misses the arguments that have been added throughout the years subsequently and which the table below illustrates:

- |                    |  |
|--------------------|--|
| 1992 <sup>61</sup> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• European identity will be enhanced by adopting and strengthening common foreign policies. Peace and security are high on our agenda. Europe carries responsibility for creating and maintaining stable and more equitable relations with both the East and the South. In order to achieve this, Europe must ensure the coherence of its activities in the context of its external relations. This implies mutual information, constant cooperation, common actions whenever necessary, and close coordination in international organisations and at international conferences. Community cooperation should, in principle, extend to any UN-sponsored action, whilst respecting the Constitutions of the Member States. The rest of the world expects an active role of Europe in international affairs in promoting human rights and helping development.</li></ul> |
|--------------------|--|





1994 <sup>162</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Socialists have always believed in creating peace by co-operation and we want the EU to harness all its strength to achieve this. The Maastricht Treaty is a significant step on the way to joint foreign and security policy. And in the world threatened by instability the EU provides the best example of peaceful coexistence.</li> <li>• Our most important task in the search for peace is, therefore, to find a balance between north and south, west and east, and rich and poor countries. (...) we must spend more on development and less on arms, and to be less protectionists and do more to promote a fairer world economic order. And even if improving the situation of poorer regions of the world is demanded as an act of solidarity we gain also from the contribution to our own economic well-being.</li> <li>• We need to reform and strengthen UN in order to prevent the causes of conflicts. The UN must be given the ability to safeguard peace and enforce peace. Once common foreign and security policy is in place, the question of a seat for the EU on the Security Council can be addressed.</li> <li>• We aim to further human rights and democracy throughout the world. An international court of law must exist to try war crimes and human rights abuses.</li> <li>• Peace in Europe is first and foremost the responsibility of Europe itself. Close cooperation is more important for peace than military strength. But without security from military threat there can be no peace (...)</li> <li>• Together (...) we aim to find peaceful solutions to conflicts, aid the protection of minorities and resist all attempts to change borders by force.</li> <li>• Together we want to work towards disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.</li> <li>• Together we want to create a European peace-keeping force which will be made available to CSCE and UN.</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>163</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As internationalists we believe that we make each of our countries stronger by strengthening our partnership in the European Union. (...) Together we can create a EU that will play its full part on the world stage.</li> <li>• We all have different traditions and our own responsibilities in our own countries. But we share a vision. Together we must make Europe grow.(Chapter 9) We call on all men and women to join with us to realize their aspirations for a peaceful and social Europe.</li> <li>• [Meeting the Challenge of Globalisation] Globalisation has radically changed the worlds of business and government with major implications for work and society. In larger and closer Union the countries of Europe will be stronger and better able to meet those challenges. (...) We commit ourselves to work together to meet the challenge if globalisation and develop a more effective global governance through reformed international institutions and a better regulated financial system.</li> <li>• Europe must act as one, as this makes each Member States better able to promote its interests in the world. We can secure a better deal in international negotiations on trade and other matters if we speak with one voice. We can make a bigger impact on world events and better promote international standards on social and human rights and the environment if we pursue an effective common foreign and security policy. And we can make a more effective contribution to international crisis management if we can deepen cooperation in defence as envisaged in the Treaties. Further steps in the field of arms control and disarmament will have a positive impact on stability and peace in Europe.</li> <li>• The EU has particular responsibility to build close and cooperative relations with its nearest neighbours like Russia and the Ukraine. Enlargement towards the east must be accompanied by a consistent development of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.</li> <li>• [Promoting solidarity with other Nations] Europe has a responsibility to cooperate with developing countries. Conflict, mass-migration, rapid population growth and the degradation of environment often have their roots in poverty. The European Union must strengthen its development effort and focus more of its aid on helping the poorest people and the poorest countries. The EU must also help to ensure that the benefits of globalisation are equitably shared and allow fairer access to its market for trade from poorer countries. The EU should ensure consistency between its solidarity with developing countries and its other external policies. The EU must also promote respect for human rights, democracy and good governance which are essential to stability and development.</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>164</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Social democrats of every country are strongly in favour of a successful and united European Union that is an area of peace and cooperation based on partnership and the rule of law.</li> <li>• We want strong European Union that has a clear voice in international forums, pressing for a just, stable and peaceful world in accordance with international law and in the framework of the United Nations.</li> <li>• We need to reform the UN to enhance its role in ensuring global peace and common security and to make it more representative. The EU must play a leading role in working for effective multilateralism, enabling countries to work better together to resolve conflicts and to respond to new security threats. The fight against international terrorism will succeed only if we tackle the causes of terrorism.</li> <li>• We should further develop European Security and Defence Policy to make it a credible instrument in terms of conflict prevention and crisis management.</li> </ul>

- We are committed to strengthening stability in South East Europe and to encouraging the European orientation of the countries from former Yugoslavia. We must develop our partnerships with our neighbours in the Northern Dimension and revitalise Barcelona Process for our partnership from the Mediterranean basin. Our values must not stop at the borders.
- In cooperation with other progressive forces in the world we have proposed new policies to meet global challenges, in particular UN MDGs. (...) We will step up efforts to fight global poverty and cancel the debt of developing countries. We will also intensify the global fight against AIDS and other diseases related to poverty by promoting access to affordable methods of prevention and drugs for treatment.
- We will push for progressive globalisation, which not only increases trade with developing countries, but also promotes democracy, human rights and environmental protection in these countries. The EU must play its part in ensuring good corporate governance and social responsibility of business wherever it trades.

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- The EU must also act outside its borders to promote peace and development.
- The EU should be a frontrunner in advancing peace and sustainable social and economic development worldwide, as a cornerstone for human security. (...) We believe that Europe needs a stronger common voice in the world to shape a better future for our citizens and the planet. We must work together for peace and partnership, and to eradicate poverty, in solidarity with people across the world.
- EU is already an active global player, but we must increase our influence and impact by coordinating our positions and speaking as much as possible with one voice. Strengthening the role of the EU High Representative for CFSP will be an important step forward. (...)
- Today's global governance institutions have proved themselves to be ill-adapted to new global challenges. Therefore we must take the lead in reforming global governance – in partnership with the new Democratic administration in the US – on the basis of a strengthened cooperative and multilateral approach.
- The EU must step up its conflict-resolution, peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in crisis zones, and develop capacities to assist countries after civil or environmental crisis.
- We propose EU should increasingly work on conflict prevention, resolution and post-crisis management abroad, by improving European countries joint capacities and sharing the burden of peacekeeping missions (...) within the framework of the UN.
- We propose to strengthen police, judicial and security cooperation in combating drug trafficking, crime and terrorism. Fight against terrorism should be a top priority (...)
- We propose to step up European efforts to support international disarmament, including strengthening international agreements on arms control and non-proliferation (...) We want a world without nuclear weapons.
- We support the reform of the UN.
- We propose that EU actively promotes an Alliance of Civilizations through UN, strengthening dialogue and partnership between peoples and cultures as means to enhance world peace and security.
- We propose to increase defence cooperation amongst EU Member States, without affecting the characteristics of individual Member States (...) The new European defence initiative should be developed in coordination with NATO.
- We will promote moratorium in application of death penalty in the UN, particularly the UN Security Council, as well as the revision of the decision making process, mandate and functioning of WTO, World Bank and regional banks, IMF.
- We believe that the future of Western Balkans lies within the EU, with stability bringing prosperity and security.
- We want to strengthen the EU's neighbourhood.
- We propose that EU develops its relations with Latin America (...) and will continue build transatlantic partnership with new democratic leadership (...) deepens its relations with China (...) closer ties with India (...) implement EU-Africa strategy.
- The EU must support the multilateral trading system to the benefit of developing countries (...) We propose to address the global food crisis by working to prevent further speculation on food prices and to promote food security by developing new generation of aid.
- We shall work to ensure that all trade agreements include appropriate, enforceable human, environmental and social right clauses and that all trade agreements with developing countries – such as EPAs – serve as a real tool for the economic and social development of the countries and regions concerned.
- Decent work must be a global objective.
- A new European progressive reform agenda is essential to enhance the EU's role as a partner for peace, security and development, for the sake of our own future developments and security as well as solidarity with other countries and people.

The process of establishment a European Community of Coal and Steel was put forward as a project, which not only would lift the respective countries from post-war disasters, but also would ensure the degree of interconnections among them – which would effectively prevent any armed conflicts to be even thinkable. Hence *peace* was one of the ideals that the Founding Fathers wanted to pursue. In this sense it perhaps could have been perceived not only as an order (as described in the section 2.20), but in fact as a *value* that give birth to the Community. The orientation on securing peace internally (within the EU) has only been a part of the socialist agenda. It has always had linked with the international dimension and the role of the EC (EU) on a global level. This second pillar of understanding peace has effectively become a dominant one, gaining much space within the programmatic documents. The principle that guided socialists was undoubtedly an issue of *responsibility*.

Already at the beginning, PES underlined that Europe must lead a common policy on international level, for which coordination, cooperation and common actions of member states were indispensable (1992). The subsequent Treaties were bringing along new arrangements, which allowed socialists to go deeper into details on how they envisage Europe's foreign policy (see Manifestos: post-Maastricht in 1994 and post-Lisbon in 2009). Speaking with a strong voice was to begin with a matter of fulfilling hopes entrusted in EU (1992) and then became also a matter of pragmatism – in logic of which, member states united in the name of one vision could act more effectively and also respond to globalization better (1999).

The *responsibility* of Europe laid in acting in favour of a reform of the UN, with an ambition to play a relevant role in its renewed framework (among the proposals there was i.e. a possibility of reducing the number of seats held by Europeans in the UN Security Council). The subsequent Manifestos (1994 – 2009) reflect an observation that the world global governance framework does not function – definitely as effectively and as democratically as it should. The two of the Manifestos enlarge a list of the global institutions that need to be reformed by enclosing also the financial ones (1999 and 2009). The image that arises from all these documents is the one of a progressing bankruptcy of the modern global settlement, to which however no further going, visionary answers have yet been provided. The key word remains "reform", which could indicate socialists identification with the system and hence reservations towards too rapid or too revolutionary changes.

160 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

161 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

162 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

163 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

164 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, [www.pes.org](http://www.pes.org)

In the Hague Declaration, PES recognizes the Europe’s role in maintaining peace and stability, also through the relations with its neighbors. In 1992 these are “East” and “South”; in 1994 Europe as a whole; in 1999 Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean; 2004 South East Europe and Mediterranean; and finally 2009 Western Balkans and the whole of neighborhood. These differently formulated and focused approaches mirrors the developments in the region. In terms of relations between EU and the rest of the world, till 2009 the key word was multilateralism – which in 2009 was translated into specific respective EU-other continents policies.

Development policies varied in terms of the attention they were given in the respective Manifestos, however since the first founding declaration they always were an integral part of any deliberations on *internationalism* and *peace*. Accordingly, there were certain issues that were winning attention of PES in different moments: globalization (1999); trade (1999); disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation (1994, 2009); UN MDGs (2004); fight against terrorism (2004, 2009); fight against AIDS (2004); abolition of death penalty worldwide (2009). The appearance of them can be explained by the circumstances and developments within the respective world policies. This however would suggest that overall the PES ideas for the EU policies on the global level remain still rather reactive and responsive, than leading and shaping ones.

### 3.16. Sustainable development

Alike in case of the national parties (see section 2.21) sustainable development does not score high as far as references to it in the PES Manifestos are concerned. This observation can be supported by the analyses of the following table:

1992 <sup>166</sup>	
1994 <sup>167</sup>	
1999 <sup>168</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [Ensuring a Healthy Environment] We must make sustainable development a basic principle of both the internal and external policies of the EU. (. . .) We commit ourselves to cut emissions of greenhouse gasses, to press for action to halt resource depletion, to preserve biodiversity, improve food safety and to pursue the principle that the polluter must pay.</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>169</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (PES alternatives, UN MDGs) These policies include trade with fair access to our markets for developing countries, particularly for agricultural products, aid and social development especially health and education, higher social standards and greater emphasis on sustainable development.</li> <li>• We must deliver commitments made in Kyoto (. . .) To promote global sustainability, we will encourage more sustainable alternatives to excessive use of natural resources, especially fossil fuels.</li> </ul>



- 2009<sup>170</sup>
- The EU must also act outside its borders to promote peace and development.
  - [Relaunching the economy and preventing new financial crises] We firmly believe in the principles of sustainable development, based on mutually-reinforcing economic, social and environmental policies.
  - The EU should be a frontrunner in advancing peace and sustainable social and economic development worldwide, as a cornerstone for human security. (. . .) We must work together for peace and partnership, and to eradicate poverty, in solidarity with people across the world.
  - A new European progressive reform agenda is essential to enhance the EU's role as a partner for peace, security and development, for the sake of our won future developments and security as well as solidarity with other countries and people.

Sustainable development is defined as a principle, not as a value (1999). Its importance seems to be growing from Manifesto to Manifesto starting from 1999. This can be related to the overall circumstances, in which particularly environmental issues (especially ones connected with climate change) gain attention.

The trend of attaching more relevance to *sustainable development* seems to be indicative one. There are two reasons to believe that it will become more frequently used also in the future. The first one is that the last interpretations show it in the light of not only environmental, but also social and economic contexts (see 2009). This is representative to a specific understanding of the crisis that socialists popularize – namely that it is a complex, multi-layers one. As such therefore it can remain further explored and become a guiding principle of their overall response to the modern predicaments. On the other hand, it carries along a very specific authority as a notion – not only was it developed by a socialist (see section 2.21), but also recognized by the whole International Community. It has therefore a fair framework, which once given a modern and specific socialist interpretation, can become a feasible response to the crisis. It can combine in an interesting, credible manner the concepts of *stability* (see section 3.14) and *progress*.

### 3.17. Culture and identity

In the section 2.22, it was shown that the issues of culture and identity (as also patriotism and sovereignty) play a substantial role for socialist parties in respective member states. The importance they attach to those is very much predetermined by history of their country and character of contemporary national debate.

165 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

166 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

167 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

168 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

169 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, www.pes.org

As for the European Union, the issue of “European Identity” has been touched upon in the sections devoted to the “European citizenship” (see i.e. section 3.12), however those deliberations do not touch extensively on the relation between the European and the national identities of an individual. Culture has only been a fringe issue, while discussing the notion of “Tolerant Europe”(see section 3.13). To supplement previous findings, the following paragraphs have been additionally examined:

1992 <sup>171</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [Tolerant Europe] Only in a tolerant Europe will its cultural diversity be an asset rather than a threat. We call on all other democratic forces to join us in this struggle.</li> </ul>
1994 <sup>172</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full democratic and informed participation of Europe’s citizens, national identity and diversity of the regions must become hallmarks of European Union.</li> <li>• A democratic Europe must grow from the base upwards. We must: (-) expand partnership between local authorities; (-) promote further regional co-operation both within and outside the EU; (-) strengthen and expand successful EU youth exchange programmes, in order to increase mutual understanding amongst Europeans; (-) build an educational system that brings people closer together and promotes the study of more foreign languages. Only in this way can the cultural wealth of our continents be enjoyed by the greatest possible number of people.</li> </ul>
1999 <sup>173</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We are proud of our national cultures and identities, but reject the short-sighted focus of the Right on narrow national interest at the expense of our wider and deeper common interests.</li> <li>• In order to develop a stronger European identity we propose that the fundamental civic, economic, social and cultural rights which have been won by citizens throughout the European Union, including access to public services, should be set out in a European Charter of rights. In carrying forward this work the EU and the EP in particular should initiate a wide-ranging consultation with citizens groups, the social partners and other non-governmental organisations</li> <li>• European Union Youth programmes must be reinforced to enable young people to develop their European identity and commitment.</li> <li>• [Developing Strength Through Cultural Diversity] We believe that Europe’s diversity of culture is an asset. The people of Europe share common project and have common interests which are best served by working together and strengthening their cultural identity. We treasure our different heritages and will seek to promote our thriving cultural industries. Culture and arts have an essential role to play in promoting social cohesion of others. The partnership between our peoples is stronger when they are confident of their cultural and historic identity. We commit ourselves to preserving distinct cultures, to promoting understanding between them and to ensuring that all cultures can express themselves freely.</li> </ul>
2004 <sup>174</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EU policies must provide for future generations by taking on board the priorities of young Europeans in education, information technology, environment and cultural identity.</li> <li>• We recognise the positive contribution of legal migrants and support a multicultural and tolerant society</li> </ul>
2009 <sup>175</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• We view diversity in its many forms – cultural, linguistic, religious – as one of the Europe’s greatest assets.</li> <li>• We support the recognition and fostering of Europe’s cultural and linguistic diversity, as one of its richest assets and a key part of its identity.</li> <li>• To ensure that we continue to enjoy the benefits of a more productive, prosperous and diverse society, we will work to stop illegal immigration across our borders and combat human trafficking.</li> <li>• [migration] we therefore propose to promote action at the appropriate level (local, regional, national or European), such as language or cultural training, which supports full integration of migrants in their new communities.</li> </ul>

170 The Den Haag Declaration, as adopted by the First Congress of the Party, The Hague, 9-10 November 1992, Party of European Socialists.

171 Manifesto for the Elections to the European Parliament of June 1994; Adopted by the Congress of the Party of European Socialists 6 November 1993. PES Archives.

172 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, PES Archives. Introduction, Page 4

173 Growing stronger together. Five commitments for the next five years. Manifesto of the Party of European Socialists for the June 2004 European Parliament elections. Adopted by the PES Congress, Brussels, 24 April 2004. PES Archives.

174 PES manifesto People First: A New Direction for Europe, European elections June 2009, Party of European Socialists, www.pes.org



Since its foundation, PES remains faithful to the argument that European cultural diversity is an asset not a threat (1992, 1994, 1999, 2009). The word “asset” is being repeated and in 2009 argument is formulated, that diversity contributes to more productive, prosperous and diverse society. The most outspoken about benefits is however the Manifesto of 1999, which speaks about partnership of people, which is stronger, when people are confident of their historic and cultural identity. Manifesto 1994 is the only one in fact that brings also a dimension on “national identity”.

Though generally culture and identity are the issues that embrace all, there are two specific groups targeted in the PES approach. In the Manifestos 1999 and 2004 PES entrusts young people with a hope of pursuing further developments of European identity, and 2004 and 2009 link the debate on culture with the one on migration.

There are two observations that can be made in the light of this synthesis. The first one is that socialists remain still ambiguous as far as the relation between European culture / identity and the national ones are concerned. This makes them undoubtedly vulnerable, especially, as it was said before, when the European agenda is still considered by citizens from national perspectives and the European elections are fought on the bases of the national issues. Secondly, placing a debate on cultural diversity in a context of the issues of migration may have a counter effect to the one intended in the affirmative position “united in diversity”.

## 4. Conclusions

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This empirical study “*Progressive values in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*” was concluded in order to define what the core values of European social democracy are in modern times. The answer to this question remains tremendously multifaceted, which perhaps in the best way is illustrated by the length of the paper itself.

The first major challenge that needed to be faced was a question of methodology. As it is explained in Chapter 1, the notion of value is an extremely complex notion. There are diverse definitions, which originate from various disciplines, such as sociology, economy, anthropology, linguistics and none the less also philosophy. An agreed-upon conception is still missing, which respective authors call with a name of a *theoretical limbo*. The fact that the research was conducted in a European context complicated the issue additionally. Having consciously excluded economy and linguistics as two disciplines, authors focused on the other disciplines (as listed above) and in a result of deliberations came with a set of definitions. This list of vocabulary, which includes descriptions of: *core values, principles, vision and paradigms*, is the

first achievement of the study. It has proven its utilitarian asset for authors while examining the sources, but it may also serve as an organising tool for ideological debates. As this paper clearly shows, until now there has been no shared understanding on the terminology. Simplifying, the result that parties from the same political family may have different ideas on what values are and hence are not unanimous in what they enlist as their ideological core.

The second difficulty was to gather appropriate materials and ensure adequate translation. This has been of crucial importance, as the study was designed to be an empirical one, composed of two respective chapters – both of which are based on qualitative comparative methods. The nuances played an important role and could heavily influence the conclusions on if the parties effectively share the same understanding or in fact have contradictory ones. For help and support from the side of the international secretaries of respective PES member parties the author remains extremely grateful.

Even though the initial task was to extract the core values and base the study on their comparison only, in the course of research some new questions arose and the author's choice was to embrace them. There are several examples that illustrate the results of this decision. The table in the section 2.1 illustrates the variety of the ways that the national parties – PES members have at their disposal to provide lists and definitions of their respective core values. The classification allowed discovering four categories of texts (declaration of values, political programme, electoral manifesto and constitution/statutes of a party). This typology surely illustrates diversity of means, which will naturally influence an approach to any process on a European level. Additionally, it has exposed that with two exceptions, all the PES member parties have concluded a fundamental ideological debate within the last decade and a half.

Variety of the formats led to a question on how the respective documents are being drafted. The question was only partially a curiosity about process, and rather more importantly a matter of finding out how relevant these statements are. In fact two processes were described in the respective declarations and this allowed an analysis. An observation made on that is in order to make such a statement matter, an organization should see the process almost (if not entirely) as equally important as its outcome. A fully fledged ideological process requires time (in the case of most of parties, several years), as its different consultation rounds serve identity building. This appears to be the ultimate sense of having a set of values – an ability to share a starting point for deliberations on the state and future of the world.

Even though the question on *historical heritage* may have seemed not to correspond directly to the main question of this paper, it was indispensable to include it. Especially that the political family researched here is the one with strong associations to its past and traditions. There have been several interesting observations made, among them that all the socialist





parties on the national level consider themselves as historical ones and part of whatever has led to the settlement of contemporary times. The references to their past achievements seem to serve as arguments for their legitimacy; however it may paradoxically be also seen as a danger – especially once we assume the original sense of social democracy as opponent to the system. There are those among the parties, who clearly advise caution. On the other hand the attachment to the past contributions is totally absent on the European level. The subsequent core documents of the PES seem to ignore the role of socialists in shaping the history of Europe, leaving a terrible vacuum, which is easily used by conservatives in different communications.

The historical perspective imposed in a fashion, a need to check how the parties see themselves and their role nowadays. This has been a very interesting aspect, as it allowed detecting what social democrats consider as a party, what makes it modern and what role it shall play as an important factor of democracy. However mirrored with the European level, it became evident that this element of how the party envisages itself, stopped playing any role in the 1990s. It could of course become an extremely important issue to reflect upon – especially in the light of the debate on the crisis of democracy, decline of the traditional political parties and the rise of new forces (especially those rising today much interest – such as indignados, Occupy Wall Street etc.)

Further sections of both Chapters analyse the conceptions that both the respective national parties and the PES have had, as far as what they consider their core values, is concerned. Generally speaking, there are three remarks to be made at this point. Firstly, comparative analyses provide an overview of differences (caused among others by diverse anthropological and political traditions, in which respective parties operate). They prove that the theory about cosmopolitanism of contemporary social democracy may reflect the actual state it finds itself in – which diversity shall be embraced as strength of the movement. The discrepancies in fact can serve in the best way possible to reopen certain political debates that suffer nowadays in stagnation and reach beyond contemporary boundaries, providing the renewal process with an extraordinary chance. The author took liberty to highlight some of the crucial questions and give indications on what contemporary renewal debate brought on them so far, however surely many more issues could be extracted and further examined.

Secondly, as the anthropological apparatus used within this paper's methodology would suggest, the values are defined in a certain context. This is a great challenge once there is a need to transposition them onto i.e. European level. The adopted method required mirroring all the findings concerning national parties with assessments on PES's statements, which has been duly carried out. The conclusions of respective sections in Chapter 3 provide subsequently an indication on what has been translated into the European documents and what hasn't. The

question that remains unanswered at this point is double-folded: what is the role of a European statement on values and how the mutual interdependence between the European and national declarations can be ensured. This seem to be the key to responding on how the process of *europeanisation* of the national social democratic parties should be designed; as also what indispensable ingredients are of European partisanship and identity. It seems that without such an understanding it will always be hard to speak about politisation of Europe.

Thirdly, analysed material is an extensive and complex one. Findings provide a fairly complete answer on what notions social democracy considers as their values. Nevertheless questions about a global vision still seem to be insufficiently answered. In many aspects (especially on the European level), social democracy appears to be a reactionary movement, which has an inclination to respond rather to different issues than to propose a fundamentally different idea. The lengthy documents provide very detailed descriptions of “concrete” measures that have to be taken in order to readjust, modify and reform. The tone of the documents places social democracy on the sidelines of the system, in a format of a governmental party (to which image they long for, commemorating years in which they ruled the European Council). It is possible that these are no longer times for grand visions. Perhaps such visions can also not be found among conservatives, liberals or greens (comparing to which could definitely be also a useful exercise to find out to what extend the ideological differences exist in the contemporary world of politics). But even if that was to be the true, these are still the days when people seek hope more than ever – and this, similar to optimism, is not easy to be found in the analysed documents. This is surely the point to reflect upon – that relates to a simple question that many ask: *if we did not have social democracy in 21st century, what would be the reason to invent it?*

Completing the paper required almost a year-long study. There have been many detours and also several changes in the research plan, which heavily affected methodology and imposed re-designing the paper. The author would like to express gratitude to all the Members of the FEPS Next Left Focus Group, who patiently witnessed those different dilemmas that accompanied the progress and at each stage have tirelessly offered their extraordinary support. The herewith presented outcome is a complex portrait of social democratic values nowadays, together with the suggestions on which aspects may become relevant to touch upon in order to advance the progressive ideological debate in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As such, it serves the utilitarian criteria and presents itself as a contribution to a pan-European renewal process.

PROGRESSIVE  
FOR THE  
21<sup>ST</sup>  
CENTURY



# Biographies



**Rémi BAZILLIER** is an assistant professor at the University of Orléans and a research affiliate at the Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans (LEO-CNRS). His research focuses on development, labour economics and sustainable development. His current work studies the economic consequences of labour standards, the linkages between migration and social conditions and the influence of Corporate Social Responsibility. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne in 2007. He wrote several papers published in international per-reviewed journals including World Development, Journal of Development Studies, or Revue Française d'Economie. He recently published a book on the linkages between Labour and Sustainable development ("Le travail, grand oublié du développement durable", col. eDDen, ed. Le Cavalier Bleu, Sept. 2011, 224p).



**Patrick DIAMOND** is Gwilym Gibbon Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, a Visiting Fellow in the Department of Politics at the University of Oxford, and a Senior Fellow of Policy Network. He is the former Head of Policy Planning in 10 Downing Street and Senior Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister. His recent publications include: Beyond New Labour (with Roger Liddle, 2009); Social Justice in the Global Age (with Olaf Cramme, 2009); and Global Europe, Social Europe (with Anthony Giddens, 2006).



**Christine FÄRBER**, Prof. Dr., teaches at Hamburg University of Applied Sciences. She acquired her doctorate in political science at the Free University of Berlin, where she also held the position of dean of women from 1991-99. As head of a research and consulting institute she conducted studies on gender budgeting, on the intersection of gender and migration on the labor market and on governance.



**John HALPIN** is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, a progressive think tank in Washington, D.C., focusing on political theory, communications, and public opinion analysis. He is the co-director and creator of the Progressive Studies Program at CAP, an interdisciplinary project researching the intellectual history, foundational principles, and public understanding of progressivism. Halpin is the co-author with John Podesta of The

Power of Progress: How America's Progressives Can (Once Again) Save Our Economy, Our Climate, and Our Country, a 2008 book about the history and future of the progressive movement. Prior to joining CAP, he was a senior associate at Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, providing strategic guidance and public opinion research for political parties and candidates including Al Gore's 2000 presidential campaign, the British Labour Party, the Israeli Labor Party, the Austrian Social Democrats, and a range of congressional, state legislative, and initiative campaigns in the U.S. Halpin received his undergraduate degree from Georgetown University and his M.A. in political science from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He lives in Baltimore with his wife and two children.



**Gustaf-Adolf HORN**, Director of the Research Institute of Macroeconomy and conjuncture of Hans-Böckler Foundation. Born in 1954, He studies economic at at the University of Bonn (North-Rhine Westphalia) in 1973-1979 obtaining a degree: Diplom-Volkswirt (1979). In years 1980-1981 DAAD scholarship at the London School of Economics, finishing with a degree of Master of Science (1981). In 1981-1986 he was assistant lecturer for applied economic research at the University of Konstanz, then in 1986-1998 research associate at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), and then received a doctoral degree (Dr. rer. oec.) at the Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin). In 1998-1999 interim Head of the Department of Macro Analysis and Forecasting, in 2000-2004 Head of the Department of Macro Analysis and Forecasting. In 2001 he completed habilitation at the TU Berlin and since 1st January 2005 is Director of the Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) at the Hans-Böckler Foundation. Also since 2007 we works as Professor (external) of Economics at the University of Flensburg. Prof. Horn has an extensive teaching and consulting experience. Since 2009 he has served as member of the commission of the political executive of the Social democratic Party in Germany (SPD) for regulation of financial markets and since 2010 is a member of the economic council at the party chairman of the Social democratic Party in Germany (SPD) and chairman of the Chamber for Social Order of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD). Prof. Horn is a Member of the FEPS Scientific Council.



**Julian NIDA-RÜMELIN**, Professor, born in Munich 1954, is since 1990 Professor at the Center for Science Ethics of the University of Tübingen. In years 1993 to 2003 he was Professor for Philosophy at the University of Göttingen, then for Political Theory and Philosophy at the University of Munich. Since 2004 he has been an honorary professor at the Humboldt University, Berlin.

At present he is President of the German Society for Philosophy. From 1998 to 2000 he was Head of the Department of Cultural Affairs in Munich; from Jan. 2001 to Oct. 2002 Minister of State for Cultural and Media affairs of the German Federal government. Since 2009 he serves as Member of the National Executive of the SPD and Chairman of its Basic Values Commission.



**Pim PAULUSMA** is junior researcher at the Wiardi Beckman Foundation and member of the Young Academics Network of the FEPS. His work is related to the Amsterdam Process. His main areas of research are the labour market and economic affairs. He is especially interested in the quality of labour. Before he started working at the WBS, he has been vice-president of Young Labour in the Netherlands.



**Gesine SCHWAN**, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c., was born 1943 in Berlin. In 1971 she became Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Free University Berlin. In 1977 – 1999 she worked as Professor of Political Science - particularly of Political Theory and Philosophy. In years Professor Schwan served as 1985 to 1987 President of the German Association of Political Science (DVPW). Subsequently, in years 1993 – 1995 she held a position of a Dean of the Department of Political Science at the Free University Berlin. In October 1999 to September 2008 she was also President of the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder). Twice, in 1977 - 1984 and again since 1996 till nowadays she is a Member of the "Commission for Fundamental Values" of SPD. Professor Schwan was elected as Co-Chairwomen of the German-Polish Forum from 2002 to 2009, since 2002 is a Member of the Board of Trustees of the German Institute of Poland (Deutsches Polen-Institut). Among other functions, she was Coordinator of the Federal Government for the German-Polish Relations and Civil Society Cooperation near to the Republic of Poland. In 2004 she was elected as a Candidate for the Federal President (nominated by SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), which role she was also entrusted in years 2005 – 2009. She is a co-founder and president (since June 2010) of the HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA School of Governance.





**Eric SUNDSTRÖM** is the editor in chief of Swedish web magazine “Dagens Arena”, the daily voice of the progressive think-tank “Arenagruppen”, and of “*Fresh Thinking*”, the quarterly European-wide magazine of think-tank “FEPS”. He is also president of the Swedish “Social Democratic Press Club” and was previously editor in chief of “AiP”, the newspaper of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP). He has also worked as a speechwriter for SAP, at the Swedish Prime Minister’s Office, and as a research fellow at the think-tank PPI in Washington DC. Sundström was born in Sweden in 1974 and spent his heyday as a student at universities in Stockholm, Glasgow, Montpellier, Bologna and Washington DC. He holds an MA in international economics and European studies from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He resides in his hometown Stockholm and does not only get excited during election time. A good rock concert and any match involving Liverpool FC will also do the trick.



**Dimitris TSAROUHAS** is Assistant Professor in European Politics at the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University. Dr. Tsarouhas sits at the Scientific Council of FEPS, the editorial board of Social Europe Journal and the Executive Committee of the Greek Politics Specialist Group of the British Political Studies Association (PSA). He is also a member of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) and the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES). Dr. Tsarouhas specializes in European politics broadly defined. His research seeks to transcend disciplinary, dividing and incorporating insights from IR, comparative politics and political economy. He is the author of *Social Democracy in Sweden* (London and New York: IB Tauris), editor of *Bridging the Real Divide: Social and Regional Policy in Turkey’s EU Accession Process* (Ankara: METU Press) and author of numerous journal articles on European politics that have appeared in journals such as *Public Administration*, *Social Politics*, *Social Policy & Administration*, *European Journal of Industrial Relations* and *Southeast European & BlackSea Studies*.

## TEAM OF EDITORS



**Alfred GUSENBAUER**, born in 1960, was *federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria and member of the European Council* between January 2007 till December 2008. He led *Socialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)* between the years 2000 and 2008. Dr. Gusenbauer studied law, philosophy, political sciences and economy at the University of Vienna and there obtained Ph.D. in political sciences in 1987. Dr. Gusenbauer began his political career in *Sozialistische Jugend Österreichs (SJÖ)*, of which he was President since 1984 till 1990. In 1985 on SJÖ's behalf he was elected Vice-President of the *International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY)*, in which function he served till 1989. In 1991 Dr. Gusenbauer was elected SPÖ chairperson for *Ybbs an der Donau* and member of the Lower Austria party executive. Same year he became member and Deputy of Lower Austria in *Bundesrat* (Upper Chamber of the Austrian Parliament). During the following years of his political activism, Dr. Gusenbauer held several positions and functions: was Member of Parliament between 1993 – 2007; served as Leader of the Opposition from 2000 till 2007; was Member of Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from 1991 till 2007; and was Chairman of the Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe since 1995 till 1998. He has been actively engaged in the Party of European Socialists (PES), as the party's Vice President since the year 2000 and in the Socialist International as its Vice President since 1989. Dr. Gusenbauer was Professor-at-Large at the Brown University Providence / Rhode Island, is a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University and a James Leitner Fellow for Global Affairs at the Columbia University of the N.Y.C. Furthermore, he is President of the Renner Institute, President of the Austrian Institute for International Studies, President of the Austrian-Spanish Chamber of Commerce, member of the supervisory board of F.C.C. (Construction) – Spain and Alpine Construction and a CEO of Gusenbauer Projektentwicklung und Beteiligung GmbH. Dr. Gusenbauer holds an honorary doctorate of the Hertzliah University of Israel and is Senator of the European Academy of Sciences. Since June 2009 he chairs the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) "Next Left" Research Programme.



**Ernst STETTER**, born in 1952, is *Secretary General of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS)* since its creation on 30<sup>th</sup> January 2008. He is an economist and political scientist, and a regular commentator on EU affairs in media. Dr. Stetter studied at Universities of Tübingen and Heidelberg in Germany, focusing his research on the issues such as:

international trade, finance, economic, development and social policies. In 1976 Dr. Stetter started his professional career as a lecturer in economics at the DGB Trade Unions' Centre for Vocational Training in Heidelberg. In 1980 Mr Stetter obtained his Ph.D. in political sciences for his dissertation entitled "The Association of ACP countries (Lome I and Lome II) with the European Community and the STABEX-System". From 1980 till 2008 he worked for the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) in various positions, among them: as a Director of the Paris Office from 1997 till 2003 and the Brussels office from 2003 till 2008.



**Karl DUFFEK**, born in 1962, is *Director of Renner Institut and Vice President of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS)*. Mr Duffek finished his studies of German Language and Literature, English and American Language and Literature, Political and Social Sciences at the University of Vienna, Austria and the University of Hagen, Germany. In 1986 he graduated as Mag. Phil. In

years 1985 – 1987 Mr Duffek served as Member of the Representative Body of the Department of Humanities of the University of Vienna, chairing its work in the years 1985 – 1986. From 1988 till 1992 Mr Duffek was a fellow of Renner Institut (the Political Academy of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)), in charge of education policy and social sciences. In 1992 he became Deputy Director of this Institute, which function he held for six years. Since 1997 till 1998 Mr Duffek was Secretary of the Programme Committee and Coordinator of the new Political Platform of the SPÖ and following that he served as the SPÖ Federal Secretary for Education. Since 1999 Mr Duffek has been Director of Renner Institut and a Special Advisor to the SPÖ party leadership on the Programme and Ideological issues, and currently he also serves as SPÖ International Secretary. He published several books, among which there are: "Social Democracy and Education" ed. F. Becker, K. Duffek, T. Mörschel, Amsterdam 2008 / Graz-Wien 2007; „Sozialdemokratische Reformpolitik und Öffentlichkeit“, F. Becker, K. Duffek, T. Mörschel, Wiesbaden 2007; "Moderne Österreich", ed; P. Filzmaier, P. Plaikner, K. Duffek, Wien 2007; "The EU – A Global Player?", R. Cuperus, K. Duffek, A. Fröschl, E. Mörschel, Wien-Berlin 2006.



**Ania SKRZYPEK**, (Skrzypek-Claassens), born in Warsaw in 1979, is Policy Advisor at the Foundations for European Progressive Studies (FEPS). She holds Ph.D. cum laude from the University of Warsaw, which degree she obtained for her thesis “Cooperation of the socialist and social democratic parties in uniting Europe. From Liaison Bureau to PES. 1957 – 2007.” (also published in book format in 2010). Before joining the Foundation, A. Skrzypek worked as younger researcher at the Faculty of Journalism and Political Sciences at the University of Warsaw and also had served as twice consecutively elected Secretary General of Young European Socialists (ECOSY). Among her responsibilities at FEPS, she is in charge of the Next Left Research Programme, she co-coordinates FEPS Young Academics Network (FEPS YAN) and is Managing Editor of FEPS Scientific Magazine “Queries”.

PROGRESS  
VALUES FOR

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# 21<sup>ST</sup>

CENTURY



# **FEPS Publications**

## ←NEXT LEFT→

**“Next Left – Renewing social democracy”** is the first volume of what has become a popular series of publications. This part is specifically devoted to analyses of the crisis (as evaluated in the aftermath of the 2009 European Elections) and to identifying the elements which, reviewed and renewed, could transform social democracy into a movement capable to shape the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Volume I opens with the reflections by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, President of the PES and former Prime Minister of Denmark; and of Dr. Alfred Gusenbauer, Chair of the FEPS Next Left Research Programme and former Chancellor of Austria. Their conclusions bridge with the unique collection of interdisciplinary reflections from all across the continent, which features the main disputants of the think tanks’ renewal debate on both European and national levels.

After a successful launch at the PES Congress in Prague in December 2009, the book was also presented at numerous national Round Tables held by FEPS together with its member foundations in 2010. Last but not least, it also became an inspiration for a debate organised the same year at Brown University in Providence, US.





**“Next Left – The Leaders’ Visions for Europe’s Future”** is the volume II of the series, presenting a unique collection of 28 groundbreaking speeches of progressive European leaders. Composed of 6 chapters (*“Time for a New Direction”, “Enduring Values, Enduring Virtues”, “Breaking down Neo-Liberal Myths”, “Together we are stronger”, “Jobs, welfare and prosperity”, “Beyond the Nation State”*), the book mirrors the social democratic responses to the world and European crisis, indicating also the path ahead for the left.

### Featuring

Sigmar GABRIEL, Martine AUBRY, Zita GURMAI, Martin SCHULZ, Mona SAHLIN, George PAPANDREOU, Jose Luis RODRIGUEZ ZAPATERO, Poul Nyrup RASMUSSEN, Alfred GUSENBAUER, Borut PAHOR, Jutta URPIILAINEN, Eamon GILMORE, Caroline GENNEZ, Elio DI RUPO, Jens STOLTENBERG, Werner FAYMANN



**“Towards a new strategy”** constitutes the 3<sup>rd</sup> Volume of the “Next Left” Books’ Series, of which the previous two: *“Renewing Social Democracy – Contributions to a pan-European Debate”* and *“The Leaders’ Visions for Europe’s Future”* were enthusiastically received respectively in 2009 and 2010. Presenting a handful of stimulating ideas, this book part represents a decisive shift of the focus: from critical analyses of the crisis of social democracy to a proposal on what it could become in order to be a leading political force in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The articles gathered here provide a solid synthesis of a year-long research, of which outcomes became an inspiration for progressive movement on both the national and the European levels. The material reflects the main threads of the 4 colloquiums, organized by FEPS together with Renner Institute, which took place in Brussels and gathered more than 150 high level participants. At the same time it also echoes 14 round tables that FEPS held in respective EU member states thanks to the cooperation with its member foundations, involving more than 2000 academics, politicians and experts. As such therefore, this book presents itself as a unique compilation of the points raised about the renewal of social democracy on all levels and across the continent.



*"Towards a New Strategy"* opens with a foreword by Dr. Alfred Gusenbauer, Chair of the "Next Left" Research Programme. Further the volume covers four chapters: *"Responding to Contemporary Society"*, *"Our Values in a Changing World"*, *"A New Socio-Economic Paradigm"* and *"Mobilizing International Solidarity"*. Coherently to diverse profiles of the authors and their various expertise, the structure and the tone of the respective texts differ: from longer elaborations to short and sharp statements; and from theoretical deliberations to concrete policy recommendations. This diversity is a very interesting character of the "Next Left" series, proving that a multifaceted approach is the key to success in ensuring the future for the progressive alliance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.




# Queries



## NEXT LEFT, NEXT EUROPE

In 2009, FEPS launched a call for papers addressing PhD and PhD candidates to elaborate on how they saw Europe in a decade, within the framework of its [Next Left] programme, run under the leadership of former Austrian Chancellor Alfred GUSENBAUER. The first release of Queries contains a selection of the most interesting pieces.

Contents: Future of Social Europe | Changing European Society | Green Agenda for a Sustainable Europe | Europe of Democracy and Civic Participation | International Responsibility of Europe in a Global Age.



## THE NEXT WAVE OF EMANCIPATION

Since the beginning FEPS has been strongly involved in a debate on gender equality, which in fact was one of the very first projects that it established. This issue reviews the history of the struggle for gender equality in national member states, in Europe and elaborates on the progressive agenda for the future.

Contents: Gender sensitive, progressive Europe | A commitment that arises from a century struggle | Stronger from the past, encouraging experiences | The next agenda for changing society.



## WHAT COMES BEFORE, WHAT COMES NEXT A tribute to Tony JUDT

Queries serving as a guideline in selecting themes and articles that pose the most crucial questions and can stimulate an intellectual debate, it comes with no surprise that this issue commemorates late Tony Judt and his work. As Ernst STETTER, FEPS Secretary General writes, the last book of Tony Judt, "Ill Fares the Land", poses an extraordinary challenge. This very particular intellectual testament of an outstanding academic and universalist socialist encompasses a fair, though bitter, assessment of today's world. It touches upon the mission that a renewed social

democracy must embark upon in order to reverse the negative processes corroding our societies, through respecting all the achievements of past generations and being optimistic about the chances for the progressives to succeed in the future. This motivated the title of this issue.



## THE NEXT GLOBAL DEAL

New answers seem indispensable in times in which people lose their confidence in international institutions, their governments and politicians in general. Their detachment and scepticism about politics can be overcome once the democratic rules are put back in place, as far as global governance and European decision making processes are concerned. The disastrous consequences of the recent financial, economic and social crisis exposed the bankruptcy of today's world order, dominated by neo-liberal ideologies. Its inability to respond to global challenges makes it inadequate for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. But recognising this is not

enough; Europe and the world need a new, feasible agenda. For FEPS this is both a challenge and a chance to present our NEXT Global Deal.

Contents: Preface by Joseph E. STIGLITZ | Regulating and taxing the system | The New Global Deal | A new political economic response | Conference Report



## NEXT LEFT: SOCIAL PROGRESS IN 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

A decade into the new century, Europe is beset by a striking mood of social pessimism. 49% of EU citizens believe they will be worse off in 20 years time, with majorities perceiving the rise of emerging economies as direct threats to their living standards. Such anxiety presents a particularly debilitating political problem for social democracy. Historically, the promise of social progress has been a powerful force in all of its projects, and a cornerstone to the movement's political offer. Overwhelming disbelief in the primacy of political ideas and the ability of politicians to make a difference has translated into voter resignation and

subsequently to widespread withdrawal from political life.

The contributions to this issue of *Queries* are the result of a symposium that took place in London in March this year as a joint contribution to the FEPS Next Left research programme and Policy Network – Wiardi Beckman Stichting Amsterdam Process.



## ASIA: WHAT'S NEXT? AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

- It is commonly repeated that the post-War order belongs to the past, as it no longer mirrors reality and its institutional set-up has proven incapable to respond to the challenges of the modern times. Beyond any doubt, the groups of so called "BRICS" countries will play a crucial role in writing the next chapter of global governance – which is why the attention of FEPS is given to one of them, India. Resulting from a study visit that took place in Spring 2011, the issue features articles by respective Indian high-level authors, who kindly share their views on 4 themes: "*Asian Spring: Promoting Diversity and Democracy*", "*India in Shaping its future*",

*"A world player in the making"*, "*China: Reshaping the Status Quo*".



